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PREFACE.

The manual which follows has been prepared for

the use of students in law schools and other institu-

tions of learning. The design lias been to present

succinctly the general principles of constitutional

law, whether they pertain to the federal system, or

to the. state system, or to both. Formerly, the struc-

ture of the federal constitutional government was

so distinct from that of the States, that each might

usefully be examined and discussed apart from the

other; but the points of contact and dependence

have been so largely increased by the recent amend-

ments to the federal Constitution that a different

PREFACE.

course is now deemed advisable. Some general prin-

ciples of constitutional law, which formerly were

left exclusively to state protection, are now brought

within the purview of the federal power, and any

useful presentation of them must show the part they

take in federal as well as state government. An

attempt has been made to do this in the following
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PREFACE.

The reader will soon discover that mere theories

have received very little attention, and that the

principles stated are those which have been set-

tled, judicially or otherwise, in the practical work-

ing of the government.

THOMAS M. COOLEY.

University op Michigan, Ann Aeboe,

March, 1880.

The reader will soon discover that mere theories
have received very little attention, and that the
principles stated are those which have been settled, judicially or otherwise, in the practical working of the government.
THOMAS M. COOLEY.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, ANN ARBOR,
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CONSTITUTION

OF THE

UNITED STATES OP AMEEICA.

We the people of the United States, in order to form a more

perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity,

provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare,

and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,

do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United

CONSTITUTION

States of America.

ARTICLE I.

Sect. 1. All legislative powers herein granted shall be

OF THE

vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist

of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Sect. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of

members chosen every second year by the people of the several

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifica-

tions requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the

State Legislature.

No person shall be a Representative who shall not have at-

tained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a

citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected,

be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among
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the several States which may be included within this Union,

according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined

by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those

bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not

taxed, three fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration

WE the people of the United States, in order to form a more
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity,
provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare,
and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,
do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION for the United
States of America.

shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the

ARTICLE I.
1. All legislative powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist
of a Senate and House of Representatives.
SECT. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of
members chosen every second year by the people of the several
States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the
State Legislature.
No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to ·the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a
citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected,
be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among
the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined
by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those
bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not
taxed, three fif tbs of all other persons. The actual enumeration
shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the
SECT.

xxiv

XXlV

CONSTITUTION OF

CONSTITUTION OF

Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent

terra of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct.

The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every

thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one Repre-

sentative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State

of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachu-

setts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Con-

necticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania

eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina

five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

When vacancies happen in the representation from any State,

the Executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to

fill such vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and

other officers; and shall have the sole power of impeachment,

Sect. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed

of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature

thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of

the first election, they shall be divided as equally as' may be

into three classes. The seats of the Senators of the first class

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:43 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the

second class at the expiration of the fourth year, and of the

third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that one third

may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies happen by

resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the Legislature

of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary ap-

pointments until the next meeting of the Legislature, which

shall then fill such vacancies.

No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to

the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the

United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhab-

itant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice-President of the United States shall be President

of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally

divided.

The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a Presi-

dent pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice-President, or when

he shall exercise the office of President of the United States.

Congress of the United States. and within every subsequent
term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct.
The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every
thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State
of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Con· necticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania
eight, Delaware one, Marylano six, Virginia ten, North Carolina
five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.
When vacancies happen in the representation from any St~te,
the ExecutiYe authority thereof shall issue writs of election to
fill such vacancies.
The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and
other officers; and shall have the sole power of impeachment.
SECT. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed
of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature
thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.
Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of
the first election, they shall be divided as equally as· may be
into three classes. The seats of the Senators of the first class
shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the
second class at the expiration of the fourth year, and of .the
third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that ·one third
may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies happen by
resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the Legislature
of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the Legislature, which
shall then fill such vacancies.
No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to
the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.
The Vice-President of the United States shall be President
of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally
divided.
The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice-President, or when
he shall exercise the office of President of the United States.

THE UNITED STATES.

THE UNITED STATES.

xxv

XXV

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments.

When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath o'r affirma-

tion. • When the President of the United States is tried, the

Chief Justice shall preside: and no person shall be convicted

without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.

Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further

than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and

enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States:

but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to

indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law.

Sect. 4. The times, places, and manner of holding elections

for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each

State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any

time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the

places of choosing Senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and

such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless

they shall by law appoint a different day.

Sect. 5. Each House shall be the judge of the elections,

returns, and qualifications of its own members, and a majority

of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller
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number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to

compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and

under such penalties, as each House may provide.

Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,

punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the con-

currence of two thirds, expel a member.

Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from

time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in

their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the

members of either House on any question shall, at the desire of

one fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.

Neither House, during the session of Congress, shall, without

the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor

to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be

sitting.

Sect. 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a

compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and

paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments.
When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirma·
tion. · When the President of the United States is tried, the
Chief Justice shall preside: and no person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.
Judgment in cases of impeachment. shall not extend further
than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States:
but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law.
SECT. 4. The times, places, and manner of holding elections
for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the
places of choosing Senators.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and
such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless
they shall by law appoint a different day.
SECT. 5. Each House shall be the judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its own members, and a majority
of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to
compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and
under such penalties, a.Ii each House may provide.
Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the con.
currence of two thirds, expel a member.
Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in
their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the
members of either House on any question shall, at the desire of
one fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.
Neither House, during the session of Congress, shall, without
the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor
to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be
sitting.
SECT. 6.
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a
compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and
paid out of the Treasury of the United St~tes. They shall in

xxvi

xxvi

CONSTITUTION OF

CONSTITUTION OF

all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be

privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of

their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the

same; and for any speech or debate in either House they shall

not be questioned in any other place.

No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which

he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the author-

ity of the United States, which shall have been created, or the

emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such

time; and no person holding any office under the United States

shall be a member of either House during his continuance in

office.

Sect. 7. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the

House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or con-

cur with amendments as on other bills.

Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representa-

tives and the Senate shall, before it become a law, be presented

to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign

it, but if not he shall return it with his objections to that House

in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections

at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after -
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such reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to

pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to

the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and,

if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a law.

But in all such cases the votes of both Houses shall be deter-

mined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting

for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of sach

House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the

President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have

been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner

as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment

prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of

the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary

(except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the

President of the United States; and, before the same shall take

effect, shall be approved by him, or, being disapproved by him,

shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Rep-

all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of
their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the
same ; and for any speech or debate in either House they shall
not be questioned in any other place.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which
he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the
emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such
time; and no person holding any office under the United States
· shall be a· member of either House during his continuance in
office.
SECT. 7. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.
Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a law, be presented
to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign
it, but if not he shall return it with his objections to that House
in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections
at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after
such reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to
pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to
the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and,
if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a law.
But in all such cases the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting
for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each
House respectively. If a.ny bill shall not be returned by the
President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have
been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner
as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment
prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.
Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of
the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary
(except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the
President of the United States; and, before the same shall take
effect, shall be approved by him, or, being disapproved by him,
shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Rep-

~

THE UNITED STATES.

xxvii

THE UNITED STATES.

xx vii

resentatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed

in the case of a bill.

Sect. 8. The Congress shall have power, —

To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises to pay

the debts and provide for the common defence and general wel-

fare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises

shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the

several States, and with the Indian tribes;

To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform

laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United

States;

To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign

coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures;

To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securi-

ties and current coin of the United States;

To establish post-offices and post-roads;

To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by secur-

ing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right

to their respective writings and discoveries;
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To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;

To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the

high seas, and offences against the law of nations;

To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and

make rules concerning captures on land and water;

To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money

to that use shall be for a longer term than two years;

To provide and maintain a navy;

To make rules for the government and regulation of the land

and naval forces;

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of

the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the mili-

tia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in

the service of the United States, reserving to the States respec-

tively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of

training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by

Congress;

resentatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed
in the case of a bill.
SECT. 8. The Congress shall have power, To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises to pay
the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States;
To borrow money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes;
To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United
States;
To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign
coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures;
To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States;
To establish post-offices and post-roads;
To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries;
To con~titute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;
To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas, and offences against the law of nations;
To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and
make rules concerning captures on land and water;
To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money
to that use shall be for a longer term than two years;
To provide and maintain a navy;
To make rules for the government and. regulation of the land
and naval forces;
To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of
the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in
the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of
training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress;

xxviii
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To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over

such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by ces-

sion of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, be-

come the seat of the government of the United States; and to

exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent

of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for

the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other

needful buildings; — and

To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for

carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other pow-

ers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United

States, or in any department or officer thereof.

Sect. 9. The migration or importation of such persons as

any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall

not be prohibited by the Congress pripr to the year one thou-

sand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be im-

posed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each

person.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus-

pended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public

safety may require it.
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No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.

No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in pro-

portion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to

be taken.

No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any

State.

No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce

or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor

shall vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter,

clear, or pay duties in another.

No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in conse-

quence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement

and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public

money shall be published from time to time.

No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States;

and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them

shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any pres-

ent, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any

king, prince, or foreign state.

To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over
such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cea.
sion of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States; and to
exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent
of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for
the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other
needful buildings; - and
To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof.
SECT. 9.
The migration or importation of such persons as
any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall
not be prohibited by tbe Congress pripr to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a .tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
person.
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require it.
No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.
No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to
be taken.
No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any
State.
No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce
or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor
shall vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter,
clear, or pay duties in another.
No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement
and account of the receipts and expenditures of all· public
money shall be published from time to time.
No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States;
and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them
shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any
king, prince, or foreign state.

THE UNITED STATES.

THE UNITED STATES.

XXl:X.

xxix

Sect. 10. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or

confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin

money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver

coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder,

ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts,

or grant any title of nobility.

No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any

imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be

absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the

net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on im-

ports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the

United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision

and control of the Congress.

No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty

of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter

into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a

foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in

such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.

ARTICLE II.

Sect. 1. The executive power shall be vested in a President

of the United States of America. He shall hold his office dur-
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ing the term of four years, and, together with the Vice-Presi-

dent, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows: —

Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature

thereof may direct, a number of Electors equal to the whole

number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may.

SECT. 10.
No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin
money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver
coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder,
ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts,
or grant any title of nobility.
No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any
imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the
net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the
United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision
and control of the Congress.
No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty
of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war ·in time of peace, enter
into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a
foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in
such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.

be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative,

or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United

States, shall be appointed an Elector.

[The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote

by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an

inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall

make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of

votes for each; which list they shall sign and certify, and trans-

mit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States,

directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the

Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Rep-

resentatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then

ARTICLE II.
SECT. 1. The executive power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows:Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a nUmber of Electors equal to the whole
number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may.
be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative,
or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United
States, shall be appointed an Elector.
[The Electo:cs shall meet in their respective States, and vote
by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an
inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall
make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of
votes for each ; which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States,
directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the
Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then
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be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes

shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the

whole number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than

one who have such majority, and have an equal number of

votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately

choose by ballot one of them for President; and if no person

have a majority, then from the five highest on the list the said

House shall in like manner choose the President. But in choos-

ing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the repre-

sentation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this

purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds

of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary

to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the President,

the person having the greatest number of votes of the Electors

shall be the Vice-President. But if there should remain two or

more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them

by ballot the Vice-President. — Repealed by Amendment XII.]

The Congress may determine the time of choosing the Elec-

tors, and the day on which they shall give their votes; which

day shall be the same throughout the United States.

No peison except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the
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United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution,

shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person

be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age

of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within

the United States.

In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his

death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and du-

ties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-Presi-

dent, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of

removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President

and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as

President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the dis-

ability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a

compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished

during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he

shall not receive within that period any other emolument from

the United States, or any of them.

be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the
whole number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than
one who have such majority, and have an equal number of
votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately
choose by ballot one of them for President; and_ if no person
have a majority, then from the five highest on the list the said
House shall in like manner choose the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this
purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds
of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary
to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the President,
the person having the greatest number of votes of the Electors
shall be the Vice-President. But if there should remain two or
more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them
by ballot the Vice-President. - Repealed by Amendment XII.]
The Congress may determine the time of choosing the Electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes; which
day shall be the same throughout the United States.
No person except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the
United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution,
shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person
be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age
of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within
the United States.
In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his
death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of
removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President
and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as
President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a
compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished
during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he
shall not receive within that period any other emolument from
the United States, or any of them.

THE UNITED STATES.
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xx xi

Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take

the following oath or affirmation:— " I do solemnly swear (or

affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of

the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve,

protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Sect. 2. The President shall be commander-in-chief of the

army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the

several States, when called into the actual service of the United

States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal

officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject

relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall

have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against

the United States, except in cases of impeachment.

He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of

the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators

present concur; and he shall nominate, and, by and with the advice

and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public

ministers, and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all

other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not

herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by

law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such
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inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone,

in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that

may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting com-

missions which shall expire at the end of their next session.

Sect. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress

information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their

consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and ex-

pedient; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both

Houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between

them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn

them to such time as he shall think proper; he shall receive

ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take care that

the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the

officers of the United States.

Sect. 4. The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers

of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeach-

ment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high

crimes and misdemeanors.

Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take
the following oath or affirmation: - '' I do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of
the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve,
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.''
SECT. 2.
The President shall be commander-in-chief of the
army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
several States, when called into the actual service of the United
States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal
officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject
relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall
have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against
the United States, except in cases of impeachment.
He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur; and he shall nominate, and, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all
other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such
inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone,
in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.
The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that
may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.
SEc'f. 3.
He shall from time to time give to the Congress
information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their
consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both
Houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between
them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn
them to such time as he shall think proper; he shall receive
ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take care that
the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the
officers of the United States.
SECT. 4.
The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers
of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors.
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ARTICLE in.

Sect. 1. The judicial power of the United States shall be

vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the

Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The

judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their

offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive

for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished

during their continuance in office.

Sect. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law

and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the

United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under

their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public

ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime

jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall

be a party; to controversies between two or more States, be-

tween a State and citizens of another State, between citizens,of

different States, between citizens of the same State claiming

lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or

the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.

In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and

consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, the Supreme
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Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases

before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate juris-

diction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under

such regulations, as the Congress shall make.

The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall

be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the

said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed

within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the

Congress may by law have directed.

Sect. 3. Treason against the United States shall consist

only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their ene-

mies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be con-

victed of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the

same overt act, or on confession in open court.

The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of

treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of

blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person at-

tainted.

ARTICLE III.
SECT. 1. The judicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their
offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive
for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office.
SECT. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law
and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the
United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction; to controversies to which the Unite.d States shall
be a party; to controversies between two or more States, between a State and citizens of another State, between citizens. of
different States, between citizens of the same State claiming
lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or
the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases
before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under
such regulations, as the Congress shall make.
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall
be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the
said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed
within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the
Congress may by law have directed.
·
SECT. 3. Treason against the United States shall consist
only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the
same overt act, or on confession in open court.
The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of
treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of
blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.
·
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ARTICLE IV.

ARTICLE IV.

Sect. 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each State

to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every

other State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe

the manner in -which such acts, records, and proceedings shall

be proved, and the effect thereof.

Sect. 2. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all

privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.

A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other

crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State,

shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from

which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State

having jurisdiction of the crime.

No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws

thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law

or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor,

but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such

service or labor may be due.

Sect. 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into

this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within

the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by
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the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without

the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well

as of the Congress.

The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all

needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other

property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this

Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of

the United States, or of any particular State.

Sect. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State

in this Union a republican form of government, and shall pro-

tect each of them against invasion; and on application of the

Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot

be convened), against domestic violence.

ARTICLE V.

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem

it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or,

on the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the sev-

eral States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments,

SECT. 1.

Full faith and credit shall be given in each State

to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every

other Stat.e. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe
the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall
be proved, and the effect thereof.
SECT. 2. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.
A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other
crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State,
shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State
having jurisdiction of the crime.
No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law
or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor,
but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such
service or labor may be due.
SECT. 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within
the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by
the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without
the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well
as of the Congress.
The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this
Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of
the United States, or of any particular State.
SECT. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot
be convened), against domestic violence.
ARTICLE V.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or,
on the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments,
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which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes,

as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of

three fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three

fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may

be proposed by the Congress; provided that no amendment

which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hun-

dred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth

clauses in the ninth section of the first article; and that no

State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage

in the Senate.

ARTICLE VI.

All debts contracted and engagements entered into, before the

adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United

States under this Constitution as under the Confederation.

This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which

shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or

which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, .

shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every

State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or

laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
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members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and

judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several

States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this

Constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a

qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.

ARTICLE VH.

The ratification of the conventions of nine States shall be

sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the

States so ratifying the same.

Done in Convention, by the unanimous consent of the States

present, the seventeenth day of September, in the year of our

Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, and of

the Independence of the United States of America the twelfth.

Kn UWftnesg whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names.

[Signed by] G°: Washington,

Presidt. and Deputy from Virginia,

which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes,
as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may
be proposed by the Congress; provided that no amendment
which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth
clauses in the ninth section of the first article; and that no
State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage
in the Senate.
ARTICLE VI.
All debts contracted and engagements entered into, before the
adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the tJnited
States ·under this Constitution as under the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, _
shall be the supreme law of the land ; and the judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several
States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this
Constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a
qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.

and by thirty-nine delegates.

ARTICLE VII.
The ratification of the conventions of nine States shall be
sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the
States so ratifying the same.
Done in Convention, by the unanimous consent of the States
present, the seventeenth day of September, in the year of our
Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, and of
the Independence of the United States of America the twelfth.
•n IJDUness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names.
[Signed by]
G 0 : WASHINGTON,
Presidt. and Deputy from Virginia, . and by thirty-nine delegates.

THE UNITED STATES.

THE UNITED STATES.
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XXXV

ARTICLES

EST ADDITION TO, AND AMENDMENT OF,

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

ARTICLE I.

ARTICLES

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging

IN ADDITION TO, AND AMENDMENT OF,

the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people

peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a re-

dress of grievances.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

ARTICLE H.

A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a

free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall

not be infringed.

ARTICLE m.

No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house,

without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a

manner to be prescribed by law.

ARTICLE IV.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon

ARTICLE I.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:43 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-

larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or

things to be seized.

ARTICLE V.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise

infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a

ARTICLE II.
A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a
free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed.

grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,

or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public

ARTICLE III.

danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled

No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.

ARTICLE IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

ARTICLE V.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
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in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be de-

prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;

nor shall private property be taken for public use without just

compensation.

ARTICLE VI.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right

to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State

and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which

district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be

in any criminal case to be a witness against himse~f, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.

ARTICLE VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-

fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory

process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the

assistance of counsel for his defence.

ARTICLE VII.

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall

exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-

served, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-exam-

ined in any court of the United States, than according to the

rules of the common law.

to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence.

ARTICLE VIII.

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
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posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

ARTICLE IX.

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall

not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the

people.

ARTICLE X.

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-

tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the

ARTICLE VII.
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.

States respectively, or to the people.

ARTICLE XI.

ARTICLE VIII.

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed

to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

ARTICLE IX.
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.

ARTICLE X.
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.

ARTICLE XI.
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any snit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or
by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

THE UNITED STATES.

THE UNITED STATES.
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ARTICLE XII.

ARTICLE XII.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by

ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least,

shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves;

they shall name in their ballots the persons voted for as Presi-

dent, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-Presi-

dent; and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for

as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President,

and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign

and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government

of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; —

the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate

and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the

votes shall then be counted; — the person having the greatest

number of votes for President shall be the President, if such

number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed;

and if no person have such majority, then from the persons hav-

ing the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those

voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose

immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the Presi-

dent, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from
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each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall con-

sist of a member or members from two thirds of the States, and

a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And

if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President,

whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before

the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President

shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other con-

stitutional disability of the President. The person having the

greatest number of votes as Vice-President shall be the Vice-

President, if such number be a majority of the whole number

of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then

from the two highest numbers on the list the Senate shall

choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall con-

sist of two thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a ma-

jority ,of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.

But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of Presi-

dent shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United

States.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by
ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least,
shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves;
they shall name in their ballots the persons voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President; and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for
as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President,
and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign
and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government
of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate
and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the
votes shall then be counted; - the person having the greatest
number of votes for President shall he the President, if such
number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed;
and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those
voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose
immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from
each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the States, and
a majority of all the States shall be necesHary to a choice. And
if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President,
whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before
the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President
shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. The person having the
greatest number of votes as Vice-President shall he the VicePresident, if such number be a majority of the whole number
of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then
from the two highest numbers on the list the Senate shall
choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority ,of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.
But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to ~hat of Vice-President of the United

States.
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CONSTITUTION OF

CONSTITUTION OF

ARTICLE XIII.

ARTICLE XIII.

Sect. 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except

as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been

duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any

place subject to their jurisdiction.

Sect. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article

by appropriate legislation.

ARTICLE XIV.

Sect. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of

SECT. 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the· United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
SECT. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.

the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No

State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor

shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sect. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the

several States according to their respective numbers, counting

the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians

not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the

choice of Electors for President and Vice-President of the
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United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and

judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature

thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State,

being twenty-one years of age and citizens of the United States,

or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or

other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be re-

duced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens

shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one

years of age in such State.

Sect. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in

Congress, or Elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any

office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any

State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of

Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member

of any State Legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of

any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,

shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same,

ARTICLE XIV.
SECT. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
SECT. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers, counting
· the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians
not taxed. But when the rig~t to vote at any election for the
choice of Electors for President and Vice-President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the executiv·e and
judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State,
being twenty-one years of age and citizens of the United States,
or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one
years of age in such State.
SECT. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member
of any State Legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same,

THE UNITED STATES.

THE UNITED STATES.

xx xix

xxxix

or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress

may, by a vote of two thirds of each House, remove such dis-

ability.

Sect. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United

States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment

of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrec-

tion or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the

United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or ob-

ligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the

United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any

slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held

illegal and void.

Sect. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-

priate legislation, the provisions of this article.

ARTICLE XV.

Sect. 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote

shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any

State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-

tude.

Sect. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this ar-

or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress
may, by a vote of two thirds of each House, remove such disability.
SECT. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United
States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment
of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrectfon or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any
slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held
illegal and void.
SECT. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
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ticle by appropriate legislation.

ARTICLE XV.
SECT. 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any
State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
SECT. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

CONSTITUTION AL LAW.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

CHAPTER I.

THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN UNION.

Independence. — The declaration which severed the polit-

ical connection between the thirteen American Colonies

and the British Crown bears date July 4, 1776, and was

made by the representatives of the Colonies in General

Congress assembled, severally empowered by the respec-

tive Colonies to make it. By this manifesto the repre-

sentatives declare to the world, that, "appealing to the

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our

intentions, [we] do, in the name and by authority of

the good people of these Colonies, solemnly publish

and declare, that these United Colonies are, and of right

ought to be, free and independent States; that they are

absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and

that all political connection between them and the state of

Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved; and

that, as free and independent States, they have full power

CHAPTER I.

to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish

commerce, and to do all other acts and things which inde-

pendent States may of right do." For more than a year

THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN UNION.

previous to this the Colonies had been in the exercise of
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sovereign powers in hostility to the government of Great

Britain, but without a repudiation of their allegiance; and

liulependence. -The declaration which severed the polit-

ical connection between the thirteen American Colonies
and the British Crown bears date July 4, 1776, and was
made by the representatives of the Colonies in General
Congress assembled, severally empowered by the re~pec
tive Colonies to make it. By this manifesto the representatives declare to the world, that, '' appealing to the
Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our
intentions, [weJ do, in the name and by authority of
the good people of these Colonies, solemnly . publish
and declare, that these United Colonies are, and of right
ought to be, free and independent States ; that they are
absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and
that all political connection between them and the state of
Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved ; and
that, as free and independent States, they have full power
to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish
commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do." For more than a year
previous to this the Colonies had been in the exercise of
sovereign powers in hostility to the government of Great
"Britain. but without a repudiation of their allegiance ; and

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

\
they now severally assumed the position of independent

States, limited only by the concessions of authority,

mostly tacit, which they made to their general Congress.

Colonial Legislation. — The people of the Colonies had

previously exercised a somewhat indefinite power to make

their own laws, which was very general in some Colonies

and greatly restricted in others. In all of them the pro-

prietary or royal Governor might defeat legislation by

refusing his assent; and in some a council not chosen by

the people formed a second legislative chamber, whose

concurrence was necessary. Colonial legislation was also

sometimes nullified in England, by the authority of an ex-

ecutive board or council, or by Parliament. Parliament

itself also exercised the power to make laws for the Colo-

nies, and in some cases the power was conceded, though

its exercise in particular instances was complained of as

an abuse, while in other cases the power itself was denied.

It was conceded that, in all matters of what may be de-

nominated imperial concern, the common legislature of the

realm must legislate for all the dominions of the Crown,

and that under this head fell the commerce of the Colonies
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with the mother country and with other nations and colo-

nies. The most severe instances of the exercise of this

authority were the Navigation Laws and the laws respect-

ing manufactures in the Colonies, the general purpose of

which was to subject the commerce and manufactures of

the Colonies to such regulations and restraints as should

be beneficial to the commerce and general business inter-

ests of the mother country. It was never disputed that

the Colonies, like all other portions of the British domin-

ions, must necessarily come under the control of the Crown

and the Parliament in respect to all their foreign relations;

and, though Indian affairs were for the most part left to

the control and management of colonial authorities, yet

these also were brought under imperial control to any

they now severally assumed the position of independent
States, limited only by the concessions of authority,
mostly tacit, which they made to their general Congress.
Colonial Legislation. -The people of the Colonies had
previously exercised a somewhat indefinite power to make
their own laws, which was very general in some Colonies
and greatly restricted in others. In all of them the proprietary or royal Governor might defeat legislation by
refusing his assent ; and in some a council not chosen by
the people formed a second legislative chamber, whose
concurrence was necessary. Colonial legislation was also
Rometimes nullified in England, by the authority of an executive board or council, or by Parliament. Parliament
itself also exercised the power to make laws for the Colonies, and in some cases thr. power was concedeQ., though
its exercise in particular instances was complained of as
an abuse, while in other cases the power itself was denied.
It was conceded that, in all matters of what may be denominated imperial concern, the common legislature of the
realm must legislate for all the dominions of the Crown,
and that under this head fell the commerce of the Colonies
with the mother country and with other nations and colonies. The most severe instances of the exercise of this
authority were the Navigation Laws and the laws respecting manufactures in the Colonies, the general purpose of
which was to subject the commerce and manufactures of
the Colonies to such regulations and restraints as should
be beneficial to the commerce and general business inter..
ests of the mother country. It was never disputed that
the Colonies, like all other portions of the British domin ..
ions, must necessarily come under the control of the Crown
and the Parliament in respect to all their foreign relations ;
and, though Indian affairs were for the most part left to
the control and management of colonial authorities, yet
these also were brought under imperial control to any

RISE OF THE AMERICAN UNION.

RISE OF THE AMERICAN UNION.
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extent that to the home government at any time seemed

politic or desirable.

The distinct claim of a right in the Colonies to make

their own laws was not made until parliamentary legisla-

tion appeared to threaten oppression. The first actual

resistance which assumed general importance was when an

attempt was made to impose internal taxation by au-

thority of the imperial Parliament. The proposed taxes

were not in themselves a serious burden, and might pos-

sibly have passed unchallenged, if it had been certain that

the tax law was not to be the herald and the pioneer of

others of a different sort, and which would touch the col-

onists in particulars in which they were even more sensi-

tive than in respect to their pecuniary interests. The

power which could tax New England could impose an

episcopal hierarchy upon it, and the disposition to do

this, not only in New England but in New York, had

often manifested itself to an extent that excited the most

serious alarm. What vital powers of sovereignty in

respect to American concerns might be asserted and exer-

cised, no one could foresee; and the tax laws were there-
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fore resisted rather as the representatives of unknown

dangers than for the burdens they imposed. The govern-

ment for a time abstained from pushing its claims to an

extreme, but, lest its doing so might be understood as an

assent to the claims of the Colonies, Parliament, when

repealing the Stamp Act, which had been rendered abor-

tive by the resistance of the people, took occasion to

assert an unqualified right to legislate for the Colonies on

all subjects whatever.1 This claim afterwards assumed

practical form in an attempt to collect a tax on tea im-

ported for consumption in the Colonies. The levy of the

tax was resisted as an invasion of the undoubted rights of

1 Pitkin, Hist, of U. S., ch. 6; Frothingham, Rise of the Republic,

ch. 5, 6.

extent that to the home government at any time seemed
politic or desirable.
The distinct claim of a right in the Colonies to make
their own laws was not made until parliamentary legislation appeared to threaten oppression. The first actual
resistance which assumed general importance was when an
attempt was made to impose internal taxation by authority of the imperial Parliament. The proposed taxes
were not in themselves a serious burden, and might possibly have passed unchallenged, if it had been certain that
the tax law was not to be the herald and the pioneer of
others of a different sort, and which would touch the colonists in particulars in which they were even more sensitive than in respect to their pecuniary interests. The
power which could tax New England could impose an
episcopal hierarchy upon it, and the disposition to do
this, not only in New England but in New York, had
often manifested itself to an extent that excited the most
serious alarm. What vital powers of sovereignty in
respect to American concerns might be asserted and exercised, no one could foresee; and the tax laws were therefore resisted rather as the representatives of unknown
dangers than for the burdens they imposed. The government for a time abstained from pushing its claims to an
extreme, but, lest its doing so might be understood as an
assent to the claims of the Colonies, P~rliament, when
repealing the Stamp Act, which had been rendered abortive by the resistance of the people, took occasion to
assert an unqualified right to legislate for the Colonies on
all subjects whatever. 1 This claim afterwards assumed
practical form in an attempt to collect a tax on tea imported for consumption in the Colonies. The levy of the
tax was resisted as an invasion of the undoubted rights or
1

Pitkin, Hist. of U. S., ch. 6; Frothingham, Rise of the Republic,
ch. 5, 6.
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Englishmen, who, in taking up their home in the Colonies,

had not lost their right to the protection of the ancient

laws of the realm. In Massachusetts and New York car-

goes of the taxed tea were destroyed by armed mobs; in

Maryland the importer was compelled to set fire to the

vessel by means of which he had offended, and in other

colonies the taxed commodity was either refused a landing,

or not suffered to be sold after the landing had been

effected; and the tax law was by these means completely

nullified.1

Liberty a Birthright. — The resistance in the cases men-

tioned, and in some others, was grounded on the claim that

the colonists, as Englishmen, according to the Constitu-

tion of the realm, were entitled to certain rights which the

government was attempting to override by the exercise of

tj'rannical power.2 The evidence of these rights was to

be found in part in certain historical documents which in

both England and America had been looked upon and

revered as the charters of liberty. The first of these was

Magna Qharta, extorted from King John in 1215, as a

restriction upon what was then an almost unlimited kingly
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power; the most important provision of which was, that

"No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseized

or outlawed or banished or anyways destroj'ed, nor will

the King pass upon him or commit him to prison, unless

by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land." In

the same instrument is foreshadowed parliamentary taxa-

tion in the clause which requires the common consent of

the realm to the levy of unusual burdens.8 Grounded

upon this charter the fabric of constitutional liberty was

1 Frothingham, Rise of the Republic, ch. 5; Pitkin, Hist, of U. S.,

oh. 7.

a Pitkin, Hist, of U. S., ch. 3.

» Blackstone's Charters ; 4 Bl. Com. 424; Story on Const., § 1779;

Stubbs, Const. Hist., ch. 12; Cooley, Const. Lira., ch. 11.

Englishmen, who,-in taking up their home in the Colonies,
had not lost their right to the protection of the ancient
laws of the realm. In Massachusetts and New York cargoes of the taxed tea were destroyed by armed mobs ; in
Maryland the ·importer was compelled to set fire to the
vessel by means of which he had offended, and in other
colonies the taxed commodity was either refused a landing,
or not suffered to be sold after the landing had been
effected ; and the tax law was by these means completely
nnllified. 1
Liberty a Birthright. -The resistance in the cases mentioned, and in some others, was grounded on the claim that
the colonists, as Englishmen, according to the Constitution of the realm, were entitled to certain rights which the
government was attempting to override by the exercise of
tyrannical power. 2 The evidence of these rights was to
be found in part in certain historical documents which in
both England and America had been looked upon and
revered as the charters of liberty. The first of these was
Magna Oharta, extorted from King John in 1215, as a
restriction upon what was then. an almost unlimited kingly
power ; the most important provision of which was, that
'' No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseized
or outlawed or banished or anyways destroyed, nor will
the King pass upon him or commit him to prison, unless
by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land." In
the same instrument is foreshadowed parliamentary taxation in the clause which requires the common consent of
the realm to the levy of unusual burdens. 1 Grounded
upon this charter the fabric of constitutional liberty was
.1 Frothingham, Rise of the Republic, ch. 6; Pitkin, Hist. of U. S.,
ch. 7.
I Pitkin, Hist.· of U. S., ch. 8.
:I Blackstone's Charters ; 4 Bl. Com. 424: ; Story on Const.,§ 1779 ;
Stubbs, Const. Hist., ch. 12; Cooley, Const. Lim., ch. 11.
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slowly and patiently erected; parliamentary institutions

acquired form and strength under the House of Lancas-

ter; and though the promise of a regular administration

of the law was as often violated as kept, the right of the

subject to its benefits was never surrendered, and at

length, at the beginning of the reign of Charles I., it re-

ceived further assurance and confirmation in the royal

assent to

The Petition of Bight.1 — By this petition it was prayed,

among other things, "that no man be compelled to make

or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such like

charge, without common consent by act of Parliament;

that none be called upon to make answer for refusal so to

do; that freemen be imprisoned or disseized only by the

law of the land, or by due process of law, and not by the

king's special command without any charge." In the next

reign was enacted

The Habeas Corpus Act,2 the purpose of which was to

give speedy relief from all unlawful imprisonments, and to

enforce upon judicial and other officers the duty of deliv-

erance. The fourth of the great charters of English con-
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stitutional liberty was

The Bill of Rights,3 which embodied in statutory form

the principles enumerated in the Declaration of Rights

presented by the Convention Parliament to the sovereigns

called by that body to the throne on the Revolution of

1688. The purpose of this act was to enumerate and

reaffirm such rights of the people as the House of Stuart

in any of its reigning representatives had set aside, en-

croached upon, or ignored.

The Common Law. — The charters above mentioned de-

clared general principles, but the common law was the

expositor of these, and the extent of the protection they

i 1 Ch. I., ch. 1 (1626). 2 81 Ch. II., ch. 2 (1679).

» 1 Wm. & Mary, Ses. 2, ch. 2 (1689).

slowly and patiently erected ; parliamentary institutions
acquired form and strength under the House of Lancaster ; and though the promise of a regular administration
of the law was as often violated as kept, the right of the
subject to its benefits was never surrendered, and at
length, at the beginning of the reign of Charles I., it received further assurance and .confirmation in the royal
assent to
The Petition of R-ight. 1 - . By this petition it was prayed,
among other things, ''that no man be compelled to make
or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such like
charge, without common consent by act of Parliament ;
that none be called upon to make answer for refusal so to
do ; that freemen be ill!prisoned or disseized only by the
law of the land, or by due process of law, and not by the
king's special command without any charge." In the next
reign was enacted
Tl~ Habeas Corpus .Act,~ the purpose of which was to
give speedy relief from all unlawful imprisonments, and to
enforce upon judicial and other officers the duty of deliverance. The fourth of .the great.charters of English constitutional liberty was
The Bill of Rights, 8 which embodied in statutory form
the principles enumerated .in the Declaration of Rights
presented by the Convention Parliament to the sovereigns
called by that body to the throne on the Revolution of
1688. The purpose of this act was to enumerate and
reaffirm such rights of the people as the House of Stuart
in any of its reigning representatives. had set aside, encroached upon, or ignored.
The Common La.to. -The charters above mentioned declared general principles, but the common law was the
expositor of these, and the extent of the protection they
1 Ch. I., ch. 1 (1626).
a 1 Wm. & Mary, Ses. 2, ch. 2 (1689).

1

~

31 Ch. II., ch. 2 (1679).
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should give could only be determined by its rules. That

law was the growth' of many centuries; its maxims were

those of a sturdy and independent race of men, who were

accustomed in an unusual degree to freedom of thought

and action, and to a share in the administration of public

affairs.1 So far as they declared individual rights, they

were a part of the constitution of the realm, and of that

'1 law of the land" the benefit of which was promised by

the charter of King John to every freeman. They were

modified and improved from age to age, by changes in

the habits of thought and action among the people, by

modifications in the civil and political state, by the

vicissitudes of public affairs, by judicial decisions, and

by statutes.

The colonists claimed that this code of law accompa-

nied them, as a standard of right and of protection in their

emigration, and that it remained their law, excepting as

in some particulars it was found unsuited to their circum-

stances in the New World. Relying upon it, they had

well known and well defined rules of protection; without

it, they were at the mercy of those who ruled, and, whether
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actually oppressed or not, were without freedom.2

Violations of Constitutional Sight. — The complaints of

violation of constitutional right were principally directed

to four points : — 1. Imposing taxes without the consent

of the people's representatives. 2. Keeping up standing

armies in time of peace to overawe the people. 3. Deny-

ing a right to trial by a jury of the vicinage in some cases,

and providing for a transportation of persons accused of

crimes in America for trial in Great Britain. 4. Expos-

1 Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., p. 81. Van Nesa v. Pacard, 2 Pet.

137, 144.

a "Not the man alone who feels, but who is exposed to tyranny,

is without freedom." — Sir Wm. Meredith, quoted in Life of Iredell,

i. 212.

should give could only be determined by its rules. That
law was the growth' of many centuries ; its maxims were
those of a sturdy and independent race of men, who were
accustomed in an unusual degree to freedom of thought
and action, and to a share in the administration of public
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The colonists claimed that this code of law accompanied them, as a standard of right and of protection in their
emigration, and that it remained their law, excepting as
in some particulars it was found unsuited to their circumstanc~CJ in the New World.
Relying upon it, they had
well known and well defined rules of protection ; without
it, they were at the mercy of those who ruled, and, whether
actually oppressed or not, were without freedom.~
Violations of Oonstitut1:onal Right. -The complaints of
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to four points : - 1. Imposing taxes without the consent
of the people's representatives. 2. Keeping up standing
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and providing for a transportation of persons accused of
crimes in America for trial in Great Britain. 4. Expos1
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187, 144.
i "Not the man alone }Vho feels, but who is exposed to tyranny,
is without freedom." - Sir Wm. Meredith, quoted in Life of Iredell,
i. 212.
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ing the premises of the people to searches, and their per-

sons, papers, and property to seizures on general warrants.

If Americans were entitled to the constitutional rights of

Englishmen, it was unquestionable that in these particu-

lars their rights were invaded; but the imperial govern-

ment denied that the colonists could claim rights as against

the exercise of its powers.

Independence. — The sovereignty passed forever from the

British Crown and Parliament when the war of the Revo-

lution was actually begun, waged on the one side by the

government of Great Britain to reduce the colonists to

submission, and directed on the other side by a Continen-

tal Congress which assumed the sovereign power of con-

ducting belligerent affairs. This great fact was not per-

ceived, and indeed not assured, for more than a year,

and it was then proclaimed to the world in the solemn

document known as the Declaration of Independence, and

which has already been mentioned.

In pronouncing the dissolution of the political bonds

with the mother country, the signers of this instrument

declare that "we hold these truths to be self-evident, that
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all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their

Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these

are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to

secure these rights governments are instituted among men,

deriving their just powers from the consent of the gov-

erned; that whenever any form of government becomes

destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people

to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new govern-

ment, laying its foundation on such principles, and organ-

izing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most

likely to effect their safety and happiness." And pro-

ceeding to an enumeration of the grievances which jus-

tify their action, they close by declaring the dissolution

of the ties that bind the Colonies to the British Crown,

ing the premises of the people to searches, and their persons, papers, and property to seizures on general warrants.
If Americans were entitled to the constitutional rights of
Englishmen, it was unquestionable that in these particulars their rights were invaded ; but the imperial government denied that the colonists could claim rights as against
the exercise of its powers.
independence. -The sovereignty passed forever from the
British Crown and Parliament when the war of the Revolution was actually begun, waged on the one side by the
government of Great Britain to reduce the colonists to
submission, and directed on the other side by a Continental Congress which assumed the sovereign power of conducting belligerent affairs. This great fact was not perceived,· and indeed not assured, for more than a year,
and it was then proclaimed to the world in the solemn
document known as the Declaration of Independence, and
which has already been mentioned.
In pronouncing the dissolution of the political bonds
with the mother country, the signers of this instrument
declare that '' we hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal ~ that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights ; that among these
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness ; that to
secure these rights governments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed ; that ~henever any form of government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people
to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their safety and happiness." And proceeding to an enumeration of the grievances which justify their action, they close by declaring the dissolution
of the ties that bind the Colonies to the British Crown,
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and asserting their independence in the terms already

given.1

Revolutionary Government. — The government of the

Union under the Continental Congress was strictly revo-

lutionary in character, and was constituted by an acquies-

cence of the people and the several States in the exercise

by the Congress of certain undefined powers of general

concern, the chief of which were the power to declare war,

to conclude peace, to form alliances, and to contract debts

on the credit of the Union.2 The governments of the sev-

eral States were also at first revolutionary, but their pre-

vious organization was such that the war disturbed them

but little, and modified forms more than substance. All

of them had local governments and the common law, which

remained undisturbed; all of them had legislative bodies,

which continued to perform then- functions, but without

the recognition of the pre-existing executive authority.

The States, however, soon proceeded to adopt formal con-

stitutions, apportioning, defining, and limiting the powers

of the several departments of government, and with two

exceptions they had completed this work before indepen-
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dence was acknowledged by Great Britain.8 The liberal

charter granted to Rhode Island by Charles II. in 1663

was found sufficient for the purposes of a free common-

wealth, and was tacitly adopted as the constitution of the

State, and remained such for two thirds of a century.4

1 Curtis, History of the Constitution, chap. 3. This author well

says: "The body by which this step was taken constituted the actual

government of the nation at the time, and its members had been

directly invested with competent legislative power to take it, and had

also been specially instructed so to do." (p. 51.)

2 Curtis, Hist, of Const., ch. 1, 2.

8 See Mr. Bancroft's admirable chapter on " The Rise of Free Com-

monwealths," Hist, of U. S., vol. x. ch. 10; Centennial ed., vol. vi. ch. 46.

4 Of the original States, Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire,

New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Vir-

and asserting their independence in the terms already
given. 1
Revol,uJ,ionary Government. - The government of the
Union under the Continental Congress was strictly revolutionary in character, and was constituted by an acquiescence of the people and the several States in the exercise
by the Congress of certain undefined powers of general
concern, the chief of which were the power to declare war,
to conclude peace, to form alliaaces, and to contract debts
on the credit of the Union.~ The governments of the several States were also at first revolutionary, but their previous organization was such that the war disturbed them
but little, and modified forms more than substance. All
of them had local governments and the common law, which
remained undisturbed ; all of them had legislative bodies,
which continued to perform their functions, but without
the recognition of the pre-existing executive authority.
The States, however, soon proceeded to adopt formal constitutions, apportioning, defining, and limiting the powers
of the several departments of government, and with two
exceptions they had completed this work before independence was acknowledged by Great Britain. 8 The liberal
charter granted to Rhode Island by Charles II. in 1663
was found sufficient for the purposes of a free commonwealth, and was tacitly adopted as the constitution of the
State, and remained such for two thirds of a century.~
Curtis, History of the Constitution, chap. 3. This author well
says: "The body by which this step was taken constituted the actual
go,·ernment of the nation at the time, and its members had been
directly invested with competent legislative power to take it, and had
also been specially instructed so to do." (p. 61.)
i Curtis, Hist. of Const., ch. 1, 2.
a See Mr. Bancroft's admirable chapter on" The Rise of Free Commonwealths," Hist. of U.S., vol. x. ch. 10; Centennial ed., v~l. vi. ch. 46.
4 Of the original States, Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Vir1
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The charter of Connecticut was not superseded by a con-
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stitution until 1818.

But a merely revolutionary government could not long

answer the purposes of the Union. The powers of the Con-

tinental Congress having never been formally conferred,

or indeed agreed upon, by the States, that body was

regarded by the people and by the State authorities as an

advisory body rather than as a government, and the pres-

sure of external necessity determined the degree of obe-

dience its commands or advice should receive. In most

important matters they were often disregarded, and the

Confederation seemed at the point of falling to pieces for

the want of a legal bond of union and of legal power to

compel the performance of duties owing to it by its several

members.

Articles of Confederation. — This evil it was sought to

remedy by "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual

Union," prepared by the Congress and submitted to the

States in 1777, and ratified subsequently by representa-

tives of the States empowered by their respective legis-

latures so to do.1

These Articles declared that "Each State retains its
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sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,

jurisdiction, and right which is not by this Confederation

expressly delegated to the United States in Congress

assembled": that "The said States hereby severally

enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for

ginia adopted constitutions in 1776, Georgia and New York in 1777,

Massachusetts in 1780, and Rhode Island in 1842.

1 Curtis, Hist, of the Const., ch. 5. All the States except two

ratified the Articles in 1778; Delaware delayed till the next year,

and Maryland till 1781. The delay in the case of Maryland was for

the purpose of obtaining a permanent and satisfactory settlement of

the claims to Western lands, and is fully explained in the monograph

of Dr. H. B. Adams of Johns Hopkins University, read before the

Maryland Historical Society (1878).

The charter of Connecticut was not superseded by a constitution until 1818.
But a merely revolutionary government could not long
answer the purposes of the Union. The powers of the Continental Congress having never been formally conferred,
or indeed agreed upon, by the States, that body was
regarded by the people and by the State authorities as an
advisory body rather than as a government, and the pressure of external necessity determined the degree of obedience its commands or advice should receive. In most
important matters they were often disregarded, and the
Confederation seemed at the point of falling to pieces for
the want of a legal bond of union and of legal power to
compel the performance of duties owing to it by its several
members .
.A.rticlea of Confederation. -This evil it was sought to
remedy by ''Articles of Confederation and Perpetual
Union," prepared by the Congress and submitted to the
States in 1777, and ratified subsequently by representatives of the States empowered by their respective legislatures so to do. 1
These Articles declared that ''Each Stste retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction, and right which is not by this Confederation
expressly delegated to the United States in Congress
assembled": that "The said States hereby severally
ent.er into a firm league of friendship with each other, for
ginia adopted constitutions in 1776, Georgia and New York in 1777,
MaHachusetts in 1780, and Rhode Island in 1842.
1 Curtis, Hist. of the Const., ch. 6. All the States except two
ratified the Articles in 1778; Delaware delayed till the next year,
and Maryland till 1781. The delay in the case of Maryland was for
the purpose of obtaining a permanent and satisfactory settlement of
the claims to Western lands, and is fully explained in the monograph
of Dr. H.B. Adams of Johns Hopkins University, read before the
Maryland Historical Society (1878).
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their common defence, the security of their liberties, and

their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to

assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks

made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion,

sovereignty, trade, or &ny other pretence whatever"; and

that, "for the more convenient management of the general

interests of the United States," delegates from the several

States shall meet in a Congress, in which each one shall

have an equal vote.

They further declared that "No State, without the con-

sent of the United States in Congress assembled, shall send

any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into

any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty with any

king, prince, or state"; that "No two or more States

shall enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance what-

ever between them without the consent of the United

States in Congress assembled "; that "No State shall lay

any imposts or duties which may interfere with any stipu-

lations in treaties entered into by the United States in

Congress assembled, with any king, prince, or state";

that "No State shall engage in any war without the con-

sent of the United States in Congress assembled, unless
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such State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have

received certain advice of a resolution being formed by

some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the

danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the

United States in Congress assembled can be consulted";

and that except in such cases " the United States in Con-

gress assembled shall have the exclusive right and power

of determining on peace and war"; also of sending and

receiving ambassadors, entering into treaties and alli-

ances, establishing rules and courts for the determination

of cases of capture and prize, granting letters of marque

and reprisal in time of peace, and appointing courts for

the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high

their common defence, the security of their liberties, and
their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to
assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks
made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion,
sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever" ; and
that, ''for the more convenient management of the general
interests of the United States," delegates from the several
States shall meet in a Congress, in which each one shall
have an equal vote.
They further declared that ''No State, without the consent of the United States in Congress a.Ssembled, shall send
any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into
any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty with any
king, prince, or state"; that "No two or more States
shall enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance whatever between them without the consent of the United
States in Congress assembled " ; that '' No State shall lay
any imposts or duties which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties entered into by the United States in
Congress assembled, with any king, prince, or state " ;
that ''No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, unless
such State .be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have
received certain advice of a resolution being formed by
some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the
danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the
United States in Congress assembled can be consulted";
and that except in such cases ''the United States in Congress assembled shall have the exclusive right and power
of determining on peace and war" ; also of sending and
receiving ambassadors, entering int,o treaties and alliances, establishing rules and courts for the determination
of cases of capture and prize, granting letters of marque
and reprisal in time of peace, and appointing courts for
the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high
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seas. Also that the United States in Congress assembled

shall be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differ-

ences between two or more States concerning boundary,

jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever.

The United States in Congress assembled were also

empowered to borrow money, or emit bills on the credit of

the United States, to build and equip a navy, to agree

upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions

upon each State for its quota, in proportion to the number

of white inhabitants of such State, but with the right to

vary from this quota when the circumstances rendered it

proper.

The delegates in Congress were to be maintained by

their States respectively; but it was declared that "All

charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be in-

curred for the common defence or general welfare, and

allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall

be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be

supplied by the several States in proportion to the value

of all land within each State, granted to or surveyed for

any person, as such land and the buildings and improve-
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ments thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode

as the United States in Congress assembled shall from

time to time direct and appoint." The United States in

Congress assembled were given the right and power of

regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own

authority or by that of the respective States, of fixing the

standard of weights and measures, and of establishing and

regulating post-offices and postage.

It was further declared, that "The United States in

Congress assembled shall never engage in a war, nor

grant letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace, nor

enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor

regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and

expenses necessary for the defence and welfare of the

seas. Also that the United States in Congress assembled
shall be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences between two or more States concerning boundary,
jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever.
The United States in Congress assembled were also
empowered to borrow money, or emit bills on the credit of
the United Stateu, to build and equip a navy, to agree
upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions
upon each State for its quota, in proportion to the number
of white inhabitants of such State, but with the right to
vary from this quota when the circumstances rendered it
proper.
The delegates in Congress were to be maintained by
their States respectively ; but it was declared that " All
charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and
allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall
be defrayed out of a common tre~sury, which shall be
supplied by the several States in proportion to the value
of all land within each State, granted to or surveyed for
any person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode
as the United States in Congress assembled shall from
time to time direct and appoint." The United States in
Congress assembled were given the right and power of
regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own
authority or by that of the respective States, of fixing the
standard of weights and measures, and of establishing and
regulating post-offices and postage.
It was further declared, that " The United Stat~s in
Congress assembled shall never engage in a war, nor
grant letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace, nor
enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor
regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and
expenses necessary for the defence and welfare of the
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United States, or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow

money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate

money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war to be

built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to

be raised, nor appoint a commander-in-chief of the army

or navy, unless nine States assent to the same; nor shall

a question on any other point, except for adjourning from

day to day, be determined, unless by the votes of a ma-

jority of the United States in Congress assembled."

The Congress was empowered to appoint an executive

committee, consisting of one from each State, to sit during

the recess of Congress, who would be authorized "to exe-

cute such of the powers of Congress as the United States

in Congress assembled, by the consent of nine States, shall,

from time to time, think expedient to vest them with."

It was declared that the United States and the public

faith were solemnly pledged for the public debts previously

contracted by authority of Congress; that the States

should abide by all the determinations of the Congress on

all questions by the Confederation submitted to that

body; and that "The Articles of this Confederation shall
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be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union

shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time

hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration

be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be

afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State."

Failure of the Confederation.—The defects in the Confed-

eration were such as rendered speedy failure inevitable.

It accomplished a temporal purpose in a verj- imperfect

manner, but it was impossible that it should do more.

The Confederation was given authority to make laws on

some subjects, but it had no power to compel obedience;

it might enter into treaties and alliances which the States

and the people could disregard with impunity; it might

apportion pecuniary and military obligations among the

United States, or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow ·
money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate
money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war to be
built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to
be raised, nor appoint a commander-in-chief of the army
or navy, unless nine States assent to the same; nor shall
a question on any other point, except for adjourning from
day to day, be determined, unless by the votes of a majority of the United States in Congress assembled.".
The Congress was empowered to appoint an executive
committee, consisting of one from each State, to sit during
the recess of Congress, who would be authorized ''to execute such of the powers of Congress as the United States
in Congress assembled, by the consent of nine States, shall,
from time to time, think expedient to vest them with."
It was declared that the United States and the public
faith were solemnly pledged for the public debts previously
contracted by authority of Congress ; that the States
should abide by all the determinations of the Congress on
all questions by the Confederation submitted to that
body ; and that '' The Articles of this Confederation shall
be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union
shall be perpetual ; nor shall any alteration at any time
hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration
be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be
afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State."
Failure of the Confederation. -The defects in the Confederation were such as rendered speedy failure inevitable.
It accomplished a temporary purpose in a very imperfect
manner, but it was impossible that it should do more.
The Confederation was given authority to make laws on
some subjects, but it had no power to compel obedience ;
it might enter into treaties and alliances which the States
and the people could disregard with impunity ; it might
apportion pecuniary and military obligations among the
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States in strict accordance with the provisions of the Ar-

ticles; but the recognition of the obligations must depend

upon the voluntary action of thirteen States, all more or

less jealous of each other, and all likely to recognize the

pressure of home debts and home burdens sooner than the

obligations of the broader patriotism involved in fidelity to

the Union; it might contract debts, but it could not pro-

vide the means for satisfying them; in short, it had no

power to levy taxes, or to regulate trade and commerce,

or to compel uniformity in the regulations of the States;

the judgments rendered in pursuance of its limited judicial

authority were not respected by the States; it had no

courts to take notice of infractions of its authoritj-, and it

had no executive. A further specification of defects is

needless, for any one of those mentioned would have been

fatal. "Obedience is what makes government, and not

the names by which it is called " ;1 and the Confederation

had neither obedience at home nor credit or respect

abroad. The people was one in promising and thirteen

when performance was due, and it became at last difficult

to enlist sufficient interest in its proceedings to keep up

the forms of government through the meetings of Congress
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and of the executive committee.2

The Constitutional Convention. — In February, 1787, a

resolution was adopted by the Congress recommending a

convention in Philadelphia, in the May following, of dele-

gates from the various States, "for the purpose of revising

the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress

and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions

1 Burke, Speech on Conciliation with America.

2 The reasons for the failure have been dwelt upon at length by

many writers, particularly Story on Const., ch. 4; Pitkin, Hist, of

U. S., ch. 17; Curtis, Hist, of the Const., book 2; Von Hoist, Const.

Hist., eh. 1; and Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, in the Federalist, and

Justice Wilson in his lectures.

States in strict accordance with the.provisions of the Articles ; but the recognition of the obligations must depend
upon the voluntary action of thirteen States, all more or
less jealous of each other, and all likely to recognize the
pressure of home debts and home burdens .sooner than the
obligations of the broader patriotism involved in fidelity to
the Union ; it might contract debts, but it could not provide the means for satisfying them; in .short, it had no
power to levy taxes, or to .regulate trade and commerce,
or to compel uniformity in the regulations of the States ;
the judgments rendered in pursuance of its limited judicial
authority were not respected by the States ; it had no
courts to take notice of infractions of its authority, and it
had no executive. A further specification of defects is
needless, for any one of those mentioned would have been
fatal. ''Obedience is what makes government, and not
the names by which it is called" ; 1 and the Confederation
had neither obedience at home nor credit or respect
abroad. The people was one in. promising and thirteen
when performance was due, and it became at last difficult
to enlist sufficient interest in its proceedings to keep up
the forms of government through the meetings of Congress
and of the executive committee.~
The Constitutional Convention. - In February, 1787, a
resolution was adopted by the Congress recommending a
convention in Philadelphia, in the 1.Iay following, of delegates from the various States, '' for the purpose of revising
the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress
and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions
Burke, Speech on Conciliation with America.
The reasons for the failure have been dwelt upon at length by
many writers, particularly Story on Const., ch. 4; Pitkin, Hist. of
U. S., ch. 17; Curtis, Hist. of the Const., book 2; Von Holst, Const.
Hist., ch. 1; and Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, in the Federalist, and
Justice Wilson in his lectures.
1
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therein as shall, when agreed to in Congress and confirmed

by the States, under the Federal Constitution, be adequate

to the exigencies of government and the preservation of

the Union." This was in strict conformity with the pro-

vision for amendment contained in the Articles, and was

acted upon by all the States except Rhode Island, which

alone sent no delegates. The Convention when it met,

after full consideration, determined that alterations in and

amendments to the Articles would be inadequate to the

purposes of government, and proceeded to recommend a

new Constitution, and to provide that " The ratification of

the conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the

establishment of this Constitution between the States so

ratifying the same." As this was in disregard of the pro-

vision in the Articles of Confederation, which required the

assent of every State, it was a revolutionary proceeding,1

and could be justified only by the circumstances which

had brought the Union to the brink of dissolution.

Its revolutionary character appears more distinctly from

the action under it, since eleven States only had ratified

the Constitution when the government was organized in
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pursuance of its provisions,2 and the remaining two, North

Carolina and Rhode Island, were for a time excluded from

the Union. Both gave their assent, however, and became

members of the Union, the first in November, 1789, and

the other in May, 1790.

Sovereignty of the States.—The term sovereignty in its

full sense imports the supreme, absolute, and uncontrol-

lable power by which any independent state is governed.3

1 Van Buren, Political Parties, p. 50; Federalist, No. 43, by Madison.

2 March 4, 1789, was the time fixed for the organization of the

government, but it was not in fact inaugurated until the 30th of the

following month.

8 Burlamaqui, Politic. Law, ch. 5; 1B1. Com. 49; Story on Const.,

§ 207; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 5; Austin, Prov. of Juris.,

ch. 6; Chipman on Gov. 137.

therein as shall, when agreed to in Congress and confirmed
by the States, under the Federal Constitution, be adequate
to the exigencies of government and the preservation of
the Union." This was in strict conformity with the provision for amendment contained in the Articles, and was
acted upon by all the States except Rhode Island, which
alone sent no delegates. The Convention when it met,
after full consideration, determined that alterations in and
amendments to the Articles would be inadequate to the
purposes of government, and proceeded to recommend a
new Constitution, and to provide that " The ratification of
the conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the
establishment of this Constitution between the States so
ratifying the same." As this was in disregard of the provision in the Articles of Confederation, which required the
assent of every State, it was a revolutionary proceeding, 1
and could be justified only by the circumstances which
had brought the Union to the brink of dissolution.
Its revolutionary character appears more distinctly from
the action under it, since eleven States only had ratified
the Constitution when the government was organized in
pursuance of its provisions,~ and the remaining two, North
Carolina and Rhode Island, were for a time excluded from
the Union. Both gave their assent, however, and became
members of the Union, the first in November, 1789, and
the other in May, 1790.
Sovereignty of the States. -The term sovereigntg in its
full sense imports the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is governed. 8
1

Van Buren, Political Parties, p. 60; Federalist, No. 43, by Madison.
March 4, 1789, was the time fixed for the organization of the
government, but it was not in fact inaugurated until the 30th of the
following month.
a Burlamaqui, Politic·. Law, ch. 6; 1 Bl. Com. 49; Story on Const.,
§ 207; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 6; Austin, Prov. of Juris.,
ch. 6; Chipman on Gov. 137.
~
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From what has already been said it appears that, although

the States were called sovereign and independent in the

Declaration of Independence, they were never in their

individual character strictly so, because they were always,

in respect to some of the higher powers of sovereignty,

subject to the control of some common authority, and were

never separately recognized or known as members of the

family of nations. This common authority was, first, the

Crown and Parliament of Great Britain; second, the Revolu-

tionary Congress'; third, the Congress of the Confederation;

and at length the government formed under the Constitu-

tion. The powers of these differed greatly, but in one

most important particular there was uniformity: each had

control of affairs of war for all the Colonies or States, and

of all intercourse with foreign nations. Only North Caro-

lina and Rhode Island are to be considered exceptions to

this general statement: these for the little time while they

were excluded from the Union by their neglect to ratify

the Constitution were relieved from all common authority,

and became wholly independent. It is to be said of them,

however, that they remained in that condition for a period
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bo brief that as sovereignties they neither obtained nor

sought for recognition by foreign nations.1

Bill of Rights. — The several charters of English liberty

to which reference has already been made had been much

relied upon by the American people in the controversies

resulting in independence, and their clear assertion of

individual rights was of inestimable value in inspiring the

people to resist tyrannical action of the government.

Each of these charters had been more specific and enlarged

in its provisions than that which preceded, and it might

have been expected that the Convention of 1787 would

» Life and Writings of A. J. Dallas, 200-207; Von Hoist, Const

Hist, ch. 1; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 470, per Jay, Ch. J.;

Texas v. White, 7 WaU. 700, 724.

2

From what has already been said it appears that, although
the States were called sovereign and independent in the
Declaration of Independence, they were never in their
individual character strictly so, because they were always,
in respect to some of the higher powers of sovereignty,
subject to the control of some common authority, and were
never separately recognized or known as members of the
family of nations. This common authority was, first, the
Crown and Parliament of Great Britain ; second, the Revolutionary Congress ; third, the Congress of the Confederation ;
and at length the government formed under the Constitution. The powers of these differed greatly, but in one
most important particular there was uniformity : each had
control of affairs of war for all the Colonies or States, and
of all intercourse with foreign nations. Only North Carolina and Rhode Island are to be considered exceptions to
this general statement : these for the little time while they
were excluded from the Union by their neglect to ratify
the Constitution were relieved from all common authority,
and became wholly independent. It is to be said of them,
however, that they reniained in that condition for a period
so brief that as sovereignties they neither obtained nor
sought for recognition by foreign nations. 1
Bill of Rights. -The several charters of English liberty
to which reference has already been made had been much
relied upon by the American people in the controversies
resulting in independence, and their clear assertion of
individual rights was of inestimable value in inspiring the
people to resist tyrannical action of the government.
Each of these charters had been more specific and enlarged
in its provisions than that which preceded, and it might
have been expected that the Convention of 1787 would
Life and Writings of A. J. Dallas, 200-207; Von Holst, Const.
Hist., ch. 1 ; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 470, per Jay, Ch. J.;
Texaa "·White, 7 Wall. 700, 724.
2
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have followed the examples, and that in their completed

work would have been found a clear and full enumeration

of those rights which were deemed indefeasible, and which

might lawfully be asserted against the government itself.

The importance of this, however, did not impress itself on

the minds of the members of that body.1 The Constitu-

tion did indeed insure the benefits*of the habeas corpus; it

precluded constructive treasons; it prohibited bills of

attainder and ex post facto laws; and it provided for the

trial of criminal accusations by jury; but there was no

attempt at a systematic enumeration of fundamental rights,

and the absence of this was made a ground of persistent

opposition to the ratification of the Constitution. Some

of the leading States, indeed, were only induced to ratify in

reliance upon a bill of rights being added to the Constitu-

tion by amendments,5 and this was done in eight articles,

which were proposed and adopted as speedily as the neces-

sary forms could be gone through with. For a proper

understanding of these provisions it is essential to keep in

mind that their purpose, as well as that of similar pro-

visions in the original instrument, was to put it out of the
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power of the government now being created to violate the

fundamental rights of the people who were to be subjected

to its authority. They constitute limitations, therefore,

upon the power of the Federal government only. The

exceptions to this general statement are only of those few

cases in which the States are named, and the exercise of

certain powers by them expressly prohibited. For exam-

ple, when the Constitution, in Art. I. § 9, declares that

1 For reasons that might he urged against it, see Federalist, No.

84; compare Jefferson's Works, vo1. iii. pp. 4, 13, 101, vol. ii. pp.

329, 358; Life of Madison, hy Rives, vol. ii. p. 38 et seq.; Hamilton's

Hist, of the Republic, vol. iv. p. 23.

2 See the recommendations by Massachusetts, South Carolina,

New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode

Island, in Elliott's Debates, i. 322-334.

have followed the examples, and that in their completed
work would have been found a clear and full enumeration
of those rights which were deemed indefeasible, and which
might lawfully be asserted againit the government itself.
The importance of this, however, did not impress itself on
the minds of the members of that body .1 The Constitution did indeed insure the benefits• of the habeas corpus,· it
precluded constructive treasons ; it prohibited bills of
attainder and ex post facto laws ; and it provided for the
trial of criminal accusations by jury ; but there was no
attempt at a systematic enumeration of fundamental rights,
and the absence of this was made a ground of persistent
opposition to the ratification of the Constitution. Some
of the leading States, indeed, were only induced to ratify in
reliance upon a bill of rights being added to the Constitution by amendments, 2 and this was done in eight articles,
which were proposed and adopted as speedily as the necessary forms could be gone through with. For a proper
understanding of these provisions it is essential to keep in
mind that their purpose, as well as that of similar provisions in the original instrument, was to put it out of the
power of the government now being created to violate the
fundamental rights of the people who were to be subjected
to its authority. They constitute limitations, therefore,
upon the power of the Federal government only. The
exceptions to this general statement are only of those few
cases in which the States are named, and the exercise of
certain powers by them expressly prohibited. For example, when the Constitution, in Art. I. § 9, declares that
1 For reasons that might be urged against it, see Federalist, No.
84 ; compare Jefferson's Works, vol. iii. pp. 4, 13, 101, vol. ii. pp.
329, 358; Life of Madison, by Rives, vol. ii. p. 38 et seq.; Hamilton's
Hist. of the Republic, vol. iv. p. 23.
~- See the recommendations by Massachusetts, South Carolina,
New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode
Island, in Elliott's Debates, i. 822-884.
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"no bill of attainder or ex post faeto law shall be passed,"

it is still necessary, in order to extend the prohibition to

the States, to provide, as is done in the next section, that

"no State" shall pass such a bill or law. To state the

rule of construction concisely, it is this: The restrictions

imposed upon government by the Constitution and its

amendments are to be understood as restrictions only upon

the government of the Union, except where the States are

expressly mentioned.1

1 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How.

71; Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475; Twitchell v. Common-

wealth, 7 Wall. 321; Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274; Edwards v.

Elliott, 21 Wall. 532; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. Eep. 90.

'' no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed,"
it is still necessary, in order to extend the prohibition to
the States, to provide, as is done in the next section, that
"no State" shall pass such a bill or law. To state the
rule of construction concisely, it is this : The restrictions
imposed upon government by the Constitution and its
amendments are to be understood as restrictions only upon
the government of the Union, except where the States are
expressly mentioned. 1
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1 Barron "· Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How.
71; Pervear v. Commonwealth, 6 Wall. 476; Twitchell z:. Commonwealth, 7 Wall. 321; Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274; Edwards v.
Elliott, 21 Wall. 632; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. Rep. 00.
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CHAPTER II.

DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

Nation and State. — A state maybe defined to be a body

politic or society of men united together under common

laws for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and

advantage by the joint efforts of their combined strength.1

The term is often employed as importing the same thing

with nation; but the latter is more nearly synonymous

with people, and while a single state may embrace several

CHAPTER Il.

different nations or peoples, a single nation will sometimes

be so divided politically as to constitute several states.

In the following pages the word State will sometimes be

DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

employed in the general sense above expressed, but more

commonly it will refer to the several members of the

American Union, while the word Nation will be applied to

the whole body of the people coming under the jurisdiction

of the federal government.

A State is either sovereign or dependent. It is sover-

eign when there resides within itself a supreme and abso-

lute power, acknowledging no superior, and it is dependent

when in any degree or particular its authority is limited
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by an acknowledged power elsewhere.2 It is immaterial

to this definition whether the supreme power reposes in

one individual, or one body or class of individuals, or in

the whole body of the people; whether, in other words, the

i Vattel, b. 1, c. 1, § 1; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 1, c. 2, § 2; Story on

Const., § 207; Burlamaqui, Pol. Law, c. 5; Cooley, Const. Lim. 1.

1 Vattel, b. l,o. 1, § 2; Chipman on Government, 137; Halleck,

Int. Law, 65.

Nation and State. -A state may be defined to be a body
politic or society of men united together under common
laws for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and
advantage by the joint efforts of theii9 combined strength. 1
The term is often employed as importing the same thing
with nation ; but the Jatter is more nearly synonymous
with people, and while a single state may embrace several
different nations or peoples, a single nation will sometimes
be so divided politically as to constitute several states.
In the following pages the word State will sometimes be
employed in the general sense above expressed, but more
commonly it will refer to the several members of the
American Union, while the word Nation will be applied to
the whole body of the people coming under the jurisdiction
of the federal government.
A State is either sovereign or dependent. It is sovereign when there resides within itself a supreme and absolute power, acknowledging no superior, and it is dependent
when in any degree or particular its authority is limited
by an acknowledged power elsewhere.i It is immaterial
to this definition whether the supreme power reposes in
one individual, or one body or class of individuals, or in
the whole body of the people; whether, in other words, the
1 Vattel, b. 1, c. 1, § 1; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 1, c. 2, § 2; Story on
Const.,§ 207; Burlamaqui, Pol. Law, c. 5; Cooley, Const. Lim. 1.
i Vattel, b. 1, c. 1, § 2; Chipman on Government, 137 ; Halleck,
Int. Law, 65.
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government is a monarchy, an aristocracy, a republic, or a

democracy, or any combination of these; for the form

only determines the methods in which sovereign powers

shall be exercised.

All civilized states recognize a body of rules or laws

which is called the Law of Nations, and the rules are

either rules of public international law, as they relate to

and regulate the intercourse of states with each other, or

of private international law, as they define and protect the

rights, privileges, and obligations of the citizens or subjects

of one state passing into another, or owning property,

making contracts, or conducting operations that may be

governed by the laws of another. In contemplation of

the law of nations all sovereign states are and must be

equal in rights, since from the very definition of sovereign

state it is impossible that there should be in respect to it

any political superior.

In theory sovereignty must be a unity, and the sov-

ereignty of a state must extend to all the subjects of

government within the territorial limits occupied by the

associated people who compose it, so that the dividing line
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between sovereignties must be a territorial line. In the

law of nations for the purposes of international intercourse

some encroachment upon the theory is admitted, and the

sovereignty of one state is projected within the jurisdiction

of another, so as to retain within its rule its ambassadors

and ministers resident abroad, and its ships of war in

foreign ports. In American constitutional law a peculiar

system is established; the powers of sovereignty being

classified, and some of them apportioned to the govern-

ment of the United States for its exercise, while others are

left with the States. Under this apportionment the nation

is possessed of supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power

in respect to certain subjects throughout all the States,

while the States have the like unqualified power, within

government is a monarchy, an aristocracy, a republic, or a
aemocracy, or any combination of these ; for the form
only determines the methods in which sovereign powers
shall be exercised.
All civilized states recognize a body of rules or laws
which is called the Law of Nations, and the rules are
either rules of public international law, as they relate to
and regulate the intercourse of states with each other, or
of private international law, as they define and protect the
rights, privileges, and obligations of the citizens or subjects
of one state passing into another, or owning property,
making contracts, .or conducting operations that may be
governed by the laws of another. In contemplation of
the law of nations all sovereign states are and must be
equal in rights, since from the very definition of sovereign
state it is impossible that there should be in respect to it
any political superior.
In theory sovereignty must be a unity, and the sovereignty of a state must extend to all the subjects of
government within the territorial limits occupied by the
associated people who compose it, so that the dividing line
between sovereignties must be a territorial line. In the
law of nations for the purposes of international intercourse
some encroachment upon the theory is admitted, and the
sovereignty of one state is projected within the jurisdiction
of another, so as to retain within its rule its ambassadors
and ministers resident abroad, and its ships of war in
foreign ports. In American constitutional law a peculiar
system is established ; the powers of sovereignty being
classified, and some of them apportioned to the government of the United States for its exercise, while others are
left with the States. Under this apportionment the nation
is possessed of supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power
in respect to certain subjects throughout all the States,
while the States have the like unqualified power, within
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their respective limits, in respect to other subjects.1 Over

certain other subjects the States have a qualified depend-

ent or defeasible power, inasmuch as their action is liable

at any time to be overruled, and their powers to become

dormant by the exercise of a superior power which is

conferred upon the nation over the same subjects.2

Constitution. — The term constitution may be defined as

the body of rules and maxims in accordance with which

the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised.8 A

constitution is valuable in proportion as it is suited to the

circumstances, desires, and aspirations of the people, and

as it contains within itself the elements of stability, perma-

nence, and security against disorder and revolution. Al-

though every state may be said in some sense to have

a constitution, the term constitutional government is only

applied to those whose fundamental rules or maxims not

only define how those shall be chosen or designated to

whom the exercise of sovereign powers shall be confided,

but also impose efficient restraints on the exercise for the

purpose of protecting individual rights and privileges, and

shielding them against any assumption of arbitrary power.4

The number of such governments is not as j-et great, but
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is increasing.

A constitution may be written or unwritten. If unwrit-

ten, there may still be laws or authoritative documents

which declare some of its important principles; as we

have seen has been and is still the case in England. The

weakness of an unwritten constitution consists in this,

that it is subject to perpetual change at the will of the

law-making power; and there can be no security against

1 License Cases, 5 How. 504, 588; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How

506, 516; United States v. Cruikshanks, 02 U. S. Rep. 542.

2 Cooley v. Wardens, &c, 12 How. 299.

8 Duer, Const. Juris. 26; Cooley, Const. Lim. 2.

* Calhoun, Disquisition on Government, Works, i. 11.

their respective limits, in i·espect to other subjects. 1 Over
certain other subjects the States have a qualified dependent or defeasible power, inasmuch as their action is liable
at any time to be overruled, and their powers to become
dormant by the exercise of a superior power which is
conferred upon the nation over the same subjects.~
Oonstitu.tion. -The term constitution may be defined as
the body of rules and maxims in accordance with which
the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised. 8 A
constitution is valuable in proportion as it is suited to the
circumstances, desires, and aspirations of the people, and
as it contains within itself the elements of st~bility, permanence, and security against disorder and revolution. Although every state may be said in some sense to have
a constitution, the term conititutional government is only
applied to those whose fundamental rules or maxims not
only define how those shall be chosen or designated to
whom .the exercise of sovereign powers shall be confided,
but also impose efficient restraints on the exercise for the
purpose of protecting individual rights and privileges, and
shielding them against any assumption of arbitrary power.•
The number of such governments is not as yet great, but
is increasing.
A constitution may be written or unwritten. If unwritten, there may still be laws or ·authoritative documents
which declare some of its important principles ; as we
have seen has been and is still the case in England. The
weakness of an unwritten constitution consists in this,
that it is subject to perpetual change at the will of the
law-making power; and there can be no security against
1 License Cases, 6 How. 604, 688; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How
606, 616; United States v. Cruikshanks, 02 U. S. Rep. 642.
2 Cooley v. Wardens, &c., 12 How. 299.
a Duer, Const. Juris. 26; Cooley, Const. Lim. 2.
' Calhoun, Disq~sition on Government, Works, i. 11.
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such change except in the conservatism of the law-making

authority, and its political responsibility to the people, or,

if no such responsibility exists, then in the fear of resist-

ance by force. In America the leading principle of consti-

tutional liberty has from the first been, that the sovereignty

reposed in the people; and as the people could not in their

collective capacity exercise the powers of government, a

written constitution was by general consent agreed upon

in each of the States. These constitutions create depart-

ments for the exercise of sovereign powers; prescribe the

extent of the exercise, and the methods, and in some par-

ticulars forbid that certain powers which would be within

the compass of sovereignty shall be exercised at all. Each

of these constitutes for the state the absolute rule of action

and decision for all departments and officers of the gov-

ernment, in respect to all the points covered by it, which

must control until it shall be changed by the authority

which established it. Whatever act or regulation of any

department or officer is in excess of the power conferred

by this instrument, or is opposed to any of its directions

or regulations, is altogether void. The constitution, more-
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over, is in the nature of a covenant of the sovereign people

with each individual thereof, under which, while they in-

trust the powers of government to political agencies, they

also divest themselves of the sovereign power of making

changes in the fundamental law except by the method in the

constitution agreed upon. The Constitution of the United

States creates similar governmental trusts and imposes sim-

ilar restrictions. The weaknesses of a written constitution

are, that it establishes iron rules, which, when found incon-

venient, are difficult of change; that it is often construed

on technical principles of verbal criticism, rather than in

the light of great principles; and that it is likely to invade

the domain of ordinary legislation, instead of being re-

stricted to fundamental rules, and thereby to invite demor-

such change except in the conservatism of the law-making
authority, and its political responsibility to the people, oi:,
if no such responsibility exists, then in the fear of resistance by force. In America the leading principle of constitutional liberty has from the first been, that the sovereignty
reposed in the people ; and as the people could not in their
collective capacity exercise the powers of government, a
written constitution was by general consent agreed upon
in each of the States. These constitutions create departments for the exercise of sovereign powers ; prescribe the
extent of the exercise, and the methods, and in some particulars forbid that certain powers which would be within
the compass of· sovereignty shall be exercised at all. Each
of these constitutes for the state the absolute rule of action
and decision for all departments and officers of the government, in respect to all the points covered by it, which
must control until it shall be changed by the authority
which established it. Whatever act or regulation of any
department or officer is in excess of the power conferred
by this instrument, or is opposed to any of its directions
or regulations, is altogether void. Th:e constitution, moreover, is in the nature of a covenant of the sovereign people
with each individual thereof, under which, while they intrust the powers of government to political agencies, they
also divest themselves of the sovereign power of making
changes in the fundamental law except by the method in the
constitution agreed upon. The Constitution of the United
States creates similar governmental trusts and imposes similar restrictions. The weaknesses of a written constitution
are, that it establishes iron rules, which, when found inconvenient, are difficult of change ; that it is often construed
on technical principles of verbal criticism, rather than in
the light of great principles ; and that it is likely to invade
the domain of ordinary legislation, instead of being restricted to f .mdamental rules, and thereby to invite demor-
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alizing evasions. But, the written constitution being a

necessity in America, the attendant evils are insignificant

as compared with the inestimable benefits.

In the following pages, where the Constitution is spoken

of, the Constitution of the United States will be intended

unless otherwise explained.

Unconstitutional Law.— A law is sometimes said to be

unconstitutional, by which is meant that it is opposed to

the principles or rules of the constitution of the state.

An unconstitutional enactment is sometimes void, and

sometimes not; and this will depend upon whether, accord-

ing to the theory of the government, any tribunal or officer

is empowered to judge of violations of the constitution,

and to keep the legislature within the limits of a delegated

authority by annulling whatever acts exceed it. Accord-

ing to the theory of British constitutional law the Parlia-

ment possesses and wields supreme power,1 and if therefore

its enactments conflict with the Constitution, they are

nevertheless valid, and must operate as modifications or

amendments of it. But where, as in America, the legis-

lature acts under a delegated authority, limited by the

Constitution itself, and the judiciary is empowered to de-
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clare what the law is, an unconstitutional enactment must

fall when it is subjected to the ordeal of the courts. Such

an enactment is in strictness no law, because it establishes

no rule: it is merely a futile attempt to establish a law.

The remedy for unconstitutional enactments in England

must therefore be political or revolutionary, while in Amer-

ica they may be found in the ordinary process of the

courts. Still even in America some cases must be beyond

the reach of judicial cognizance, because the questions in-

volved are purely political. Such, for example, were

questions involved in the reconstruction of the States

1 1 Bl. Com. 161; Broom, Const. Law, 795; De Tocqueville, De-

mocracy in America, c. 6.

alizing evas.ions. But, the written constitution being a
necessity in America, the attendant evils are insignificant
as compared with the inestimable benefits.
In the following pages, where the Constitution is spoken
of, the Constitution of the United States will be intended
unless otherwise explained.
Unconstitutional Law. - A law is sometimes said to be
unconstitutional, by which is ·meant that it is opposed to
the principles or rules of the constitution of the state.
· An unconstitutional enactment is sometimes void, and
sometimes not; and this will depend upon whether, according to the theory of the government, any tribunal or officer
is empowered to judge of violations of the constitution,
and to keep the legislature within the limits of a delegated
authority by annulling whatever acts exceed it. According to the theory of British constitutional law the Parlia.ment possesses and wields supreme power, 1 and if therefore
its enactments conflict with the Constitution, they are
nevertheless valid, and must operate as modifications or
amendments of it. But where, as in America, the legislature acts under a delegated authority, limited by the
Constitution itself, and the judiciary is empowered to declare what the law is, an unconstitutional enactment must
fall when it is subjected oo the ordeal 'of the courts. Such
an enactment is in strictness no law, because it establishes
no rule : it is merely a futile attempt to establish a law.
The remedy for uuconsti~tional enactments in England
must therefore be political or revolutionary, while in America they may be found in the ordinary process of the
courts. Still even in America some cases must be beyond
the reach of judicial cognizance, because the questions involved are purely political. Such, for example, were
questions involved in the reconstruction of the States
1

1 Bl. Com. 161; Broom, Const. Law, 795; De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, c. 6.
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recently in rebellion, and the question growing out of the

attempt to overthrow the charter government of Rhode

Island.1

The Right of Revolution. — The authority of the British

Crown over the Colonies was rejected, and a government

created by the people of the Colonies for themselves, and

this afterwards radically changed and reformed in the

adoption of the Federal Constitution under the great and

fundamental right of every people to change their institu-

tions at will, — in other words, under the right of revolu-

tion. It is true that the colonists in the incipient period

of the change planted themselves upon established rights,

instead of seeking or desiring a revolution. Their pur-

pose, therefore, was to maintain old established principles

of the Constitution, instead of overturning them; and they

occupied a conservative position, resisting innovations

which the imperial government was attempting to force.

Nevertheless there was no settled principle of the consti-

tution that limited in any manner the sovereign right of

Parliament to change at will the laws protecting the life,

liberty, and property of the subject; and had the same

laws which in this particular oppressed the people of the
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Colonies been applied to the people of the realm, they

would have been within the acknowledged power of the

Parliament. So in regard to the Colonies the right of

the imperial government to rule in all respects might be

defended on precedent, and the leading publicists of the

day affirmed it. It was nevertheless the fact that the ex-

ercise of imperial power in the particulars complained of

was tyrannical and in disregard of constitutional princi-

ples, and that resistance was directly in the line of English

precedents which at the time were almost universally ap-

proved in England itself. There, was consequently am-

ple ground for resistance, and if the other conditions for

1 Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475.

recently in rebellion, and the question growing out of the
attempt to overthrow the charter government of Rhode
Island. 1
The Right of Revolution. -The authority of the British
Crown over the Colonies was rejected, and a government
created by the people of the Colonies for themselves, and
this afterwards radically changed and reformed in the
adoption of the Federal Constitution under the great and
fundamental right of every people to change their institutions at will, - in other words, under the right of revolution. It is true that the colonists in the incipient period ·
of the change planted themselves upon established rights,
instead of seeking or desiring a revolution. Their purpose, therefore, was to maintain old established principles
of the Constitution, instead of overturning them ; and they
occupied a conservative position, resisting innovations
which the imperial government was attempting to force.
Nevertheless there was no settled principle of the constitution that limited in any manner the sovereign right of
Parliament to change at will the laws protecting the life;
liberty, and property of the subject; and had the same
laws which in this particular oppressed the people of the
Colonies been applied to the people of the realm, they
would have been within the acknowledged power of the
Parliament. So in regard to the Colonies the right of
the imperial government to rule in all respects might be
defended on precedent, and the leading publicists of the
day affirmed it. It was nevertheless the fact that the exercise of imperial power in the particulars complained of
was tyrannical and in disregard of constitutional principles, and that resistance was directly in the line of English
precedents which at the time were almost universally approved in England itself. There. was consequently ample ground for resistance, and if the other conditions for
1

Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 476.
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revolution existed, the colonists were right in attempt-

ing it.

The right of revolution may be said to exist when the

government has become so oppressive that its evils decid-

edly overbalance those which are likely to attend a change,

when success in the attempt is reasonably certain, and

when such institutions are likely to result as will be satis-

factory to the people.1 In this last particular the proba-

bility of success will depend largely on the extent of the

revolution attempted, — whether it extends to the laws in

general, or only to the head of the government. In Amer-

ica only a change in the general sovereignty was intended;

in respect to the general laws, the revolution was strictly

preservative. It became necessary, nevertheless, to make

considerable changes in state laws and institutions before

the revolution was perfected, and when these were com-

pleted in the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the

revolution was fully justified in the establishment of more

satisfactory institutions than had existed before.

The Constitution: by whom adopted. — To a proper under-

standing and construction of the Constitution it becomes
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important to know at the outset who were the parties to

it, — by whom it was adopted, and what it was meant to

accomplish. In these particulars the present work cannot

enter into the field of speculation or discussion, nor would

it be important to do so. The general principles governing

the case have been judicially determined, and the political

departments of the government have accepted the conclu-

sions. It therefore becomes sufficient for our purposes to

say here, that the Constitution was agreed upon by dele-

gates representing the States in convention; that it was

submitted to the people of the several States by their re-

spective legislatures; that it was adopted by the people

through delegates elected for the express purpose of con-

i Woolsey, Pol. Science, i. 402.

revolution existed, the colonists were right in attempting it.
The right of revolution may be said to exist when the
government has become so oppressive that its evils decidedly overbalance those which are likely to attend a change,
when success in . the attempt is reasonably certain, and
when such institutions are likely to result as will be satisfactory to the people. 1 In this last particular the probability of success will depend largely on the extent of the
revolution attempted, -whether it extends to the laws in
general, or only to the head of the government. In America only a change in the general sovereignty was intended ;
in respect to the general laws, the revolution was strictly
preservative. It became necessary, nevertheless, to make
considerable changes in state laws and institutions before
the revolution was perfected, and when these were completed in the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the
revolution was fully justified in the establishment of more
satisfactory institutions than had existed before.
The Oonstitution: by whom adopted. - To a proper understanding and construction of the Constitution it becomes
important to know at the outset who were the parties to
it, - by whom it was adopted, and what it was meant to
accomplish. In these particulars the present work cannot
enter into the field of speculation or discussion, nor would
it be important to do so. The general principles governing
the case have been judicially determined, and the political
departments of the government have accepted the conclusions. It therefore becomes sufficient for our purposes to
say here, that the Constitution was agreed upon by delegates representing the States in convention ; that it was
submitted to the people of the several States by their respective legislatures ; that it was adopted by the people
through delegates elected for the express purpose of con1

Woolsey, Pol. Science, i. 402.
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sidering and deciding upon it, and that the people of the

States, as well as the States themselves, thereby became

parties to it. It was therefore properly declared in the

preamble, that "We, the people of the United States, do

ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States

of America."1 By the adoption of the Constitution the

people of the States before united in a confederation

became a nation under one government,2 and the citizens

of every State became also citizens of the United States.8

The purpose of the Constitution is forcibly and clearly de-

clared in the preamble. It was "in order to form a more

perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquil-

lity, provide for the common defence, promote the general

welfare, and secure the blessings of the people to ourselves

and our posterity." These purposes collectively, it has

been well said, "comprise everything requisite, with the

blessing of Divine Providence, to render a people prosper-

ous and happy."4 By the new amendments to the Consti-

tution the freedmen become a part of the people, and all

the purposes for which it was made and established are to

be deemed to have them in view, and to contemplate their

protection and benefit as a part of the body politic.
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Not a mere Compact. — The confederation of the States

had existed by force of a mere compact, and for want of

power in the common authority had so completely failed

in the purposes of its formation as to justify its being

superseded by revolutionary, though peaceful, means.

Among its chief defects was the fact that it operated on

States only, and that the highest sanction it could give to

1 Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 324; Cohens v. Virginia, 6

Wheat. 264, 413.

2 Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76.

8 Minor ». Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; United States v. Cruikshanks,

92 U. S. Rep. 542.

* Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419.

sidering and deciding upon it, and that the people of the
States, as well as the States themselves, thereby becam~
parties to it. It was therefore properly declared in the
preamble, that '' We, the people of the United States, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America." 1 By the adoption of the Constitution the
people of the States before united in a confederation
became a nation under one government, 2 and the citizens
of every State became also citizens of the United States. 8
The purpose of the Constitution is forcibly and clearly declared in the preamble. It was ''in order to form a more
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, l?rovide for the common defence, promote the general
welfare, and secure the blessings of the people to ourselves
and our posterity." These purposes collectively, it has
been well said, '' comprise everything requisite, with the
blessing of Divine Providence, to render a people prosperous and happy." 4 By the new amendments to the Constitution the freedmen become a part of the people, and all
the purposes for which it was made and established are to
be deemed to have them in view, and to contemplate their
protection and benefit as a part of the body politic.
Not a mere Compact. -The confederation of the States
had existed by force of a mere compact, and for want of
power in the common authority had so completely failed
in the purposes of its formation as to justify its being
superseded by revolutionary, though peaceful, means.
Among its chief defects was the fact that it operated on
States only, and that the highest sanction it could give to
1 Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 804, 824; Cohens v. Virginia, 6
Wheat. 264, 413.
2 Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76.
8 Minor v. Happersett, 21Wall.162; United States v. Cruikshanks,
9'J U.S. Rep. 542.
'Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419.
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its lawful determinations was that of advice or entreaty:

it could not command, and it could not enforce. The Con-

stitution which was adopted to supersede it, on the other

hand, is an instrument of government, agreed upon and

established, and rendered efficient as such by being made

operative upon the people individually and collectively,

and, within the sphere of its powers, upon the States also.1

This was the judicial view of the Constitution from the

first,2 and it has been practically and finally settled against

opposing theories, by the action of the several departments

of the government, extending over the whole period of the

existence of the Union under the Constitution; by the

acquiescence of the people in this view, and their forcible

resistance to the attempt made to supersede it; and, finally,

by the adoption of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth

articles of the amendments to further strengthen and con-

solidate the Union under the government of the Con-

stitution.3

The Union Indissoluble.—By the Articles of Confedera-

tion '' the Union was declared to be ' perpetual.' And when

these Articles were found to be inadequate to the exigen-
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1 Webster, "The Constitution not a Compact," Speeches, iii. 349;

Jackson's Proclamation on Nullification in 1833, Elliott's Debates, iv.

610, Statesman's Manual, i. 890.

2 Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 324; M'Culloch v. Maryland,

4 Wheat. 316,402; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,187; Rhode Island

v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 720; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 726.

8 Views either radically or in part opposed to those which hare

prevailed are presented in Calhoun's Discourse on the Constitution

and Government of the United States, Works, i. 11; and Address on

the Relations of the State to the General Government, Works, vi.

59; Upshur on the Federal Constitution; Construction Construed and

Constitution Vindicated, by John Taylor; New Views of the Con-

its lawful determinations was that of advice or entreaty:
it could not command, and it could not enforce. The Constitution which was adopted to supersede it, on the other
hand, is an instrument of government, agreed upon and
established, and rendered efficient as such by being made
operative upon the people individually and collectively,
and, within the sphere of its powers, upon the States also. 1
This was the judicial view of the Constitution from the
first,~ and it has been practically and finally settled against
opposing theories, by the action of the several departments
of the government, extending over the whole period of the
existence of the Union under the Constitution ; by the
acquiescence of the people in this view, and their forcible
resistance to the attempt made to supersede it ; and, finally,
by the adoption of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
articles of the amendments to further strengthen and consolidate the Union under the government of the Constitution. 8
The Union Ind,lssoluble. -By the Articles of Confederation'' the Union was declared to be' perpetual.' And when
these Articles were found to be inadequate to the exigen-

stitution of the United States, by the same; The Constitutional View

of the War between the States, by A. H. Stephens; The Kentucky

and Virginia Resolutions of 1798-9, Elliott's Debates, iv. 566, 572;

and other publications too numerous for mention here.

1 Webster, "The Constitution not a Compact," Speeches, iii. 849;
Jackson's Proclamation on Nullification in 1833, Elliott's Debates, iv.
610, Statesman's Manual, i. 890.
2 Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 324; M'Culloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 402; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 187; Rhode Island
v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 720; Texas v. White, 7 Wa.11. 700, 726.
s Views either radically or in part opposed to those which have
prevailed are presented in Calhoun's Discourse ·on the Constitution
and Government of the United States, Works, i. 11 ; and Address on
the Relations of the State to the General Government, Works, vi.
69; Upshur on the Federal Constitution; Construction Construed and
Constitution Vindica.ted, by John Taylor; New Views of the Constitution of the United States, by the same; The Constitutional View
of the War between the States, by A.H. Stephens; The Kentucky
and Virginia Resolutions of 1798-9, Elliott's Debates, iv. 666, 672;
and other publications too numerous for mention here.
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cies of the country, the Constitution was ordained 'to

form a more perfect Union.' It is difficult to convey the

idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these words.

What can be indissoluble, if a perpetual union made more

perfect is not?"1 When a State is once in the Union,

there is "no place for reconsideration or revocation,

except through revolution, or through the consent of the

States." a

The States Indestructible. — "But the perpetuity and in-

dissolubility of the Union by no means implies the loss of

distinct and individual existence, or of the right of self-

government by the States. Without the States in union

there could be no such political body as the United States.8

'Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and

independent autonomy to the States, through their union

under the Constitution, but it may not unreasonably be

said that the preservation of the States and the mainte-

nance of their governments are as much within the design

and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the

Union and the maintenance of the national government.

The Constitution in all its provisions looks to an inde-

structible Union composed of indestructible States."4
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The Constitution a Grant of Powers. — The government

created by the Constitution is one of limited and enumer-

ated powers, and the Constitution is the measure and the

test of the powers conferred. Whatever is not conferred

is withheld, and belongs to the several States or to the

people thereof.6 As a constitutional principle this must

1 Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725.

1 Texas v. White, 7 WaU. 700, 726.

8 Lane County v. Oregon, 7> Wall. 71, 76.

« Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725.

5 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 187;

Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3

Wall. 713; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; United States v.

Cruikshanks, 92 U. S. Rep. 542, 550.

cies of the country, the Constitution was ordained ' to
form a more perfect Union.' It is difficult to convey the
idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these words.
What can be indissoluble, if a perpetual union made more
perfe~t is not?" 1 When a State is once in the Union,
there is '' no place for reconsideration or revocation,
except through revolution, or through the consent of the
States."~

The States Indestructible. - " But the perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union by no means implies the loss of
distinct and individual existence, or of the right of selfgovernment by the States. Without the States in union
there could be no such political body as the United States. 8
· Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and
independent autonomy to the States, through their union
under the Constitution, but it may not unreasonably be
said that the preservation ·or the States and the maintenance of their governments are as much within the design
and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the
Union and the maintenance of the national government.
The Constitution in all its provisions looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States." 4
The Constitution a Grant of Powers. -The government
created by the Constitution is one of limited and enumerated powers, and the Constitution is the measure and the
test of the powers conferred. Whatever is not conferred
is withheld, and belongs to the several States or to the
people thereof. 6 As a constitutional principle this must
Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725.
Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 726.
8 Lane County v. Oregon, 7, Wall. 71, 76.
' Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725.
6 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 187;
Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Gilman v. Philadelphia, S
Wall. 713; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; United States v.
Cruikshanks, 92 U. S. Rep. 642, 650.
1
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result from a consideration of the circumstances under

which the Constitution was formed. The States were in

existence before, and possessed and exercised nearly all

the powers of sovereignty. The Union was in existence,

but the Congress which represented it possessed a few

powers only, conceded to it by the States, and these cir-

cumscribed and hampered in a manner to render them of

little value. The States were thus repositories of sover-

eign powers and wielded them as being theirs of inherent

right; the Union possessed but few powers, enumerated,

limited, and hampered, and these belonged to it by compact

and concession. In a confederation thus organized, if a

power could be in dispute between the States and the Con-

federacy, the presumption must favor the States. But it

was not within the intent of those who formed the Consti-

tution to revolutionize the States, to overturn the presump-

tions that supported their authority, or to create a new

government with uncertain and undefined powers. The

purpose, on the contrary, was to perpetuate the States in

their integrity, and to strengthen the Union in order that

they might be perpetuated. To this end the grant of
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powers to the Confederacy needed to be enlarged and ex-

tended, the machinery of government to be added to and

perfected, the people to be made parties to the charter of

government, and the sanction of law and judicial authority

to be given to the legitimate acts of the government in any

and all of its departments. But when this had been done,

it remained true that the Union possessed the powers

conferred upon it, and that these were to be found enumer-

ated in the instrument of government under which it was

formed. But lest there might be any possible question of

this in the minds of those wielding any portion of this

authority, it was declared by. the tenth article of the

amendments, that "The powers not delegated to the

United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to

result froTTl a consideration of the circumstances under
which the Constitution was formed. The States were in
existence before, and possessed and exercised nearly all
the powers or sovereignty. The Union was in existence,
but the Congress which represented it possessed a few
powers only, conceded to it by the States, and these circumscribed and hampered in a ·manner to render them of
little value. The States were thus repositories of sovereign powers and wielded them as being theirs of inherent
right ; the Union possessed but few powers, enumerated,
limited, and hampered, and these belonged to it by compact
and concession. In a confederation thus organized, if a
power could be in dispute between the States and the Confederacy, the presumption must favor the States. But it
was not within the intent of those who formed the Constitution to revolutionize the States, to overturn the presumptions that supported their authority, or to create a new
government with uncerta.in and undefined powers. The
purpose, on the contrary, was to perpetuate the States in
their integrity, and to strengthen the Union in order that
they might be perpetuated. To this end the grant of
powers to the Confederacy needed to be enlarged and extended, the machinery of government to be added to and
perfected, the people to be made parties to the charter of
government, and the sanction of law and judicial authority
to be giYen to the legitimate acts of the government in any
and all of its departments. But when this had been done,
it remained true that the Union possessed the powers
conferred upon it, and that these were to be found enumerated in the instrument of government unrler which it was
formed. But lest there might be any possible question of
this in the minds of those wielding any portion of this
authority, it wa.s declared by. the tenth article of the
amendments, that " The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
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the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the

people." 1

From what has just been said, it is manifest that there

must be a difference in the presumption that attends an

exercise of national and one of State powers. The differ-

ence is this. To ascertain whether any power assumed by

the government of the United States is rightfully assumed,

the Constitution is to be examined in order to see whether

expressly or by fair implication the power has been granted,

and if the grant does not appear, the assumption must be

held unwarranted. To ascertain whether a State right-

fully exercises a power, we have only to see whether by

the Constitution of the United States it is conceded to the

Union, or by that Constitution or that of the State pro-

hibited to be exercised at all. The presumption must be

that the State rightfully does what it assumes to do, until

it is made to appear how, by constitutional concessions, it

has devested itself of the power, or by its own Constitution

has for the time rendered the exercise unwarrantable.2

It is Supreme. — By Article VI. it is declared that" This

Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall

be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or
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which shall be made, under the authority of the United

States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the

judges, in every State, shall be bound thereby, anything in

the Constitution and laws of any State to the contrary

notwithstanding."8 Upon this it is to be observed: —

1. The Congress of the United States derives its power

1 The corresponding article in the Confederation was : "Each State

retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,

jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly

delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." — Art. II.

2 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash. C. C. 313;

Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; United States v. Cruikshanks,

92 U. S. Rep. 542.

8 Const U. S., Art. VI. § 2.

the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the
people." 1
From what has just been said, it is manifest that there
must be a difference in the presumption that attends an
exercise of national and one of State powers. The difference is this. To ascertain whether any power assumed by
the government of the United States is rightfully assumed,
the Constitution is to be examined in order to see whether
expressly or byfair implication the power has been granted,
and if the grant does not appear, the assumption must be
held unwarranted. To ascertain whether a State rightfully exercises a power, we have only to see whether by
the Constitution of the United States it is conceded to the
Union, or by that Constitution or that of the State prohibited to be exercised at all. The presumption must be
that the State rightfully does what it assumes to do, until
it is made to appear how, by constitutional concessions, it
has devested itself of the power, or by its own Constitution
has for the time rendered the exercise unwarrantable. 2
It is Supreme. -By Article VI. it is declared that'' This
Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land ; and the
judges, in every State, shall be bound thereby, anything in
the Constitution and laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding." 8 Upon this it is to be observed: 1. The Congress of the United States derives its power
1 The corresponding article in the Confederation was:" Each State
retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly
delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." -Art. II.
2 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash. C. C. 313;
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; United States v. Cruikshanks,
92 u. s. Rep. 542.
a Const. U.S., Art. VI.§ 2.
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to legislate from the Constitution, which is the measure of

its authority; and any enactment of Congress which is

opposed to its provisions, or is not within the grant of

powers made by it, is unconstitutional, and therefore no

law, and obligatory upon no one.1

2. As between a law of the United States made in pur-

suance of the Constitution and a treaty made under the

authority of the United States, if the two in any of their

provisions are found to conflict, the one last in point of

time must control.2 For the one as well as the other is an

act of sovereignty, differing only in form and in the organ

or agency through which the sovereign will is declared.

Each alike is the law of the land in its adoption, and the

last law must repeal whatever that is of no higher authority

is found to come in conflict with it. A treaty may there-

fore supersede a prior act of Congress;8 and, on the

other hand, an act of Congress may supersede a prior

treaty.4

3. A State law must yield to the supreme law, whether

expressed in the Constitution of the United States or in

any of its laws or treaties, so far as they come in collision,
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and whether it be a law in existence when the "supreme

law" was adopted, or enacted afterwards.8 The same is

true of any provision in the constitution of any State

which is found to be repugnant to the Constitution of the

Union.8 And not only must " the judges in every State"

1 Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 520; United States v. Cruik-

shanks, 92 U. S. Rep. 542.

2 Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314; Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635.

» Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253.

* The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616; Ropes v. Clinch, 8 Blatch.

304; Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curt. C. C. 454; Gray v. Clinton Bridge,

1 Woolw. 150.

5 Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199.

6 Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Jefferson Branch Bank v.

Skelly, 1 Black, 436; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Railroad
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to legislate from the Constitution, which is the measure of
1ts authority ; and any enactment of Congress which is
opposed to its provisions, or is not within the grant of
powers made by it, is unconstitutional, and therefore no
law, and obligatory upon no one. 1
2. As between a law of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution and a treaty made under the
authority of the United States, if the two in any of their
provisions are found to conflict, the one last in point of
time must control. 2 For the one as well as the other is an
act of sovereignty, differing only in form and in the organ
or agency through which the sovereign will is declared.
Each alike is the law of the land in its adoption, and the
last law must repeal whatever that is of no higher authority
is found to come in conflict with it. A treaty may therefore supersede a prior act of Congress ; 8 and, on the
other hand, an act of Congress may supersede a prior
treaty.•
3. A State law must yield ro the supreme law, whether
expressed in the Constitution of the United States or in
any of its laws or treaties, so far as they come in collision,
and whether it be a law in existence when the " supreme
law" was adopted, or enacted afterwards. 6 The same is
true of any provision in the constitution of any State
which is found to be repugnant to the Constitution of the
Union. 6 And not only must'' the judges in every State"
1 Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 606, 620 ; United States v. Cruikshanks, 92 U. S. Rep. 642.
.
2 Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314; Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 685.
a Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253.
' The Cherokee Tobacco, 11Wall.616; Ropes v. Clinch, 8 Blatch.
304; Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curt. C. C. 454; Gray v. Clinton Bridge,
1Woolw.150.
6 Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199.
& Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Jefferson Branch Bank v.
Skelly, 1 Black, 436; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Railroad
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be bound by such supreme law, but so must the State

itself, and every official in all its departments, and every

citizen.

4. The Constitution itself never yields to treaty or enact-

ment; it neither changes with time, nor does it in theory

bend to the force of circumstances. It may be amended

according to its own permission; but while it stands, it is

"a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace,

and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of

men, at all times and under all circumstances." Its prin-

ciples cannot, therefore, be set aside in order to meet

the supposed necessities of great crises. "No doctrine in-

volving more pernicious consequences was ever invented

by the wit of man, than that any of its provisions can

be suspended during any of the great exigencies of gov-

ernment. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or

despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based

is false; for the government within the Constitution has

all the powers granted to it which are necessary to pre-

serve its existence, as has been happily proved by the re-

sult of the great effort to throw off its just authority."1

State Rights. — This phrase is common in political dis-
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cussions, and especially in those which relate to the powers

of the federal government, and its proper sphere of action

under the Constitution. The meaning is likely to differ

as do the constitutional views of those who make use of it.

At certain constitutional crises it has been insisted by

some persons that the right to nullify any congressional

enactments which were deemed to be unauthorized by the

Constitution, and the right when the Union became op-

pressive to withdraw the consent of the State thereto, and

thereby secede from it, were within the compass of the

Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511; "White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646; Gunn v.

Barry, 15 Wall. 610; Padific Railroad Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. 36.

» Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 120.

3

be bound by such supreme law, but so must the State
itself, and every official in all its departments, and every
citizen.
4. The Constitution itself never yields to treaty or enactment ; it neither changes with time, nor does it in theory
bend to the force of circumstances. It may be amended
according to its own permission ; but while it stands, it is
'' a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace,
and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times and under all circumstances." Its principles cannot, therefbre, be set aside in order to meet
the supposed necessities of great crises. '' No doctrine jnvolving more pernicious consequences was ever invented
by the wit of man, than that any of its provisions can
be suspended during any. of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or
despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based
is false ; for the government within the Constitution has
all the powers granted to it which are necessary to preserve its existence, as has been happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority." 1
State Righ.ts. -This phrase is common in political discussions, and especially in those which relate to the powers
of the federal government, and its proper sphere of action
under the Constitution. The meaning is likely to differ
as do the constitutional views of those who make use of it.
At certain constitutional crises it has been insisted by
some persons that the right to nullify any congressional
enactments which were deemed to be unauthorized by the
Constitution, and the right when the Union became oppressive to withdraw the consent of the State thereto, and
thereby secede from it, were within the compass of the
Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646; Gunn v.
Barry, 16 Wall. 610 ; Pa<!iftc Railroad Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. 36.
l Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 120.
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reserved rights of the States; and therefore State rights,

as a generic term, would in the mind of such persons in-

clude these. By their opponents the term would then be

used as a term of reproach, and as indicating that those

who professed to be their advocates held disorganizing

views, and perhaps indulged revolutionary purposes. These

extreme views are now for the most part abandoned, and

those who profess to be the special advocates and sup-

porters of state rights put forward as their leading prin-

ciple a strict construction of the federal Constitution, and

insist that that instrument has been greatly perverted from

its original purpose, and federal powers greatly enlarged

at the expense of the States, under the doctrine of a grant

of powers by implication. Among those who profess to

be the special advocates of national rights are also persons

of extreme views, some of whom contend that the nation

is to be considered the fountain and source of all sover-

eignty, and the States as emanations from it; a view that

would change radically the rules of constitutional construc-

tion which the courts have laid down. Thus the extreme

views on one side tend to disintegration, and on the other
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to centralization; but the adherents to the national, as

distinguished from the state rights idea, may be said to

advocate only a liberal construction of national powers as

being essential to accomplish the purposes for which the

Union was formed, and therefore within the intent of those

who formed it.

In a constitutional view, state rights consist of those

rights which belonged to the States when the Constitution

was formed, and have not by that instrument been granted

to the federal government, or prohibited to the States.

They are maintained by limiting the exercise of federal

power to the sphere which the Constitution expressly or by

fair implication assigns to it. This^is a statement of the

legal principle, but the parties who accept it may still in

reserved rights of the States ; and therefore State rights,
as a generic term, would in the mind of such persons include these. By their opponents the term would then be
used as a term of reproach, and as indicating that those
who professed to be their advocates held disorganizing
'liews, and perhaps indulged revolu~ionary purposes. These
extreme views are now for the most part abandoned, and
those who profess to be the special advocates and supporters of state rights put forward as their leading principle a strict construction of the federal Constitution, and
insist that that instrument has been greatly perverted from
its original purpose, and federal powers greatly enlarged
at the expense of the States, under the doctrine of a grant
of powers by implication. Among those who profess to
be the special advocates of national rights are also persons
of extreme views, some of whom contend that the nation
is to be considered the fountain and source of all sover- ·
eignty, and the States as emanations from it; a view that
would change radically the rules of constitutional construction which the courts have laid down. Thus the extreme
views on one side tend to disintegration, and on the other
to centralization ; but the adherents to the national, as
distinguished from the state rights idea, may be said to
advocate only a liberal construction of national powers as_
being essential to accomplish the purposes for which the
Union was formed, and therefore within the intent of those
who formed it.
In a constitutional view, state rights consist of those
rights which belonged to the States when the Constitution
was formed, and have not by that instrument been granted
to the federal government, or prohibited to the States.
They are maintained by limiting the exercise of federal
power to the sphere which the Constitution expressly or by
fair implication assigns to it. This 's a state!llent of the
legal principle, but the parties who accept it may still in
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applying it find ample occasion for differences respecting

the proper scope of national and State powers respectively.

When a particular power is found to belong to the

States, they are entitled to the same complete independ-

ence in its exercise as is the national government in

wielding its own authority. Each within its sphere has

sovereign powers.1

Concurrent Powers. — The mere grant of a power to

Congress does not of itself, in most cases, imply a prohibi-

tion upon the States to exercise the like power. The full

sphere of federal powers may, at the discretion of Con-

gress, be occupied or not, as the wisdom of that body may

determine. If not fully occupied, the States may legislate

within the same sphere, subject, however, to any subse-

quent legislation that Congress may adopt. It is not the

mere existence of the national power, but its exercise,

which is incompatible with the exercise of the same power

by the States.2 The few exceptions in which the grant

to Congress is necessarily exclusive will be mentioned

further on.

Reserved Rights. — In the incorporation in the Constitu-

tion of a bill of personal rights and liberties by the first
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ten articles of the amendments, it was deemed important

to declare in the ninth article that "the enumeration in

the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to

deny or disparage others retained by the people." The

occasion for this article is supposed to have been found in

the apology of the Federalist for the absence of a bill of

rights in the Constitution as first adopted, where the writer

suggested that such a bill might be dangerous, since it

would contain various exceptions to powers not granted,

and on this very account would afford a tolerable pretext

1 Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash. C. C. 813; Calder ». Bull, 8 Dall. 886;

Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397,406.

* Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat 122, 196.

applying it find ample occasion for differences respecting
the proper scope of national and State powers respectively.
When a particular power is found to belong to the
States, they are entitled to the same complete independence in its exercise as is the national government in
wielding its own authority. Each within its sphere has
sovereign powers .1 .
Concurrent Powers. - The mere grant of a power to
Congress does not of itself, in most cases, imply a prohibition upon· the States to exercise the like power. The full
sphere of federal powers may, at the discretion of Congress, be occupied or not, as the wisdom of that body may
determine. If not fully occupied, the States may legislate
within the same sphere, subject, however, to any subsequent legislation that Congress may adopt. It is not the
mere existence of the national power, but its exercise,
which is incompatible with the exercise of the same power
by the States. 2 The few exceptions in which the grant
to Congress is necessarily exclusive will be mentioned
further on.
Reserved Rights. -In the incorporation in the Constitution of a bill of personal rights and liberties by the first
ten articles of the amendments, it was deemed important
to declare in the ninth article that '' the enumeration in
the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." The
occasion for this article is supposed to have been found in
the apology of the Federalist for the absence of a bill of
rights in the Constitution as first adopted, where the writer
suggested that such a bill might be dangerous, since it
would contain various exceptions to powers not granted,
and on this very account would afford a tolerable pretext
1 Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash. C. C. 813; Calder v. Bull, 8 Dall. 386;
Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 606; Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 406.
t Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 196.
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to claim more than were granted.1 However unfounded

such a fear might be, there could be no harm in affirming

by this amendment the principle that constitutions are not

made to create rights in the people, but in recognition of,

and in order to preserve them, and that if any are spe-

cially enumerated and specially guarded, it is only because

they are peculiarly important or peculiarly exposed to in-

vasion.

The Territories. — The Constitution was made for the

States, not for Territories. It confers power to govern

Territories, but in exercising this the United States is a

sovereign dealing with dependent territory according as in

its wisdom shall seem politic, wise, and just, having re-

gard to its own interests as well as to those of the people

of the Territories.2 It is believed, however, that the secu-

rities for personal liberty which are incorporated in the

Constitution were intended as limitations of its power

over any and all persons who might be within its jurisdic-

tion anywhere, and that citizens of the Territories as well

as citizens of the States may claim the benefit of their

protection.
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In this dependence of the Territories upon the central

government there is some outward resemblance to the con-

dition of the American Colonies under the British Crown;

but there are some differences which are important, and

indeed vital. The first of these is that the territorial con-

dition is understood under the Constitution to be merely

temporary and preparatory, and the people of the Terri-

tories while it continues are assured of the right to create

and establish State institutions for themselves so soon as

the population shall be sufficient and the local conditions

suitable; while the British colonial system contained no

i Federalist, No. 84.

a American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511; Scott v. Jones, 5 How.

343.

to claim more than were granted. 1 However unfounded
such a fear might be, there could be no harm in affirming
by this amendment the principle that constitutions are not
made to create rights in the people, but in recognition of, and in order to preserve them, and that if any are specially enumerated and specially guarded, it is only because
they are peculiarly important or peculiarly exposed to in'"asion.
The Terri'tories. -The Constitution was made for the
States, not for Territories. It confers power to govern
Territories, but in exercising this the United States is a
sovereign dealing with dependent territory according as in
its wisdom shall seem politic, wise, and just, having regard to its own interests as well as to those of the people
of the Territories. 2 It is believed, however, that the securities for, personal liberty which are incorporated in the
Constitution were intended as limitations of its power
over any and all persons who might be within its jurisdiction anywhere, and that citizens of the Territories as well
as citizens of the States may claim the benefit of their
protection.
In this dependence of the Territories upon the central
government there is some outward resemblance to the condition of the American Colonies under the British Crown ;
but there are some differences which are important, and
indeed vital. The first of these is that the territorial condition is understood under the Constitution to be merely
temporary and preparatory, and the people of the Territories while it continues are assured of the right to create
and establish State institutions for themselves so soon as
the population shall be sufficient and the local conditions .
suitable ; while the British colonial system contained no
1
t

343.

Federalist, No. 84.
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 611; Scott v. Jones; 6 How.
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promise or assurance of any but a dependent government

indefinitely. The second is that above given, that the

people of the American Territories are guaranteed all the

benefits of the principles of constitutional right which

protect life, liberty, and property, and may defend them

under the law, even as against the action of the government

itself; while in the Colonies these principles were the sub-

ject of dispute, and, if admitted, would be within the

control of an absolute imperial legislature, which might

overrule them at will. There is also a difference in respect

to taxation, which, though not so striking, is still impor-

tant. The Territories levy their own taxes for all local

purposes, and they are never taxed separately for national

purposes, but only as parts of a whole country, and under

the same rules and for the same purposes as are the

States. Nor is it intended to realize from them any reve-

nue for the national treasury beyond what is expended by

the United States in their interest.

Amendments. — In the adoption of the Constitution pro-

vision was made for amendments to be made under regular

forms, which should not only give to the people an easy

method of removing any evils that might be found to exist
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in their institutions, and of keeping them in sympathy

with the prevailing sentiments and desires of the people,

but should take away all reasonable excuse for attempts at

revolution by force. Two methods of amendment were

provided for. First, by Congress — two thirds of both

houses assenting — proposing amendments for ratification

by the legislatures or by conventions of the States, which

shall be valid to all intents and purposes when ratified by

three fourths of the States; and Second, by Congress on

the application of two thirds of the States calling a con- •

vention for proposing amendments, which when ratified in

like manner shall be valid as aforesaid. The only restric-

tion imposed on the power to amend is this: that "No

promise or assurance of any but a dependent government
indefinitely. The second is that above given, that the
people of the American Territories are guaranteed all the
benefits of the princip1es of constitutional right which
protect life, liberty, and property, and may defend them
under the law, even as against the action of the government
itself; while in the Colonies these principles were the subject of dispute, and, if admitted, would be within the
control of an absolute imperial legislature, which nrlght
overrule them at will. There is also a difference in respect
to taxation, which, though not so striking, is still important. The Territories levy their own taxes for all local
purposes, and they are never taxed separately for national
purposes, but only as parts of a whole country, and under
the same rules and for the same purposes as are the
States. Nor is it intended to realize from them any revenue for the national treasury beyond what is expende<:} by
the United States in their interest .
.Amendments. - In the adoption of the Constitution provision was made for amendments to be made under regular
forms, which should not only give to the people an easy
method of removing any evils that might be found to exist
in their institutions, and of keeping them in sympathy
with the prevailing sentiments and desires of the people,
but should take away all reasonable excuse for attempts at
revolution by force. Two methods of amendment were
provided for. First, by Congress - two thirds of both
houses assenting - proposing amendments for ratification
by the legislatures or by conventions of the States, which
shall be valid to all intents and purposes when ratified by
three fourths of the States ; and Second, by Congress on
the application of two thirds of the States calling a convention for proposing amendments, which when ratified in
like manner shall be valid as aforesaid. The only restriction imp.osed on the power to amend is this: that ''No
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State without its consent shall be deprived of its equal

suffrage in the Senate."1 In theory, except as changes

are so made, the Constitution is to remain the settled and

definite law of the nation; meaning the same thing to-day,

to-morrow, and forever; its written provisions, stipula-

tions, and guaranties being subject to no such growth,

amplification, and modification as inheres in the unwritten

constitution of Great Britain.

But it is not in the nature of institutions to remain

stationary, however they may be formulated and declared,

especially when the government has within itself the power

to determine its own jurisdiction, and to solve in its own

favor at discretion all questions of disputed authority. It

has been truly said that "power, when it has attained a

certain degree of energy and independence, goes on gen-

erally to further degrees. But when below that degree

the direct tendency is to further degrees of relaxation,

until the abuses of liberty beget a sudden transition to an

undue degree of power."a The government of the United

States was below the degree of self-protecting energy while

the Articles of Confederation constituted the bond of
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union, but it attained at a bound to due energy and inder

pendence under the administration of Washington and

Hamilton while the judiciary was in accord with their

views, and if the period of relaxation ever came, its in-

fluence upon the authority asserted for the government

was not great, and was only temporary. The principles

that at one time applied the power over commerce to the

regulation of navigation,8 at a later day are found equally

applicable to traffic and travel by railroad4 and communi-

cation by telegraph;6 and though these new applications

1 Const., Art. V. 2 Madison, Life by Rives, ii. 641.

8 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.

* Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584.

6 Pensacola Tel. Co. v. West. TJ. Tel. Co., 96 IT. S. Rep. 1.

State without its consent shall be deprived of its equal
suffrage in the Senate." 1 In theory, except as changes
are so made, the Constitution is to remain the settled and
definite law of the nation; meaning the same thing to-day,
to-morrow, and forever ; its written provisions, stipulations, and guaranties being subject to no such growth,
amplification, and modification as inheres in the unwritten
constitution of Great Britain.
But it is not in the nature of institutions to remain
stationary, however they may be formulated and declared,
especially when the government has within itself the power
to determine its own jurisdiction, and to solve in its own
favor at discretion all questions of disputed authority. It
has been truly said that "power, when it has attained a
certain degree of energy and independence, goes on generally to further degrees. But when below that degree
the direct tendency is to further degrees of relaxation,
until the abuses of liberty beget a sudden transition to an
undue degree of power." 2 The government of the United
States was below the degree of self-protecting energy while
the Articles of Confederation constituted . the bond of
union, but it attained at a bound to due energy and ind~
pendence under the administration of Washington and
Hamilton while the judiciary was in accord with their
views, and if the period of relaxation ever came, its influence upon the authority asserted for the government
was not great, and was only temporary. The principles
that at one time applied the power over commerce to the
regulation of navigation, 8 at a later day are found equally
applicable to traffic and travel ·by railroad 4 and communication by telegraph ; 6 and though these new applications
Const., Art. V.
!2 Madison, Life by Rives, ii. 641.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.
' Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 10 Wall. 584.
I Pensacola Tel. Co. v. West. U. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. Rep. 1.
1
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of principle do not in the least depart from or enlarge

former doctrines, they nevertheless strengthen greatly the

national power by the immensity of the interests it is thus

invited to take under its control. So the authority to pur-

chase territory at one time is found equal to the annexation

of an independent state at another. The gradual energiz-

ing of federal authority has been accomplished quite as

much by the course of public events as by the new amend-

ments to the Constitution; and however careful every fed-

eral and state official and every citizen may be to so

perform all political functions as to preserve under all cir-

cumstances the true constitutional balance of powers, and

to sanction no unconstitutional encroachments, there can

be no question that the new interests coming gradually

within the purview of federal legislation, and the increase

in magnitude and importance of those already urder fed-

eral control, must have a still further tendency in the di-

rection indicated.

Majority Rule. — Government in the United States and

in the several States, in all its grades, is representative;

the body of the people performing very few acts directly,

except that of adopting the Constitution. When they act
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directly, the result of their will must be ascertained by

such preponderating vote as the law shall prescribe. This

may be a majority vote, or it may be merely the vote in

which the largest number of electors agree. In determin-

ing upon a majority or plurality, those only are counted

who actually participated in the election, except in a few

cases where by some constitutional provision an actual

majority of all the electors is required.

American government is frequently spoken of as a gov-

ernment based on faith in majorities, and the machinery of

election as being provided merely to ascertain what the

will of the majority is. But the government is never

handed over to the absolute control of the majority, and

of principle do not in the least depart from or enlarge
former doctrines, they nevertheless strengthen greatly the
national power by the immensity of the interests it is thus
invited to take under its control. So the authority to purchase territory at one time is found equal to the annexation
of an independent state at another. The gradual energizing of federal authority has been accomplished quite as
much by the course of public events as by the new amendments to the Constitution ; and however careful every federal and state official and every citizen may be to so
perform all political functions as to preserve under all circumstances the true constitutional balance of powers, and
1io sanction no unconstitutional encroachments, there can
be no question that the new interests coming gradually
within the purview of federal legislation, and the increase
in magnitude and importance of those already m:der federal control, must have a still further tendency in the direction indicated.
Majority Rule. - Government in the United States and
in the several States, in all its grades, is representative ;
the body of the people performing very few acts directly,
except that of adopting the Constitution. When they act
directly, the result of their will must be ascertained by
such preponderating vote as the law shall prescribe. This
may be a majority vote, or it may be merely the vote in
which the largest number of electors agree. In detennining upon a majority or plurality, those only are counted
who actually participated in the election, except in a few
cases where by some constitutional provision an actual
maj01ity of all the electors is required.
American government is frequently spoken of as a government based on faith in majorities, and the machinery of
election as being provided merely to ascertain what the
will of the majority is. But the government is never
handed over to the absolute control of the majority, and
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many precautions are taken to prevent its expressing exclu-

sively their will: — 1. In the Constitution many permanent

rules are prescribed which control the majority absolutely,

and which cannot be changed except by the slow process

of constitutional amendment. 2. The times and methods

of election of legislative and executive officers are so con-

trived that in different branches of the government the

majority of one period will be restrained and checked by

the majority of another, and it is scarcely possible that any

considerable minority shall not have its representatives,

and be entitled to be heard through them in the legisla-

ture, in ways that shall at least hold the majority to due

accountability for their conduct and measures. It must

often be the case that one house of the legislature will

represent the views of a popular majority, and the other

those of a minority only; but for all purposes of enact-

ing laws, the latter has as much authority as the former.

3. The electoral system is so contrived that the President

is sometimes chosen by a minority of the people; but un-

less a majority is overwhelming, he may generally defeat

its measures by his veto. 4. All the safeguards which
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under kingly government were ever interposed to the

tyrannical power of rulers are incorporated in the bills of

rights in the American constitutions as absolute limita-

tions laid on the power of the majority for the protection

of the liberty, property, privileges, and immunities of

the minority, and of every individual citizen; and the

judiciary is given a power to enforce these limitations,

irrespective of the will or control of the legislature,

such as it has never possessed in any other country.

So far then from the government being based on un-

limited confidence in majorities, a profound distrust of

the discretion, equity, and justice of their rule is made

evident in many precautions and checks, and the ma-

jority is in fact trusted with power only so far as is

many precautions are taken t.o prevent its expressing exclusively their will: -1. In the Constitution many pe1·manent
rules are prescribed which control the majority absolutely,
and which cannot be changed except by the slow process
of constitutional amendment. 2. The times and methods
of election of legislative and executive officers are so contrived that in different branches of the government th&
majority of one period will be restrained and checked by
the majority of another, and it is scarcely possible that any
considerable minority shall not have its representatives,
and be entitled to be heard through them in the legislature, in ways that shall at least hold the majority to due
accountability for their conduct and measures. It must
often be the case that one house of the legislature will
represent the views of a popular majority, 8Jld the other
those of a minority only; but for all purposes of enacting laws, the latter has as much authority as the former.
3. The electoral system is so contrived that the President
is sometimes chosen by a minmity of the people ; but unless a majority is overwhelming, he may generally defeat
its measures by his veto. 4. All the safeguards which
under kingly government were ever interposed to the
tyrannical power of rulers are incorporated in the bills of
rights in the American constitutions as absolute limitations laid on the power of the majority for the protection
of the liberty, property, privileges, and immunities of
the minority, and of every individual citizen ; and the
judiciary is given a power to enforce these limitations,
irrespective of the will or control of the legislature,
such as it has never possessed in any other country.
So far then from the government being based on unlimited confidence in majorities, a profound distrust of
the discretion, equity, and just.ice of their rule is made
evident in many precautions and checks, and the majority is in fact trusted with power only so far as is
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absolutely essential to the working of republican insti-

tutions.

Instruction of Representatives. — The care taken to im-

pose restraints on the action of temporary majorities is

sufficient to demonstrate the want of constitutional basis

for the opinion that representatives are bound to obey the

instructions of their constituents from time to time com-

municated to them. But it would be conclusive, also,

against such an opinion, that no method is provided, or is

available, by means of which instructions can be authori-

tatively given. A representative in Congress is chosen

by popular vote, at an election of which all must take no-

tice; but there is no machinery for gathering the voice of

all electors again until the next general election, and it is

then gathered only in the ballots which express a choice

between candidates. Between the elections the constitu-

ents may speak through the press and by petitions, but

these are not authoritative, and it can seldom be known

from such expressions what is the popular will. Senators

sometimes consider themselves bound to respect and obey

the instructions of state legislatures; but these are com-

posed only of delegates of the people, and they may rep-
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resent the sentiments of the constituency no more than

the Senator himself.

But aside from practical difficulties, the right to instruct

representatives cannot on principle be sustained. Repre-

sentatives are chosen in States and districts; but when

chosen they are legislators for the whole country, and are

bound in all they do to regard the interest of the whole.

Their own immediate constituents have no more right than

the rest of the nation to address them through the press,

to appeal to them by petition, or to have their local in-

terests considered by them in legislation. They bring

with them their knowledge of local wants, sentiments, and

opinions, and may enlighten Congress respecting these,

absolutely essential to the working of republican institutions.
Instruction of Representatives. -The care taken to impose restraints on the action of temporary majorities is
sufficient to demonstrate the want of constitutional basis
for the opinion that representatives are bound to obey the
instructions of their constituents from time to time communicated to them. But it would be conclusive, also,
against such an opinion, that no method is provided, or is
available, by means of which instructions can be authoritatively given. A representative in Congress is chosen
by popular vote, at an election of which all must take notice ; but there is no machinery for gathering the voice of
all electors again until the next general election, and it is
then gathered only in the ballots which express a choice
between candidates. Between the elections the constituents may speak through the press and by petitions, but
these are not authoritative, and it can seldom be known
from such expressions what is the popular will. Senators
sometimes consider themselves bound to respect and obey
the instructions of state legislatures ; but these are composed only of delegates of the people, and they may represent the sentiments of the constituency no more than
the Senator himself.
But aside from practical difficulties, the right to instruct
representatives cannot on principle be sustained. Representatives are chosen in States and districts ; but when
chosen they are legislators for the whole country, and are
bound in all they do to regard the interest of the whole.
Their own immediate constituents have no more right than
the rest of the nation to address them through the press,
to appeal to them by petition, or to have their local interests considered by them in legislation. They bring
with them their knowledge of local wants, sentiments, and
opinions, and may enlighten Congress respecting these,
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and thereby aid all the members to act wisely in matters

which affect the whole country; but the moral obligation

to consider the interest of one part of the country as much

as that of another, and to legislate with a view to the best

interests of all, is obligatory upon every member, and no

one can be relieved from this obligation by instructions

from any source. Moreover, the special fitness to legis-

late for all, which is acquired by the association, mutual

information, and comparison of views of a legislative

body, cannot be had by the constituency, and the advan-

tages would be lost to legislation if the right of instruc-
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tion were recognized.

and thereby aid all the members to act wisely in matters
which affect the whole country ; but the moral obligation
to consider the interest of one part of the country as much
as that of another, and to legislate with a view to the best
interests of all, is obligatory upon every member, and no
. one can be relieved from this obligation by instructions
from any source. Moreover, the special fitness to legislate for all, which is acquired by the association, mutual
information, and comparison of views of a legislative
body, cannot be had by the constituency, and the advantages would be lost to legislation if the right of instruction were recognized.
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CHAPTER m.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT.

Necessity of Separation of Powers. — When all the powers

of sovereignty are exercised by a single person or body,

who alone makes laws, determines complaints of their vio-

lation, and attends to their execution, the question of a

classification of powers can have only a theoretical im-

portance, for the obvious reason that nothing can depend

CHAPTER III.

upon it, which can have practical influence upon the happi-

ness and welfare of the people. But inasmuch as a gov-

ernment with all its powers thus concentrated must of

DISTRIBUTION OF THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT.

necessity be an arbitrary government, in which passion and

caprice is as likely to dictate the course of public affairs

as a sense of right and justice, it is a maxim in political

science that, in order to the due recognition and protection

of rights, the powers of government must be classified

according to their nature, and each class intrusted for

exercise to a different department of the government.

This arrangement gives each department a certain inde-

pendence, which operates as a restraint upon such action

of the others as might encroach on the rights and liberties

of the people, and makes it possible to establish and en-
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force guaranties against attempts at tyranny. We thus

have the checks and balances of government, which are

supposed to be essential to free institutions.

Classification. — The natural classification of govern-

mental powers is into legislative, executive, and judicial.

The legislative power is the power to make laws and to

alter them at discretion; the executive power is the power

to see that the laws are duly executed and enforced; the

Necessity of Separation of Powers. -When all the powers
of sovereignty are exercised by a single person or body,
who alone makes laws, determines complaints of their violation, and attends to their execution, the question of a
classification of powers can have only a theoretical importance, for the obvious reason that nothing can depend
upon it, which can have practical influence upon the happiness and welfare of the people. But inasmuch as a government with all its powers thus concentrated must of
necessity be an arbitrary government, in which passion and
caprice is as likely to dictate the course of public affairs
as a sense of right and justice, it is a maxim in political
science that, in order to the due recognition and protection
of rights, the powers of government must be classified
according to their nature, and each class intrusted for
exercise to a different department of the government.
This an-angement gives each department a certain independence, which operates as a restraint upon such action
of the others as might encroach on the rights and liberties
of the people, and makes it possible to establish and enforce guaranties against attempts at tyranny. We thus
have the checks and balances of government, which are
supposed to be essential to free institutions.
Olass·ification. -The natural classification of governmental powers is into legislative, executive, and judicial. •
The legislative power is the power to make laws and to
alter them at discretion ; the executive power is the power
to see that the laws are duly executed and enforced; the
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judicial power is the power to construe and apply the law

when controversies arise concerning what has been done

or omitted under it. Legislative power therefore deals

mainly with the future, and executive power with the

present, while judicial power is retrospective, dealing only

with acts done or threatened, promises made, and injuries

suffered.1 The line of division is nevertheless somewhat

indefinite, since in many cases the legislature may desig-

nate the agents for the execution of its enactments, and

the judiciary is expected to enforce the law in such contro-

versies as are brought before it; while the executive and

the judiciary may respectively make rules which are in the

nature of laws, for the regulation of its own course in the

discharge of its duties. There are then powers strictly

legislative, others strictly executive, and others strictly

judicial; while still other powers may be exercised by one

department or by another, according as the law may

provide. For illustration the case may be taken of rules

for regulating the practice of courts, which are sometimes

made by the legislature and sometimes by the courts; and

also the case of the appointment of officers and agents,
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subordinate to the chief executive, to see to the enforcement

of the laws; which can be made by law except as the Con-

stitution has conferred the power upon the executive.a

And whenever a power is not distinctly either legislative,

executive, or judicial, and is not by the Constitution dis-

tinctly confided to a department of the government desig-

nated, the mode of its exercise, and the agency, must

necessarily be determined by law; in other words, must

necessarily be under the control of the legislature.8

I Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 46; Bates v. Chapman, 2

Chip. (Vt.) 77; Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 489; Jones v.

Perry, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 59; Shumway v. Bennett, 29 Micb. 451;

Taylor v. Place, 4 K. I . 324; Ex parte Burns, 1 Tenn. Ch. 83.

II Field v. People, 3 111. 80; Bridges v. Shallcross, 6 W. Va. 562.

8 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386.

judicial power is the power to construe and apply the law
when controversies arise concerning what has been done
or omitted under it. Legislative power therefore deals
mainly with the future, and executive power with the
present, whi~e judicial power is retrospective, dealing only
with acts done or threatened, promises made, and injuries
suffered. 1 The line of division is nevertheless somewhat
indefinite, since in many cases the legislature may designate the agents for the execution of its enactments, and
the judieiary is expected to enforce the law in such controversies as are brought before it; while the executive nnd
the judiciary may respectively make rules which are in the
nature of laws, for the regulation of its own course in the
discharge of its duties. There are then powers strictly
legislative, others strictly executive, and others strictly
judicial; while still other powers may be exercised by one
department or by another, according as the law may
provide. For illustration the case may be tak'en of rules
for regulating the practice of courts, which are sometimes
made by the legislature and sometimes by the courts ; and
also the case of the appointment of officers and agents,
subordinate to the chief executive, to see to the enforcement
of the laws ; which can be made by law except as the Constitution has conferred the power upon the executive. 2
And whenever a power is not distinctly either legislative,
executive, or judicial, and is not by the Constitution distinctly confided to a department of the government designated, the mode of its exercise, and the agency, must
necessarily be determined by law ; in other words, must
necessarily be under the control of the legislature. 8
Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 46; Bates v. Chapman, 2
Chip. (Vt.) 77; Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 489; Jones v.
Perry, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 69; Shumway v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 461;
Taylor z:. Place, 4 R. I. 324; Ex parte Burns, 1 Tenn. C_h. 83.
i Field v. People, 3 Ill. 80 ; Bridges v. Shallcross, 6 W. Va. 662.
a Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386.
1
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But when a department is created for the exercise of

judicial authority, the act itself constitutes a setting apart

to it for exercise of the whole judicial power of the sover-

eignty with such exceptions only as the Constitution itself

may make.1 As therefore the determination of a contro-

versy on existing facts where there are adverse interests

is judicial action, the act is not within the compass of

legislation; neither is the setting aside of judgments and

granting of new trials ;2 nor the opening of controversies

after remedy under the general law is gone;8 nor, it seems,

the giving of an appeal after the time allowed by law has

expired,4 though as to this last there are decisions contra.1

Neither can the legislature bind parties interested by a re-

cital of facts, or prescribe conclusive rules of evidence, for

either of these would be only an indirect method of dispos-

ing of controversies.6 These cases will sufficiently suggest

the proper rule of decision for others.7

The Departments of Government. — The Constitution of

the United States creates three departments of government,

and directly or by implication determines their powers.

The Legislature. —All the legislative powers granted by

1 Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 489; Alexander v. Bennett,
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60 N. Y. 204; Van Slyke v. Ins. Co., 39 "Wis. 390.

2 Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326; Dorsey v. Dorsey, 37 Md. 64; Oliver

v. McClure, 28 Ark. 555; Hooker v. Hooker, 18 Miss. 599.

* Bradford v. Brooks, 2 Aik. (Vt.) 284; Brent v. Chapman, 5

Cranch, 358; Lefflngwell ». Warren, 2 Black, 599.

* Hill ». Sunderland, 3 Vt. 507; Burch v. Newberry, 10 N. Y. 374.

See Carleton v. Goodwin's executor, 41 Ala. 153.

6 Prout v. Berry, 2 Gill, (Md.) 147; Page r. Mathews's Admr., 40

Ala. 547; Wheeler's Appeal, 45 Conn. 306. To take away a statutory

right of appeal is not an exercise of judicial authority. Ex parte

MoCardle, 7 Wall. 506.

6 Parmelee v. Thompson, 7 Hill, (N. Y.) 77; Lothrop v. Stedman,

But when a department is created for the exercise of
authority, the act itself constitutes a setting apart
to it for exercise of the whole judicial power of the sovereignty with such exceptions only as the Constitution itself
may make. 1 As therefore the determination of a controversy on existing facts where there are adverse interests
is judicial action, the act is not within the compass of
legislation ; neither is the setting aside of judgments and
granting of new trials ; 2 nor the opening of controversies
after remedy under the general law is gone ; 8 nor, it seems,
the giving of an appeal after the time allowed by law has
expired, 4 though as to this last there are decisions contra. 6
Neither can the legislature bind parties interested by a recital of facts, or prescribe conclusive rules of evidence, for
either of these would be only an indirect method of disposing of controversies. 8 These cases will sufficiently suggest
the proper rule of decision for others. 7
The Departments of Government. -The Constitution of
the United States creates three departments of government,
and directly or by implication determines their powers.
The Legislature.-· All the legislative powers granted by
jndici~l

42 Conn. 583, 592; McCready v. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 356; Groesbeck v.

Seeley, 13 Mich. 329.

'In Cooley, Const. Lim., ch. 5, is a large collection of authorities

on this general subject.

1 Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 489 ; Alexander v. Bennett,
60 N. Y. 204; Van Slyke v. Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 390.
~ Lewis v. Webb, 8 Me. 326; Dorsey v. Dorsey, 37 Md. 64; Oliver
v. McClure, 28 Ark. 655; Hooker v. Hooker, 18 Miss. 699.
a Bradford v. Brooks, 2 Aik. (Vt.) 284; Brent v. Chapman, 5
Cranch, 358 ; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 699.
• Hill v. Sunderland, 8 Vt. 607; Burch v. Newberry, 10 N. Y. 374.
See Carleton v. Goodwin's executor, 41 Ala. 168.
6 Prout v. Berry, 2 Gill, (Md.) 147; Page v. Mathews's Admr., 40
Ala. 647; Wheeler's Appeal, 46 Conn. 806. To take away a statutory
right of appeal is not an exercise of judicial authority. Ex parte
McCardle, 7 Wall. 606.
6 Parmelee v. Thompson, 7 Hill, (N. Y.) 77 ; Lothrop v. Stedman,
42 Conn. 683, 59'J ; McCready v. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 366 ; Groesbeck v.
Seeley, 13 Mich. 829.
1 In Cooley, Const. Lim., ch. 6, is a large collection of authoritie1
on this general subject.
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the Constitution are vested in a Congress consisting of a

Senate and House of Representatives,1 subject to a quali-

fied veto in the President.

The House of Representatives is composed of members

chosen every second year by the people of the several

States, and the electors in each State must have the

qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous

branch of the State legislature.2 Each State will deter-

mine for itself what these qualifications shall be.

No person can be a representative who has not attained

the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen

of the United States, or who at the time is not an inhab-

itant of the State in which he is chosen.8

Representatives are apportioned among the States ac-

cording to their respective numbers, counting the whole

number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not

taxed.4

The Senate is composed of two senators from each State,

chosen by the legislature thereof for six years, and divided

into three classes, so that one class is chosen every second

year. If vacancies happen, by resignation or otherwise,

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:44 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

during the recess of the legislature of any State, the ex-

ecutive thereof may make temporary appointments until

the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill

such vacancies.6

No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained

the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the

United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an

inhabitant of the State from which he shall be chosen.6

The House chooses its own Speaker, and other officers.7

» Const., Art. I. § 1. 2 Const., Art I. § 2.

8 Const., Art I . § 2, cl. 2.

* Const, Amendment 14, § 2. Note the qualification in the latter

part of the section.

* Const, Art. I. § 3. 8 Const, Art. I . § 3.

'Const, Art V. § 2.

the Constitution are vested in a Congress consisting of a
Senate and House of Representatives, 1 subject to a qualified veto in the President.
The House of Representatives is composed of members
chosen every second year by the people of the several
States, and the electors in each State must have the
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous
branch of the State legislature. 9 Each State will determine for itself what these qualifications shall be.
No person can be a representative who has not attained
the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen
of the United States, or who at the time is not an inhabitant of the State in which he is chosen. 1
Representatives are apportioned among the States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed.'
The Senate is composed of two senators from each State,
chosen by the legislature thereof for six years, and divided
into three classes, so that one class is chosen every second
year. If vacancies happen, by resignation or otherwise,
during the recess of the legislature of any State, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until
the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill
such vacancies. 6
No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained
the age of thirty years. and been nine years a citizen of the
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
inhabitant of the State from which he shall be chosen. 1
The House chooses its own Speaker, and other officers.'
Const., Art. I. § 1.
2 Const., Art. I. § 2.
a Const., Art. L § 2, cl. 2.
'Const., Amendment 14, § 2. Note the qualification in the latter
part of the section.
6 Const., Art. I. § 3.
e Const., Art. L § 8.
1 Const., Art V. § 2.
1
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The Vice-President of the United States is President of

the Senate, but without a vote except in case of equal di-

vision. The Senate chooses its other officers, and also a

President pro tempore in the absence of the Vice-President,

or when he shall exercise the office of President.1

The times, places, and manner of holding elections for

senators and representatives shall be provided in each State

by the legislature thereof; but Congress m&y at any time

by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the

place of choosing senators.2

It is provided by law that representatives in Congress

shall be chosen in single districts ;8 and that the elections

shall take place on the Tuesday next after the first Monday

of November.4 Vacancies are filled as may be provided

by state laws.6 All votes for representatives in Congress

must be by written or printed ballot, and all votes received

or recorded contrary to this provision are of no effect.6

For the election of senators it is provided that the legis-

lature of each State which is chosen next preceding the

expiration of the time for which any senator was elected

to represent such State in Congress, shall, on the second

Tuesday after the meeting and organization thereof, pro-
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ceed to elect a senator.7 If an election fails to be made

the first day, at least one vote is required to be taken every

day thereafter, during the session of the legislature, until

a senator is chosen.8 An existing vacancy is filled at the

same time and in the same way;9 and a vacancy occurring

during the session is filled by election, the proceedings for

which are had on the second Tuesday after the legislature

has organized and has notice of such vacancy.10

1 Const,. Art I. § 3. 2 Const., Art. 1. § 4.

8 Rev. Stat. TJ. S. (1878), § 23. * Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 25.

6 Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 26. 6 Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 27.

7 Rev. Stat. TJ. S. (1878), § 14. <» Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 15.

9 Rev. Stat. TJ. S. (1878), § 16. «> Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 17.

The Vice-President of the United States is President of
the Senate, but without a vote except in case of equal diVIs1on. The Senate chooses its other officers, and also a
President pro tempore in the absence of the Vice-President,
or when he shall exercise the office of President. 1
The times, places, and manner of holding elections for
senators and representatives shall be provided in each State
by the legislature thereof; but Congress may at any time
by law make or alter such regl,llations, except as to the
place of choosing senators. 2
It is provided by law that representatives in Congress
shall be chosen in single districts ; 8 and that the elections
shall take place on the Tuesday next after the first Monday
of November. 4 Vacancies are filled as may be provided
by state laws. 6 All votes for representatives in Congress
must be by written or printed ballot, and all votes received
or recorded contrary to this provision are of no effect. 8
For the election of senators it is provided that the legislature of each State which is chosen next preceding the
expiration of the time for which any senator was elected
to represent such State in Congress, shall, on the second
Tuesday after the meeting and organization thereof, proceed to elect a senator. 1 If an election fails to be made
the first day, at least one vote is required to be taken every
day thereafter, during the session of the legislature, until
a senator is chosen. 8 An existing vacancy is filled at the
same time and in the same way ; 9 and a vacancy occurring
during the session is filled by election, the proceedings for
which are had on the second Tuesday after the legislature
bas organized and has notice of such vacancy .10
Const,. Art I.§ 3.
3 Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 23.
6 Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 26.
T Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 14.
9 Rev. Stat. U.S. (1878), § 16.

1

~

Const., Art. "I. § 4.
' Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878),
8 Rev. Stat. U.S. (1878),
8 Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878),
10 Rev. Stat. U.S. (1878),

§ 25.
§ 27.
§ 15.
§ 17.
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When Congress convenes, the President of the Senate

administers the oath to its members,1 and takes charge of

the organization. The clerk of the next preceding House

of Representatives makes a roll of the representatives

elect, and places thereon the names of those persons, and

of those only, whose credentials show that they were regu-

larly elected in accordance with the laws of their States

respectively, or the laws of the United States.2 In case

of vacancy in the office of clerk, or of his absence or dis-

ability, the sergeant-at-arms of the next preceding house

performs this duty; and, in turn, it may devolve upon the

doorkeeper in case of vacancy in the office of. sergeant-at-

arms, or his absence or disability.8 The clerk acts as

temporary presiding officer of the House until a speaker

is chosen. The Senate is supposed to have a presiding

officer at all times.

Each house is judge of the elections, returns, and quali-

fications of its own members, and may determine the rules

of its proceeding, punish its members for disorderly be-

havior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a

member.4 Each house shall also keep a journal of its
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proceedings,6 and from time to time publish the same,

excepting such parts as in their judgment may require

« Rev. Stat. TJ. S. (1878), § 28. 2 Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 31.

» Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), §§ 32, 33.

4 This is a power that by common parliamentary law would exist

without being expressly conferred. It is "a necessary and incidental

power to enable the house to perform its high functions, and is neces-

sary to the safety of the State. It is a power of protection." And

a member may be expelled for misconduct when away from the

house on duty as a committee-man, as well as for misconduct during

its sessions. Hiss v. Bartlett, 3 Gray, (Mass.) 468.

6 Whether expunging a resolution, as was done by the Senate in

the case of the resolution of censure of General Jackson, is not a

violation of this provision, was much discussed in that case. Benton,

Thirty Years' View, ch. 159-161; Webster's Speeches, iv. 259.

When Congress convenes, the President of the Senate
administers the oath to its members, 1 and takes charge of
the organization. The clerk of the next preceding House
of Representatives makes a roll of the representatives
elect, . and places thereon the names of those persons, and
of those only, whose credentials show that they were regularly elected in accordance with . the laws of their States
respectively, or the laws of the United States. 2 In case
of vacancy in the office of clerk, or of his absence or disability, the sergeant-at-arms of the next preceding house
performs this duty ; and, in turn, it may devolve upon the
doorkeeper in case of ·vacancy in the office of. sergeant-atarms, or his absence or disability. 8 The clerk acts as
temporary presiding officer of the House until a speaker
is chosen. The Senate is supposed to have a presiding
officer at all times.
Each house is judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members, and may determine the rules
of its proceeding, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a
member." Each house shall also keep a journal of its
proceedings, 6 and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as in their judgment may require
Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 28.
2 Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 31. .
a Rev. Stat. U.S. (1878), §§ 32, 33.

1

' This is a power that by common parliamentary law would exist
without being expressly conferred. It is "a necessary and incidental
power to enable the house to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the State. It is a power of protection." And
a member may be expelled for misconduct when away from the
house on duty as a committee-man, as well as for misconduct during
its sessions. Hiss v. Bartlett, 3 Gray, (Mass.) 468.
6 Whether expunging a resolution, as was done by the Senate in
the case of the resolution of censure of General Jackson, is not a
violation of this provision, was much discussed in that case. Benton,
Thirty Years' View, ch. 169-161; Webster's Speeches, iv. 259.
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secrecy, and the yeas and nays of the members of either

house on any question shall, at the demand of one fifth

of those present, be entered on the journal.1

A majority of each house constitutes a quorum to do

business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to

day, and compel attendance of absent members. But

neither house during the session of Congress shall without

the consent of the other adjourn for more than three days,

nor to any other place than that in which the two houses

shall be sitting.2

Senators and representatives are paid by the United

States a compensation determined by law.8 They also,

in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace,

are privileged from arrest during their attendance at the

sessions of their respective houses, and in going to and

» Const., Art. I. § 5.

2 Const., Art. I. § 5.

• Const., Art. I. § 6. The compensation of members of Congress

was first fixed by law at six dollars for each day's attendance, and

six dollars for each twenty miles of the estimated distance by the

most usual road in going to, and returning from, the capital. This in

the case of senators was to be increased one sixth after March 4,
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1795. 1 Stat, at Large (1789), p. 70. In 1798, the pay of senators

and representatives was equalized at six dollars per day, and six

secrecy, and the yeas and nays of the members of either
house on any question shall, at the demand of one fifth
of those present, be entered on the journal. 1
A majority of each house constitutes a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to
day, and compel attendance of absent members. But
neither house dming the session of Congress shall without
the consent of the other adjourn for more than three days,
nor to any other place than that in which the two houses
shall be sitting.~
Senators and representatives are paid by the United
States a compensation determined by law.• They also,
in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace,
are privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of their respective houses, and in going to and

dollars for every twenty miles' travel. 1 Stat, at Large, 448. In 1816,

the per diem was changed to a salary of $1,500. 3 Stat, at Large,

257. The act for this purpose was repealed the next year. 3 Stat,

at Large, 345. In 1818, the compensation was fixed at eight dollars

a day, and eight dollars for every twenty miles' travel. 3 Stat, at

Large, 404. In 1856, a salary of $3,000 was substituted for the per

diem compensation. 11 Stat, at Large, 48. In 1866, the salary was

increased to $5,000, and the mileage reduced to twenty cents a mile.

In 1873, the salary was increased to $7,500, and actual travelling ex-

penses were to be paid in lieu of mileage; but in 1874 the compensa-

tion was restored to what it was under the act of 1866. Laws of

1873-74, ch. 10; Rev. Stat. U.S. (1878), § 35. In 1816,1866, and

1873, the increased compensation was made to date back to the com-

ing in of the Congress which granted it.

4

Const., Art. I. § 5.
Const., Art. I. § 5.
a Const., Art. I.§ 6. The compensation of members of Congress
was first fixed by law at six dollars for each day's attendance, and
six dollars for each twenty miles of the estimated distance by the
most usual road in going to, and returning from, the capital. This in
the case of senators was to be increased one sixth after March 4,
1795. 1 Stat. at Large (1789), p. 70. In 1796, the pay of senators
and representatives was equalized at six dollars per day, and six
dollars for every twenty miles' travel. 1 Stat. at Large, 448. In 1816,
the per diem was changed to a salary of $1,600. 3 Stat. at Large,
257. The act for this purpose was repealed the next year. 3 Stat.
at Large, 345. In 1818, the compensation was fixed at eight dollars
a day, and eight dollars for every twenty miles' travel. 3 Stat. at
Large, 404. In 1856, a salary of $3,000 was substituted for the per
diem compensation. 11 Stat. at Large, 48. In 1866, the salary was
increased to $5,000, and the mileage reduced to twenty cents a mile.
In 1873, the salary was increased to $7,500, and actual travelling expenses were to he paid in lieu of mileage ; but in 1874 the compensation was restored to what it was under the act of 1866. Laws of
1873-74, ch. 10; Rev. Stat. U.S. (1878), § 35. In 1816, 1866, and
1873, the increased compensation was made to date back to the coming in of the Congress which granted it.
1
2

'
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returning from the same;1 and for any speech or debate

in either house they shall not be questioned in any other

place.2

All bills for raising revenue must originate in the House

returning from the same ; 1 and for any speech or debate
in either house they shall not be questioned in any other
place.~

of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur

with amendments.3 All other bills may originate indiffer-

ently in either house, and any member of either house

may introduce bills under its rules.

No senator or representative shall, during the time for

which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under

the authority of the United States which shall have been

created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been in-

creased, during such time; and no person holding any

office under the United States shall be a member of either

house during his continuance in office.4

The Veto Power. — The power to veto legislation, which

is conferred upon the President, makes him in effect a

third branch of the legislature. The power is legislative,

1 Const., Art. I. § 6. Holiday v. Pitt, 2 Strange, 985; Hoppin v.

Jenckes, 8 E. I. 453. This privilege is that of the house to enable

it to perform its functions with the aid of all its members, but it is
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also the privilege of the people, as well as of the member himself.

Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1.

2 Const., Art. I. § 6. It is held in England that the privilege

does not extend to the publishing by the member of his speeches.

The King v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 273; The King v. Abingdon, 1 Esp.

226. Compare Davison v. Duncan, 7 El. & Bl. 229. But in this

country, where all debates are published by authority of law, the

All bills for raising revenue must originate in the House
of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments. 8 All other bills may originate indifferently in either house, and any member of either house
may introduce bills under its rules.
No senator or representative shall, during the time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under
the authority of the United States which shall have been
created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time ; and no person holding any
office under the United States shall be a member of either
house during his continuance in office. 4
The Veto Power.-_ The power to veto legislation, which
1s conferred upon the President, makes him in effect a
third branch of the legislature. The power is legislative,

rule, we should say, must at least cover the official publication. But

the privilege is confined strictly to what is said in the house or in

committee in the discharge of legislative duty. Coffin v. Coffin, 4

Mass. 1.

8 Const., Art. I. § 7. In this provision is incorporated a principle

of the English constitution, which requires all revenue bills to originate

in the House of Commons. As to what are revenue bills see May,

Const. Hist., chap. 7. The subject was much considered in debates

in Congrats in the year 1872.

* Const., Art. I. § b\

1 Const., Art. I.§ 6. Holiday v. Pitt, 2 Strange, 985; Hoppin v.
Jenckes, 8 R. I. 453. This privilege is that of the house to enable
it to perform its functions with the aid of all its members, but it is
also the privilege of the people, as well as of the member himself.
Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1.
2 Const., Art. I. § 6.
It is held in England that the privilege
does not extend to the publishing by the member of his speeches.
The King v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 273; The King v. Abingdon, 1 Esp.
22~. Compare Davison v. Duncan, 7 El. & Bl. 229. But in this
country, where all debates are published by authority of law, the
rule, we should say, must at least cover the official publication. But
the privilege is confined strictly to what is said in the house or in
committee in the discharge of legislative duty. Coffin v. Coffin, 4
Mass. 1.
s Const., Art. I. § 7. In this provision is incorporated a principle
of the English constitution, which requires all revenue bills to originate
in the House of Commons. As to what are revenue bills see May,
Const. Hist., chap. 7. The subject was much considered in debates
in Congre~1s in the year 1872.
• Const., Art. I.§ 6.
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not executive, and the questions presented to his mind are

precisely the same as those the two houses of Congress

must determine in passing a bill. Whether the proposed

law is necessary or expedient, whether it is constitu-

tional, whether it is so framed as to accomplish its intent,

and so on, are questions transferred from the two houses

to the President with the bill itself.

The Executive. — The executive power is vested in a

President, who holds his office during a term of four years,

and, together with a Vice-President, chosen for the same

term, is elected by electors appointed in the several States

for the purpose.1 No person except a natural-born citizen,

who has been fourteen years a resident within the United

States, and has attained the age of thirty-five, is now

eligible to the office of Presidenta or of Vice-President.8

In case of the removal of the President from office, or

his death, resignation, or inability to discharge its powers

and duties, the same devolves on the Vice-President, and

Congress may by law provide for the case of removal,

death, or resignation, or inability both of the President and

Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as

President until the disability be removed or a President
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elected.4

1 Const., Art II. § 1; Amendment 12. The manner of making

choice, where no candidate has a majority of electoral votes, is

explained by this amendment.

1 Const., Art. II. § 1. 8 Const., Amendment 12.

* Const., Art. II. § 1. If the Vice-President becomes acting Presi-

dent, he holds for the full term. Congress has provided by law

that in case of removal, death, resignation, or inability of both the

President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate, or, if there

is none, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives for the time

being; shall act as President until the disability is removed or a Presi-

dent is elected. The law provides for a speedy election in such case.

Rev. Stat. TJ. S. (1878), §§ 146 to 149. Whether either of these officers

could act as President if he did not possess the qualifications that

would render him "eligible" to the office, may be a question.

not executive, and the questions presented to his mind are
precisely the same as those the two houses of Congress
must determine in passing a bill. Whether the proposed
law is necessary or expedient, whether it is constitutional, whether it is so framed as to accomplish its intent,
and so on, are questfons transferred from the two houses
to the President with the bill i~elf.
The Executive. -The executive power is vested in a
President, who holds his office during a term of four years,
and, together with a Vice-President, chosen for the same
term, is elected by electors appointed in the several States
for the purpose. 1 No person except a natural-born citizen,
who has been fourteen years a resident within the United
States, and has attained the age of thirty-five, is now
eligible to the office of President~ or of Vice-President. 1
In case of the removal of the President from office, or
his death, resignation, or inability to discharge its powers
and duties, the same devolves on the Vice-President, and
Congress may by law provide for the case of removal,
death, or resignation, or inability both of the President and
Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as
President until the disability be removed or a President
elected.'
1 Const., Art II. § 1; Amendment 12. The manner of making
choice, where no candidate has a majority of electoral Totes, ia
explained by this amendment.
1 Const., Art. II. § 1.
a Const., Amendment 12.
' Const., Art. II. § 1. If the Vice-President becomes acting Presi·
dent, he holds for the full term. Congress has provided by law
that in case of removal, death, resignation, or inability of both the
President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate, or, if there
is none, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives for the time
being; shall act as President until the disability is removed or a Presi·
dent is elected. The law provides for a speedy election in such case.
Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), §§ 146to149. Whether either of these omcera
could act as President if be did not possess the qualifications that
would render him ,, eligible ,, to the oftlce, may be a question.
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The Judiciary. — The Constitution provides that the

judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one

Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may

from time to time ordain and establish.1 The judges both

of the Supreme and inferior courts hold their offices during

good behavior. As the Constitution does not determine

the number of the judges of the Supreme Court, the num-

ber may be changed at pleasure, except that it cannot be

diminished so as to deprive a judge of his office. The

other courts exist at the will of Congress, and may be

changed and modified at discretion, subject to a like limita-

tion that a judge cannot be legislated out of his office while

the office itself remains.2

In a time of war, when portions of hostile territory are

in the military occupation of federal forces, the President as

commander-in-chief may appoint provisional courts for the

determination of controversies within such territory, and

the administration of justice.8 But such courts, established

on foreign soil, are mere agents of the military power to

assist in preserving order and protecting the inhabitants

in their persons and property; and they cannot adjudicate
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upon questions of prize, or decide upon the rights of the

United States or of individuals.4

The territorial courts are not created by Congress under

the power conferred by the articles above referred to, but

1 Const., Art. III. § 1. The power " to constitute tribunals in-

ferior to the Supreme Court" is conferred upon Congress by Article I.

§ 8, cl. 0.

2 The legislative precedent is in favor of the power in Congress

to indirectly deprive judges of their offices by abolishing courts.

Reference is here made to the abolition of district courts when Mr.

Jefferson-became President. There are state precedents of the same

sort.

» Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How. 498; The Grape Shot, 9 Wall.

129. See Edwards v. Tanneret, 12 Wall. 446.

* Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How. 498.

Tke Judiciary. -The Constitution provides that the
judicial power of the United States shall he vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. 1 The judges both
of the Supreme and inferior courts hold their offices during
good behavior. As the Constitutioh does not determine
the number of the judges of the Supreme Court, the number may be changed at pleasure, except that it cannot be
diminished so as to deprive a judge of his office. The
other courts exist at the will of Congress, and may be
changed and modified at discretion, subject to a like limitation that a judge cannot be legislated out of his office while
the office itself remains. 9
In a time of war, when portions of hostile territory are
in ~he military occupation of federal forces, the President as
commander-in-chief may appoint provisional courts for the
determination of controversies within such territory, and
the administration of justice.• But such courts, established
on foreign soil, are mere agents of the military power to
assist in preserving order and protecting the inhabitants
in their persons and property ; and they cannot adjudicate
upon questions of prize, or decide upon the rights of the
United States or of individuals.'
The territorial courts are not created by Congress under
the power conferred by the articles above referred to, but
Const., Art. m. § 1. The power "to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court" is conferred upon Congress by Article I.
§ 8, cl. 9.
t The legislative precedent is in favor of the power in Congress
to indirectly deprive judges of their offices by abolishing courts.
Reference is here made to the abolition of district courts when l\lr.
Jefferson. became President. There are state precedents of the same
sort.
· • Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How. 498; The Grape Shot, 9 Wall
129. See Edwards v. Tanneret, 12 Wall. '46.
' Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How. 498.
1
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in the exercise of the general sovereignty of the United

States over the territory it may possess. The judges of

such courts may therefore he appointed for definite terms,

removable by the President.1

Upon judges as such no functions can be imposed except

those of a judicial nature. They cannot therefore be re-

quired to act as commissioners to determine questions

subject to the consideration and supervision of Congress

or of an executive officer;1 or to make or review as ap-

praisers the assessments that have been made of property

for taxation;8 nor can they by virtue of equity powers

appoint officers to assess and collect taxes from municipal-

ities, even to pay judgments against such municipalities

standing on their own records.4 When judicial authority

is conferred by law upon a court, it must be exercised by

the judges sitting and organized as a court, and not by

the judge out of court.6

1 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511.

2 Note to Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409; United States v. Ferreira,

13 How. 40. The remark in the text has no reference to courts like

the Court of Claims, which, being a tribunal created to consider de-

mands against the government, may have its authority restricted to
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any extent that seems wise.

* Auditor of State v. Railroad Co., 6 Kans. 500. In Massachu-

setts it has been held that courts cannot be empowered to appoint

supervisors of election. Case of Supervisors of Election, 114 Mass.

247.

4 Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107 ; Heine v. Levee Commissioners,

in the exercise of the general sovereignty of the United
States over the territory it may possess. The judges of
such courts may therefore be appointed for definite terms,
removable by the President. 1
Upon judges as such no functions can be imposed except
those of a judicial nature. They cannot therefore be required to act as commissioners to determine questions
subject to the consideration and supervision of Congress
or of an executive officer ; 2 or to make or review as appraisers the assessments that have been made of property
for taxation ; 8 nor can they by virtue of equity powers
appoint officers to assess and collect taxes from municipalities, even to pay judgments against such municipalities
standing on their own records.• When judicial authority
is conferred by law upon a court, it must be exercised by
the judges sitting and organized as a court, and not by
the judge out of court. 6

1 Woods, 246; 19 WaU. 655.

4 Note by the Chief Justice to United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 52.

American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511.
Note to Rayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409; United States v. Ferreira,
13 How. 40. The remark in the text has no reference to courts like
the Court of Claims, which, being a tribunal created to consider demands against the government, may have its authority restricted to
any extent that seems wise.
a Auditor of State v. Railroad Co., 6 Kans. 500. In Massachusetts it has been held that courts cannot be empo'!ered to appoint
supervisors of election. Case of Supervisors of Election, 114 Ma88.
1

2

247.

' Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107 ; Heine v. Levee Commissioners,
1 Woods, 246; 19 Wall. 655.
6 Note by the Chief Justice to United States 11. Ferreira, 13 How. 62.
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CHAPTER IV.

THE POWERS OF CONGBESS.

National Powers. —In any sovereign state, the law-mak-

ing department is the repository of most power, and it is

also the most immediate representative of the sovereignty.

Not that the others are subordinate within their respective

spheres, but the exercise of governmental authority begins

with the making of laws, and the other departments exe-

CHAPTER IV.

cute and administer what the law-making department

enacts. For this reason the Constitution, in enumerating

the powers which shall be exercised by authority of the

general government, confers them in terms upon Congress.

THE POWERS OF CONGRESS.

But this in legal effect is conferring them upon the United

States, and by implication a corresponding executive and

judicial power is also given, though to a large extent the

exercise of these powers respectively is left to be provided

for in the discretion of Congress.

Section I.—Taxes, Loans, and Debts.

The Power.—In the specific enumeration of national

powers, it is first declared that " The Congress shall have

power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and ex-
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cises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common de-

fence and general welfare of the United States; but all

duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout

the United States." 1 Thus a power is conferred which is

essential to the maintenance of independent government,

» Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 1.

National Powers. - In any sovereign state, the law-mak·
Ing department is the repository of most power, and it is
also the most immediate representative of the sovereignty.
Not that the others are subordinate within their respective
spheres, but the exercise of governmental authority begins
with the making of laws, and the other departments execute and administer what the law-making department
enacts. For this reason the Constitution, in enumerating
the powers which shall be exercised by authority of the
general government, confers them in terms upon Congress.
But this in legal effect is conferring them upon the United
States, and by implication a corresponding executive and
Judicial power is also given, though to a large extent the
exercise of these powers respectively is left to be provided
for in the discretion of Congress.
SECTION

I. -TAXES,

LOANS, AND DEBTS.

Tlte Power. -In the specific enumeration of national
powers, it is first declared that ''The Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States ; but all
duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States." 1 Thus a power is conferred which is
essential to the maintenance of independent government,
1

Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 1.
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and the want of which was one of the principal causes of

the failure of the Confederacy. The purposes for which

the power may be exercised are also specified, but in such

general terms that they comprehend all the needs of gov-

ernment. The requirement of uniformity in the levy of

duties, imposts, and excises is an important limitation to

a power which otherwise might have been exercised par-

tially and oppressively.

Definition. — The word " taxes," in its most enlarged

sense, embraces all the regular impositions made by gov-

ernment upon the person, property, privileges, occupations,

and enjoyments of the people for the purpose of raising

public revenue.1 As duties, imposts, and excises are laid

or imposed for this purpose, they are in a strict sense

taxes, and no doubt might have been levied by the gov-

ernment under that designation, without being here spe-

cifically mentioned. But as the term taxes is sometimes

used in contradistinction to these levies, it conduced to

certainty to name them separately. It was also a con-

venience in view of the special rule which was prescribed

for their levy. The terms duties and imposts are nearly
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synonymous, and are usually applied to the levies made

by government dn the importation or exportation of

commodities, while the term excises is applied to the

taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale, or consumption

of commodities within the country, and upon licenses to

pursue certain occupations.2

Taxes are distinguished from arbitrary levies in that

they are laid according to some rule which apportions the

burden between the subjects thereof. An exaction which

is made without regard to any rule of apportionment is

1 Montesq., Sp. of the L., b. 13, c. 1; Perry v. Washburn, 20 Cal.

818, 350; Hilbish v. Catherman, 64 Penn. St. 154, 159; Loan Associa-

tion v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 664; Opinion of Judges, 58 Maine, 590.

1 Cooley on Taxation, 3.

and the want of which was one of the principal causes of
the failure of the Confederacy. The purposes for which
the power may be exercised are also specified, but in such
general terms that they comprehend all the needs of government. The requirement of uniformity in the levy of
duties, imposts, and excises is an important limitation to
a power which otherwise might have been exercised partially and oppressively.
Definition. -The word "taxes," in its most enlarged
sense, embraces all the regular impositions made by. government upon the person, property, plivileges, occupations,
and enjoyments of the people for the purpose of raising
public revenue. 1 As duties, imposts, and excises are laid
or imposed for this purpose, they are in a strict sense
taxes, and no doubt might have been levied by the government under that designation, without being here specifically mentioned. But as the term taxes is sometimes
used in contradistinction to these levies, it conduced to
certainty to name them separately. It was also a convenience in view of the special rule which was prescribed
for their levy. The terms duties and imposts are nearly
synonymous, and are usually applied to the levies made
by government dn the importation or exportation of
commodities, while the term excises is applied to the
taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale, or consumption
of commodities within the country, and upon licenses to
pursue certain occupations. 2
Taxes are distinguished from arbitrary levies in that
they are laid according to some rule which apportions the
burden between the subjects thereof. An exaction which
is made without regard to any rule of apportionment is
1 Montesq., Sp. of the L., b. 13, c. 1; Perry v. Washburn, 20 Cal.
818, 350; Hilbish v. Catherman, 64 Penn. St. 154, 159; Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 664; Opinion of Judges, 68 Maine, 500.
2 Cooley on Taxation, 3.
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therefore not a tax, and is not within the constitutional

authority of the government.1

The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty, and is

coextensive with the subjects to which the sovereignty ex-

tends. It is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its

very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is

to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature

which imposes the tax to the constituency who are to

pay it.2 A people, however, in establishing their consti-

tution, and delegating to their representatives this power,

may impose at discretion limits to its exercise; and many

effective limitations have been imposed in the constitutions

of the States.

The Power Discretionary. — As respects the hind of tax

that shall be laid, or the subjects upon which it shall be

imposed, every government will regulate its action accord-

ing to its own view of what will best accomplish the end,

and best subserve the general interest. Therefore, taxes

may be levied upon either land or personalty to the exclu-

sion of the other, or upon occupations in preference to

either or both, or they may be collected in the form of du-
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ties on imports or excises on domestic productions. The

United States for the most part has collected its revenues

from duties on imports, but at exceptional periods has

levied taxes on land, occupations, manufactures, incomes,

deeds and other contracts, and many other subjects. The

basis of apportionment in the case of imports and excises

has sometimes been value, sometimes weight, quantity, or

quality, and sometimes other standards, while upon deeds

1 Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville, 5 Dana, (Ky.) 28-31; Grim v. School

District, 57 Penn. St. 433.

2 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 548; McCulloch v. Mary-

land, 4 Wheat. 316, 428; Howell v. State, 3 Gill, (Md.) 14; People v.

Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Pullen v. Commissioners, 66 N. C. 361; Tay-

lor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240; State v. Newark, 26 N. J. 519; Williams

v. Cammack, 27 Miss. 209, 219; Parham t>. Justices, 9 Geo. 341, 352.

therefore not a tax, and is not within the constitutional
authority of the government. 1
The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty, and is
coextensive with the subjects to which the sovereignty extends. It is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its
very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is
to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature
which imposes the tax to the constituency who are to
pay it.~ A people, however, in establishing their constitution, and delegating to their representatives this power,
may impose at discretion· limits t;o its exercise ; and many
effective limitations have been imposed in the constitutions
of the States.
The Power Discretionary. -As respects the kind of tax
that shall be laid, or the subJects upon which it shall be
imposed, every government will regulate its action according to its own view of what will best accomplish the end,
and best subserve the general interest. Therefore, taxes
may be levied upon either land or personalty to the exclusion of the other, or upon occupations in preference to
either or both, or they may be collected in the form of duties on imports or excises on domestic productions. The
United States for the most part has collected its revenues .
from duties on imports, but at exceptional periods has
levied taxes on land, occupations, manufactures, incomes,
deeds and other contracts, and many other subjects. The
basis ot apportionment in the case of imports -and excises
has sometimes been value, sometimes weight, quantity, or
quality, and sometimes other standards, while upon deeds
1 ~·utton's

Heirs v. Louisville, 6 Dana, (Ky.) 28-31; Grim v. School
District, 67 Penn. St. 433.
2 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 633, 648; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428; Howell v. State, 3 Gill, (Md.) 14; People v.
Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Pullen v. Commissioners, 66 N. C. 361; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240; State ''· Newark, 26 N. J. 519; Williams
v. Cammack, 27 Miss. 209, 219 ; Parham v. Justices, 9 Geo. 341, 352.
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and contracts the apportionment has been according to

number or importance, and the tax has been collected by

the sale of stamps. By the Constitution the United States

is precluded from laying any tax or duty on articles ex-

ported from any State.1 The requirement that an article

intended for exportation shall be stamped, to prevent fraud

and secure the carrying out of the declared intent, is not

laying a duty, even though a small charge is made for the

stamp.2 It would be otherwise if the stamp were required

for the purpose of revenue.8

The Purposes. — Constitutionally a tax can have no other

basis than the raising of a revenue for public purposes,

and whatever governmental exaction has not this basis is

tyrannical and unlawful. A tax on imports, therefore,

the purpose of which is, not to raise a revenue, but to dis-

courage and indirectly prohibit some particular import for

the benefit of some home manufacture, may well be ques-

tioned as being merely colorable, and therefore not war-

ranted by constitutional principles. But if any income is

derived from the levy, the fact that incidental protection

is given to home industry can be no objection to it, for all
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taxes must be laid with some regard to their effect upon

the prosperity of the people and the welfare of the coun-

try, and their validity cannot be determined by the money

returns. This rule has been applied when the levy pro-

duced no returns whatever; it being held not competent

to assail the motives of Congress by showing that the

levy was made, not for the purpose of revenue, but to an-

nihilate the subject of the levy by imposing a burden which

it could not bear.4 Practically, therefore, a law purporting

1 Const., Art. I. § 9, cl. 5. 2 Pace v. Burgess, 92 U. S. Kep. 372.

4 Almy v. California, 24 How. 169.

4 Veazie Bank t\ Fenno, 8 Wall. 533. Mr. Justice Story, in his

Commentaries on the Constitution, asserts broadly that" the absolute

power to levy taxes includes the power in every form in which it

und contractis the apportionment has been according to
number or importance, and the tax has been collected by
the sale of stamps. By the Constitution the United States
is precluded from laying any tax or duty on articles exported from any State. 1 The requirement that an article
intended for exportation shall be stamped, to prevent fraud
and secure the carrying out of the declared intent, is not
laying a duty, even though a small charge is made for the
stamp. 2 It would be otherwise if the stamp were required
for the purpose of revenue. 8
The Purposes. - Constitutionally a tax can have no other
basis than the raising of a revenue for public purposes,
and whatever governmental exaction has not this basis is
tyrannical and unlawful. A tax on imports, therefore,
the purpose of which is, not to raise a revenue, but to discourage and indirectly prohibit some particular import for
the benefit of some home manufacture, may well be questioned as being merely colorable, and therefore not warranted by constitutional principles. But if any income is
derived from the. levy, the fact that incidental protection
is given to home industry can be no objection to it, for all
taxes must be laid with some regard to their effect upon
the prosperity of the people_ and the welfare of the country, and their validity cannot be determined by the money
returns. This rule has been applied when the levy produced. no returns whatever ; it being held not competent
to assail the motives of Congress by showing that the
levy was made, not for the purpose of revenue, but to annihilate the subject of the levy by imposing a burden which
it could not bear.' Practically, therefore, a law purporting
1

Const., Art. I. § 9, cl. 6.

2

Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. Rep. 372.

a Almy v. California, 24 How. 169.
' Veazie Bank t'. Fenno, 8 Wall. 633. Mr. Justice Story, in his
Commentaries on the Constitution, asserts broadly that" the absolute
power to levy taxes includes the power in every form in which it
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to levy taxes, and not being on its face subject to objec-

tion, is unassailable, whatever may have been the real

purpose. And perhaps even prohibitory duties may be

defended as a regulation of commercial intercourse.

Levies for Private Purposes.—Where, however, a tax is

avowedly laid for a private purpose, it is illegal and void.

The following are illustrations of taxes for private pur-

poses. A tax levied to aid private parties or corporations

to establish themselves in business as manufacturers;1 a

tax the proceeds of which are to be loaned out to individ-

uals who have suffered from a great fire ;a a tax to supply

with provisions and seed such farmers as have lost their

crops ; * a tax to build a dam which at discretion is to be

devoted to private purposes;4 a tax to refund moneys to

individuals which they have paid to relieve themselves

from an impending military draft;6 and so on. In any

one of these cases the public may be incidentally bene-

fited, but the incidental benefit is only such as the public

might receive from the industry and enterprise of individ-

uals in their own affairs, and will not support exactions

under the name of taxation.
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But, primarily, the determination what is a public pur-

pose belongs to the legislature, and its action is subject to

no review or restraint so long as it is not manifestly color-

may be used, and for every purpose to which the legislature may

choose to apply it. It therefore includes the power to levy protec-

tive duties, though the duties may in effect be prohibitory." — Story

on Const., § 965.

1 Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655,663; Allen e. Jay,

60 Me. 124.

2 Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454.

8 State v. Osawkee, 14 Kans. 418.

4 Attorney-General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400.

6 Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Penn. St. 9; Crowell v. Hopkinton,

45 N. H. 9; Usher ». Colchester, 33 Conn. 567; Freeland v. Hastings,

10 Allen, (Mass.) 570; Miller ». Grandy, 13 Mich. 540.

to levy taxes, and not being on its face subject to objection, is unassailable, whatever may have been the real
purpose. And perhaps even prohibitory duties may be
defended as a regulation of commercial intercourse.
Levies for Private Purposes. -Where, however, a tax is
avowedly laid f?r a private purpose, it is illegal and void.
The following are illustrations of taxes for private purposes. A tax levied to aid private parties or corporations
to establish themselves in business as manufacturers; 1 a
tax the proceeds of which are to be loaned out to individuals who have suffered from a great fire ; ~ a tax to supply
with provisions and seed such farmers as have lost their
crops ; 1 a tax to build a dam which at discretion is to be
devoted to private purposes ; ' a tax to refund moneys to
individuals which they have paid to relieve themselves
from an impending military draft ; 6 and so on. In any
one of these cases the public may be incidentally benefited, but the incidental benefit is only such as the public
might receive from the industry and enterprise of individuals in their own affairs, and will not s.upport exactions
under the name of taxation.
But, primarily, th~ determination what is a public purpose belongs to the legislature, and its action is subject to
no review or restraint so long as it is not manifestly colormay be used, and for every purpose to which the legislature may
choose to apply it. It therefore includes the power to levy protective duties, though the duties may in effect be prohibitory."-Story
on Const., § 965.
1 Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 663; Allen v. Jay,
60 Me. 124.
2 Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454.
a State v. Osawkee, 14 Kans. 418.
' Attorney-General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400.
6 Tyson v. School Directors, 61 Penn. St. 9 ; Crowell v. Hopkinton,
4:5 N. H. 9; '1sher v. Colchester, 33 Conn. 567; Freeland v. Hastings,
10 Allen, (Mass.) 570; Miller v. Grandy, 13 Mich. 540.
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able. All cases of doubt must be solved in favor of the

validity of legislative action, for the obvious reason that

the question is legislative, and only becomes judicial

when there is a plain excess of legislative authority. A

court can only arrest the proceedings, and declare a

levy void, when the absence of public interest in the

purpose for which the funds are to be raised is so clear

and palpable as to be perceptible to any mind at first

blush.1

But sometimes the public purpose is clear, though the

immediate benefit is private and individual. For example,

the government promises and pays bounties and pensions;

but in every case the promise or payment is made on a

consideration of some advantage or service given or ren-

dered, or to be given or rendered, to the public, which is

supposed to be an equivalent; and the law for the pay-

ment has in view only the public interest, and does not

differ in principle or purpose from a law for the payment

of salaries to public officers. The same is true where a

State continues the payment of salaries to officers who

have become superannuated in its service. The question
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whether they shall be paid is purely political, and resolves

itself into this: whether the State will thereby probably

secure better and more valuable service, and whether there-

fore it would be wise and politic for the State to give the

seeming bounty.2

Where a law for the levy of a tax shows on its face the

purpose to collect money from the people and appropriate

it to some private object, the execution of the law may be

resisted by those of whom the exaction is made, and the

1 Broadhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624, 652; Cheaney v. Hooser,

9B. Monr. (Ky.) 330, 345; Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118, 128;

Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St. 146; Tide Water Co. v. Coster,

18 N. J. Eq. 518.

a Cooley on Taxation, 74.

able. An cases of doubt must be solved in favor of the
validity of legislative action, for the obvious reason that
the question is legislative, and only becomes judicial
when there is a plain excess of legislative authority. A
court can only arrest the proceedings, and declare a
levy void, when the absence of public interest in the
purpose for which the funds are to be raised is so clear
and palpable as to be perceptible to any mind at first
blush. 1
·
But sometimes the public purpose is clear, though the
immediate benefit is private and indiTidual. For example,
the government promises and pays bounties and pensions ;
but in every case the promise or payment is made on a
consideration of some advantage or service given or rendered, or to be given or rendered, to the public, which is
supposed to be an equivalent ; and the law for the payment has in view only the public interest, and does not
differ in principle or purpose from a law for the payment
of salaries to public officers. The same is true where a
State continues the payment of salaries to officers who
have become superannuated in its service. The question
whether they shall be paid is purely political, and resolves
itself into this: whether the State will thereby :probably
secure better and more valuable service, and whether therefore it would be wise and politic for the State to give. the
seeming bounty.t
Where a law for the levy of a tax shows on its face the
purpose to collect money from the people and appropriate
it to some private object, the execution of the law may be
resisted by those of whom the exaction is made, and the
1 Broadhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624, 652; Cheaney v. Hooser,
9 B. Monr. (Ky.) 330, 845; Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118, 128;.
Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St.146; Tide Water Co. v. Coster,
18 N. J. Eq. 518.
s Cooley on Taxation, 74.
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courts, if appealed to, will enjoin collection, or give rem-

edy in damages if property is seized. But if a tax law

on its face discloses no illegality, there can in general be

no such remedy. Such is the case with the taxes levied

under authority of Congress; they are levied without any

specification of particular purposes to which the collections

shall be devoted, and the fact that an intent exists to mis-

apply some portion of the revenue produced, cannot be a

ground of illegality in the tax itself. In cases arising in

local government, an intended misappropriation may some-

times be enjoined; but this could seldom or never happen

in case of an intended or suspected misappropriation by a

State or by the United States, neither of them being sub-

ject to the process of injunction. The remedies for such

cases are therefore political, and can only be administered

through the elections.1

Taxation of Government Agencies. — The power to tax,

whether by the United States or by the States, is to be

construed in the light of, and limited by, the fact, that the

States and the Union are inseparable, and that the Con-

stitution contemplates the perpetual maintenance of each,
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with all its constitutional powers, unembarrassed and unim-

paired by any action of the other. The taxing power of the

federal government does not therefore extend to the means

or agencies through or by the employment of which the

States perform their essential functions, since, if these were

within its reach, they might be embarrassed, and perhaps

wholly paralyzed, by the burdens it should impose. '' That

the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the

power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power

to create; that there is a plain repugnance in conferring

on one government a power to control the constitutional

measures of another, which other, in respect to those very

measures, is declared to be supreme over that which ex-

1 Cooley on Taxation, 541, 572, 575.

courts, it appealed to, will enjoin collection, or give remedy in damages if ·property is seized. But if a tax law
on its face discloses no illegality, there can in general be
no such remedy. Such is the case with the taxes levied
under authority of Congress ; they are levied without any
specification of particular purposes to which the collections
shall be devoted, and the fact that an intent exists to misapply some portion of the revenue produced, cannot be a
ground of illegality in the tax itself. In cases arising in
local government, an intended misappropriation may sometimes be enjoined ; but this could seldom or never happen
in case of an intended or suspected misappropriation by a
State or by the United States, neither of them being subject to the process of injunction. The remedies for such
cases are therefore poll tical, and can only be administered
through the elections. 1
Taxation of Government .Agencies. -The power to tax,
whether by the United States or by the States, is to be
construed in the light of, and limited by, the fact, that the
States and the Union are inseparable, and that the Constitution contemplates the perpetual maintenance of each,
with all its constitutional powers, unembarrassed and unimpaired by any action of the other. The taxing power of the
federal government does not therefore extend to the means
or agencies through or by the employment of which the
States perform their essential functions, since, if these were
within its reach, they might be embarrassed, and perhaps
wholly paralyzed, by the burdens it should impose. ''That
the power to tax involves the power to destroy ; that the
power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power
to create ; that there is a plain repugnance in conferring
on one government a power to control the constitutional
measures of another, which other, in respect to those very
measures, is declared to be supreme over that which ex1

Cooley on Taxation, Ml, 672, 675.
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erts the control, — are propositions not to be denied."1 It

is true that taxation does not necessarily and unavoidably

destroy, and that to carry it to the excess of destruction

would be an abuse not to be anticipated; but the very

power would take from the States a portion of their in-

tended liberty of independent action within the sphere

of their powers, and would constitute to the State a per-

petual danger of embarrassment and possible annihilation.

The Constitution contemplates no such shackles upon state

powers, and by implication forbids them.

The United States, therefore, cannot tax a state mu-

nicipal corporation or its resources,2 or the salary of a

state officer,8 or the process of state courts,4 or a railroad

owned by a State,6 and so on.6 And on the other hand

a State cannot tax the salary or emoluments of federal

officers,7 or the bonds or other securities issued under the

power to borrow money on the credit of the United States,8

or the revenue stamps or treasury notes issued by the

United States,9 or a bank created by the United States as

its fiscal agent,10 and so on. But the sovereignty whose

means or agencies of government would be affected by the
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tax might render it lawful by its assent, as has been done

1 McCulIoch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431.

2 United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322.

» The Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113.

* Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 276; Moore v. Quirk, 105 Mass. 49;

Union Bank v. Hill, 3 Gold. (Tenn.) 325.

6 Georgia v. Atkins, 1 Abb. U. S. 22.

• Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418,427; State v. Gustin, 32 Ind. 1;

Sayles t>. Davis, 22 Wis. 225.

7 Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Pet. 435.

> Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 442; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200.

9 Palfrey v. Boston, 101 Mass. 329; Montgomery v. Elston, 32 Ind.

27; The Bank v. The Supervisors, 7 Wall. 26.

» McCulIoch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 368; Osborn v. Bank of

erts the control, - are propositions not to be denied." 1 It
is true that taxation does not necessarily and unavoidably
destroy, and that to carry it to the excess of destruction
would be an abuse not to be anticipated ; but the very
power would take from the States a portion of their intended liberty of independent action within 'the sphere
of their powers, and would constitute to the State a perpetual danger of embarrassment and possible annihilation.
The Constitution contemplates no such shackles upon state
powers, and by implication forbids them.
The United States, therefore, cannot tax a state municipal corporation or its resources, 2 or the salary of a
state officer, 8 or the process of state courts, 4 or a railroad
owned by a State, 6 and so on. 6 And on the other hand
a State cannot tax the salary or emoluments of federal
officers, 7 or the bonds or other securities issued under the
power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, 8
or the revenue stamps or treasury notes issued by the
United States, 9 or a bank created by the United States as
its fiscal agent, 10 and so on. But the sovereignty whose
means or agencies of government would be affected by the
tax might render it lawful by its assent, as has been done

United States, 9 Wheat. 738. See United States v. Railroad Co., 17

Wall. 322.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431.
United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322.
a The Collector v. Day, 11Wall.113.
4 Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 276; Moore v. Quirk, 105 Mass. 49;
Union Bank v. Hill, 3 <A>ld. (Tenn.) 325.
6 G€orgia v. Atkins, 1 Abb. U. S. 22.
I Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 427; State v. Gustin, 32 Ind. 1;
Sayles v. Davis, 22 Wis. 225.
'1 Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Pet. 435.
8 Weston''· Charleston, 2 Pet. 442; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200.
9 Palfrey v. Boston, 101 Mass. 329; Montgomery v. Elston, 32 Ind.
27; The Bank v. The Supervisors, 7 Wall. ~6.
10 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 816, 368; Osborn v. Bank of
United States, 9 Wheat. 738. See United States v. Railroad Co., 17
Wall. 322.
1
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in some cases. The fact that the general government has

chartered and brought into existence a corporation with

stipulations in the charter whereby the United States may

have certain benefits from its use, does not exempt it from

state taxation,1 but restrictions to prevent unjust discrimi-

nations might be imposed, as has been done in the case of

the existing national banks.

Direct Taxes. — It is provided in the Constitution that

direct taxes shall be apportioned among the States accord-

ing to their representative population.2 What was meant

by direct taxes in this provision is not entirely clear.

Taxes are usually classed as direct when they are assessed

upon the persons, property, business, income, &c. of those

who are to pay them, and as indirect when they are levied

on commodities before they reach the consumer, and are

paid by those upon whom they ultimately fall, not as taxes,

but as a part of the market price of the commodity.8 But

it has been generally conceded that the term direct tax as

it is used in the federal Constitution had a more restricted

meaning, and was perhaps to be limited to capitation and

land taxes exclusively. A tax levied on carriages kept
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for use is not a direct tax;4 and it is manifest that no ap-

portionment of such a tax by representative population

could possibly be just. The same ruling has been made

in the case of a tax on income,6 and a tax on the circula-

tion of bankg.6 Succession taxes and all taxes of excise

would come under these rulings.

Collection.—The power to tax includes the power to

make use of all customary and usual means to enforce

» Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5.

1 Const., Art. I . § 2. See Art. I . § 9, el. 4.

» 1 Kent, 254; Story on Const., §§ 950-957.

« Hylton ». United States, 3 Dall. 171.

6 Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433.

• Veazi< Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533.

in some cases. The fact that the general government has
chartered and brought. into existence a corporation with
stipulations in the charter whereby the United States may
have certain benefits from its use, does not exempt it from
state taxation, 1 but restrictions to prevent unjust discriminations might be imposed, as has been done in the case of
the existing national banks.
Direct Taxes. - It is provided in the Constitution that
direct taxes shall be apportioned among the States according to their representative population. 2 What was meant
by direct taxes in this provision is not entirely clear.
Taxes are usually classed as direct when they are assessed
upon the persons, property, business, income, &c. of those
who are to pay them, and as indirect when they are levied
on commodities before they reach the consumer, and are
paid by those upon whom they ultimately fall, not as taxes,
but as a part of the market price of the commodity. 8 But
it has been generally conceded that the term direct tax as
it is used in the federal Constitution had a more restricted
meaning, and was perhaps to be limited to capitation and
land taxes exclusively. A tax levied on carriages kept
for use is not a direct tax ; 4 and it is manliest that no apportionment of such a tax by representative population
could possibly be just. The same ruling has been made
in the case of a tax on income, 6 and a tax on the circulation of bank~. 8 Succession taxes and all taxes of excise
would come under these rulings.
Oollection. -The power to tax includes the power to
make use of all customary and usual .means to enforce
Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5.
Const., Art. I. § 2. See Art. I. § 9, cl. 4.
a 1 Kent, 254 ; Story on Const., §§ 960-957.
' Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171.
6 Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433.
I v eazi~ Bank v. Fenno, 8 wall. 633.
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payment. But legislation must prescribe these means and

give full directions for their employment, and it is essential

to the validity of the proceedings that the statute in all

essential particulars shall be followed.1

Borrowing Money. — Congress is also empowered to bor-

row money on the credit of the United States.2 This

power may be exercised directly, in the usual mode, but

the indirect method, of issuing government obligations for

debts or services, is equally admissible. And all such ob-

ligations are excepted from the state power to tax, since

otherwise they might be so burdened with taxation as to

render it impossible for the government to negotiate them

at all.8

Public Faith and the Public Debt. — In the Constitution

it was declared that " all debts contracted and engage-

ments entered into before the adoption of this Constitution

shall be as valid against the United States under this Con-

stitution as under the Confederation."4 This was perhaps

intended merely as a solemn assurance to public creditors

and the world that the public faith should be inviolably

kept by the United States under its changed government;
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but it might have had a special significance and impor-

tance had one or more of the States failed to adopt the

Constitution. In that event, although the general rule

would apply that a public corporation remains liable for

pre-existing debts notwithstanding the changes in its or-

ganization, or in its corporators, and notwithstanding any

loss of territory, yet it would have been easy to raise cav-

ils concerning it, had some States escaped the debt by re-

jecting the Union. It was therefore as politic as it was

1 Stead v. Course, 4 Cranch, 403; Williams v. Peyton, 4 Wheat. 77;

Parker v. Overman, 18 How. 137.

2 Const., Art. I . § 8, cl. 2.

8 The Banks v. The Mayor, 7 Wall. 16; The Bank v. The Super-

visors, 7 Wall. 26.

* Const., Art. VI. cl. 1.

payment. But legislation must prescribe these means and
give full directions for their employment, and it is essential
to the validity of the proceedings that the statute in all
essential particulars shall be followed. 1
Borrowing Money. - Congress is also empowered to borrow money on the credit of the United States.~ This
power may be exercised directly, in the usual mode, but
the indirect method, of issuing government obligations for
debts or services, is equally admissible. And all such obligations are excepted from the state power to tax, since
otherwise they might be so burdened with taxation as to
render it impossible for the government to negotiate them
at all. 8
Public Faith and the PuMfo Debt. - In the Constitution
it was declared that ''all debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of this Constitution
shall be a~ valid against the United States under this Constitution as under the Confederation." 4 This was perhaps
intended merely as a solemn assurance to public creditors
and the world that the public faith should be inviolably
kept by the United States under its changed government ;
but it might have had a special significance and importance had one or more of the States failed to adopt the
Constitution. In that event, although the general rule
would apply that a public corporation remains liable for
pre-existing debts notwithstanding the changes in its organization, or in its corporators, and notwithstanding any
loss of territory, yet it would have been easy to raise cavils concerning it, had some States escaped the debt by rejecting the Union. It was therefore as politic as it was
1 Stead v. Course, 4 Cranch, 403; Williams v. Peyton, 4 Wheat. 77;
Parker v. Overman, 18 How. 137.
2 Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 2.
a The Banks t', The Mayor, 7 Wall. 16; The Bank v. The Supervisors, 7 Wall. 26.
' Const., Art. VI. cl. 1.
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just to pledge the United States to the payment of the

whole debt, that no one might be encouraged to raise ques-

tions respecting it afterwards. A like pledge was made

in one of the amendments adopted after the close of the

great civil war. It was then declared that " the validity

of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,

including debts incurred for payment of pensions and boun-

ties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion,

shall not be questioned. But neither the United States

nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation

incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the

United States, or any claim for loss or emancipation of any

slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be

held illegal and void." 1 The prohibitory portion of this

provision was as unnecessary as the other for the purpose

of settling any principle. No nation can be expected to,

or does, make compensation for losses occasioned in war

to its enemies. It might be said, however, that slave

property of loyal and disloyal alike was destroyed by the

government under circumstances rendering the destruction

equivalent to an appropriation, and that the equitable
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claim to compensation was such as should be respected.

But the prevailing view was that slavery was itself the

cause of the civil war, with all its losses and calamities,

and that its destruction was the destruction of a public

enemy, and no just claim could arise from it. The ex-

ample was therefore followed which was set at the Revo-

lution, of making no compensation for the incidental losses

of the war; and this was made impossible by expressly

prohibiting it.

Section II. — Regulation op Commerce.

The Constitution. —It is further provided by the Consti-

tution, that Congress shall have power " to regulate crm-

1 Amendment 14.

just to pledge the United States to the payment of the
whole debt, that no one might be encouraged to raise questions respecting it afterwards. A like pledge was made
in one of the amendments adopted after the close of the
great civil war. It was then declared that ''the validity
of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion,
shall not be· questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the
United States, or any claim for loss or emancipation of any
slave ; but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be
held illegal and vo~d. '' 1 The prohibitory portion of this
provision was as unnecessary as the other for the purpose
of settling any principle. No nation can be expected to,
or does, make compensation for losses occasioned in war
to its enemies. It might be said, however, that slave
property of loyal and disloyal alike was destroyed· by the
government under circumstances rendering the destruction
equivalent to an appropriation, and that the equitable
claim to compensation was such as should be respected.
But the prevailing view was that slavery was itself the
cause of the civil war, with all its losses and calamities,
and that its destruction was the destruction of a public
enemy, and no just claim could arise from it. The example was therefore followed which was set at the Revolution, of making no compensation for the incidental losses
of the war ; and this was made impossible by expressly
prohibiting it.
SECTION

II. -

REGULATION OF

CoMHERCE.

TM Constitution. - It is further provided by the Constitution, that Congress shall have power'' to regulate ccm1

Amendment 14.
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merce with fbreign nations, and among the several States,

and with the Indian tribes."1

Commerce. — The word commerce is not limited to traffic;

to buying and selling and the exchange of commodities;

but it comprehends navigation also, and all that is in-

cluded in commercial intercourse between nations and

parts of nations in all its branches, and is regulated by

prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.2 Navi-

gation and intercourse, therefore, upon the natural high-

ways by water is under the regulating control of Congress,

wherever it is not exclusively limited to a single State.8

So are transportation and intercourse by railroad between

different parts of the country; and it is therefore compe-

tent for Congress to provide that all railroad companies

may carry passengers, mails, and property over their roads,

boats, bridges, and ferries, on their way from one State to

another, and receive compensation therefor, and may con-

nect with other roads so as to form continuous lines for the

transportation of the same to their places of destination;

also to provide for the construction of bridges over naviga-

ble rivers between States, and to provide that the bridges
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when constructed shall be free for the crossing of all trains

of railroads terminating on the sides of the rivers respec-

tively.4 Congress may also regulate communication by tele-

graph between the States, and where a State has given

exclusive privileges which would preclude free intercourse,

it may under this power and the power to establish post-

offices and post-roads, provide for the construction of com-

peting lines. These powers "keep pace with the progress

1 Const., Art. I . § 8, cl. 8.

1 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283;

Henderson v. New York, 92 TJ. S. Rep. 259; Pensacola Tel. Co. v.

West, &c. Tel. Co., 96 TJ. S. Rep. 1, 9.

» Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.

* Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584.

5

merce with foreign nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian tribes." 1
Commerce. -The word commerce is not limited to traffic;
to buying and selling and the exchange of commodities ;
but it comprehends navigation also, and all that is included in commercial intercourse between nations and
parts of .nations in all its branches, and is regulated by
prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. 2 N avigation and intercourse, therefore, upon the natural highways by water is under the regulating control of Congress,
wherever it is not exclusively limited to a single State. 8
So are transportation and intercourse by railroad between
different parts of the country ; and it is therefore competent for Congress to provide that all railroad companies
may carry passengers, mails, and property over their roads,
boats, bridges, and ferries, on their way from one State to
another, and receive compensation therefor, and may connect with other roads so as to form continuous lines for the
transportation of the same to their places of destination ;
also to provide for the construction of bridges .over navigable rivers between States, and to provide that the bridges
when constructed shall be free for the crossing of all trains
of railroads terminating on the sides of the rivers respectively. 4 Congress may also regulate communication by telegraph between the States, and where a State has given
exclusive privileges which would preclude free intercourse,
it may under this power and the power to establish postoftices and post-roads, provide for the construction of competing lines. These powers '' keep pace with the progress
Const., Art. L § 8, cl. 8.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283;
Henderson v. New York, ~U.S. Rep. 269; Pensacola Tel. Co. "·
West., &.c. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. Rep. 1, 9.
a Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.
' Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 684.
6
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of the country, and adapt themselves to the new develop-

ments of times and circumstances. They extend from the

horse with its rider to the stage-coach, from the sailing

vessel to the steamboat, from the coach and the steamboat

to the railroad, and from the railroad to the telegraph, as

these new agencies are successively brought into use to

meet the demands of increasing population and wealth.

They were intended for the government of the business to

which they relate, at all times and under all circumstances.

As they were intrusted to the general government for the

good of the nation, it is not only the right but the duty of

Congress to see to it that intercourse among the States

and the transmission of intelligence are not obstructed or

unnecessarily encumbered by state legislation." 1

Commerce between States. — To constitute commerce be-

tween States it is essential that it be not confined to one

State exclusively, but concern more than one.a The ordi-

nary trade of a State, the local buying, selling,, and ex-

change, the making of contracts and conveyances, the

rules for the regulation of local travel and communication,

and all the infinite variety of matters which are of local
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interest exclusively, are left wholly to the regulation of

state law. The commerce of a State which Congress may

control must in some stage of its progress be extra-terri-

torial. It can never include transactions wholly internal,

between citizens wholly of the same community, or extend

to a polity and laws whose ends and purposes and opera-

tions are restricted to the territory and soil and jurisdiction

of such community. Nor can it be property concluded,

because the products of domestic enterprise in agriculture

or manufactures or in the arts may ultimately become the

subjects of commerce outside the State, that the control of

• Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western, &c. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. Rep. 1, 9.

a Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,189; The Passaic Bridges, 3 Wall.

782.

of the country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of times and circumstances. They extend from the
horse with its rider to the stage-coach, from the sailing
vessel to the steamboat, from the coach and the steamboat
to the railroad, and from the railroad to the telegraph, as
these new agencies are successively brought into use to
meet the demands of increasing population and wealth.
They were intended for the government of the business to
which they relate, at all times and under all circumstances.
As they were intrusted to the general government for the
good of the nation, it is not only the right bµt the duty of
Congress to see to it that intercourse among the States
and the transmission of intelligence are not obstructed or
unnecessarily encumbered by state legislation." 1
Commerce between States. - To constitute commerce between States it is essential that it be not confined to one
State exclusively, but concern more than one. 2 The ordinary trade of a State, the local buying, selling,.and exchange, the making of contracts and conveyances, the
rules for the .regulation of local travel and communication,
and all the infinite variety of matters which are of local
interest exclusively, are left wholly to the regulation of
state law. The commerce of a State wh1ch Congress may
control must in some stage of its progress be extra-territoriaJ. It can never include transactions wholly internal,
between citizens wholly of the same community, or extend
tio a polity and laws whose ends and purposes and operations are restricted to the territory and soil and jurisdiction
of such community. Nor can it be properly concluded,
because the products of domestic enterprise in agriculture
or manufactures or in the arts may ultimately become the
subjects of commerce outside the State, that the control of
1 Pen~acola
2

782.

Tel. Co. v. Western, &c. Tel. Co., 00 U. S. Rep. 1, 9.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189; The Passmc Bridges, 3 Wall.
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the means or the encouragements by which enterprise is

fostered and protected is implied in this important grant

of power.1 Therefore Congress cannot legislate for the

regulation of commerce on a stream whose navigable waters

are exclusively within the limits of a State, and which

does not, by connecting with other waters, form a contin-

uous highway over which commerce is or may be carried

on with other States or with foreign countries.2 It is

otherwise, however, with a river which, though wholly

within a State, forms, with the lake into which it runs, a

highway for inter-state commerce; and the regulations may

extend to the vehicles of commerce which are used upon

the river exclusively, but deliver merchandise upon the

vessels navigating the lake.8 So a law of Congress which

undertakes to regulate the sale of an article within a State,

and to impose penalties for preparing, offering for sale, or

selling it, except after it has been subjected to a prescribed

1 Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568, 574. It is well said in this case

that " a pretension as far-reaching as this would extend to contracts

between citizen and citizen of the same State, would control the pur-

suits of the planter, the grazier, the manufacturer, the mechanic, the
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immense operations of the collieries, the mines and furnaces of the

country; for there is not one of these avocations the results of which

may not become the subjects of foreign commerce, and be borne,

either by turnpikes, canals, or railroads, from point to point within

the several States, towards an ultimate destination. Such a preten-

sion would effectually prevent or paralyze every effort at internal

the means or the encouragements by which enterprise is
fostered and protected is implied in this important grant
of power .1 Therefore Congress cannot legislate for the
regulation of commerce on a stream whose navigable waters
are exclusively within the limits of a State, and which
docs not, by connecting with other waters, form a continuous highway over which commerce is or may be carried
on with other States or with foreign countries. 2 It is
otherwise, however, with a river which, though wholly
within a State, forms, with the lake into which it runs, a
highway for inter-state commerce ; and the regulations may
extend to the vehicles of commerce which are used upon
the river exclusively, but deliver merchandise upon the
vessels navigating the lake. 8 So a law of Congress which
undertakes to regulate the sale of an article within a State,
and to impose penalties for preparing, offering for sale, or
selling it, except after it has been subjected to a prescribed

improvement of the several States; for it cannot be supposed that

the States would exhaust their capital and their credit in the con-

struction of turnpikes, canals, and railroads, the remuneration de-

rivable from which, and all control over which, might be immediately

wrested from them, because such public works would be facilities for

commerce which, whilst availing itself of these facilities, was un-

questionably internal, although immediately or ultimately it might

become foreign."

a Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568.

» The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84;

The Bright Star, 1 Woolw. 266; The Montello, 20 Wall. 430.

1 Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568, 674. It is well said in this case
that " a pretension as far-reaching as this would extend to contracta
between citizen and citizen of the same State, would control the pursuits of the planter, the grazier, the manufacturer, the mechanic, the
immense operations of the collieries, the mines and furn aces of the
country; for there is not one of these avocations the results of which
may not become the subjects of foreign commerce, and be borne,
either by turnpikes, canals, or railroads, from point to point within
the several States, towards an ultimate destination. Such a pretension would effectually prevent or paralyze every effort at internal
improvement of the several States ; for it cannot be supposed that
the States would exhaust their capital and their credit in the construction of turnpikes, canals, and railroads, the remuneration derivable from which, and all control over which, might be immediately
wrested from them, because such public works would be facilities for
commerce which, whilst availing itself of these facilities, was unquestionably internal, although immediately or ultimately it might
become foreign."
i Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 668.
a The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 667; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84;
The Bright Star, 1 Woolw. ~66; The Montello, 20 Wall. 430.
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test as a protection against explosions, is inoperative within

state limits.1

Commerce with Indian Tribes. — It is immaterial to the

power of Congress over commerce with an Indian tribe that

the tribe resides within the limits of a State.2 The power

of regulation may extend to the prohibition of all inter-

course except that carried on under license,8 and at the dis-

cretion of Congress the prohibition may no doubt be

made total.

Embargo. — At one notable period in the history of the

country it was deemed wise to lay an embargo upon all

commerce with Great Britain and France, as a means of

obtaining redress against unfriendly action on their part,

under which the commerce of the country was being seri-

ously crippled. The embargo act was contested as uncon-

stitutional. It was said that it was not a regulation of

commerce, but a total destruction of commerce, and there-

fore not warranted by the power now under consideration.

The act was nevertheless sustained in the District Courts.4

The purpose was to protect and save commerce, not to

destroy it. As an embargo is commonly intended to be
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hurtful to another nation, and is likely to be followed by

hostilities if redress is not obtained, it would seem to be

justified under the war power also. But the power that

controls commerce must from the very nature of things

include the power to restrict and limit, — to prohibit as to

certain things, and to suspend altogether when for the

time it seems wise. It is a sovereign power, and therefore

knows no limit.

1 United States v. DeWitt, 9 "Wall. 41.

2 United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407; Worcester v. Georgia,'

6 Pet. 515; Johnson v. Mcintosh, 8 Wheat. 543; Jackson v. Goodell,

20 Johns. (N. Y.) 188.

* United States v. Cisna, 1 McLean, 254.

♦ United States v. The William, 2 Am. Law Jour. 255; Wheeling

Bridge Case, 18 How. 421, 439.

test as a prot;ection against explosions, is inoperative within
state limits. 1
Commerce with Indian Tribes. - It is immaterial to the
power of Congress over commerce with an Indian tribe that
the tribe resides within the limits of a State. i The power
of regulation may extend to the prohibition of all intercourse except that carried on under license, 8 and at the discretion of Congress the prohibition may no doubt be
made total.
Embargo. -At one notable period in the history of the
country it was deemed wise to lay an emLargo upon all
commerce with Great B1-itain and France, as a means of
obtaining redress against unfriendly action on their part,
under which the commerce ·of the country was being seriously c1ippled. The embargo act was contested as unconstitutional. It was said that it was not a regulation of
commerce, but a total destruction of commerce, and therefore not warranted by the power now under consideration.
The act was nevertheless sustained in the District Courts.'
The purpose was to protect and save commerce, not to
destroy it. As an embargo is commonly intended to be
hurtful to another nation, and· is likely to be followed by
hostilities if redress is not obtained, it would seem to be·
justified under the war power also. But the power that
controls commerce must from the very nature of things
include the power to restrict and limit, - to prohibit as to
certain things, and to suspend altogether when for the
time it seems wise. It is a sovereign power, and therefore
knows no limit.
United States"· DeWitt, 9 Wall. 41.
United States "· Holliday, 3 Wall. 407; Worcester "· Georgia,·
6 Pet. 616; Johnson v. Mcintosh, 8 Wheat. 648; Jackson v. Goodell,
20 Johns. (N. Y.) 188.
I United States v. Cisna, 1McLean,254:.
' United States v. The William, 2 Am. Law Jour. 256; Wheeling
Bridge Case, 18 How. 421, 489.
1
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The Power Exclusive. — The mere existence of this

power in Congress does not necessarily exclude the States

from all authority whatever which might affect the com-

merce falling within the control of Congress, provided no

actual legislation of Congress is interfered with. Some

regulations of minor importance it is usual to leave exclu-

sively to the States; such, for example, as the regulation

of pilots and the policing of harbors into which foreign

and inter-state commerce is brought. So where foreign

commodities are brought within a State and sold for retail

trade between local1 merchants and consumers, they then

become subjects of local commerce, and the control of

Congress passes to the State. But in respect to the

commerce that properly falls within the control of Con-

gress, its authority is necessarily exclusive so far as it is

exercised, and it is competent for Congress to extend its

regulations to the most minute particulars. The lines of

distinction between congressional and state jurisdiction

will be best understood by a reference to the leading cases.

The State of New York granted to Robert Fulton and

his associates, in consideration of the valuable service
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rendered in bringing the steamboat into practical use, the

exclusive right to navigate the waters of the State with

vessels propelled by steam for a series of years. The act

was held void so far as concerned the waters which consti-

tuted the highways of foreign and inter-state commerce.1

The State of Maryland passed an act requiring importers

of goods to take out a license and pay a license fee there-

for. But this, whether regarded as the imposition of a

tax, or a mere regulation, imposed a restraint, condition,

or burden upon engaging in foreign commerce, and was

therefore an encroachment upon the powers of Congress.

No more important regulation can well be imposed than

that of taxation, and a taxation of the importer because

1 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.

The Ppwer Exclusive. -The mere existence of this
power in Congress does not necessarily exclude the States
from all authority whatever which might affect the commerce falling within the control of Congress, provided no
actual legislation of Congress is interfered with. Some
regulations of minor importance it is usual to leave excln·
sively to the States; such, for example, as the regulation
of pilots and the policing of harbors into which foreign
and inter-state commerce is brought. So where foreign
commodities are brought within a State and sold for retail
1
trade between local merchants and consumers, they then
become subjects of local commerce, and the control of
Congress passes to the State. But in respect to the
commerce that properly falls within the control of Congress, its authority is necessarily exclusive so far as if' is
exercised, and it is competent for Congress to extend its
regulations to the most minute particulars. The lines of
distinction between congressional and state jurisdiction
will be best understood by a reference to the leading cases.
The State of New York granted to Robert ¥ulton and
his associates, in consideration of the valuable service
rendered in bringing the steamboat into practical use, the
exclusive right to navigate the waters of the State with
vessels propelled by steam for a series of years. The act
was held void so far as concerned the waters which constituted the highways of foreign and inter-state commerce. 1
The State of Maryland passed an act requiring importers
of goods to take out a license and pay a license fee there;,;_br. But this, whether regarded as the imposition of a
tax, or a mere regulation, imposed a restraint, condition,
or burden upon engaging in foreign commerce, and was
the refore an encroachment upon the powers of Congress.
No more important regulation can well be imposed than
that of taxation, and a taxation of the importer because
1

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.
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of his business as importer is manifestly equivalent to a

tax on the business itself.1

The State of Pennsylvania imposed a tax to be paid

by railroads upon freights taken up within the State and

carried out of it, and taken up without the State and

brought within it. This was a tax upon inter-state com-

merce, and was pronounced invalid accordingly.2

The State of New York required every master of a vessel

bringing passengers from other countries, and landing them

within its limits, to pay to the State a certain sum per

head for every such passenger. This requirement was

clearly within the principle of the cases above referred to,

and was also held unauthorized.* The State might never-

theless require a report from masters of vessels of the

names, &c. of passengers brought by them; this being

only a proper police regulation.4

The State of Alabama passed an act requiring the

owners of steamboats navigating the waters of the State,

before the boat should leave the port of Mobile, to file a

statement with the probate judge of Mobile County, setting

forth the names, residence, and interests of the owners.
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This was held invalid so far as it related to vessels en-

rolled and licensed for trade under the laws of Congress.6

1 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419,437; Low v. Austin, 13 Wall.

29. But articles imported may be taxed after they have passed from

the hands of the importers, even though they remain in the original

package. Waring v. The Mayor, 8 Wall. 110. See Welton ». Mis-

souri, 91 U. S. Rep. 275. A state tax on a bill of lading of goods

transported on the high seas is a regulation of commerce, and void.

Almy v. California, 24 How. 169.

2 Case of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232.

» Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283.

* New York o. Miln, 11 Pet. 103. See this case examined and criti-

cised in Henderson v. New York, 92 V. S. Rep. 259, where the principle

of the Passenger Cases, that a State cannot impose any condition to

the landing of passengers from a foreign country, is affirmed.

of his business as importer is manifestly equivalent to a
tax on the business itself. 1
The State of Pennsylvania imposed a tax to be paid
by railroads upon freights taken up within the State and
carried out of it, and taken up without the State and
brought within it. This was a tax upon inter-state commerce, and was pronounced invalid accordingly. 9
The State of New York required every master of a vessel
bringing passengers from other countries, and landing them
within its limits, to pay to the State a certain sum per
head for every such passenger. This requirement was
clearly within the principle of the cases above referred to,
and was also held unauthorized. 1 The State might nevertheless require a report from masters of vessels of the
names, &c. of passengers brought by them ; this being
only a proper police regulation.•
The State of Alabama passed an act requiring the
owners of steamboats navigating the waters of the State,
before the boat should leave the port of Mobile, to file a
statement with the probate judge of l\Iobile County, setting
forth the names, residence, and interests of the owners.
This was held invalid so far as it related to vessels enrolled and licensed for trade under the laws of Congress. 6

6 Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227. See Foster v. Master, &c.,

94 U. S. Rep. 246; Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31.

1 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 437; Low 11. Austin, 13 'Vall.
29. But articles imported may be taxed after they have passed from
the hands of the importers. even though they remain in the original
package. Waring v. The Mayor, 8 Wall. 110. See Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. Rep. 275. A state tax on a bill of lading of goods
transported on the high seas is a regulation of commerce, and void.
Almy v. California, 24 How. 169.
2 Case of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232.
• Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283.
' New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 103. See this case examined and criticised in Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. Rep. 259, where the principle
of the Passenger Cases, that a State cannot impose any condition to
the landing of passengers from a foreign country, is affirmed.
6 Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227. See Foster v. Master, &c.,
94: U. S. Rep. 246; Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31.
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The State of Louisiana enacted a law to compel all

carriers of passengers to provide equal and impartial ac-

commodations to those applying for carriage, irrespective

of race, color, or previous condition. So far as this ap-

plied to vessels transporting passengers from Louisiana

into other States, it was held inoperative.1 A like de-

cision was made in respect to a statute of Missouri which

imposed a license tax on those who within the State dealt

in goods, wares, and merchandise not the growth, produce,

or manufacture of the State, while imposing no correspond-

ing tax on those who dealt in goods, wares, and merchan-

dise which were the growth, production, or manufacture of

the State.2

The particular statement of these cases will suffice for

our purpose.

Where state legislation is in its essence and of necessity

a regulation of foreign or inter-state commerce, and there-

fore of national importance, it is an encroachment upon

the power of Congress over the subject, and is therefore

void, even though Congress may never have legislated

upon the subject.8 By refraining from action Congress in
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effect adopts as its own regulations those which the com-

mon law, or the civil law where that prevails, has provided

for the government of such business, and those which the

States, in the regulation of their domestic concerns, have

established affecting commerce, but not regulating it within

the meaning of the Constitution. In fact, congressional

legislation is only necessarj' to cure defects in existing

laws, as they are discovered, and to adapt such laws to

new developments of trade.4 Inaction by Congress is

equivalent to a declaration that the commerce under its

1 Hall v. DeCuir, 95 V. S. Rep. 485.

2 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. Rep. 275.

» Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. Rep. 275.

* Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. Rep. 485, 490.

The State of Louisiana enacted a law to compel all
carriers of passengers to provide equal and impartial accommodations to those applying for carriage, irrespective
of race, color, or previous condition. So far as this applied to vessels transporting passengers from Louisiana
into other States, it was held inoperative. 1 A like decision was made in respect to a statute of Missouri which
imposed a license tax on those who within the State dealt
in goods, wares, and merchandise not the growth, produce,
or manufacture of the State, while imposing no corresponding tax on those who dealt in goods, wares, and merchandise which were the growth, production, or manufacture of
the State. 2
The particular statement of these cases will suffice for
our purpose.
Where state legislation is in its essence and of necessity
a regulation of foreign or inter-state commerce, and therefore of national importance, it is an encroachment upon
the power of Congress over the subject, and is therefore
void, even though Congress may never have legislated
upon the subject. 8 By refraining from action Congress in
effect adopts as its own regulations those which the common law, or the civil law. where that prevails, has provided
for the government of such business, and those which the
States, in the regulation of their domestic concerns, have
established affecting commerce, but not regulating it within
the meaning of the Constitution. In fact, congressional
legislation is only necessary to cure defects in existing
laws, as they are discovered, and to adapt such laws to
new developments of trade.• Inaction by Congress is
equivalent to a declaration that the commerce under its
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. Rep. 485.
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. Rep. 275.
3 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. Rep. 275.
' Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. Rep. 485, 490.
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control shall remain free and untrammelled.1 Therefore

state legislation which undertakes to prohibit the driving

or conveying of Texan, Indian, or Mexican cattle into the

State during certain seasons of the year, is void though

conflicting with no act of Congress.2 So is legislation

void which provides for the appointment of a state com-

missioner who is to satisfy himself whether or not any

passenger (not a citizen) "who shall arrive in the State

from any foreign port or place is lunatic, idiotic, deaf,

dumb, blind, crippled, or infirm, and is not accompanied

by relatives who are able and willing to support him,

or is likely to become a public charge, or has been a

pauper in any other country, or is from sickness or disease

a public charge or likely soon to become so, or is a con-

victed criminal, or a lewd or debauched woman"; and

who shall prevent any such person from landing unless the

master, or owner, or consignee of the vessel shall give a

bond in each case to save harmless every county, city, or

town of the State against any expense incurred for the

relief, support, or care of such person for two years

thereafter. Such legislation is well characterized by the
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federal Supreme Court as "most extraordinary," not

only as it assumes control over an important branch of

foreign intercourse, with regulations nearly prohibitory,

and intermeddles with matters which are properly the sub-

ject of treaty stipulations with foreign countries, but also

as undertaking to confer despotic powers upon the com-

missioner, making him witness, judge of last resort, and

officer to execute his own judgments.8 So an act which

imposes a burdensome and almost impossible condition on

the shipmaster as a prerequisite to his landing his passen-

gers, with an alternative payment of a small sum of money

1 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. Rep. 275, 282.

2 Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. Rep. 465.

8 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. Rep. 275.

control shall remain free and untrammelled. 1 Therefore
state legislation which undertakes to prohibit the driving
or conveying of Texan, Indian, or Mexican cattle into the
State ·during certain seasons of the year, is void though
conflicting with no act of Congress.~ So is legislation
void which provides for the appointment of a state commissioner who is to satisfy himself whether or not any
passenger (not a citizen) "'who shall arrive in the State
from any foreign port or place is lunatic, idiotic, deaf,
dumb, blind, crippled, or infirm, and is not accompanied
by relatives who are able and willing to support him,
or is likely to become a public charge, or has been a
pauper in any other country, or is from sickness or disease
a public charge or likely soon to become so, or is a convicted criminal, or a lewd or debauched woman" ; and
who shall prevent any such person from landing unless the
master, or owner, or consignee of the vessel shall give a
bond in each case to save harmless every county, city, or
town of the State against any expense incurred for the
relief, support, or care of such person for two years
thereafter. Such legislation is well characterized by the
federal Supreme Court as '' most extraordinary," not
only as it assumes control over an important branch of
foreign intercourse, with regulations nearly prohibitory,
and intermeddles with matters which are properly the subject of treaty stipulations with foreign countries, but also
as undertaking to confer despotic powers upon the commissioner, making him witness, judge of last resort, and
officer to execute his own judgments. 8 So an act which
imposes a burdensome and almost impossible condition on
the shipmaster as a prerequisite to his landing his passengers, with an alternative payment of a small sum of money
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. Rep. 275, 282.
i Railroad Co. v. Rusen, 95 U. S. Rep·. 465.
s Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. Rep. 275.
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for each of them, is void, as being a tax on the ship-

owner for the right to land his passengers, and in effect a

tax on the passenger himself.1

In the cases above mentioned, the state legislation in-

vaded a domain which is appropriated exclusively to the

national power. But the regulation of the internal police

of the State is with equal exclusiveness left to the States,

so far as its rules will operate only within its own limits,

even though indirectly foreign and inter-state commerce

may be affected by it.2 Therefore a state law granting

to a state corporation the exclusive right for a term of

years to control the slaughtering of cattle in and near to

one of its cities, and requiring that all cattle and other

animals intended for sale or slaughter in that district shall

be brought to the yards and slaughter-houses of the cor-

poration, and authorizing the corporation to exact certain

prescribed fees for the use of its wharves and for each

animal landed or slaughtered, may be maintained as a state

regulation of police.8 So the regulation of the sale of in-

toxicating drinks within a State belongs to the State itself,

and it may require the taking out of a license as a condi-

tion to the dealing in intoxicating drinks, whether of home
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or foreign production, or may prohibit the sale of such

drinks as a beverage, including those imported after they

have passed from the hands of the importer and become a

part of the general merchandise of the State.4 So it is com-

petent to require railroad companies to advertise annually,

and adhere through the year to a tariff of fares.6 Many

other cases of regulation will be hereafter referred to.

1 Henderson v. New York, 92 TJ. S. Rep. 259.

a Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475; United States v. DeWitt,

9 Wall. 41; Sherlock v. Allen, 93 U. S. Rep. 99.

3 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.

4 License Cases, 5 How. 504; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462.

6 Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560.

for each of them, is void, as being a tax on the shipowner for the right to land his passengers, and in effect a
tax on the passenger himself. 1
In the cases above mentioned, the state legislation invaded a domain which is appropriated exclusively to the
national power. But the regulation of the internal police
of the State is with equal exclusiveness left to the States,
. so far as its rules will operate only within its own limits,
even though indirectly foreign and inter-state commerce
may be affected by it. 2 Therefore a state law granting
to a state corporation the exclusive right for a term of
years to control the slaughtering of cattle in and near to
one of its cities, and requiring that all cattle and other
animals intended for .sale or slaughter in that district shall
be brought to the yards and slaughter-houses of the corporation, and authorizing the corporation to exact certain
prescribed foes for the use of its wharves and for each
animal landed or slaughtered, may be maintained as a state
regulation of police. 8 So the regulation of the sale of intoxicating drinks within a State belongs to the State itself,
and it may require the taking out of a license as a condition to the dealing in intoxicating dtinks, whether of home
or foreign production, or may prohibit the sale of such
drinks as a beverage, including those imported after they
have passed from the hands of the importer and become s
part of the general merchandise of the State.• So it is competent to ·require railroad companies to advertise annually,
a.nd adhere through the year tu a tariff of fares. 6 Many
other cases of regulation will be hereafter referred to.
Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. Rep. 259.
Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475; United States v. DeWitt,
9 Wall. 41; Sherlock v. Aile~, 93 U. S. Rep. 99.
3 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.
4 License Cases, 5 How. 504; License Tax Cases, 6 Wall. 462.
6 Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 660.
1

~

74

74

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Concurrent Jurisdiction. — An example of state regula-

tion on a subject which may at the discretion of Congress

be brought within its control, is to be seen in the state

pilot laws and harbor regulations. These have been rec-

ognized and their validity sustained from the organization

of the government.1 The States may also pass quaran-

tine laws for their own protection against the introduction

of disease from other States or foreign countries ;2 but the

power that controls the foreign and inter-state commerce

of the country must undoubtedly have the authority to

take this subject under its control as a part of its com-

mercial regulations.

Bridges, Dams, and Ferries. — In general, every State

establishes, regulates, and improves the highways within

its own limits at discretion, and this is as true of highways

by water as it is of any others. Sometimes the regulations

go to the extent of establishing practical monopolies; as

in case of provisions in the lumber regions of the coun-

try, under which rafting companies are empowered to take

control of all logs thrown into a public stream, and raft

them to their destination, as the owners may direct. The
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States may also establish ferries across navigable waters,

and require the owners of ferry-boats to take out license

for running them, and pay fees therefor.8 So the States

may cause the navigable streams within their limits to be

improved, and impose tolls on those making use of them to

defray the expense.4 But when a stream in its natural state

constitutes a highway for foreign or inter-state commerce,

1 Cooley v. Wardens, &c., 12 How. 299; The James Gray v. The

John Fraser, 21 How. 184; Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450.

2 License Cases, 5 How. 504, 632; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S.

Rep. 465.

8 United States v. The James Morrison, Newb. Adm. 241; Con-

way v. Taylor, 1 Black, 603.

* Palmer v. Cuyahoga Co., 3 McLean, 226; McReynolds v. Small-

house, 8 Bush, (Ky.) 447; Kellogg v. Union Co., 12 Conn. 7.

Ooncurrent Jurisdiction. - An example of state regulation on a subject which may at the discretion of Congress
be brought within its control, is to be seen in the state
pilot laws and harbor regulations. These have been recognized and their validity sustained from the organization
of the government. 1 The States may also pass quarantine laws for their own protection against the introduction
of disease from other States or foreign countries; 2 but the
power that controls the foreign and inter-state commerce
of the country must undoubtedly have the authority to
take this subject under its control as a part of its commercial regulations.
Bridges, Dama, and Ferrie1. - In general, every State
establishes, regulates, and improves the highways within
its own limits at discretion, and this is as true of highways
by water as jt is of any others. Sometimes the regulations
go to the extent of establishing practical monopolies ; as
in case of provisions in the lumber regions of the country, under which rafting companies are empowered to take
control of all logs thrown into a public stream, and raft
them to their destination, as the owners may direct. The
States may also establish ferries across navigable waters,
and require the owners of ferry-boats to take out license
for running them, and pay fees therefor. 8 So the States
may cause the navigable streams within their limits to be
improved, and impose tolls on those making use of them to
defray the expense.• But when a stream in its natural state
constitutes a highway for foreign or inter-state commerce,
'
Cooley v. Wardens,
&c., 12 How. 299; The James Gray v. The
John :Fraser, 21 How. 184; Steamship Co. t'. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450.
2 License Cases, 6 How. 604, 632 ; Railroad Co. v. Rusen, 96 U. S.
Rep. 465.
8 United States v. The James Morrison, Newb. Adm. 241; Con-way v. Taylor, 1 Black, 603.
" Palmer v. Cuyahoga Co., 3 McLean, 226; McReynolda v. Small·
house, 8 Bush, (Ky.) 447; Kellogg v. Union Co.., 12 Conn. 7.
1
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it is, as we have already seen, to be considered as consti-

tuting a part of the navigable waters of the Union, and as

such it is subject to the superior regulation and control of

the United States.1 A State may authorize the bridging

of a river constituting a part of the navigable waters of

the Union, even though the bridge may to some extent be

an impediment to commerce which is carried on upon the

river under the protection of federal law.2 But to justify

such a bridge, its advantages to the general business of

the country must be so great as to overbalance the incon-

venience; and when such appears not to be the case, the

bridge may be abated as a nuisance under the judgment of

a competent court.8 Nevertheless, even after a bridge

has thus been judicially condemned, Congress in its plenary

power over the subject may take away the grounds for its

removal as an impediment to commerce, by declaring it

a lawful structure.4

State Duties on Imports and Exports. — Further to pre-

clude interference with the control by Congress over com-

merce it is declared by the Constitution that no State shall,

without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties
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on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely

necessary for executing its inspection laws.6 It seems

that the imports here intended are imports from foreign

countries only,6 but it is believed that a State cannot levy

a tax upon property because of the intent of the owner to

1 As to what are navigable waters of the United States, see Will-

son v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245; The Daniel Ball, 10

Wall. 557; The Montello, 20 Wall. 430.

* Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; Jolly v. Terre Haute Bridge

Co., 6 McLean, 2.37; Silliman v. Bridge Co., 4 Blatch. 74, 395.

» Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How. 518.

« Wheeling Bridge Case, 18 How. 421.

* Const., Art. I § 10, cl. 2.

* Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123. See Almy v. California, 24

How. 169.

it is, as we have already seen, to be considered as constituting a part of the navigable waters of the Union, and as
such it is subject to the superior regulation and control of
the United States. 1 A State may authorize the bridging
of a river constituting a part of the navigable waters of
the Union, even though the bridge may to some extent be
an impediment to commerce which is ca1Tied on upon the
river under the protection of federal law. 2 But to justify
such a bridge, its advantages to the general business of
the country must be so great as to overbalance the inconvenience ; and when such appears not to be the case, the
bridge may be abated as a nuisance under the judgment of
a competent court. 8 Nevertheless, even after a bridge
has thus been judicially condemned, Congress in its plenary
power over the subject may take away the grounds for its
removal as an impediment to commerce, by declaring it
a lawful structure.•
State Duti"es on Imports and Exports. -Further to preclude interference with the control by Congress over commerce it is declared by the Constitution that no State shall,
without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties
on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection laws. 6 It seems
that the imports here intended are imports from foreign
countries only, 6 but it is believed that a State cannot levy
a tax upon property because of the intent of the owner to
1 As to what are navigable waters of the United States, see Willson v. Blackbird Creek Ma.rsh Co., 2 Pet. 245; The Daniel Ball, 10
Wall. 557; The Montello, 20 Wall. 430.
2 Gilman v. PhiladC'lphia, 3 Wall. 713; Jolly v. Terre Haute Bridge
Co., 6 McLean, 237 ; Silliman v. Bridge Co., 4 Blatch. 74, 395.
a Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How. 618.
' Wheeling Bridge Case, 18 How. 421.
6 Const., Art. I. § 10, cl. 2.
6 Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123. See Almy v. California, 24
How. 169.
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export it to another, or discriminate in taxation between

articles intended for consumption within the State and

those sold to be taken into another.1

Tonnage Duties. — The States are also forbidden, with-

out the consent of Congress, to lay any duty of tonnage.a

It is, therefore, not competent to levy dues upon vessels

measured by their capacity,* nor indeed any dues at all

which are imposed upon the vessels as instruments of com-

merce, or are levied for the mere privilege of trading to a

port.4 But owners of vessels may be taxed by the State

for their interests in them as property, by the same stand-

ards employed in other cases.6 Wharfage dues are not

taxes, and they may, therefore, be laid in proportion to

tonnage.6

Preferences. — An important restriction is imposed upon

the power of Congress in the provision that " no prefer-

ence shall be given by any regulation of commerce or rev-

enue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor

shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to

enter, clear, or pay duties in another."7 The provision is

plain, simple, and just, and requires no comment.8
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Possession of Imported Goods. — Goods imported but not

yet delivered to the importer are in the custody of the

1 Jackson Iron Co. v. Auditor-General, 32 Mich. 488.

2 Const., Art. I . § 10, cl. 3.

'Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577; State Tonnage Tax Case,

12 Wall. 204; Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. Rep. 238.

* Steamship Co. ». Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31; Peete v. Morgan,

19 Wall. 581; Wheeling, &e. Transp. Co. v. Wheeling (Sup. Ct. U. S.),

8 Reporter, 417.

6 Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581. Only, however, where they have

their home situs. St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423.

• Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. Rep. 80; St. Louis v. Ferry

Co., 11 Wall. 423.

7 Const., Art. I. § 9, cl. 6.

8 It was somewhat considered in the Wheeling Bridge Case, 18

How. 421.

export it to another, or discriminate in taxation between
articles intended for consumption within the State and
those sold to be taken into another. 1
Tonnage Duties. - The States are also forbidden, without the consent of Congress, to lay any duty of tonnage. 1
It is, therefore,. not competent to levy dues upon vessels
measured by their capacity, 1 nor indeed any dues at all
which are imposed upon the vessels as instruments of commerce, or are levied for the mere privilege of trading to a
port. 4 But owners of vessels may be taxed by the State
for their interests in them as property, by the same standards employed in other cases. 1 Wharfage dues are not
taxes, and they may, therefore, be laid in proportion to
tonnage. 8
Preferences. -An important restriction is imposed upon
the power of Congress in the provision that '' no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor
. shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to
enter, clear, or pay duties in another." 7 The provision is
plain, simple, and just, and requires no comment. 8
Possession of Imported Goods. - Goods imported but not
yet delivered to the importer are in the custody of the
Jackson Iron Co. v. Auditor-General, 32 Mich. 488.
Const., Art. I. § 10, cl. 3.
3 Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577; State Tonnage Tax Case,
12 Wall. 204; Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. Rep. 238.
' Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31; Peete v. Morgan,
19 Wall. 681; Wheeling, &c. Transp. Co. v. Wheeling (Sup. Ct. U.S.),
8 Reporter, 417.
6 Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 681. Only, however, where they have
their home situs. St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423.
o Packet Co. "· Keokuk, 96 U. S. Rep. 80; St. Louis v. Ferry
Co., 11 Wall. 423.
T Const., Art. I. § 9, cl. 6.
• It was so mew hat considered in the Wheeling Bridge Case, 18
1

2

How. 421.
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United States, and process from state courts will not reach

them. They can only be delivered to the person entitled

to receive them under the laws of Congress.1

Section III.—Naturalization.

The Constitution. — Congress is further empowered "to

United States, and process from state courts will not reach
them. They can only be delivered to the person entitled
to receive them under the laws of Congress. 1

establish an uniform rule of naturalization."2 Naturali-

SECTION

zation is the act by which the rights, privileges, and im

III. -NATURALIZATION.

munities of citizenship are conferred upon a person born

an alien. There is no doubt that, when Congress has pre-

scribed a rule, its power is exclusive, since any regulation

by a State, not in force in every other State, would break

the rule of uniformity.8 The States have, therefore, by

their assent to this provision, made Congress the exclu-

sive depositary of the power to confer citizenship.4

A citizen, in the full acceptation of that term, may be

said to be a member of the civil state entitled to all its

privileges. The principal differences in privilege between

an alien and a citizen consist in these: — the former when

he resides in the country is there by sufferance merely; he

cannot own real estate therein, and he cannot exercise po-

litical rights. But these differences do not always exist:
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the States of the Union recognize fully the right of aliens

to reside within their limits without hindrance, and in

many States they are permitted freely to hold, convey, and

transmit to their descendants real estate. No less than

twelve of the States also permit aliens, after a short resi-

dence therein, and after declaring their intention to become

citizens, to exercise the elective franchise. When an alien

is thus given the privilege permanently to reside within a

» Harris v. Dennie, 3 Pet. 292. 2 Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 4.

8 Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat.

1, 48; Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 How. 504; Smith v. Turner, 7

How. 283.

« United States v. Villato, 2 Dall. 370.

The Oonstitution. - Congress is further empowered '' to
establish an uniform rule of naturalization." 2 N aturalization is the act by which the rights, privileges, and im
munities of citizenship are conferred upon a person born
an alien. There is no doubt that, when Congress has prescribed a rule, its power is exclusive~ since any regulation
by a State, not in force in every other State, would break
the rule of uniformity. 8 The States have, therefore, by
their assent to this provision, made Congress the exclusive depositary of the power to confer citizenship.•
A citizen, in the full acceptation of that term, may be
said to be a member of the civil state entitled to all its
privileges. The principal differences in privilege between
an alien and a citizen consist in these : - the former when
he resides in the country is there by sufferance merely ; he
cannot own real estate therein, and he cannot exercise political rights. But these differences do not always exist :
the States of the Union recognize fully the right of aliens
to reside within their limits without hindrance, and in
many States they are permitted freely to hold, convey, and
transmit to their descendants real estate. No less than
twelve of the States also permit aliens, after a short residence therein, and after declaring their intention to become
citizens, to exercise the elective franchise. When an alien
is thus given the privilege permanently to reside within a
Harris v. Dennie, 8 Pet. 292.
1 Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 4.
Chirac t'. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat.
1, 48; Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 How. 604; Smith v. Turner, 7
How. 283.
' United States v. Villa to, 2 Dall. 870.
1
1
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State, and to hold property of all kinds therein, and to

State, and t,o hold property of all kinds therein, and to

exercise the privilege of suffrage, the distinction in right

and privilege and immunity between him and a citizen is

not very plain. Indeed, as the suffrage would seem peculi-

arly to belong to citizens, and as the voter for representa-

tives in the state legislature may vote for representatives

in Congress also,1 it would seem that there might be some

question whether a State could confer upon an alien this

high privilege. It is a question, however, which has never

been made. One privilege, at least, the State could not

confer upon an alien. Without the power of naturaliza-

tion she could not give him as a citizen a title to all those

privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States

which the federal Constitution guarantees and secures.2

Section IV. — Bankruptcy.

The Constitution.—Congress may also establish " uni-

form laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the

United States."3 This is a power which Congress may or

may not exercise, and when it abstains from doing so, the

States are at liberty to legislate on the subject. Never-

theless their legislation must yield to the uniform laws

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:44 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

whenever Congress shall see fit to pass them.4 The power

exercise the privilege of suffrage, the distinction in right
and privilege and immunity between him and a citizen is
not very plain. Indeed, as the suffrage would seem peculiarly to belong to citizens, and as the voter for representatives in the state legislature may vote for representatives
in Congress also, 1 it would seem that there might be some
question whether a State could confer upon an alien this
high privilege. It is a question, however, which has never
been made. One privilege, at least, the State could not
confer upon an alien. Without the power of naturalization she could. not give him as a citizen a title to all those
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States
which the federal Constitution guarantees and secures. 1

of Congress extends to voluntary as well as involuntary

SECTION

bankruptcy; and though formerly merchants and traders

IV. -

BANKRUPTCY.

alone were subjected to the bankrupt laws, it is com-

petent for Congress to bring all persons within their pur-

view.6

Exemptions. — A bankrupt law may recognize and give

» Const., Art. I. § 2, cl. 1. 1 Const., Art. IV. § 1, cl. 1.

"Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 4.

4 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Ogden v. Saunders,

12 Wheat. 213; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; Ex parte Eames, 2

Story, 322.

* Re California Pac. B. E. Co., 3 Sawyer, 240; Ee Silverman,

1 Sawyer, 410; 2 Abb. U. S. 243.

The Oonsti•tution. - Congress may also establish '' uni-

form laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the
United States." 8 This is a power which Congress may or
may not exercise, and when it abstains from doing so, the
States are at liberty to legislate on the subject. Nevertheless their legislation must yield to the uniform laws
whenever Congress shall see fit to pass them. 4 The power
of Congress extends to voluntary as well as involuntary
bankruptcy ; and though formerly merchants and traders
alone were subjected to the bankrupt laws, it is competent for Congress to bring all persons within their purview. 6
Exemption1. - A bankrupt law may recognize and give
Const., Art. I. § 2, cl. 1.
I Const., Art. IV. § 1, cl. 1.
a Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 4.
' Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Ogden v. Saunders,
12 Wheat. 213; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; Ex parte Eames, 2
Story, 822.
·
6 Re California Pac. R.R. Co., 8 Sawyer, 240; Re Silverman,
1 Sawyer, 410; 2 Abb. U. S. 248.
1
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to those who become subject to its provisions the benefit

of the exemption laws of the States in which they re-

spectively reside, and the fact that these differ in liberality

is not to be regarded as depriving the bankrupt law of the

character of uniformity.1 Indeed, this is a just and equal

rule, since the bankrupt's debts are contracted on the

understanding that he is entitled to the exemptions pro-

vided by the laws of his own State, and creditors cannot

complain when he is allowed them.

Section V.—The Currency.

Coining Money and regulating its Value.—Among the

most important of the powers conferred upon Congress is

that "to coin money and regulate the value thereof and

of foreign coin." 2 This power would seem to be made

to those who become subject to its provisions the benefit
of the exemption laws of the States in which they respectively reside, and the fact that these differ in liberality
is not to be regarded as depriving the bankrupt law of the
character of uniformity . 1 Inde~d, this is a just and equal
rule, since the bankrupt's debts are contracted on the
understanding that he is entitled to- the exemptions provided by the laws of his own State, and creditors cannot
complain when he is allowed them.

exclusive by the further provision that no State shall

"coin money," or " make anything but gold and silver a

SECTION

tender in payment of debts." 8 The general purpose in-

v. -THE

CURRENCY.

tended to be accomplished by these provisions was,.to

confer upon Congress the power of general regulation of

the currency of the country, with a view to uniformity.

To coin money is to stamp pieces of metal for use as a
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medium of exchange in commerce, according to fixed

standards of value. When money is thus coined and

1 Re Smith, 2 Woods, 458; Re Aflold's Estate, 16 Am. Law Reg.

624. There are other decisions on the subject, and some of them

are in conflict. See Re Deckert, 10 Bank. Reg. 1; Re Shipman, 14

Bank. Reg. 570.

2 Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 5.

* Const, Art. I. § 10, cl. 1. Practically, the power is made exclusive,

though doubtless the States might legislate on the subject of legal

tender, if at any time the legislation of Congress should be found not

fully to cover the subject. And possibly a State might establish stand-

ards differing from those fixed by Congress, for the discharge of

contracts subsequently made within the State. But when Congress

alone can coin money and regulate its value, it is difficult to under-

stand how this can be.

Ooining Money and regulating its Value. - Among the
most important of the powers conferred upon Congress is
that ''to coin money and regulate the value thereof and
of foreign coin." 2 This power would seem to be made
exclusive by the further provision that no State shall
" coin money," or " make anything but gold and silver a
tender in payment of debts." 8 The general purpose intended to be accomplished by these provisions was, . to
confer upon Congress the power of general regulation of
the currency of the country, with a view to uniformity.
To ~oin money is to stamp pieces of metal for use as a
medium of exchange in commerce, according to fixed
standards of value. When money is thus coined and
Re Smith, 2 Woods, 458; Re Affold's Estate, 16 Am. Law Reg.
624. There are other decisions on the subject, and some of them
are in conflict. See Re Deckert, 10 Bank. Reg. 1; Re Shipman, 14
Bank. Reg. 670.
2 Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 5.
s Const., Art. I.§ 10, cl. 1. Practically, the power is made exclusive,
though doubtless the States might legislate on the subject of legal
tender, if at any time the legislation of Congress should be found not
fully to cover the subject. Anu possibl,11 a State might establish standards differing from those fixed by Congress, for the discharge of
contracts subsequently made within the State. But when Congress
alone can coin money and regulate its value, it is difficult to under..
stand how this can be.
1
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valued by sovereign authority, and when by law no other

standard exists, it would by force of these facts become a

lawful tender; but where money is coined of two or more

metals, it is usual to restrict the legal tender quality of the

baser metal to small sums, as has been done with silver,

copper, and nickel coins in this country.

Legal Tender Paper. — It has been decided that Con-

gress has power to make treasury notes a legal tender in

the payment of debts previously as well as subsequently

contracted.1 It is not agreed from what clause or portion

of the Constitution this power is derived; and as the legal

tender act was passed during the existence of a civil war

which put the existence of the Union in peril, some jurists

have been inclined to justify the exercise of the power as

they would any other act made imperative by the extreme

exigencies of war. But a power whose justification rests

upon necessity can never be restricted to any one period

or exigency; and from the nature of the justification it

must rest in the discretion of Congress, to be exercised

whenever in its opinion the need is sufficiently urgent. In

the law it is declared that " United States treasury notes
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shall be lawful money " ;2 as though the making them with

the legal tender quality was the coining of money; but

there is nothing in the debates attending the making and

adoption of the Constitution, or in contemporary history,

which would lead to the belief that the phrase "to coin

money " was understood in a broader sense than is above

expressed.

Changing Values. — Under the power to regulate, the

legal value may be changed at discretion. As the relative

1 Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, overruling Hepburn v. Gris-

wold, 8 Wall. 602.

1 Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 3588. See Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall.

687, 695, per Field, J.; and more particularly the opinion of Bradley,

J., in Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 554.

valued by sovereign authority, and when by law no other
standard exists, it would by force of these facts become a
lawful tender; but where money is coined of two or more
metals, it is usual to restrict the legal tender quality of the
baser metal to small sums, as has been done with silver,
copper, and nickel coins in this country.
Legal_ Tender Paper. - I t has been decided that Congress has power to make treasury notes a legal tender in
the payment of debts previously as well as subsequently
contracted. 1 It is not agreed from what clause or portion
of the Constitution this power is derived ; and as the legal
tender act was passed during the existence of a civil war
which put the existence of the Union in peril, some jurists
have been inclined to justify the exercise of the power as
they would any other act made imperative by the extreme
exigencies of war. But a power whose justification rests
upon necessity can never be restricted to any one period
or exigency ; and from the nature of the justification it
must rest in the discretion of Congress, to be exercised
whenever in its opinion the need is sufficiently urgent. In
the law it is declared that "United States treasury notes
shall be lawful money" ; i as though the making them with
the legal tender quality was the coining of money ; but
there is nothing in the debates attending the making and
adoption of the Constitution, or in contemporary history,
which would lead to the belief that the phrase '' to coin
money " was understood in a broader sense than is above
expressed.
,
Ohanging Values. -Under the power to regulate, the
legal value may be changed at discretion. As the relative
1 Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wlll. 457, overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 602.
2 Rev. Stat. U.S. (1878), § 3588. See Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall.
687, 695, per Field, J.; and more particularly the opinion of Bradley,
J., in Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 564.
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values of the different metals change from time to time, it

becomes necessary to employ this power with a view to

uniformity in standards, since otherwise the coin of least

intrinsic value in proportion to its legal rating would in

time drive the other from circulation. Any considerable

change in the legal standards for any other reason is not

to be expected, and, as it would operate to change the value

of all existing credits, would be tyrannical.

Dues to the States. — The States, in the exercise of their

own sovereignty, will determine for themselves in what

currency they will collect their taxes, and the act making

treasurjT notes a legal tender can have no application as

between a State and those upon whom the State imposes

pecuniary burdens for its own necessary purposes.1 And

private parties in their contracts may stipulate in what

currency they shall be discharged, and the courts will en-

force the stipulation.2 And, on common-law principles, a

tender in whatever passes current as money in the business

transactions of the day is a sufficient tender, if not ob-

jected to by the creditor at the time the tender is made.8

Section VI.—Bills op Credit.
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Prohibition.—The States are also prohibited to "emit

bills of credit." This inhibition was in furtherance of the

same general policy which took from the States the power

to coin money and restricted their power over the legal

tender. Previous to the Revolution, the Colonies from

time to time had issued paper obligations, promising to

pay to the holders certain definite sums of money, and had

put these in circulation as money among the people. These

1 Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71.

2 Brownson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229; Butler v. Horwitz, 7 Wall. 258;

Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall. 687.

values of the different metals change from time to time, it
becomes. necessary to employ this power with a view to
uniformity in standards, since otherwise the coin of least
intrinsic value in proportion to its legal rating would in
time drive the other from circulation. Any considerable
change in the legal standards for any other reason is not
to be expected, and, as it would operate to change the value
of all existing credits, would be tyrannical.
Dues to the States. -The States, in the exercise of their
own sovereignty, will determine for themselves in what
cWTency they will collect their taxes, and the act making
treasury notes a legal tender can have no application as
between a State and those upon whom the State imposes
pecuniary burdens for its own necessary purposes. 1 And
private parties in their contracts may stipulate in what
currency they shall be discharged, and the courts will enforce the stipulation.t And, on common-law principles, a
tender in whatever passes current as money in the business
transactions of the day is a sufficient tender, if not objected to by the creditor at the time the tender is made. 8

8 Warren v. Manis, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 476; Snow v. Perry, 9 Pick.

(Mass.) 540; Wheeler v. Knaggs, 8 Ohio, 169.

6

SECTION

VI.-BILLS

OF CREDIT.

Prohibition. -The States are also prohibited to '' emit
bills of credit." This inhibition was in furtherance of the
same general policy which took from the States the power
to coin money and restricted their power over the legal
tender. Previous to the Revolution, the Colonies from
time to time had issued paper obligations, promising to
pay to the holders certain definite sums of money, and had
put these in circulation as money among the people. These
Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71.
2 Brownson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229 ; Butler v. Horwitz, 7 Wall. 258;
Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall. 687.
a Warren v. Manis, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 476; Snow v. Perry, 9 Pick.
(Mass.) 640; Wheeler v. Knaggs, 8 Ohio, 169.
6
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•were bills of credit, based on the credit of the Colony

issuing them; and they had had when issued an invariable

tendency to depreciation and to the dishonor of the public

credit. The Constitutional Convention, and the people in

adopting their work, agreed that the States should surren-

der the power to repeat this painful history. The pro-

hibition, however, does not go so far as to preclude the

States from chartering banks of issue; for to " emit bills

of credit" the State itself must put them out on its own

credit.

Definition. — By bill of credit, then, is meant a bill

issued by the State, involving the faith of the State, and

designed to circulate as money on the credit of the State,

in the ordinary uses of business.1 And the bills of a bank

chartered by the State are not bills of credit in this sense,

even though the State is sole stockholder in the bank,2 or

though the State has pledged its credit for their payment

in case the bank shall fail to do so.8

Section VII.—Weights and Measures.

Standards.—Congress is further empowered "to fix

the standard of weights and measures."4 When this
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power is exercised it is exclusive, or there would be no

"standard."

Section VIII. — Counterfeiting.

Congress may also " provide for the punishment of coun-

terfeiting the securities and current coin of the United

States."6

"This power," it has been said, "would naturally flow

as an incident from the antecedent powers to borrow money

were bills of credit, based on the credit of the Colony
issuing them ; and they had had when issued an invariable
tendency to depreciation and to the dishonor of the public
credit. The Constitutional Convention, and the people in
adopting their work, agreed that the States should surrender the power to repeat this painful history. The prohibition, however, does not go so far as to preclude the
States from chartering banks of issue; for to ''emit bills
of credit" the State itself must put them out on its own
credit.
Definition. - By bill of credit, then, is meant a bill
issued by the State, involving the faith of the Statie, and
designed to circulate as money on the credit of the Statie,
in the ordinary uses of business. 1 And the bills of a bank
chartered by the State are not bills of credit in this sense,
even though the State is sole stockholder in the bank, 1 or
though the State has pledged its credit for their payment
in case the bank shall fail to do so. 1

1 Craig o. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 109.

SECTION

a Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257.

VII. -WEIGHTS

AND MEASURES.

'Darrington v. State Bank, 13 How. 12.

« Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 5. 6 Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 6.

Standartl,s. -Congress is further empowered

''to fix

the standard of weights and measures." • When this
power is exercised it is exclusive, or there would be no
"standard."
SECTION

VIII. -

COUNTERFEITING.

Congress may also'' provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United
States." 6
" This power," it has been said, "would naturally flow
as an incident from the antecedent powers to borrow money
Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 109.
Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257.
a Darrington z;. State Bank, 13 How. 12.
' Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 6.
6 Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 6.
1
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and regulate the coinage; and, indeed, without it those

powers would be without any adequate sanction." 1 It

would also naturally include the punishment of uttering

and publishing the forged securities and coin, and the

having them in possession for that purpose; and such has

been the practical construction. Nevertheless, the States y

may punish these acts, as offences against themselves.*

Section IX.—Post-Offices and Post-Roads.

The Constitution. — Congress is further given power

"to establish post-offices and post-roads." Every road

within a State, including railroads, canals, turnpikes, and

navigable waters, existing or created within a State, be-

and regulate the coinage ; and, indeed, without it those
powers would be without any adequate sanction." 1 It
would also naturally include the punishment of uttering
and publishing the forged securities and coin, and the
having them in possession for that purpose ; and such has
been the practical construction. Nevertheless, the States _\';_
may punish these acts, as offences against themselves. i

comes a post-road when by law or by the action of the

post-office department provision is made for the transporta-

SECTION

tion of the mail upon or over it. Whether by the power

IX. -POST-OFFICES

AND POST-ROADS.

to establish post-roads any more was intended than a

power to designate or point out what roads shall be mail

roads, and the right of way along them when so desig-

nated, has always been and is still made a question. Many

statesmen and jurists have contended that the power com-

prehends the laying out and constructing any roads which

Congress may deem proper and needful for the conveyance
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of the mails, and the keeping them in due repair for the

purpose.8 This last view has been acted upon by Congress

in some instances. The power to establish post-offices

includes everything essential to a complete postal system

under federal control and management, and the power to

protect the same by providing for the punishment as

crimes of such acts as would tend to embarrass or defeat

1 Story on Const., § 1128.

2 Fox o. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 433. See United States v. Marigold,

9 How. 560; Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13.

8 See 1 Kent, 268, and note; Story on Const., §§ 1128-1150, and

notes; Wheeling Bridge Case, 18 How. 421; Dickey v. Turnpike

Co., 7 Dana, (Ky.) 113.

Tile Constitution. - Congress is further given power
"to establish post-offices and post-roads." Every road
within a State, in9luding railroads, canals, turnpikes, and
navigable waters, existing or created within a State, becomes a post-road when by law or by the action of the
post-office department provision is made for the transportation of the mail upon or over it. Whether by the power
to establish post-roads any more was intended than a
power to designate or point o'ut what roads shall be mail
roads, and the right of way along them when so designated, has always been and is still made a question. Many
statesmen and jurists have contended that the power comprehends the laying out and constructing any roads which
Congress may deem proper and needful for the conveyance
of the mails, and the keeping them in due repair for the
purpose. 8 This last view has been acted upon by Congress
in some instances. The power to establish post-offices
includes everything essential to ·a complete postal system
under federal control and management, and the power to
protect the same by providing for the punishment as
crimes of such acts as would tend to embarrass or defeat
Story on Const., § 1123.
Fox v. Ohio, 6 How. 410, 483. See United States v. Marigold,
9 How. 660; Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13.
8 See 1 Kent, 268, and note; Story on Const., §§ 1128-1150, and
notes; Wheeling Bridge Case, 18 How. 421; Dickey v. Turnpike
Co., 7 Dana, (Ky.) 113.
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the purpose had in view in their establishment. And what-

ever place is officially kept as a place of deposit of mail-

able matter is a post-office, though it be merely a desk or a

trunk or box carried about a house or from one building

to another.1

Section X. — Copyrights and Patents.

The Constitution. — Congress is further empowered "to

promote the progress of science and useful arts by se-

curing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the

the purpose had in view in their establishment. And what. ever place is officially kept as a place of deposit of mailable matter is a post-office, though it be merely a desk or a
tnmk or .box carried about a house or from one building
to another.1

exclusive, right to their respective writings and discov-

eries." 2 Under this power, exclusive copyrights are

SECTION

granted for a term of years to the authors, inventors,

x. -

COPYRIGHTS AND PATENTS.

designers, or proprietors of books, maps, charts, pictures,

prints, statues, models, etc., and exclusive rights to make,

use, and vend new inventions. Acts of Congress under-

taking to secure exclusive rights in the use of registered

trade-marks have recently been held void, as not being

within this grant of power.8 The same cases hold that

Congress cannot pass" such acts under its power to regulate

commerce with foreign nations and among the several

States and with the Indian tribes; at least, if such laws

are general in their operation, and not limited to the com-
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merce over which Congress is given control.

Common-Law Rights. — An author has in the United

States no exclusive property in a published work except

under the federal laws.4 But the common law protects

him against the unauthorized publication of his manu-

scripts and letters.6

» United States v. Marselis, 2 Blatch. 108.

* Const., Art. I. § 8, oL 8.

* United States v. Steffens, U. S. Sup. Court, Oct. Term, 1879;

United States v. Witteman, decided at the same time.

* Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591.

6 Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 657; Bartlett v. Crittenden, 5

McLean, 32; Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 342.

The Oonstitution. -Congress is further empowered ''to
promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the
exclusive. right to their respective writings and discoveries." 1 Under this power, exclusive copyrights are
granted for a term of years to the authors, inventors,
deiigners, or proprietors of books, maps, charts, pictures,
prints, statues, models, etc., and exclusive rights to make,
use, and vend new inventions. Acts of Congress undertaking to secure exclusive rights in the use of registered
trade-marks have recently been held void, as not being
within this grant of power.• The same cases hold that
Congress cannot pas! such acts under its power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the ·several
States and with the Indian tribes ; at least, if such laws
are general in their operation, and not limited to the commerce over which Congress is given control.
Common-Law Rights. -An author has in the United
States no exclusive property in a published work except
under the federal laws.• Bnt the commo~ law protects
him against the unauthorized publication of his manuscripts and letters. 6
United States v. Marselis, 2 Blatcb. 108.
Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 8.
a United States v. Steffens, U. S. Sup. Court, Oct. Term, 1879;
United States v. Witteman, decided at the same time.
' Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591.
6 Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 691, 667; ·Bartlett o. Crittenden, 6
Mc~an, 32; Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 842.
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The Power Plenary. — The power to legislate on the

subject of patents is plenary, and may be exercised in the

passage of either general or special laws.1 But such laws

have no extra-territorial effect whatever.a

Section XI. — Piracies, Felonies on the High Seas, etc.

Punishment.—Congress is further empowered " to de-

fine and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high

The Power Plenary;. -The power to legislate on the
subject of patents is plenary, and may be exercised in the
passage of either general or special laws. 1 But such laws
have 110 extra-territorial effect whatever. 2

seas, and offences against the law of nations." Piracy is

universally understood in the law of nations as robbery

or a forcible depredation on the high seas, animo furandi.

It is the same offence at sea with robbery on land,8 and a

statute for the punishment of piracy, '' as defined by the

law of nations," is sufficient without further definition.4

But the manifest purpose of this provision is to empower

Congress to provide for the punishment as crimes of all

such infamous acts committed on the high seas as consti-

tute offences against the United States or against all na-

tions.6 But robbery committed on a ship belonging to

subjects of a foreign state, by one not a citizen of the

United States, is a crime only against such foreign state,

and not punishable in the courts of the United States.*

By high seas is intended all tide-waters below low-water
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mark.7

1 Evans v. Eaton, Pet. C. C. 322; Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean,

158; Blanchard v. Sprague, 2 Story, 164; Blanchard'g Factory v.

Warner, 1 Blatch. 258.

2 Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183.

» 1 Kent, 183; 4 Bl. Com. 71-73.

« United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153. See United States ». Brig

Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210.

6 1 Kent, 188.

• United States v. Palmer, 8 Wheat. 610; United States v. Kessler,

Baldw. 15, 22.

1 United States v. Pirates, 5 Wheat. 184; United States v. Wilt-

berger, 5 Wheat. 76, 94.

XI. - PIRACIES, FELONIES ON THE HIGH SEAS, ETC.
Punishment. -Congress is further empowered ''to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas, and offences against the law of nations." Piracy is
universally understood in the law of nations as robbery
or a forcible depredation on the high seas, animo furandi.
It is the same offence at sea with robbery on land, 8 and a
statute for the punishment of piracy, '' as defined by the
law of nations," is sufficient without further definition. 4
But the manifest purpose of this provision is to empower
Congress to provide for the punishment as crimes of all
such infamous acts committed on the high seas as constitute offences against the United States or against all nations. 6 But robbery c~mmitted on a ship belonging to
subjects of a foreign state, by one not a citizen of the
United States, is a crime only against such foreign· state,
and not punishable in the courts of the United States. 1
By high seas is intended all tide-waters below low-water
mark. 7
SECTION

Evans v. Eaton, Pet. C. C. 822; Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean,
158; Blanchard v. Sprague, 2 Story, 164; Blanchard's Factory v.
Warner, 1 Blatch. 258.
2 Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183.
8 1 Kent, 183; 4 Bl. Com. 71-73.
' United States v. Smith, 6 Wheat. 163. See United States"· Brig
Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210.
6 1 Kent, 188.
e United States v. Palmer, 8 Wheat. 610; United States v. Kessler,
Baldw. 15, 22.
1 United States v. Pirates, 5 Wheat. 184; United States v. Wiltberger, 6 Wheat. 76, 94.
1
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Section XII.—War.

SEOI'ION

The Constitution. — It is further provided that Congress

XII. -WAB.

shall have power "to declare war, to grant letters of

marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures

on land and water."1

Definition. — War is said to be " that state in which a

nation prosecutes its right by force."a It may exist with-

out being declared, through the hostile acts of a foreign

power, or through armed insurrection, and may then be

recognized and repelled by the President as commander-in-

chief of the army and navy.8 The power to grant letters

of marque and reprisal is included in the power to declare

war; but there is a propriety in granting it specifically,

since they are sometimes issued with a view to obtain

redress for some national injury without resort to further

hostile measures. Until rules are made concerning cap-

tures and confiscations, no private citizen can enforce rights

of forfeiture, either with or without judicial assistance.4

But as a legitimate means of prosecuting war the property

of a belligerent may be seized and confiscated, and dis-

posed of absolutely at the will of the captor.6 And this
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right exists in favor of the United States in respect to its

citizens engaged in rebellion against its authority.6 So as

a war measure the slaves of persons in rebellion may be

freed by proclamation.7 When war exists the government

1 Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 11.

2 The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635, 666.

* The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635, 668.

« Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch, 110.

6 Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268; Tyler v. Defrees, 11 Wall.

831.

• The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635, 673; The Grape Shot, 9 Wall.

129,132.

7 Slabach v. Cushman, 12 Fla. 472; Dorris v. Grace, 24 Ark. 326;

Weaver v. Lapsley, 42 Ala. 601; Hall v. Keese, 31 Texas, 504.

Tlie Constitution. - It is further provided that Congress
shall have power "to declare war, to grant letters of
marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures
•
on land and water." 1
Definition. - 'Var is said to be '' that state in which a
nation prosecutes its right by force." 1 It may exist without being declared, through the hostile acts of a foreign
power, or through armed insurrection, and may then be
re.cogniz.ed and repelled by the President as commander-inchief of the army and navy.• The power to grant letters
of marque and reprisal is included in the power to declare
war; but there is a propriety in granting it specifically,
since they are sometimes issued with a view to obtain
redress for some national injury without resort to further
hostile measures. Until rules are made concerning captures and confiscations, no private citizen can enforce rights
of forfeiture, either with or without judicial assistance.~
But as a legitimate means of prosecuting war the property
of a belligerent may be seized and confiscated, and disposed of absolutely at the will of the captor. 6 And this
right exists in favor of the United States in respect to its
citizens engaged in rebellion against its authority. 8 So as
a war measure the slaves of persons in rebellion may be
freed by proclamation. 1 When war exists the government
Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 11.
The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635, 666.
a The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635, 668.
' Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch, 110.
I Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268; Tyler"· Defrees, 11 Wall.
1

t
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e The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635, 673; The Grape Shot, 9 Wall.
129, 132.
T Slabach v. Cushman, 12 Fla. 472 ; Dorris v. Grace, 24 Ark. 326;
Weaver v. Lapsley, 42 Ala. 601; Hall"· Keese, 31 Texas, 604.
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possesses and may exercise all those extreme powers

which any sovereignty can wield under the rules of war

recognized by the civilized world; and among these is the

power to acquire territory, either by conquest or by treaty,1

to create military commissions for the trial of military and

other offences in districts where the civil law is displaced

by warlike operations,a and to establish provisional courts

in conquered territory.8 But there is and can be no power

to displace the guaranties and protections of the Constitu-

tion where the civil courts are discharging their functions

and can enforce them.4

Armies.—Congress may also "raise and support ar-

mies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be

for a longer term than two years."6 The purpose of

this restriction is to put it out of the power of the execu-

tive to keep on foot a standing army, when in the opinion

of the legislature it is not needful.6 Who shall compose

these armies, and how they shall be raised, must be deter-

mined by law. Minors may be enlisted without the con-

sent of their parents or guardians when the law fails to

require such consent,7 and all persons capable of perform-
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ing military duty, irrespective of age or of previous ex-

emptions, may be compelled to do so under laws for the

purpose.8

1 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 542.

8 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.

» Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How. 498; The Grape Shot, 9 WaU.

129.

* Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.

6 Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 12.

• Story on Const., § 1188. The same end is accomplished in Great

Britain by passing mutiny laws only from year to year.

7 Ex parte Brown, 5 Cranch, C. C. 554; United States v. Bain-

bridge, 1 Mason, 71.

8 It was so held in the Confederate States, where the question

would be the same. Ex parte Coupland, 26 Texas, 386; Barber v.

Irwin, 34 Geo. 27; Ex parte Tate, 39 Ala. 254.

possesses and may exercise ·an those extreme powers
which any sovereignty can wield under the rules of war
recognized by the civilized world ; and among these is the
power to acquire territory, either by conquest or by treaty, 1
to create military commissions for the trial of military and
other offences in districts where the civil law is displaced
by warlike operations, 2 and to establish provisional courts
in conquered territory. 8 But the-re is and can be no power
to displace the guaranties and. protections of the Constitution where the civil courts are discharging their functions
and can enforce them.•
.Armies. - Congress may also ''raise and support armies ; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be
for a longer term than two years." 6 The purpose of
thiH restriction is to put it out of the power of the executive to keep on foot a standing army, when in the opinion
of the legislature it is not needful. 6 'Yho shall compose
these armies, and how they shall be raised, must be determined by law. Minors may be enlisted without the consent of their parents or guardians when the law fails to
require such consent, 1 and all persons capable of performing military duty, irrespective of age or of previous exemptions, may be compelled to do so under laws for the
purpose. 8
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 542.
Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.
a Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How. 498; The Grape Shot, 9 Wall.
1
t

129.

\

' Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.
6 Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 12.
e Story on Const.,§ 1188. The same end is accomplished in Great
Britain by passing mutiny laws only from year to year.
'l Ex parte Brown, 5 Cranch, C. C. 554; United States v. Bainbridge, 1 Mason, 71.
8 It was so held in the Confederate States, where the question
would be the same. Ex parte Coupland, 26 Texas, 386; Barber v.
Irwin, 34 Geo. 27 ; Ex parte Tate, 39 Ala. 254.
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Navy. — Congress may also '' provide and maintain a

navy."1 What has been said respecting armies applies

equally here. The powers of enlistment and conscription

are the same, but conscription must operate under pre-

scribed and impartial rules: the impressment of seamen,

formerly practised in England, is not admissible in this

country.2

Military Law. — Congress may also "make rules for the

government and regulation of the land and naval forces." *

These rules must not be inconsistent with the proper au-

thority of the President as commander-in-chief of the army

and navy, which, being conferred by the Constitution, can-

not be taken away by Congress.

Militia. — Congress may also " provide for calling forth

the militia, to execute the laws of the Union, suppress

insurrections, and repel invasions." 4 The militia consists

of those persons who under the law are liable to perform

military duty, and who are enrolled and officered so as to

be ready for service when called upon; and they are state

forces until actually called into the service of the Union.

Congress may confer upon the President the power to call
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them forth, and this makes him the exclusive judge when

the exigency has arisen for the exercise of the authority,

and renders one who refuses to obey the call liable to pun-

ishment under military law.6 The President may make

his requisition directly upon the executive of the State, or

upon the militia officers.6

Congress may also " provide for organizing, arming, and

disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of

them as may be employed in the service of the United

i Const., Art. I. § 8, cL 13.

8 Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 367.

» Const, Art. I . § 8, cl. 14. See In re Griner, 16 Wis. 423.

4 Const., Art. I. § 8, el. 15.

6 Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1; Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19.

1 See cases cited in last note.

Navy. - Congress may also " provide and maintain a
navy." 1 What has been said respecting armies applies
equally here. The powers of enlistment and conscription
are the same, but conscription most operate under prescribed and impartial roles : the impressment of seamen,
formerly practised in England, is not admissible in this
country.!
Military Law. - Congress may also '' make rules for the
government and regulation <?f the land and naval forces." 1
These rules must not be inconsistent with the proper authority of the President as commander-in-chief of the army
and navy, which, being conferred by the Constitution, cannot be taken away by Congress.
Militia. - Congress may also '' provide for calling forth
the militia, to· execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions." 4 The militia consists
of those persons who under the law are liable to perform
military duty, and who are enrolled and officered so as to
be ready for service when called upon ; and they are state
forces until actually called into the service of the Union.
Congress may confer upon the President the power to call
them forth, and this makes him the exclusive judge when
the exigency has arisen for the exercise of the authority,
and renders one who refuses to obey the call liable to punishment under military law. 6 The President may make
his requisition directly upon the executive of the State, or
upon the militia officers. 8
Congress may also'' provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining the militia, and for go\?erning such part of
them as may be employed in the service of the United
Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 18. ·
1 Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 867.
a Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 14:. See In re Griner, 16 Wis. 4:23.
' Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 15.
6 Houston v. Moore, 6 Wheat. 1 ; Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19.
e See cases cited in last note.
1
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States, reserving to the States respectively the appoint-

ment of the officers, and the authority of training the mi-

litia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." 1

But though the States have the appointment of the officers,

the bodies of militia called into the service of the United

States are subject not only to the orders of the President

as commander-in-chief, but also to those of any officer out-

ranking their own, who may, under the authority of the

commander-in-chief, be placed over them. An army ob-

tained by conscription is not the militia, though conscripted

from it.2

Slate Power Subordinate. — The intent of the foregoing

provisions is to render the federal government supreme in

all that pertains to war, with subordinate authority in the

States. This is made more apparent by a subsequent pro-

vision that no State shall enter into any treaty, alliance,

or confederation, or grant letters of marque and reprisal; 8

and by still another, which declares that no State without

the consent of Congress shall keep troops or ships of war

in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with

another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war
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unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as

will not admit of delay.4 By troops here are meant a

standing force, in distinction to the militia which the States

are expected to enrol, officer, equip, and instruct.6 The

agreements and compacts which may be entered into with

the consent of Congress differ from the treaties, alliances,

and confederations which are absolutely forbidden, in this:

that the latter are made for perpetuity or for a consider-

able time, and generally have successive execution, while

the former are made for temporary purposes, and are per-

1 Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 16.

2 See the discussion in Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Penn. St. 238.

» Const., Art. I. § 10, cL 1. * Const., Art. I. § 10, cL 3.

6 See Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.

States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." 1
But though the States have the appointment of the officers,
the bodies of militia called into the service of the United
States are subject not only to the orders of the President
as commander-in-chief, but also to those of any officer outranking their own, who may, under the authority of the
commander-in-chief, be placed over them. An army obtained by conscription is not the militia, though conscripted
from it. 1
State Power Subordinate. -The intent of the foregoing
provisions is to render the federal government supreme in
all that pertains to war, with subordinate authority in the
States. This is made more apparent by a subsequent provision that no State shall enter into any treaty, .alliance,
or confederation, or grant letters of marque and reprisal ; 8
and by still another, which declares that no State without
the consent of Congress shall keep troops or ships of war
in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with
another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war
unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as
will not admit of delay.• By troops here are meant a
standing force, in distinction to the militia which the States
are expected to enrol, officer, equip, and instruct. 6 The
agreements and compacts which may be entered into with
the consent of Congress differ from the treaties, alliances,
and confederations which are absolutely forbidden, in this :
that the latter are made for perpetuity or for a considerable time, and generally have successive execution, while
the former are made for temporary purposes, and are per1

~
3

6

Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 16.
See the discussion in Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Penn. St. 238.
Const., Art. I. § 10, cl. 1.
4 Const., Art. I. § 10, cl. 8.
See Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.
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fected in their execution once for all.1 An attempt by a

State to deliver a fugitive from justice to a foreign sov-

ereignty, in response to a demand therefor, would be an

attempt to perfect and perform an agreement, and is there-

fore unauthorized.8

Section XIII. — Ceded Districts.

The Constitution.—Congress is further empowered "to

exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over

fected in their execution once for all. 1 An attempt by a
State to deliver a fugitive from justice to a foreign sovereignty, in response to a demand therefor, would be an
attempt to perfect and perform an agreement, and is therefore unauthorized. 1

such district, not exceeding ten miles square, as may by

SECTION

cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress

XIII. -

CEDED DISTRICTS.

become the seat of the government of the United States,

and to exercise like authority over all places purchased

by the consent of the legislature of the State in which

the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines,

arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings." 8

District of Columbia. — The cession contemplated by

this clause was afterwards made by the legislatures of

Maryland and Virginia, and Congress, as the legislature of

the Union,4 assumed the exercise of exclusive legislation

over it, but creating municipal governments with limited

powers. This exclusive legislation over people who have
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no voice in the selection of legislators is inconsistent

with the right of self-government, on the recognition of

which American institutions rest, and, like the control over

territories, must be regarded as one of the necessary ex-

ceptions to which, in their application, such general prin-

ciples are subject.4 In respect to a portion of this territory

Congress has relinquished its jurisdiction by retroceding

it to Virginia, and for a time it gave to the remainder a

territorial government. But the power in Congress thus

1 Holmes ». Jenniaon, 14 Pet. 540, 572.

2 Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540. 'Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 17.

« Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 424.

6 Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, 322.

The Constitution. -Congress is further empowered'' in
exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over
such district, not exceeding ten miles square, as may by
cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress
become the seat of the government of the United States,
and to exercise like authority over all places purchased
by the consent of the legislature of the State in which
the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines,
arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings." 8
District of Columbia. - The cession contemplated by
this clause was afterwards made by the legislatures of
Maryland and Virginia, and Congress, as the legislature of
the Union;' assumed the exercise of exclusive legislation
over it, but creating municipal governments with limited
powers. This exclusive legislation over people who have
no voice in the selection of legislators is inconsistent
with the right of self-government, on the recognition of
which American institutions rest, and, like the control over
territories, must be regarded as one of the necessary exceptions to which, in their application, such general principles are subject. 6 In respect to a portion of this territory
Congress has relinquished its jurisdiction by retroceding
it to Virginia, and for a time it gave to the remainde1· a
t,erritorial government. But the power in Congress thus
I

Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 672.
s Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. MO.
a Const., Art. I. § 8, cl. 17.
' Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 424.
6 Loughborough v. Blake, 6 Wheat. 317, 322.
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to delegate its general legislative authority has been de-

nied, with much apparent reason.1

Exclusive Jurisdiction.—A power of exclusive legisla-

tion carries with it exclusive jurisdiction,2 and therefore

to delegate its general legislative authority has been denied, with much apparent reason. 1
Exclusive Jurisdict ion. -A power of exclusive legislation carries with it exclusive jurisdiction, i and therefore
the States cannot take cognizance of acts done in places
thus acquired by the United States, and the inhabitants of
those places cease to be inhabitants of the State, and can
no longer exercise any civil or political rights under the
laws of the State. 8 But state jurisdiction 1s not excluded
over territory held or acquired by the United States without the consent of the State within which it lies. 4
1

the States cannot take cognizance of acts done in places

thus acquired by the United States, and the inhabitants of

those places cease to be inhabitants of the State, and can

no longer exercise any civil or political rights under the

laws of the State.8 But state jurisdiction's not excluded

over territory held or acquired by the United States with-

out the consent of the State within which it lies.4

Section XIV".—Treason.

Punishment. — Congress is further empowered " to de-

clare the punishment of treason; but no attainder of trea-

son shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except

during the life of the person attainted."6 By this last

clause the cruel feature of the old law, which punished the

traitor in the persons of his descendants, was forever

precluded.6

SECTION

Section XV. — Non-enumerated and Implied Powers.

XIV. -TREASON.

General Powers.—Congress is further empowered "to
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make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for

carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other

1 Roach v. Van Riswick, Sup. Ct. Dist. Columbia, 20 Alb. Law-

Jour. 433.

2 United States o. Cornell, 2 Mason, 60.

• Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72; Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio,

N. S. 306.

4 People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225.

5 Const., Art. III. § 3. See United States v. Greathouse, 2 Abb.

U. S. 364; Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 Wall. 339; Miller v. United States,

11 Wall. 268.

Punishment. -Congress is further empowered ''to declare the punishment of treason ; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except
during the life of the person attainted." 6 By this last
clause the cruel feature of the old law, which punished the
traitor in the persons of his descendants, was forever
precluded. 6

6 Forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted, was

abolished in England by Stat. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 106.

SECTION

xv. -

NON-ENUMERATED AND IMPLIED POWERS.

General Powers. -Congress is further empowered ''to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other
1 Roach 11. Van Riswick, Sup. Ct. Dist. Columbia, 20 Alb. Law
Jour. 433.
~ United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 60.
a Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72 ; Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio,
N. S. 306.
' People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 226.
6 Const., Art. III.§ 3. See United States v. Greathouse, 2 Abb.
U. S. 364; Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 Wall. 339; Miller v. United States,
11 Wall. 268.
6 Forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted, was
abolished in England by Stat. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 106.
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powers vested by this Constitution in the government of

the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."1

The import of the clause is, that Congress shall have all

the incidental and instrumental powers necessary and

proper to carry into execution all the express powers.

It neither enlarges any power specifically given, nor is it

a grant of any new power to Congress, but it is merely a

declaration, for the removal of all uncertainty, that the

means for carrying into execution those otherwise granted

are included in the grant.2 The grant of the principal

must include the necessary and proper incidents without

which the grant would be ineffectual. It would be as un-

desirable as it would be impracticable to enumerate all the

means by the use of which the powers expressly conferred

shall be exercised, since what may be suitable and proper

means at one period may be wholly unsuitable and inef-

fectual at another period, under conditions which had not

been anticipated, and thus the iron rule of limitation to

means specified would defeat the grant itself. The clause

above recited distinctly negatives any suggestion that

so unwise and impracticable a restriction was intended.
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Those who made the Constitution, conferred upon the

government of their creation sovereign powers; they pre-

scribed for it a sphere of action, limited, indeed, as respects

subjects and purposes, but within which it should move

with supreme authority, untrammelled except by the re-

straints which were expressly imposed, or which were

implied in the continued existence of the States and of

free institutions. But there cannot be such a thing as a

sovereign without a choice'of the means by which to exer-

cise sovereign powers.

In any particular in which the powers of the United

States are contemplated, the necessity for the exercise of

incidental powers is apparent. Congress, as a means to

1 Const., Art. I . § 8, cl. 18. 2 Story on Const., § 1243.

powers vested by.this Constitution in the government of
the United States, or in any department or officer. thereof." 1
The import of the clause is, that Congress shall have all
the incidental and instrumental powers necessary and
proper to carry into execution all the express powers.
It neither enlarges any power specifically given, nor is it
a grant of any new power to Congress, but it is merely a
declaration, for the removal of all uncertainty, that the
means for carrying into execution those otherwise granted
are included in the grant.~ The grant of the principal
must include the necessary and proper incidents without
which the grant would be ineffectual. It would be as un. desirable as it would be impracticable to enumerate all the
means by the use of which the powers expressly conferred
shall be exercised, since what may be suitable and proper
means at one period may be wholly unsuitable and ineffectual at another period, under conditions which had not
been anticipated, and thus the iron rule of limitation to
means specified would defeat the grant itself. The clause
above recited distinctly negatives any suggestion that
so unwise and impr~cticable a restriction was intended.
Those who made the Constitution, conferred upon the
government of their creation sovereign powers ; they prescribed for it a sphere of action, limited, indeed, as respects
subjects and purposes, but within which it should move
with supreme authority, untrammelled except by the restraints which were expressly imposed, or which were
implied in the continued existence of the States and of
free institutions. But there cannot be such a thing as a
sovereign without a choice"of the mean~ by which to exercise sovereign powers.
•
In any particular in which the powers of the United
States are contemplated, the necessity for the exercise of
incidental powers is apparent. Congress, as a means to
1

Const., Art. L § 81 cl. 18.

t

Story on Const., § 1243.
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the collection of its revenues, provides for the seizure, sale,

or confiscation of property; in its regulation of commerce,

builds light-houses and removes obstructions from harbors;

in establishing post-offices, prescribes the rates of postage,

provides for the appointment of postmasters and other

agents, for the free delivery of postal matter, and for the

sale and payment of postal money orders, &c. But what-

ever may be the power it exercises in these and other

cases, it must provide against its being rendered nugatory,

and its purpose thwarted, by enacting laws for the punish-

ment of those who commit acts which tend to obstruct,

defeat, or impair the force of their due execution, or who

neglect duties essential to the accomplishment of the ends

designed.1 Without these and similar incidental powers,

the government would be as completely without the means

of perpetuating its existence as was the Confederation

itself.

The necessity that shall justify the making of particular

laws is not an absolute necessity, but Congress may make

any law, not by the Constitution expressly or impliedly

prohibited, which it shall deem conducive to the execution
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of any express power.2 It may therefore charter a na-

tional bank as a necessary and useful instrument in the

fiscal operations of the government.8 It may give a prefer-

ence to the demands of the United States in case of insol-

vent estates.4 It may provide for the punishment of acts

which interfere with, obstruct, or prevent navigation, though

done on land.6 And Congress is of necessity the exclusive

i United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336.

a Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 539; Martin v. Hunter, 1

Wheat. 304.

» McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 413; Osborn v. United

States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738.

« United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358.

• United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72.

the collection of its revenues, provides for the seizure, sale,
or confiscation of property ; in its regulation of commerce,
builds light-houses and removes obstructions from harbors ;
in establishing post-offices, prescribes the rates of postage,
provides for the appointment of postmasters and other
agents, for the free delivery of postal matter, and for the
sale and payment of postal money ordePS, &c. But whatever may be the power it exercises in these and other
cases, it must provide against its being rendered nugatory,
and its purpose thwarted, by enacting laws for the punishment of those who commit acts which tend to obstruct,
defeat, or impair the force of tb.eir due execution, or who
neglect duties essential to the accomplishment of the ends
designed. 1 , Without these and similar incidental powers,
the government would be as completely without the means
of perpetuating its existience as was the Confederation
itself.
The necessity that shall justify the making of particular
laws is not an absolute necessity, but Congress may make
any law, not by the Constitution expressly or impliedly
prohibited, which it shall deem conducive to the execution
of any express power.i It may therefore charter a national bank as a necessary and useful instrument in the
fiscal operations of the government. 8 It may give a preference to the demands of the United States in case of insolvent estates.• It may provide for the punishment of acts
which interfere with, obstruct, or prevent navigation, though
done on land. 6 And Congress is of necessity the exclusive
United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336.
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 467, 639; Martin v. Hunter, 1
Wheat. 304.
a McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 816, 418; Osborn v. United
States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738.
' United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 868.
I United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72.
1
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judge of what is needful and proper, when the means chosen

conduce to the end and are not forbidden.1

Internal Improvements. — How far Congress as an inci-

dent to powers expressly granted has a right to appro-

priate money or public lands to what are called internal

improvements within the States, has been the subject of

earnest discussion, almost from the foundation of the gov-

ernment, and is even now not authoritatively determined.

It is for the most part conceded that such appropriations

may be made for the improvement of the navigable wa-

ters which constitute highways of foreign and inter-state

commerce, and the harbors which are important to such

commerce, and to build breakwaters, light-houses, and

piers; but it is contended by some that Congress may

also assist in the making or improvement of highways,

railroads, and canals, existing or authorized under state

authority. To some extent such assistance has been given

in money, but to a much greater extent in lands, and

the question of right, like that of protective duties, has

always been treated as exclusively political.2

Alien and Sedition Laws. — Two noted instances of
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the exercise of implied powers in the early history of the

country led to much earnest and excited discussion of the

theory of the Constitution, and to bitter and dangerous

controversies respecting it. The first was in the Alien

Law, so called,8 which authorized the President to order

out of the country such aliens as he should deem danger-

ous to the peace and safety of the United States, or should

have reasonable grounds to suspect to be concerned in any

treasonable or secret machinations against the govern-

ment, and imposed severe penalties for disobedience to

1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 413. See Anderson v.

Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204.

2 Story on Const., ch. 26 and notes.

» Act of June 25, 1798.

judge of what is needful and proper, when the means chosen
~onduce to the end and are not forbidden. 1
Internal Improvements. - How far Congress as an incident to powers expressly granted has a right to appropriate money or public lands to what are called internal
improvements within the States, has been the subject of
earnest discussion, almost from the foundation of the government, and is even now not authoritatively determined.
It is for the most part conceded that such appropriations
may be made for the improvement of the navigable waters which constitute highways of foreign and inter-state
commerce, and the harbors which are important to such
commerce, and to build breakwaters, light-houses, and
piers ; but it is contended by some that Congress may
also assist in the making or improvement of highways,
railroads, and canals, existing or authorized under state
authority. To some extent such assistance has been given
in money, but to a much greater extent in lands, and
the question of right, like that of protective duties, has
always been treated as exclusively political. 2
.Alien and Sedition, Laws. -Two noted instances or
the exercise of implied powers in the early history or the
country led to much earnest and excited discussion or the
theory of the Constitution, and to bitter and dangerous
controversies respecting it. The first was in the .Alien
Law, so called, 8 which authorized the President to order
out of the country such aliens as he should deem dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or should
have reasonable grounds to suspect to be concerned in any
treasonable or secret machinations against the government, and imposed severe penalties for disobedience to
l McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 418.
Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204.
2 Story on Const., ch. 26 and notes.
a Act of June 26, 1798.
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the order. The other was in the Sedition Law,1 which

declared it to be a public crime, punishable with fine and

imprisonment, for any persons unlawfully to combine and

conspire together with intent to oppose any measure or

measures of the United States, &c., or with such intent

to counsel, advise, or attempt to procure any insurrection,

unlawful assembly, or combination, or to write, print,

utter, or publish, or cause or procure to be written, &c.,

or wilfully to assist in writing, &c., any false, scandalous,

and malicious writings against the government of the

United States, or either house of Congress, or the Presi-

dent, with intent to defame them, or to bring them into

contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them the hatred

of the people, or to stir up sedition, or to excite any un-

lawful combination for opposing or resisting any law, or

any lawful act of the President, or to resist, oppose, or

defeat any such law or act, or to aid, encourage, or abet

any hostile designs of foreign nations against the United

States.2 Prosecutions were had under this last law, and

it was sustained by the judiciary, but the prosecutions had

the effect to excite a violent public clamor throughout the
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country, and were held up to the people as attempts to

stifle constitutional discussion, and to prolong the ascen-

dency of the party in power, by holding the threat of pun-

ishment over the heads of those who would vigorously

assail its conduct, measures, and purposes.8

Resolutions of '98. — These laws were the immediate

incitement to the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of

1798-9, passed by the legislatures of those States respec-

tively. The Virginia Resolutions, after avowing a firm

attachment to the Constitution, and a determination to

support it, declare that the legislature "views the powers

1 Act of July 14, 1798. * Story on Const., § 1293.

8 The prosecutions under the Sedition Law are given in Wharton's

State Trials.

the order. The other was in the Sedition Law, 1 which
declared it to be a public crime, punishable with fine and
imprisonment, for any persons unlawfully to combine and
conspire together with intent to oppose any measure or
measures of the United States, &c., or with such intent
to counsel, advise, or attempt to procure any insurrection,
unlawful assembly, or combination, or to write, print,
utter, or publish, or cause or procure to be written, &c.,
or wilfully to assist in writing, &c., any false, scandalous,
and malicious writings against the govermpent of the
United States, or either house of Congress, or the President, with intent to defame them, or to bring them into
contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them the hatred
of the people, or to stir up sedition, or to excite any unlawful combination for opposing or resisting any law, or
any lawful act of the President, or to resist, oppose, or
defeat any such law or act, or to aid, encourage, or abet
any hostile designs of foreign nations against the United
States.~ Prosecutions were had under this last law, '1nd
it was sustained by the judiciary, but the prosecutions had
the effect to excite a violent public clamor throughout the
country, and were held up to the people as attempts to
stifte constitutional discussion, and to prolong the ascendency of the party in power, by holding the threat of punishment over the heads of thos.e who would vigorously
assail its conduct, measures, and purposes. 8
Resolutions of '98. - These laws were the immediate
incitement to the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of
1798-9, passed by the legislatures of those States respectively. The Virginia Resolutions, after avowing a firm
attachment to the Constitution, and a determination to
support it, declare that the legislature '' views the powers
Act of July 14, 1798.
2 Story on Const.,§ 1293.
a The prosecutions under the Sedition Law are given in Wharton's
State Trials.
1
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of the federal government as resulting from the compact to

which the States are parties, as limited by the plain sense

and intention of the instrument constituting that compact,-

as no further valid than they are authorized by the grants

enumerated in that compact, and that, in case of a deliber-

ate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers not

granted by the said compact, the States, who are the parties

thereto, have the right and are in duty bound to interpose

for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining

within their respective limits the authorities, rights, and

liberties appertaining to them."1 Of the Kentucky Keso-

lutions there were two sets, the first of which, after declar-

ing that the Constitution was a compact between the States

and the government founded by it, proceeded to assert

that'' this government, created by this compact, was not

made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the pow-

ers delegated to itself, since that would have made its dis-

cretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers,

but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties

having no common judge, each party has an equal right to

judge for itself as well of infractions as of the mode and
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measure of redress."2 The second, passed in the follow-

ing year, declared that a nullification by the States of all

unauthorized acts done under color of the Constitution is

the rightful remedy.8

The Alien and Sedition Laws were temporary, and soon

expired, and it has long been settled that there must be and

is within the federal government authority to decide finally

upon the extent and scope of its powers. The judicial

decisions to this effect are numerous,4 and the practice of

1 Elliott's Debates, iv. 528, where Madison's report on the Reso-

lutions is also published.

1 Elliott's Debates, iv. 540. 'Elliott's Debates, iv. 544.

* Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 334; Cohens v. Vir-

ginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419; Ableman ».

of the federal government as resulting from the compact to
which the States are parties, as limited by the plain sense
and intention of the instrument constituting that compact,.
as no further valid than they are authorized by the grants
enumerated in that compact, and that, in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers not
granted by the said compact, the States, who are the parties
thereto, have the right and are in duty bound to interpose
for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining
within their respective limits the authorities, rights, and
liberties appertaining t.o them." 1 Of the Kentucky Resolutions there were two sets, the first of which, after declaring that the Constitution was a compact between the States
and the government founded by it, proceeded to assert
that '' this government, created by this compact, was not
made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself, since that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers,
but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties
having no common judge, each party has an equal right to
judge for itself as well of infractions as of the mode and
measure of redress." 2 The second, passed in the following year, declared that a nullification by the States of all
unauthorized acts done under color of the Constitution is
the rightful remedy. 8
The Alien and Sedition Laws were temporary, and soon
expired, and it has long been settled that there must be and
is within the federal government authority to decide finally
upon the extent and scope of its powers. The judicial
decisions to this effect are numerous,' and the practice of
1 Elliott's Debates, iv. 628, where Madison's report on the Resolutions is also published.
t Elliott's Debates, iv. MO.
3 Elliott's Debates, iv. 644.
' Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 334: ; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 ; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419; Ableman v.
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the other departments, and of the States also, is in accord

with them.

Section XVI.—Restrictions on the Powers op

the other departments, and of the States also, is in accord
with them.

Congress.

Implied Restrictions. — In the preceding chapter allusion

SECTION
has been made to, certain restrictions on the powers of

Congress, which are implied from the division of powers as

XVI. -

RESTRICTIONS ON THE POWERS OF
CONGRESS.

between the nation and the States, and as between the

several departments of the national government. First,

that it must not exercise the powers, or any portion thereof,

conferred by the Constitution on the executive or the judi-

ciary; and, second, that it must not encroach upon the

sphere of sovereignty which by the Constitution is left in

or assigned to the States. Some others will now be

mentioned.

1. No legislative body can delegate to another depart-

ment of the government, or to any other authority, the

power^ either generally or specially, to enact laws. The

reason is found in the very existence of its own powers.

This high prerogative has been intrusted to its own wis-

dom, judgment, and patriotism, and not to those of other
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persons, and it will act ultra vires if it undertakes to

delegate the trust, instead of executing it.1 But this

principle does not preclude conferring local powers of gov-

ernment upon the local authorities, according to the imme-

morial practice of our race and country,2 nor the giving to

Booth, 21 How. 506; Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397. There was always

a dispute whether the "nullification " intended by the Kentucky and

Virginia Resolutions was anything more than a resort to such means

of redress as were admissible under the Constitution, and to an

amendment of that instrument if needful.

1 Locke on Civil Government, § 142; Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483;

Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479; Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 141-152.

'Durach's Appeal 62 Penn. St. 491; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis.

415; People v. Kelsey 34 Cal. 470; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44

7

Implied Restrictions. - In the preceding chapter allusion
has been made to certain restrictions on the powers of
Congress, which are implied from the division of powers as
between the nation and the States, and as between the
several departments of the national government. First,
that it must not exercise the powers, or any portion thereof,
conferred by the Constitution on the executive or the judiciary ; and, second, that it must not encroach upon the
sphere of sovereignty which by the Constitution is left in
or assigned to the States. Some others will now be
mentioned.
1. No legislative body can delegate to another department of the government, or to any other authority, the
power~ either generally or specially, to enact laws.
The
reason is found in the very existence of its own powers.
This high prerogative has been intrusted to its own wisdom, judgment, and patriotism, and not to those of other
persons, and it will act ultra vires if it undertakes to
delegate the trust, instead of executing it. 1 But this
principle does not preclude conferring local powers of government upon the local authorities, according to the immemorial practice of our race and country, 2 nor the giving to
Booth, 21.How. 606; Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397. There was always
a dispute whether the "nullification" intended by the Kentucky and
Virginia Resolutions was anything more than a resort to such means
of redress as were admissible under the Constitution, and to an
amendment of that instrument if needful.
1 Locke on Civil Government, § 142 ; Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483;
Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479; Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 141-152.
2 Durach's Appeal 62 Penn. St. 491; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis.
415; People v. Kelsey 34 Cal. 470; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44
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the territories a general authority to legislate on their own

affairs. It is competent also, and sometimes necessary,

to confer authority on the executive or the judiciary to

determine in what cases a particular law shall be applied.

For example, the act of Congress suspending the privilege

of the writ of habeas corpus during the late civil war did

not declare a general suspension, — which would have

been entirely needless, and therefore an act of tyranny, —

but it empowered the President to exercise his judgment,

and supersede the writ in particular cases, as he might

deem the public interest to require. A similar discretion-

ary power is conferred upon the President, or upon one

of the heads of department, in many cases.

2. No legislative body under its general authority can

pass any act which shall limit or be derogatory to the au-

thority of its successors. If one legislature could in any

degree limit the power of its successors, the process might

be repeated from time to time, until the State would be

stripped of its legislative authority, and of the sovereignty

itself. It is for this reason that a State can pass no irre-

pealable law; for an irrepealable law must necessarily re-

move something from the reach of subsequent legislation.1
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3. Every legislative body is to make laws for the public

good, and not for the benefit of individuals; and it is to

make them aided by the light of those general principles

which lie at the. foundation of representative institutions.

Here, however, we touch the province of legislative dis-

cretion. What is for the public good, and what is required

by the principles underlying representative government,

the legislature must decide under the responsibility of its

members to their constituents.

Cross v. Hopkins, 6 W. Va. 323; Stone v. Charlestown, 114 Mass. 214;

and many cases collected in Cooley, Const. Lira., 4th ed., 141-152,

where the validity of local option laws is discussed,

i 1 Bl. Com. 90; Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean, 161.

the territories a general authority to legislate on their own
affairs. It is competent also, and sometimes necessary,
to confer authority on the executive or the judiciary to
determine in what cases a particular law shall be applied.
For example, the act of Congress suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus during the late civil war di<l
not declare a general suspension, - which would have
been entirely needless, and therefore an act of tyranny, but it empowered the President to exercise his judgment,
and supersede the writ in ~articular cases, as he might
deem the public interest to require. A similar discretionary power is confeITed upon the President, or upon one
of the heads of department, in many cases.
2. No legislative body under its general authority can
pass any act which shall limit or be derogatory to the authority of its successors. If one legislature could in any
degree limit the powet.9 of its successors, the process might
be repeated from time to time, until the State would be
stripped of its legislative authority, ·and of the sovereignty
itself. It is for this reason that a State can pass no irrepealable law; for an irt'epealable law must necessarily remove something from the reach of subsequent legislation. 1
3. Every legislative body is to make law~ for the public
good, and not for the benefit of individuals; and it is to
make them aided by the light of those general principles
which lie at the. foundation of representative institutions.
Here, however, we touch the province of legislative discretion. What is for the public good, and what is required
by the principles underlying representative government,
the legislature must decide under the responsibility of its
members to their constituents.
Cross v. Hopkins, 6 W. Va. 823; Stone v. Charlestown, 114 Mass. 214;
and many cases collected in Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 141-162,
where the validity of local option laws is discussed.
1 1 Bl. Com. 00; Bloomer v. Stolley, 6 McLean, 161.
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Express Restrictions. — Those express restrictions upon

the powers of Congress which are intended for the protec-

tion of personal rights and liberties, it will be more con-

venient to refer to hereafter, in connection with other

protections. The following are some which concern gen-

eral policy.

Slave Trade. — Congress was forbidden, though in ob-

scure language, to prohibit the importation of slaves prior

to the year 1808.1 The forbidden power was exercised as

soon as this time had expired.

Titles, Presents, fyc. — The granting of titles of nobility

is prohibited.2 Their inconsistency with republican insti-

tutions, based upon perfect equality of rights, was so

manifest as to render the prohibition an important security.

It is also provided, that no person holding an office of

profit or trust under the United States shall, without the

consent of Congress, accept any present, emolument,

office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince,

or foreign state. A wise jealousy of foreign influence in

the aflairs of government will amply justify this provision.8

i Const., Art. 1 § 9, cL 1. 2 Const., Art. L § 9, cL 8.
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* Story on Const., § 1352.

Express Restrictions. -Those express restrictions upon
the powers of Congress which are intended for the protection of personal rights and liberties, it will be more convenient to refer to hereafter, in connection with other
. protections. The following are some which concern general policy.
Slave Trade. - Congress was forbidden, though in obscure language, to prohibit the importation of slaves prior
to the year 1808. 1 The forbidden power was exercised as
soon as this time had expired.
Titles, Presents, ~c. -The granting of titles of nobility
is prohibited.~ Their inoonsistency with republican institutions, based upon perfect equality of rights, was so
manifest as to render the prohibition an important security.
It is also provided, that no person holding an office of
profit or trust under the United States shall, without the
consent of Congress, accept any present, emolument,
office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince,
or foreign state. A wise jealousy of foreign influence in
the affairs of government will amply justify this provision. 8
1 Const., Art. I. § 9, cl. 1.
a Story on Const., § 1362.

s Const., Art. I.§ 9, cl. 8.
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CHAPTER V.

THE POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE.

Commander-in-Chief.—The President is Commander-

in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States,

and of the militia of the several States when called into

actual service.1 This important power is confided to him

to be exercised in his discretion, but it is expected to be

exercised through the War Department, and not by taking

CHAPrER V.

command in the field, or by any personal direction of

armies.2 As commander, while war prevails the President

has all the powers recognized by the laws and usages of

war, but at all times he must be governed by law, and his

THE POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE.

orders which the law does not warrant will be no protec-

tion to officers acting under them.8 An example is where

he appoints an unlawful military commission, which pro-

Commander-in- (Jhief. -The President is Commander-

ceeds to try and punish offenders against the law.4 The

power to declare war being confided to the legislature,

he has no power to originate it, but he may in advance

of its declaration employ the army and navy to suppress

insurrection or repel invasion.6

The Cabinet. — The President may require the opinion
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in writing of the principal officer in each of the executive

departments upon any subject relating to the duties of

1 Const., Art. II . § 2.

a United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291.

8 Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch, 170.

* Milligan v. Hovey, 3 Biss. 13.

6 The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635, 668.

in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States,
and of the militia of the several States when called into
actual service. 1 This important power is confided to him
to be exercised in his discretion, but it is expected to be
exercised through the War Department, and not by taking
command in the field, or by any personal direction of
armies.~ As commander, while war prevails the President
bas all the powers recognized by the laws and usages of
war, but at all times he must be governed by law, and his
orders which the law does not warrant will be no protection to officers acting under them. 1 An example is where
he appoints an unlawful military commission, which proceeds to try and punish offenders against the law. 4 The
power to declare war being confided to the legislature,
he has no power to originate it, but he may in advance
of its declaration employ the army aud navy to suppress
insun·ection or repel invasion. 6
The Oahinet. -The President may require the opinion
in writing of the principal officer in each of the executive
departments upon any subject relating to the duties of
Const., Art. II. § 2.
1 United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291.
a Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch, 170.
' Milligan v. Hovey, 3 Biss. 13.
' The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635, 668.
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Iheir respective offices.1 The Constitution is silent respect-

ing the convening of these officers as a council; but

custom sanctions it, and it is usual for the I resident to

call them together and act upon their joint ad,ice on all

important matters coming within his cognizance. The

head3 of departments do not act independently of the

President, except in such cases as the law may specially

provide for, nor are they responsible to Congress; but

they are executive agents, and any official act done by

any one of them is, in contemplation of law, done by the

President himself, and the responsibility is upon him.a

The responsibility, however, is only political; the Pres-

ident cannot be called to account in prosecutions, civil or

criminal, impeachment alone excepted.8 In customary

language the heads of department collectively are spoken

of as the Cabinet; but a cabinet council, not created or

required by the Constitution or by law, can only be an

advisory body, which the President will convene or consult

in his own discretion.

Reprieves and Pardons. — The President has power to

grant reprieves and pardons, for offences against the

United States, except in cases of impeachment.4 There
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are several ways in which this power may be exercised: —

1. A pardon may be given to a person under conviction

by name; and this will take effect from its delivery, unless

otherwise provided therein. 2. It may be given to one

or more persons named, or to a class of persons by

description before conviction, and even before prosecution

1 Const., Art. II. § 2. These departments are created by law, and

are increased as the exigencies of the public service seem to require.

2 Parker v. United States, 1 Pet. 293; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet.

498; United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291; United States v. Freeman,

3 How. 556; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137. But this is other-

wise as to any duties imposed by law on heads of the departments

specially. Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524.

3 Durand v. Hollis, 4 Blatch. 451. 4 Const., Art. II. § 2.

their respective offices. 1 The Constitution is silent respecting the convening of these officers as a council ; but
custom sanctions it, and it is usual for the I .resident to
call them together and act upon their joint .ad, ice on all
important matters coming within his cognizance. The
heads of departments do not act independently of the
President, except in such cases as the law may specially
provide for, nor are they responsible to Congress ; but
they are executive agents, and any official act done by
any one of them is, in contemplation of law, done by the
President himself, and the responsibility is upon him. 2
The responsibility, however, is only political ; the President cannot be called to account in prosecutions, civil or
criminal, impeachment alone excepted. 8 In customary
language the heads of department collectively are spoken
of as the Cabinet ; but a cabinet council, not created or
required by the Constitution or by law, can only be an
advisory body, which the President will convene or consult
in his own discretion.
Reprieves and Pardons. -The President has power to
grant reprieves and pardons, for offences against the
United States, except in cases of impeachment. 4 There
are several ways in which this power may be exercised : 1. A pardon may be given to a person under conviction
by name; and this will take effect from its delivery, unless
otherwise provided therein. 2. It may be given to one
·or more persons named, or to a class of persons by
description before conviction, and even before prosecution
Const., Art. II. § 2. These departments are crehlcd by law, and
are increased as the exigencies of the public service seem to require.
2 Parker v. United States, 1 Pet. 293; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet.
498; United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291; United Sta.tea v. Freeman,
3 How. 566; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137. But this is otherwise as to any duties imposed by law on heads of the departments
specially. Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 624.
8 Durand v. Hollis, 4 Blatch. 451.
' Const.', Art. II. § 2.
1

102

102

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

begun. Such a pardon is rather in the nature of an am-

nesty or act of oblivion or forgiveness, blotting out the

supposed offence, and relieving the parties from all actual

or supposed criminality. 3. It may be given by general

proclamation, forgiving all persons who may have been

guilty of the specified offence, or offences,1 and in this

case the pardon takes effect from the time the proclamation

is signed.2 4. It may in any of these ways be made a

pardon on conditions to be first performed, in which case

it has effect only on performance; or on conditions to be

thereafter performed, in which case a breach in the condi-

tion will place the offender in the position occupied by

him before the pardon was issued.8 The power to pardon

includes the power to reduce or commute the punishment,

but not to substitute one of a different nature.4 A reprieve

is a withdrawal or withholding of punishment for a time

after conviction and sentence, and is in the nature of a

stay of execution.

By a full pardon the offender is relieved from all conse-

quences of the criminal conduct,6 except so far as third

persons, by the prosecution of judicial proceedings, may
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themselves have acquired rights to a share in penalties, or

to property forfeited and actually sold.8

« Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380; United States v. Klein, 13

Wall. 128, 147.

a Lapeyre v. United States, 17 Wall. 191.

8 United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150; United States v. Greathouse,

2 Abb. U. S. 382; Haynes v. United States, 7 Court of Claims, 443.

* Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 305.

6 Armstrong Foundry Case, 6 Wall. 766; Carlisle v. United States,

16 Wall. 147; Osborn v. United States, 91 U. S. Rep. 474.

6 United States v. Lancaster, 4 Wash. C. C. 64; United States v.

Harris, 1 Abb. U. S. 110. In this last case it is decided that the par-

don does not release from an uncollected judgment in favor of an

informer for part of a penalty, but the contrary was held in United

States v. Thomasson, 4 Biss. 336. The power to pardon extends to

begun. Such a pardon is rather in the nature of an amnesty or act of oblivion or forgiveness, blotting out the
supposed offence, and relieving the parties from all actual
or supposed criminality. 8. It may be given by genera.1
proclamation, forgiving all persons who may have been
guilty of the specified offence, or offences, 1 and in this
case the pardon takes effect from the time the proclamation
is signed. 2 4. It may in any of these ways be made a
pardon on conditions to be first performed, in which case
it has effect only on performance ; or on conditions to be
thereafter performed, in which case a breach in the condition will place the offender in the position occupied by
him before the pardon was issued. 8 The power to pardon
includes the power to reduce or commute' the punishment,
but not to substitute one of a different nature. 4 A reprieve
is a withdrawal or withholding of punishment for a time
after conviction and sentence, and is in the nature of a
stay of execution.
By a full pardon the offender is relieved from all consequences of the criminal conduct, 6 except so far as third
persons, by the prosecution of judicial proceedings, may
themselves have acq~red rights to a share in penalties, or
to property forfeited and actually sold. 8

punishments for contempts. Re Muller, 7 Blatch. 23.

Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380; United States v. Klein, 13
Wall. 128, 147.
2 Lapeyre v. United States, 17 Wall. 191.
a United States"· Wilson, 7 Pet. 150; United States v. Greathouse, ·
2 Abb. U. S. 382; Haynes v. United States, 7 Court of Claims, 443.
' Ex pa.rte Wells, 18 How. 305.
6 Armstrong Foundry Case, 6 Wall. 766; Carlisle 1'. United States,
16 Wall. 147; Osborn v. United States, 91 U. S. Rep. 474.
6 United States v. Lancaster, 4 Wash. C. C. 64; United States v.
Harris, 1 Abb. U. S. 110. In this last case it is decided that the pardon does not release from an uncollected judgment in favor of an
informer for part of a penalty, but the contrary was held in United
States v. Thomasson, 4 Biss. 336. The power to pardon extends to
punishments for contempts. Re Muller, 7 Blatch. 23.
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Treaties. — The President has power, by and with the

consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two

thirds of the Senators concur.1 The Constitution imposes

no restriction upon this power, but it is subject to the im-

Treaties. -The President has power, by and with the
consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two

plied restriction that nothing can be done under it which

changes the Constitution of the country, or robs a depart-

ment of the government or any of the States of its consti-

tutional authoritj'.2 But foreign territory may be acquired

by treaty;8 the operation of acts of Congress as to the

contracting parties may be modified and controlled, and

the treaty will take effect as law from its enactment, pro-

vided it is capable of operating of itself without new legis-

lation to give it effect.4 Whether those with whom the

President has dealt, in making a treaty had proper au-

thority from their own government for the purpose, and

whether that government could give .the right it has as-

sumed by the treaty to transfer, are political questions,

and the judiciary cannot inquire into them.6 If by a treaty

a sum of money is to be paid to a foreign nation, it be-

comes the duty of Congress to make the necessary appro-

priation; but in the nature of things this is a duty the

performance of which cannot be coerced.6 The payment
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of awards under arbitration is therefore, in one sense,

discretionary, but only as the payment of public debts is

discretionary, — that is, it cannot be compelled by any

process of execution.

» Const., Art. II. § 2, cl. 2.

a Story on Const., § 1508; 1 Tucker's B1., Ap. 332.

8 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511.

* Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet.

691; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511.

6 Doe y. Braden, 16 How. 635; Fellows v. Blacksmith, 19 How. 366.

6 This subject underwent much discussion at the time of the

treaty of 1791, known as Jay's treaty, with England; at the time of

the purchase of Alaska; and in the later case of the award to Eng-

land by the Commission on the Fisheries.

thirds of the Senaoors ·concur .1 The Constitution imposes
no restriction upon this power, but it is subject to the implied restriction that nothing can be done under it which
changes the Constitution of the country, or robs a depart..
ment .of the government or any of the States of its constitutional authority. 2 But foreign territory may be acquired
by treaty ; 8 the operation of acts of Congress as to the
contracting parties may be modified and controlled, and
the treaty will take e~ect as law from its enactment, provided it is capable of operating of itself without new legislation to give it effect. 4 Whether those with whom the
President has dealt. in making a treaty had proper authority from their own government for the purpose, and
whether that government could give .the right it has assumed by the treaty to transfer, are political questions,
and the judiciary cannot inquire into them. 6 If by a treaty
a sum of money is to be paid to a foreign nation, it becomes the duty of Congress to make the necessary appropriation ; but in the nature of things this is a duty the
performance of which cannot be coerced. 8 The payment
of awards under arbitration is therefore, in one sense,
discretionary, but only as the payment of public debts is
discretionary, -that is, it cannot be compelled by any
process of execution.
·Const., Art. II. § 2, cl. 2.
2 Story on Const., § 1508 ; 1 Tucker's Bl., Ap. 832.
a American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 611.
' Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet.
691; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 611.
6 Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 636; Fellows v. Blacksmith, 19 How. 366.
6 This subject underwent much discussion at' the time of the
treaty of 1794, known as Jay's treaty, with England; at the time of
the purchase of Alaska ; and in the later case of the a ward to England by the Commission on the Fisheries.
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Appointments and Removals. — The President shall nom-

inate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-

ate shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and

consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other offi-

cers of the United States whose appointments are not in

the Constitution otherwise provided for, and which shall

be established by law; but Congress may by law vest

the appointment of such inferior officers in the Presi-

dent alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of de-

partments.1

The power to appoint includes the power to re-

move ;2 but this, it seems, equally requires the advice

and consent of the Senate, or may by law be made

to do so.8 But the consent of the Senate to an appoint-

ment in the place of an incumbent is sufficient for the

purpose.4 „

The President has power to fill all vacancies that may

happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting com-

missions which shall expire at the end of their next

session.6 But he cannot by removals make vacancies in

1 Const., Art. II. § 2, cl. 3. As to who are inferior officers, see
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United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385; United States v. Moore, 95

U. S. Rep. 760; United States v. Jermaine, 99 U. S. Rep. 503; United

States v. Tinklepaugh, 3 Blatch. 425; Collins v. United States, 99

U. S. Rep. 503.

2 Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230.

» Act of Mar. 2, 1867, Rev. Stat, of U. S. (1878), § 1767 et seq. See

United States v. Avery, Deady, 204.

4 Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230; Bowerbank v. Morris, Wall. C. C.

118.

6 Const., Art. II. § 2, cl. 3. A newly created office, which has

Appointments and Removals. -The President shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and
oonsuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other ofD.cers of the United States whose appointments are not in
the Constitution otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by law ; but Congress may by law vest
the appointment of such inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments .1
The power to appoint includes the power to remove;~ but this, it seems, equally requires the advice
and consent of the Senate, or may by law be made
to do so. 8 But the consent of the Senate to an appointment in the place of an incumbent is sufficient for the
purpose.'
-.
The President has power to fill all vacancies that may
happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting comm1ss10ns which shall expire at the end of their next
session. 6 But he cannot by removals make vacancies in

never been filled, is not a case of vacancy within the meaning of this

provision. McCrary, Am. Law of Elections, § 237. The President

has no authority to anticipate a vacancy, and make an appointment

in advance to fill it. Ibid., § 257. The decision of the executive that

a vacancy exists is not conclusive. Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Monr.

(Ky.) 648

1 Const., Art. II. § 2, cl. 3. As to who are inferior officers, see
United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385 ; United States v. Moore, 96
U. S. Rep. 760; United States v. Jermaine, 99 U. S. Rep. 603; United
States v. Tinklepaugh, 3 Blatch. 425; Collins v. United States, OS»
U. S. Rep. 503.
2 Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230.
a Act of Mar. 2, 1867, Rev. Stat. of U.S. (1878), § 1767 et seq. See
United States v. Avery, Deady, 204.
4 Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230; Bowerbank v. Morris, Wall. C. C.
118.
6 Const., Art. II. § 2, cl. 3.
A newly created office, which has
never been filled, is not a case of vacancy within the meaning of this
provision. McCrary, Am. Law of Elections,§ 237. The President
has no authority to anticipate a vacancy, and make an appointment
in advance to fill it. Ibid., § 257. The decision of the executive that
a vacancy exists is not conclusive. Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Monr.
(Ky.) 648
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order that he may fill them. The President commissions

all the officers of the United States.1

Messages. — The President from time to time shall give

to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and

recommend to their consideration such measures as he

shall judge necessary and expedient;2 he may on extraor-

dinary occasions convene both Houses, or either of them,

and, in case of disagreement between them in respect to

the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such

time as he shall think proper.8

Veto Power.—Every bill passed by the two houses

shall, before it shall become a law, be presented to the

President; if he approve, he shall sign it, but if not, he

shall return it with his objections to the house in which it

originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their

journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such recon-

sideration two thirds of that house shall agree to pass the

bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the

other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered; if

approved by two thirds of that house, it shall become a

law. In the reconsideration the yeas and nays must be

entered at large on the journals of the houses respectively.
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If any bill shall not be returned by the President within

ten days — Sundays excepted — after it shall have been

presented to him, it will become a law in like manner as if

he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment

prevent its return.4 All orders, resolutions, and votes to

1 Const., Art. II. § 3. As to the time when a commission takes

effect, see Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Bowerbank v. Morris,

Wall. C. C. 118; United States v. Le Baron, 19 How. 73.

2 Const., Art. II. § 3. In practice, since Mr. Jefferson's time, this

information is conveyed by written message, transmitted by the

President's private secretary.

8 See People v. Hatch, 33 111. 9, as to the circumstances which

amount to such a disagreement as will justify his interference.

* Const., Art. I. § 7, cl. 2.

order that he may fill them. The President commissions
all the officers of the United States. 1
Messages. -The President from time to time shall give
to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and
recommend to their consideration such measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient ; 2 he may on extraordinary occasions convene both Houses, or either of them,
and, in oose of disagreement between them in respect to
the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such
time as he shall think proper. 1
Veto Power. -Every bill passed by the two houses
shall, before it shall become a law, be presented to the
President ; if he approve, he shall sign it, but if not, he
shall return it with his objections to the house in which it
originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their
journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two thirds of that house shall agree to pass the
bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the
other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered ; if
approved by two thirds of that house, it shall become a
law. In the reconsideration the yeas and nays must be
entered at large on the journals of the houses respectively.
If any bill shall not be returned by the President within
ten days - Sundays excepted- after it shall have been
presented to him, it will become a law in like manner as if
he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment
prevent its return. 4 All orders, resolutions, and votes to
1 Const., Art. II.§ 3. As to the time when a commission takes
effect, see Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137 ; Bowerbank v. Morris,
Wall. C. C. 118; United States v. Le Baron, 19 How. 73.
2 Const., Art. II. § 3. In practice, since l\lr. Jefferson's time, thla
information is conveyed by written message, transmitted by the
President's private secretary.
8 See People v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9, as to the circumstances which
amount to such a disagreement as will justify his interference.
4 Const., Art. I. § 7, cl. 2.
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which the assent of both houses may be necessary, except

on a question of adjournment, must take the course of

bills.1

Compensation. — The salary of the President is fixed by

law, and can neither be increased nor diminished during

the period for which he shall have been elected, and he

shall not receive during that period any other emolument

from the United States, or any of them.2 According to

the legislative precedent of 1373 an increase made after a

President has been re-elected, but before the second term

has begun, may apply to his salary during the second

term.

Appropriations. — The provision that no money shall be

drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appro-

priations made by law,8 applies with peculiar force to the

President, and is a proper security against the executive

assuming unconstitutional powers. The further provision

that periodical statements of receipts and expenditures

shall be published, is intended as a means of holding all

departments of the government, and particularly the legis-

lature, under a due sense of responsibility to the people.
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The duty to see to this publication is properly executive.

General Powers. —The President " shall take care that

the laws be faithfully executed," and, the foreign inter-

course of the country being committed to his charge, "he

shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers" ;4

and this implies that, for reasons satisfactory to himself, he

may refuse to receive those who are sent, or, after having

received, may dismiss them, or request their recall, or re-

fuse longer to hold relations with them.

1 Const., Art. I. § 7, cl. 8.

8 Const., Art. II. § 1, cl. 6. The salary was twenty-five thousand

dollars until 1873, when it was increased to fifty thousand.

8 Const., Art. I. § 9, cl. 7.

* Const., Art. II. § 3.

which the assent of both houses may be necessary, except
on a question of adjournment, must take the course of
bills. 1
Compensation. - The salary of the President is fixed by
law, and can neither be increased nor diminished during
the period for which he shall have been elected, and he
shall not receive during that period any other emolument
from the United ·States, or any of them. 2 According to
the legislative precedent of 1-973 an increase made after a
President has been re-elected, but before the second term
has begun, may apply to his salary during the second
term.
Appropri~ations. -The provision that no money shall be
drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law, 8 applies with peculiar force to the
President, and is a proper security against the executive
assuming unconstitutional powers. The further provision
that periodical statements of receipts and expenditures
shall be published, is intended as a means of holding all
departments of the government, and particularly the legislature, under a due sense of responsibility to the people.
The duty to see to this publication is properly executive.
General Powers. -The President'' shall take care that
the laws be faithfully executed," and, the foreign intercourse of the country being committed to his charge, '' he
shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers'~ ; '
and this implies that, for reasons satisfactory to himself, he
may refuse to receive those who are sent, or, after having
received, may dismiss them, or request their recall, or refuse longer to hold relations with them.
Const., Art. I.§ 7, cl. 8.
Const., Art. II. § 1, cl. 6. The salary was twenty-five thousand
dollars until 1873, when it was increased to fifty thousand.
a Const., Art. I. § 9, cl. 7.
,
' Const.,, Art. II. § 3.
1
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Executive Independence. — The judiciary cannot control

the President in the performance of his executive duties,

by mandamus,1 injunction,2 or otherwise.

1 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall.

347; The Secretary v. McGarrahan, 9 Wall. 298, 311.

2 Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475; Georgia v. Stanton, fl

Executive Independence. -The judiciary cannot control
the President in the performance of his executive duties,
by mandamus, 1 injunction,i or otherwise.

Wall. 57.
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l Marbury v. Madison, 1Cranch,187; Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall.
347; The Secretary v. McGarrahan, 9 Wall. 298, 311.
2 Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 476; Georgia v. Stanton, 6
Wall. 67.
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CHAPTER VI.

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT.

Extent.—The judicial power of the United States ex-

tends to all cases, in law and equity, arising under the

Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the trea-

ties made under their authority; to all cases affecting

CHAPTER VI.

ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all

cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controver-

sies to which the United States shall be a party; to con-

troversies between two or more States, between a State

and citizens of another State, between citizens of different

States, between citizens of the same State claiming landa

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT.

under grants of different States, and between a State

or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, or

subjects.1

The power thus defined is commensurate with the ordi-

Ext.ent. -The judicial power of the United States extends to all cases, in law and equity, arising under the

nary legislative and executive powers of the general gov-

ernment, and the powers which concern treaties; but it is

also still broader, and in some cases is made to embrace

controversies from regard exclusively to the parties suing
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or sued, irrespective of the nature of the questions in dis-

pute. The cases in which this authority has been given

are cases in which the influence of state interests and jeal-

ousies upon the administration of state laws might pos-

sibly be unfavorable to impartial justice, and which for

that reason it was deemed wise to remove to the federal

jurisdiction.

» Const., Art. III. § 2.

Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the treaties made under their authority; to all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls ; to all
cases of admiralty and maritime jmisdiction ; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States, between a State
and citizens of another State, between citizens of different
States, between citizens of the same State claiming lands
under grants of different States, and between a State
or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, or
subjects. 1
The power thus defined is commensurate with the ordinary legislative and executive powers of the general government, and the powers which concern treaties ; but it is
also still broader, and in some cases is made to embrace
controversies from regard exclusively to the parties suing
or sued, irrespective of the nature of the questions in dispute. The cases in which this authority has been given
are cases in which the influence of state interests and jealousies upon the administration of state laws might possibly be unfavorable to impartial justice, and which for
that reason it was deemed wise to remove to the federal
jurisdiction.
1

Const., Art. III. § 2.
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Laws for its Exercise. — But although the Constitution

extends the power to the cases specified, it does not make

complete provision for its exercise, except in the few cases

of which the Supreme Court is authorized to take cogni-

zance. For other cases it is necessary that courts shall be

created by Congress, and their respective jurisdictions de-

fined; and in creating them Congress may confer upon

each so much of the judicial power of the United States

as to its wisdom shall seem proper and suitable, and re-

strict that which is conferred at discretion. In doing so

it may appoi-tion among the several federal courts all the

judicial power of the United States, or it may apportion a

part only, and in that case what is not apportioned will be

left to be exercised by the courts of the States. Thus the

States may have a limited jurisdiction within the sphere

of the judicial power of the United States, but subject to

be further limited or wholly taken away by subsequent

ederal legislation.1 Such is the state of the law at this

~ime: many cases within the reach of the judicial power of

the United States are left wholly to the state courts, while

_n many others the state courts are permitted to exercise
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a jurisdiction concurrent with that of the federal courts,

out with a final review of their judgments on questions of

federal law in the United States Supreme Court.

Cases arising under the Constitution, Laws, and Treaties.—

The reasons for conferring jurisdiction of these cases upon

the federal courts were manifest, and were also imperative.

The alternative must be that the final decision upon ques-

tions of federal law must i>e left to the courts of the sev-

eral States, and this multitude of courts of final jurisdiction

the same causes, arising upon the same laws, would, in

1 It must always appear by the record that a case in the federal

tourt is within its jurisdiction: the presumption is against it until it

la shown. Robertson v. Cease, 97 U. S. Rep. 646; Godfrey v. Terry,

il U. S. Rep. 171.

Laws for its Exerc1:se. - But although the Constitution
extends the power to the cases specified, it does not make
complete pro"tision for its exercise, except in the few cases
of which the Supreme Court is authorized to take cognizance. For other cases it is necessary that courts shall be
created by Congresa, and their respective jurisdictions defined ; and in creating them Congress may confer upon
each so much of the judicial power of the United States
as to its wisdom shall seem proper and suitable, and restrict that which is conferred at discretion. In doing so
it may appo1tion among the several federal courts all the
judicial power of the United States, or it may apportion a
part only, and in that case what is not apportioned will be
left to be exercised by the courts of the States. Thus the
States may have a limited jurisdiction within the sphere
of the judicial power of the United States, but subject to
be further limited or wholly taken away by subsequent
ederal legislation. 1 Such is the state of the law at this
jme : many cases within the reach of the judicial power of
~he United States are left wholly to the state courts, while
_n many others the state courts are permitted to exercise
~ jurisdiction concurrent with that of- the federal courts,
:mt with a final review of their judgments on questions of
federal law in the United States Supreme Court.
Oases arising under the Constitution, Laws, and Treaties.The reasons for confey-ring jurisdiction of these cases upon
the federal courts were manifest, and were also imperative.
l'he alternative must be that the final decision upon questions of federal law must be left to the courts of the sev~ral States, and this multitude of courts of final jurisdiction
1f the same causes, arising upon the same laws, would, in
It must always appear by the record that a case in the federal
t0urt is within its jurisdiction: the presumption is against it until it
LI shown. Robertson v. Cease, 97 U. S. Rep. 646; Godfrey v. Terry,
:fl u. s. Rep. 171.
1

110

110

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

the language of the Federalist, be a hydra in government

from which nothing but contradiction and confusion could

proceed.1 Uniformity of decision could seldom or never

be expected, and never relied upon; and the federal law,

interpreted and applied one way in one State and another

way in another, would cease to be a law for the United

States, because the decisions would establish no rule for

the United States; and the Constitution itself thus admin-

istered would lose its uniform force and obligation.. Such

confusion in the laws which constitute the bond of union

for the States must be intolerable while it existed, but

could not be of long duration,' for a speedy dissolution of

the Union must follow. Any government that must de-

pend upon others for the interpretation, construction, and

enforcement of its own laws, is at all times at the mercy

of those on whom it thus depends, and will neither be

respected at home nor trusted abroad, because it can

neither enforce respect nor perform obligations.

These reasons, however, do not apply to the original

jurisdiction over a case, but only to the final application in

the case of the rule of law that shall govern it. The full
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purpose of the federal jurisdiction is subserved if the case,

though heard first in the state court, may be removed at

the option of the parties for final determination in the

courts of the United States.2 The legislation of Congress

has therefore left the parties at liberty, with few excep-

tions, to bring their suits in the state courts irrespective

of the questions involved, but has made provision for pro-

tecting the federal authority by a transfer to the federal

courts, either before or after judgment, of the cases to

which the federal judicial power extends. The exceptions

will appear as we proceed.

A case may be said to arise under the Constitution, or

under a law or treaty, when a power conferred or supposed

1 Federalist, No. 80. a Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. Hep. 10.

the language of the Federalist, be a hydra in government
from which nothing but contradiction and confusion could
proceed. 1 Uniformity of decision could seldom or never
be expected, and never relied upon; and the federal law,
interpreted and applied one way in one State and another
way in another, would cease to be a law for the United
States, because the decisions would establish no rule for
the United States ; and the Constitution itself thus administered would lose its uniform force and obligation.. Such .
confusion in the laws which constitute the bond of union
for the States must be intolerable while it existed, but
could not be of long duration; for a speedy dissolution of
the Union must follow. Any government that must de..
pend upon others for the interpretation, construction, and
enforcement of its own laws, is at all times at the mercy
of those on whom it thus depends, and will neither be
respected at home nor t~sted abroad, because it can
neither enforce respect nor perform obligations.
These reasons, however, do not apply to the original
jurisdiction oyer a case, but only to the final application in
the case of the rule of law that shall govern it. The full
purpose of the federal jurisdiction is subserved if the case,
though heard first in the state court, may be removed at
tbe option of the parties for final determination in the
courts of the United States. 2 The legislation of Congress
has therefore left the parties at liberty, with few exceptions, to bring their suits in the state courts irrespective
of the questions involved, but has made provision for protecting the federal authority by a transfer to the federal
courts, either before or after judgment, of the cases to
which the federal judicial power extends. The exceptions
will appear as we proceed.
A case may be said to arise under the Constitution, or
. under a law or treaty, when~ power conferred or supposed
1

Federalist, No. 80.

1

Gaines v. Fuentes, 9'2 U. S. Rep. 10.
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to be, a right claimed, a privilege granted, a protection

secured, or a prohibition contained therein, is ir question.1

It matters not whether the party immediately concerned

be the United States, in its sovereign capacity, asserting

one of its most important powers, or a State defending

what it believes to be its own reserved jurisdiction, or a

humble citizen contending for a trivial interest: if the

case turns wholly or in part on the interpretation or appli-

cation of the Constitution, the validity or construction of

an enactment of Congress, the force or extent of a treaty,

the justification of any act of a federal officer or agent by

the federal authority under which he assumes to act, or the

validity of any state enactment, or any act under supposed

state authority, which is disputed as an encroachment

upon federal jurisdiction, or as being expressly or by im-

plication forbidden .by the federal Constitution, —in each

instance the case is fairly within the intent of the pro-

vision under consideration, and within its reason and

necessity.2

To give the necessary effect to this provision it has been

provided that " a final judgment or decree in any suit in

the highest court of a State in which a decision in the
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suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity

of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under,

the United States, and the decision is against their validity;

or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of,

or an authority exercised under, any State, on the ground of

their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws

of the United States, and the decision is in favor of then

validity; or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity

1 Story on Const., § 1647.

3 It is held that jurisdiction of all controversies to which corpora-

tions created by the United States are parties may be conferred on

the federal courts. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat.

to be, a right claimed, a privilege granted, a protection
secured, or a prohibition contained therein, is ir question.1
It matters not whether the party immediately concerned
be the United States, in its sovereign capacity, asserting
one of its most important powers, or a State defending
what it believes to be its own reserved jurisdiction, or a
humble citizen contending for a trivial interest: if the
case turns wholly or in part on the interpretation or application of the Constitution, the validity or construction of
an enactment of Congress, the force or extent of a treaty,
the justification of any act of a federal officer or agent by
the federal authority under which he assumes to act, or the
validity of any state enactment, or any act under supposed
state authority, which is disputed as an encroachment
upon federal jurisdiction, or as being expressly or by implication forbidden .by t.he federal Constitution, - in each
instance the case is fairly within the intent of the provision under consideration, and within its reason and
necessity. 2
To give the necessary effect to this provision it has been
provided that '' a final judgment or decree in any suit in
the highest court of a State in which a decision in the
suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity
of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under,
the United States, and the decision is against their validity ;
or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of,
or an authority exercised under, any State, on the ground of
their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws
of the United States, and the decision is in favor of theb
validity ; or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity
Story on Const., § 1647.
It is held that jurisdiction of all controversies to which oorpora-tions created by the United States are parties may be conferred on
the federal courts. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat.
1

9
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is claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute

of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the

United States, and the decision is against the title, right,

privilege, or immunity specially set up or claimed by

either party, under such Constitution, treaty, statute, com-

mission, or authority, may be re-examined, and reversed

or affirmed in the Supreme Court [of the United States]

on a writ of error."1

A careful reading of this statute will show that the re-

view in the federal Supreme Court is only provided for,

when the decision in the state court is against the title,

right, privilege, or immunity set up or claimed under the

federal authority. Where the decision does not deny what

is thus claimed, the reason for a review is wanting.2 Nor

is it sufficient to authorize the removal of the case to the

federal Supreme Court that some one of the enumerated

questions might have arisen in or been applicable to it;

it must appear by the record itself, either expressly or by

clear and necessary intendment, that some one of them

did arise in the state court, and was there passed upon,

and the right, title, privilege, or immunity denied.8
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Cases affecting Ambassadors, Sfc. — In all cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those

in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court has

original jurisdiction.4 These are the only cases in which

original jurisdiction is conferred upon that court, and it

1 Act of Sept 24, 1789, as amended., Rev. Stat. U. S. (1876),

§ 709.

a Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 3 Cranch, 268; Burke v. Gaines, 19 How.

888; Ryan v. Thomas, 4 Wall. 603.

'Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 4 Cranch, 344; Messenger v. Mason,

10 Wall. 507; Boiling v. Lersner, 91 TJ. S. Rep. 594. Compare Mur-

ray ». Charleston, 96 U. S. Rep. 482.

4 Const., Art. III. § 2, cl. 2. No act of Congress is needed to

enable the court to exercise this jurisdiction. Kentucky v. Dennison,

24 How. 66.

is claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute
of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the
United States, and the decision is against the title, right,
privilege, or immunity specially set up or claimed by
either party, under such Constitution, treaty, statute, commission, or autho1ity, may be re-examined, and reversed
or affirmed in the Supreme Court [of the United States]
on a writ of error." 1
· A careful reading of this statute will show that the review in the federal Supreme Court is only provided for,
when the decision in the state court is against the title,
right, privilege, or immunity set up or claimed under the
federal authority. Where the decision does not deny what
is thus claimed, the reason for a review is wanting.~ Nor
is it sufficient to authorize the removal of the case to the
federal Supreme Court that some one of the enumerated
questions might have arisen in or been applicable to it ;
it must appear by the record itself, either expressly or by
clear and necessary intendment, that some one of them
did arise in the state court, and was there passed upon,
and the right, title, privilege, or immunity denied. 8
Oase1 affecting Ambassadors, ~c. -In all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those
in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction.' These are the only cases in which
original jurisdiction is conferred upon that court, and it
1 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, as amended. , Rev. Stat. U. S. (187b ),
§ 709.
2 Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 3 Cranch, 268; Burke v. Gaines, 19 How.
888; Ryan v. Thomas, 4 Wall. 603.
I Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 4 Cranch, 344; Messenger v. Mason,
10 Wall. 607; Bolling v. Lersner, 91 U.S. Rep. 694:. Compare Murray v. Charleston, 00 U. S. Rep. 432.
' Const., Art. Ill. § 2, cl. 2. No act of Congress is needed to
enable the court to exercise this juriadiction. Kentucky v. Dennison,
24: How. 66.
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cannot be extended by statute. Therefore the court cannot

have jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus to one of

the heads of the executive department,1 or a writ of certi-

orari to one of the district judges sitting as commissioner

under a treaty,2 or to a military commission ordered by a

general officer of the United States army, commanding a

military department which has tried and sentenced a

civilian to punishment,8 or a writ of habeas corpus, except

as an appellate process.4 The rule of construction that is

applied in these cases is this: that the affirmative words of

the Constitution, declaring in what cases the Supreme

Court shall have original jurisdiction, must be construed

negatively as to all other cases.6 Giving the Supreme

Court original jurisdiction does not exclude the jurisdiction

of other courts, and therefore cases affecting foreign rep-

resentatives may originate in other courts, but they will be

subject in such courts to all the rules of privilege conferred

by international law, and to the appellate jurisdiction of

the federal Supreme Court. And Congress in its discre-

tion may, as it has done,6 exclude altogether the jurisdic-

tion of state tribunals over suits against foreign repre-
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sentatives. As the privileges of ambassadors, ministers,

and consuls are conferred, not for their own advantage,

but as the privileges of their government, it is fit and

proper that the courts of the government to which they

are accredited, and with which alone they can have offi-

cial dealings, should have exclusive cognizance of suits

against them.7

Admiralty and Maritime Cases. — Although the grant of

1 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137.

8 Ex parte Metzger, 5 How. 176.

» Ex parte Vallandighara, 1 Wall. 248.

♦ See Ex parte Terger, 8 Wall. 85.

6 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Ex parte Vallandigham, 1

Wall. 243.

• Rev. Stat. TJ. S. (1878), § 687. 'Davis v. Packard, 7 Pet. 276.

8

cannot be extended by statute. The refore the court cannot
have jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus to one of
the heads of the executive department, 1 or a writ of certiorari to one of the district judges sitting as commissioner
under a treaty, 2 or to a military commission ordered by a
general officer of the United Sta~es army, commanding a
military department which has tried and sentenced a
civilian to punishment, 8 or a writ of habeas corpus, except
as an appellate process. 4 The rule of construction that is
applied in these cases is this : that the affirmative words of
the Constitution, declaring in what cases the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction, must be construed
negatively as to all other cases. 6 Giving the Supreme
Court original jurisdiction does not exclude the jurisdiction
of other courts, and therefore cases affecting foreign representatives may originate in other courts, but they will be
subject in such courts to all the rules of privilege conferred
by international law, and to the appellate jurisdiction of
. the federal Supreme Court. And Congress in its discretion may, as it has done, 6 exclude altogether the jurisdiction of state tribunals over suits against foreign representatives. As the privileges of ambassadors, ministers,
and consuls are conferred, not for their own advantage,
but as the privileges of their government, it is fit and
proper that the courts of the government to which they
are accredited, and with which alone they can have official dealings, should have exclusive cognizance of suits
against them. 1
Admiralty and Maritime Oases. -Although the grant of
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137.
~ Ex parte Metzger, 5 How. 176.
8 Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 248.
' See Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85.
6 Marbury t'. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Ex parte Vallandigham, 1
Wall. 243.
e Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 687.
'I Davia v. Packard, 7 Pet. 276.
8
1
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jurisdiction in these cases is not in terms exclusive, it has

been practically conceded, from the first, that it is exclu-

sive in cases of prize, since those were always excluded

from the cognizance of the courts of law. But it is also

exclusive in all cases of maritime torts and contracts, and

liens for maritime services,1 though suits in personam in

the same cases, whether authorized by the principles of

the common law, or by state statutes, are cognizable only

in the state courts.2 The distinction between admiralty

and maritime jurisdiction is thus explained: '' The first

respects acts or injuries done upon the high seas, where all

nations claim common right and common jurisdiction; or

acts or injuries done upon the coasts of the sea; or, at

farthest, acts or injuries done within the ebb and flow of the

tide. The second respects contracts, claims, and services

purely maritime, and touching rights and duties appertain-

ing to commerce and navigation. The former is again

divisible into two great branches, — one embracing cap-

tures and questions of prize arising jure belli; the other

embracing acts, torts, and injuries strictly of civil cog-

nizance, independent of belligerent operations." 8 But it
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is now settled, overruling the early opinions and decisions,

that the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is not limited

to the high seas, or to tide-water, or even to waters naviga-

ble from the ocean, but that it extends to the great lakes

and their navigable waters,4 and to the great rivers,6 even

though their navigable course may be entirely within the

1 The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558.

2 The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; Leon

v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 185. A right given by a State, if of a maritime

nature, may be enforced in the admiralty. Ex parte McNiel, 13

Wall. 236; The Sea Gull, Chase's Dec. 145; The Lottawanna, 21

Wall. 558.

» Story on Const., § 1666.

* The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443; The Eagle, 8 Wall. 15.

* Fretz v. Bull, 12 How. 466.

jurisdiction in these cases is not in terms exclusive, it has
been practically conceded, from the first, that it is exclusive in cases of prize, since those were always excluded
from the cognizance of the courts of law. But it is also
exclusive in all cases of maritime torts and contracts, and
liens for maritime services, 1 though suits in personam in
the same cases, whether authorized by the principles of
the common law, or by state statutes, are cognizable only
in the state courts. 2 The distinction between admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction is thus explained : '' The first
respects acts or injuries done upon the high seas, where all
nations claim common right and common jurisdiction ; or
acts or injuries done upon the coasts of the sea ; or, at
farthest, acts or injuries done within the ebb and flow of the
tide. The second r~spects contracts, claims, and services
purely maritime, a:nd touching rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation. The former is again
divisible into two great branches, - one embracing captures and questions of prize arising jure belli; the other
embracing acts, torts, and injuries strictly of civil cognizance, independent of belligerent operations." 8 But it
is now settled, overruling the early opinions and decisions,
that the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is not limited
to the high seas, or to tide-water, or even to waters navigable from the ocean, but that it extends to the great lakes
and their navigable waters,' and to the great rivers, 6 even
though their navigable course may be entirely within the
The Lotta wanna, 21 Wall. 658.
The.Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; Leon
v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 185. A right given by a State, if of a maritime
nature, may be enforced in the admiralty. Ex parte McNiel, 13
Wall. 236; The Sea Gull, Chase's Dec. 145; The Lottawanna, 21
Wall. 658.
a Story on Const., § 1666.
' The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443; The Eagle, 8 Wall. 16.
I Fretz v. Bull, .12 How. 466.
1

2
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limits of a single State.1 "Nor can the jurisdiction of the

courts of the United States be made to depend on regula-

tions of commerce. They are entirely distinct things,

having no necessary connection with one another, and are

conferred in the Constitution by separate and distinct

grants."a The federal jurisdiction will therefore include

the case of collisions on navigable lakes or rivers, of ves-

sels engaged in commerce between ports of the same State,

and occurring within the body of a county,8 and also the

case of contracts of affreightment, though to be performed

within the State where made.4 So cases of collision of

vessels passing from one navigable body of water to

another, through a connecting canal, like the Welland

Canal, are of federal cognizance.6 And admiralty has

jurisdiction of collisions occurring on tide-water, though

the vessel be at a wharf or pier in a harbor.8

The general jurisdiction over the place within a State

which is subject to the grant of admiralty power adheres

to the territory, as a portion of the sovereignty not given

away, and the residuary powers of legislation remain in

the States. Therefore the admiralty jurisdiction does not

divest the state jurisdiction to punish crimes.7 Neither
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does it divest the state jurisdiction to regulate the fish-

eries, and to punish those who transgress the regulations.8

1 Jackson v. The Magnolia, 20 How. 296; The General Cass,

1 Brown, Adm. 334. The first of these cases arose on the Alabama

River, and the second on the Saginaw.

* The Commerce, 1 Black, 574, 579.

8 The Commerce, 1 Black, 574; Waring v. Clark, 5 How. 441.

« The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624.

6 Scott v. The Young America, Newb. Adm. 101; The Avon, 1

Brown, Adm. 170; The Oler, 14 Am. Law Reg., N. S. 300. Compare

McCormick v. Ives, Abb. Adm. 418.

* The Lotty, Olcott, 829.

7 United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336.

* Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371; Smith v. Maryland, 18

How. 71; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. Rep. 391.

limits of a single State. 1 "Nor can the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States be made to depend on regulations of commerce. They are entirely distinct things,
having no necessary connection with one another, and are
conferred in the Constitution by separate and distinct
grants."~ The federal jurisdiction will therefore include
the case of collisions on navigable lakes or rivers, of vessels engaged in commerce between ports of the same State,
and occurring within the body of a county, 8 and also the
case of contracts of affreightment, though to be performed
within the State where made.' So cases of collision of
vessels passing from one navigable body of water to
another, through a connecting canal, like the Welland
Canal, are of federal cognizance. 6 And admiralty has
jurisdiction of collisions occurring on tide-water, though
the vessel be at a wharf or pier in a harbor. 6
The general jurisdiction over the place within a State
which is subject to the grant of admiralty power adheres
to the territory, as a portion of the sovereignty not given
away, and the residuary powers of legislation remain in
the States. Therefore the admiralty jurisdiction does not
divest the state jurisdiction to punish crimes. 7 Neither
does it divest the state jurisdiction to regulate the fisheries, and to punish those who transgress the regulations. 8
1 Jackson v. The Magnolia, 20 How. 296 ; The General Cass,
1 Brown, Adm. 334. The first of these cases arose on the Alabama
River, and the second on the Saginaw.
2 The Commerce, 1 Black, 674, 679.
a The Commerce, 1 Black, 674; Waring v. Clark, 6 How. 441.
' The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624.
6 Scott v. The Young America, Newb. Adm. 101 ; The Avon, 1
Brown, Adm. 170; The Oler, 14 Am. Law Reg., N. S. 800. Compare
McCormick v. Ives, Abb. Adm. 418.
& The Lotty, Olcott, 829.
7 United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336.
8 Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371 ; S~ith v. Maryland, 18
How. 71; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. Rep. 391.
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Suits by and against the United States. — The United

States, like any other sovereignty, is not suable in its own

courts, except with its own consent; but it may consent,

as has been done by creating and defining the jurisdiction

of the Court of Claims. Neither is the United States suable

in a state court, for the United States is supreme within its

sphere, and the States cannot subordinate it to their au-

thority.1 It has been quite authoritatively conceded, how-

ever, by the federal judiciary, "that land within a State,

purchased by the United States as a mere proprietor, and

not reserved or appropriated to any special purpose, may

be liable to condemnation for streets or highwaj-s, like

the land of other proprietors, under the rights of eminent

domain " ;2 and the concession will cover all cases of ap-

propriations for public purposes.8 A right to appropriate

implies a right to provide the means whereby a court may

obtain jurisdiction, which in these cases may be some

other means than the ordinary writs. But the States can

have no right to appropriate any portion of the land which

has been purchased, or otherwise acquired, by the United

States, as a means in the performance of any of its gov-
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ernmental functions; such as land held for a fortification,4

or for an arsenal and government manufactory of arms.6

As a corporation the United States may sue as plaintiif,

in either its own or the state courts, or in the courts of a

foreign country, as occasion may require.6

1 Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506.

8 United States v. Chicago, 7 How. 185, 194. Opinion by Mr. Jus-

tice Woodbury, concurred in by the whole court, except one judge,

who dissented on a point of jurisdiction.

8 The right was asserted to the fullest extent by Mr. Justice

McLean in United States v. Railroad Bridge Co., 6 McLean, 517.

* United States v. Chicago, 7 How. 185.

6 United States v. Ames, 1 Wood. & M. 76.

• Queen of Portugal v. Grymes, 7 C1. & Fin. 66; United States v.

Wagner, Council Reports, 2 Ch. Ap. 582.

Suits by and against the United States. -The United
States, like any other sovereignty, is not suable in its own
courts, except with its own consent ; but it may consent,
as has been done by creating and defining the jurisdiction
of the Court of Claims. Neither is the United States suable
in a state court, for the United States is supreme within its
sphere, and the States cannot subordinate it to their authority .1 It has been quite authoritatively conceded, however, by the federal judiciary, '' that land within a State,
purchased by the United States as a mere proprietor, and
not reserved or appropriated to any special purpose, may
be liable to condemnation for streets or highways, like
the land of other proprietors, under the rights of eminent
domain " ; 2 and the concession will cover all cases of appropriations for public purposes. 8 A right to appropriate
implies a right to provide the mea~s whereby a court may
obtain jurisdiction, which in these cases may be some
other means than the ordinary writs. But the States can
have no right to appropriate any portion of the land which
has been purchased, or otherwise acquired, by the United
States, as a means in the performance of any of its governmental functions ; such as land held for a fortification, 4
or for an arsenal and government manufactory of arms. 5
As a corporation the United States may ·sue as plaintiff,
in either its own or the state courts, or in the courts of a
foreign country, as occasion may require. 6
Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506.
1 United States v. Chicago, 7 How. 185, 194. Opinion by Mr. Justice Woodbury, concurred in by the whole court, except one judge,
who dissented on a point of jurisdiction.
a The right was asserted to the fullest extent by Mr. Justice
McLean in United States v. Railroad Bridge Co., 6 McLean, 517.
' United States v. Chicago, 7 How. 185.
6 United States v. Ames, 1 Wood. & M. 76.
e Queen of Portugal v. Grymes, 7 Cl. & Fin. 66 ; United States o.
Wagner, Council Reports, 2 Ch. Ap. 582.
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Controversies between States. — Many questions might

arise under this clause concerning the reach of the federal

jurisdiction over controversies between States, the sub-

jects that may be dealt with and determined, and how far

the sovereign rights of the States, and the extent of their

respective territorial jurisdictions, may be brought within

the cognizance and final determination of the federal ju-

diciary. The clause conferring jurisdiction of such contro-

versies is general, and only as cases arise can "it be

determined whether they present questions which are prop-

erly of judicial cognizance as between the States. A

question of boundary is plainly such a question,1 and so

is the question whether the conditions in a compact

between two States, on the performance of which certain

territory was to be detached from the one and become a

part of the other, have ever been complied with, so as

to effect the transfer.2

By "States," in the provision of the Constitution

conferring this jurisdiction, is intended the States in the

Union.8 An Indian tribe is neither a State in the Union

in this sense, nor a foreign state, and entitled as such to
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sue in the federal courts.4

Suits by States.—The federal jurisdiction extends to

suits by States against citizens of other States, and against

foreign states, citizens, or subjects. The States intended

here are States holding their constitutional relations to

the United States. A State which has been in rebellion,

and is not restored to peaceful relations as a member of

"the Union, cannot sue in the federal courts.6 The fact

1 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657; Missouri v. Iowa,

7 How. 660; Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478; Alabama v. Georgia,

23 How. 505.

2 Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39.

» Seott v. Jones, 5 How. 343, 377.

* Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1.

s Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700.

Oontroversi"es between States. -Many questions might
arise under this clause concerning the reach of the federal
jurisdiction over controversies between States, the subjects that may be dealt with and determined, and how far
the sovereign rights of the States, and the extent of their
respective territorial jurisdictions, may be brought within
the cognizance and final deterinination of the federal judiciary. The clause conferring jurisdiction of such controversies is general, and only as cases arise can "it be
determined whether they present questions which are properly of judicial cognizance as between the States. A
question of boundary is plainly such a question, 1 and so
is the question whether the conditions in a compact
between two States, on the performance of which certain
territory was to be detached from the one and become a
part of the other, have ever been complied with, so as
to effect the transfer. 2 ·
By '' States," in the provisioQ. of the Constitution
conferring this jurisdiction, is inte~ded the States in the
Union. 8 An Indian tribe is neither a State in the Union
in this sense,' nor a foreign state, and entitled as such 1n
sue in the federal courts. 4
Suits bg States. - The federal jurisdiction extends to
suits by States against citizens of other States, and against
foreign states, citizens, or subjects. The States intended
here are States holding their constitutional relations to
the United States. A State which has been in rebellion,
and is not restored to peaceful relations as a member of
-the Union, cannot sue in the federal courts. 6 The fact
1 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 667; Missouri v. Iowa,
7 How. 660; Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478; Alabama v. Georgia,
28 How. 605.
s Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 89.
a Scott v. Jones, 6 How. 343, 877.
' Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 1.
6 Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700.
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that, in a suit between two individuals to which a State

does not appear to be a party of record, a question of

boundary between States may incidentally arise, does not

make the case one to which the State is a party within the

meaning of the provision which gives to the Supreme

Court original jurisdiction of suits where a State is a

party.1 A suit against a state agent for moneys or se-

curities wrongfully taken by him under a void law, is

not a suit against the State; * but a suit by the Gov-

ernor of the State, in his title of office and in the in-

terest of the State, is a suit by the State.3

Suits against States. — The clause of the Constitution

which at first conferred the federal jurisdiction extended

to suits against States by other States, by citizens of

other States, and by foreign states, citizens, or subjects.4

But by amendment to the Constitution this jurisdiction

has been so limited as to be confined to suits brought by

States in the Union, and by foreign states, and the States

are no longer subject to be sued in the federal courts by

private persons.6 But the fact that a State has an interest

in the controversy, however extensive, will not bring the
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case under the amendment and exclude the federal juris-

diction so long as the State itself is not a partj-.6 There-

fore a state corporation may be sued in the federal courts,

notwithstanding the State is the sole stockholder.7 It is

not believed, however, that a State can be indirectly sued

1 Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 Dall. 411.

2 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738.

» The Governor v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110, 124.

* Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419.

8 Const., Amendment 11.

6 Osborn v Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738.

7 Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 2 Pet. 318. This decision is in

harmony with that in Darrington v. State Bank, 13 How. 12, in which

it was held that bills issued by a bank of which the State owns all

the stock are not bills of credit.

that, in a suit between two individuals to which a State
does not appear to be a party of record, a question ot
boundary between States may incidentally arise, does not
make the case one to which the State is a party within the
meaning of tbe provision which gives to the Supreme
Court original jurisdiction of suits where a State is a
party . 1 A suit against a state agent for moneys or securities wrongfully taken by him under a void law, is
not a suit against the State ; 9 but a suit by the Governor of the State, in his title of office and in the interest of the State, is a suit by the State. 8
_Sut"t,s aga·inst States. -The clause of the Constitution
which at first conferred the federal jurisdiction extended
to suits against States by other States, by citizens of
other States, and by foreign states, citizens, or subjects.'
But by amendment to the Constitution this jurisdiction
has been so limited as to be confined to suits brought by
States in the Union, and by foreign states, and the States
are no 'longer subject to be sued in the federal courts by
private persons. 6 But the fact that a State has an interest
in the controversy, however extensive, will not biing the
case under the amendment and exclude the federal jurisdiction so long as the State itself is not a party. 8 Therefore a state corporation may be sued in the federal courts,
notwithstanding the State is the sole stockholder.' It is
not believed, however, that a State can be indirectly sued
Fowler v. Lindsey, 8 Dall. 411.
s Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 788.
I The Governor v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110, 124.
' Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419.
6 Const., Amendment 11.
e Osborn v Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 788.
7 Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 2 Pet. 818. This decision is in
harmony with that in Darrington v. State Bank, 18 How. 12, in which
It was held that bills issued by a bank of which the State owns all
the stock are not bills of credit.
1
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by making its agent or officer the nominal defendant,

where the agent or officer merely holds the state property

or securities, or occupies a position of trust under the

State, and in the performance of its duties commits upon

others no trespass, so that the cause of action relied upon

must be one in which he would be responsible only as

such agent, officer, or trustee. If such action were per-

mitted, the eleventh amendment might be nullified. But

where an officer makes himself a trespasser1 by attempting

to enforce a void authority, it is immaterial to the jurisdic-

tion who undertook to confer the void authority, since he

is responsible individually, on well settled common-law

principles.2

The force of the eleventh amendment is restricted to

original suits, and it does not preclude a review in the

federal Supreme Court of decisions in the state courts

where is drawn in question any title, right, privilege, or

exemption under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States.8

Other Controversies. — "Where the jurisdiction of a case

depends upon the citizenship of parties, the fact should
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appear on inspection of the record.4 But citizenship in

the sense of this provision means nothing more than resi-

dence.6 A resident in one of the Territories, or of the

District of Columbia, is not entitled to sue or be sued as

a citizen of a State.6 A corporation created by and trans-

acting business within a State is for this purpose to be

1 As was the case in Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat.

738.

2 See New Jersey v. Babcock, 4 Wash. C. C. 344.

8 Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.

* Brigham v. Cabott, 3 Dall. 382; Jackson v. Ashton, 8 Pet. 148;

Bailey v. Dozier, 6 How. 23; Robertson v. Cease, 97 U. S. Rep. 646.

5 Gassies v. Ballon, 6 Pet. 761; Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163.

8 Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445, 448; Scott v. Jones, 5 How.

343, 377.

by making its agent or officer the nominal defendant,
where the agent or officer merely holds the state property
or securities, or occupies a position of trust under the
State, and in the performance of its duties commits upon
others no trespass, so that the cause of action relied upon
must be one in which he would be responsible only aR
such agent, officer, or trustee. If such action were perntitted, the eleventh amendment might be nullified. But
where an officer makes himself a trespasser 1 by attempting
to enforce a void authority, it is immaterial to the jurisdiction who undertook to confer the void authority, since he
is responsible individually, on well settled common-law
principles. 2
The force of the eleventh amendment is restricted to
original suits, and it does not preclude a review in the
federal Supreme Court of decisions in the state courts
where is drawn in question any title, right, privilege, or
exemption under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States. 8
Other Controvers'ies. - Where the jurisdiction of a case
depends upon the citizenship of parties, the fact should
appear on inspection of the record. 4 But citizenship in
the sense of this provision means nothing more than residence. 6 A resident in one of the Territories, or of the
District of Columbia, is not entitled to sue or be sued as
a citizen of a State. 6 A corporation created by and transacting business within a State is for this purpose to be
1

As was the case in Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat.

738.
2

See New Jersey v. Babcock, 4 Wash. C. C. 344.
s Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.
4 Brigham v. Cabott, 3 Dall. 382; Jackson v. Ashton, 8 Pet. 148;
Bailey v. Dozier, 6 How. 23; Robertson v. Cease, 97 U. S. Rep. 646.
:> Gassies v. Ballon, 6 Pet. 761; Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163.
6 Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445, 448; Scott v. Jones, 5 How.

343, 377.
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deemed to represent corporators who are citizens of the

State,1 and a foreign corporation is to be deemed to rep-

resent corporators who are aliens.2 As a declaration

of intention to become a citizen under the naturalization

laws does not make one a citizen, it will not preclude an

alien suing as such.8 The courts will not be open to suits

by aliens when their country is at war with our own.

Legislation assigning the Jurisdiction to Courts. — In the

exercise of its authority to assign to courts such portion of

the judicial power as it shall determine is proper or need-

ful, Congress has provided by law that the jurisdiction

vested in the courts of the United States, in the cases and

proceedings following, shall be exclusive of the courts of

the several States : —

1. Of all crimes and offences cognizable under the au-

thority of the United States;

2. Of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred

under the laws of the United States;

3. Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime juris-

diction; saving to suitors in all cases the right of a com-

mon-law remedy where the common law is competent to
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give it:

4. Of all seizures under the laws of the United States,

on land or waters not within admiralty and maritime

jurisdiction;

5. Of all cases arising under the patent-right or copy-

right laws of the United States;

6. Of all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy;

7. Of all controversies of a civil nature where a State is

1 United States Bank v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904; Ohio, &c.

R. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black, 286; Insurance Company v. Francis,

11 Wall. 210. A stockholder resident in another State may never-

theless as such stockholder be the antagonistic party. Dodge v.

Woolsey, 18 How. 331.

2 Society, &c. v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464.

3 Story on Const., § 1700.

deemed to represent corporators who are citizens of the
State, 1 and a foreign corporation is to be deemed to represent corporators who are aliens.~ As a declaration
of intention to become a citizen under the naturalization
laws does not make one a citizen, it will not preclude an
alien suing as such. 8 The courts will not be open to suits
by aliens when their country is at war with our own.
Legislation assigning the Juri"sdiction to Courts. - In the
exercise of its authority to assign to courts such portion of
the judicial power as it shall determine is proper or needful, Congress has provided by law that the jurisdiction
vested in the courts of the United States, in the cases and
proceedings following, shall be exclusive of the courts of
the several States : ,
1. Of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States ;
2. Of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred
under the laws of the United States;
3. Of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ; saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to
give it;
4. Of all seizures under the laws of the United States,
on land or waters not within admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction ;
5. Of all cases arising under the patent-right or copyright laws of the United States ;
6. Of all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy;
7. Of all controversies of a civil nature where a State is
1 United States Bank v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904; Ohio, &c.
R. R. Co. v. "\Yheeler, 1 Black, 286; Insurance Company v. Francis,
11 Wall. 210. A stockholder resident in another State may nevertheless as such stockholder be the antagonistic party. Dodge v.
Woolsey, 18 How. 331.
2 Society, &c. v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464.
a Story on Const., § 1700.
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a party, except between a State and its citizens, and be-

tween a State and citizens of other States or aliens.1

Federal courts are also given original jurisdiction of

causes of action arising under the postal laws; suits for

drawback of duties; suits for violations of the statute of

the United States for the protection of civil rights, or for

the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured

by the Constitution or laws of the United States; suits to

recover the possession of any office, — except legislative of-

fices and the office of Elector of President and Vice-Presi-

dent, — where the sole question touching the title thereto

arises out of the denial of the right to Vote to any citizen

offering to vote, on account of race, color, or previous

condition of servitude ;2 proceedings for the removal from

office of any one holding the same contrary to the pro-

visions of the third section of the fourteenth amend-

ment; and suits by or against the national banks.8

Also of suits at common law, where the United States,

or any officer thereof, suing under authority of an act of

Congress, is plaintiff; suits arising under the revenue

laws; suits arising under any law relative to the slave
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trade; and suits brought by any person to recover dam-

ages for an injury to person or property on account of any

act done by him under any law of the United States for

the protection or collection of any of its revenues, or to

1 Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 711.

2 This is conferred with a proviso " that such jurisdiction shall

extend only so far as to determine the rights of the parties to such

office by reason of the denial of the right guaranteed by the Consti-

tution of the United States and secured by any law to enforce the

right of citizens of the United States to vote in all the States." Fed-

eral courts have no jurisdiction over contested state elections, except

in this single case. Harrison v. Hadley, 2 Dill. 229. Neither this nor

the next provision seems as yet to have had authoritative examina-

tion.

3 Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 563.

u party, except between a State and its citizens, ana be-

tween a State and citizens of other States or aliens. 1
Federal courts are also given original jUI·isdiction of
causes of action arising under the postal laws ; suits for
drawback of duties; suits for violations of the statute of
the United States for the protection of civil rights, or for
the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States ; suits to
recover the possession of any office, - except legislative offices and the office of Elector of President and Vice-President, - where the sole question touching the title thereto
arises out of the denial of the iight to vote to any citizen
offering to vote, on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude ; 2 proceedings for the removal from
office of any one holding the same contrary to the provisions of the third section of the fourteenth amendment ; and suits by or against the national banks. 8
Also of suits at common law, where the United States,
or any officer thereof, suing under authority of an act of
Congress, is plaintiff; suits arising under the revenue
laws ; suits arising under any law relative .to the slave
trade ; and suits brought by any person to recover damages for an injury to person or property on account of any
act done by him under any law of the United States for
the protection or collection of any of its revenues, or to
Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 711.
This is conferred with a proviso" that such jurisdiction shall
extend only so far as to determine the rights of the parties to such
office by reason of the denial of the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and secured by any law to enforce the
right of citizens of the United States to vote in all the States." Federal courts have no jurisdiction over contested state elections, except
in this single case. Harrison v. Hadley, 2 Dill. 229. Neither this nor
the next provision seems as yet to have had authoritative examination.
3 Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 563.
1
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enforce the rights of citizens of the United States to vote

in any State.1

Also of suits of a civil nature, at common law or in

equity, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs,

exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, and an alien is a

part}-, or where the suit is between a citizen of the State

where it is brought and a citizen of another State, and

suits in equity where the matter in dispute, exclusive of

costs, exceeds the sum or value of five hundred dollars,

and the United States are petitioners.2

Transfer of Causes from State Courts. — As suits may

be instituted in the state courts in all cases in which the

jurisdiction of the federal courts is not made exclusive, the

purpose had in view in conferring the federal power would

often be defeated if there were not some provision under

which a cause brought in a state court might be removed

to a federal court. For example, if a citizen of one State

should bring suit in one of its courts against a citizen of

another State, the case would be one which by the Consti-

tution is embraced in the grant of the federal power; and

the reason why it was included is that it may sometimes
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happen that local feelings, sentiments, prejudices, or pre-

possessions may preclude a fair trial in the state court, or

at least give rise to fears or suspicions that such may be

the case. But it may be and is entirely proper to allow

the suit to be thus brought in the first instance, because in

most cases no such influences will be suspected or feared,

and the parties would go to trial in the state court without

objection. But if they are feared, the reasons for refer-

ring the case to the federal court are then apparent. A

case of more importance to the federal jurisdiction is

where a federal officer is sued in a state court, for some

act or omission in his office. For many such acts or omis-

sions there is no civil responsibility in any court, but for

i Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 629. > Eev. Stat. U. S., § 629.

enforce the rights of citizens of the United States to vote
in any State. 1
Also of suits of a civil nature, at common law or in
equity, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costB,
exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, and an alien is a
party, or where the suit is between a citizen of the State
where it is brought and a citizen of another State, and
suits in equity where the matter in dispute, exclusive of
costs, exceeds the sum or value of five hundred dollars,
and the United States are petitioners.~
Transfer of Causes from State Oourta. -As suits may
be instituted in the state courts in all cases in which the
jurisdiction of the federal courts is not made exclusive, the
purpose had in view in confening the f ederai power would
often be defeated if there were not some provision under
which a cause brought in·a state court might be removed
to a federal court. For example, if a citizen of one State
should bring suit in one of its courts against a citizen of
another State, the case would be one which by the Constitution is embraced in the grant of the federal power ; and
the reason why it was included is that it may sometimes
happen that local feelings, sentiments, prejudices, or prepossessions may preclude a fair trial in the state court, or
at least give rise to fears or suspicions that such may be
the case. But it may be and is entirely proper to allow
the suit to be thus brought in the first instance, because in
most cases no such influences will be suspected or feared,
and the parties would go to trial in the state court without
objection. But if they are feared, the reasons for referring the case to the federal court are then apparent. A
case of more importance to the federal jurisdiction is
where a federal officer is sued in a state court, for some
act or omission in his office. For many such acts or omissions there is no civil responsibility in any court, but for
1

Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878),·§ 629.

1

Rev. Stat. U. S., § 629.
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some there is. The general rule is, that, if a duty imposed

upon an officer is exclusively of a public nature, his neg-

lect to perform it can only be punished by some proceed-

ing, either civil or criminal, instituted by the proper

public authorities; but if a duty is imposed upon him for

the benefit of an individual, the latter has bis private

action to recover damages for any failure in performance

whereby he is injured. The difference between the public

and the private duties is well illustrated in cases arising

under the post-office laws. The Postmaster-General has

duties to perform, which are of high importance to the na-

tion and to all its people; but they are public duties ex-

clusively, and he never becomes charged with obligations

to any particular person, so as to be liable to individual

actions.1 It is different with a local postmaster. When

mail matter is received at his office, directed to a par-

ticular person, it becomes his duty to that person to de-

liver it on demand, and he is liable to a suit for damages

in case of refusal.2 A like distinction exists between the

duties of the Secretary of the Treasury and the collector

of the customs at a port: the former is responsible only to

the government for the faithful performance of duty; but
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the latter owes duties to those whose imported goods pass

through his hands, and he may become liable to private

suits for oppressive conduct and illegal charges.8 So the

duties of the United States marshal, which resemble those

of the sheriff, are to a large extent duties to individuals,

and may frequently subject him to suits. So any federal

officer may become involved in private suits on allegations

that, in the pretended discharge of duty, he has tres-

1 Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 646; S. C. 12 Mod. 472, and 1 Salk.

17; Smith v. Powditch, Cowp. 182; Rowning v. Goodchild, 2 W. BL

906; Whitfield v. LeDespencer, Cowp. 754, 765.

2 Teall v. Felton, 1 N. Y. 537; S. C. in error, 12 How. 284.

» Barry v. Arnaud, 10 Ad. & El. 646.

some there is. The general rule is, that, if a duty imposed
upon an officer is exclusively of a public nature, his neglect to perform it can only be punished by some proceeding, either civil or criminal, instituted by the proper
public authorities ; but if a duty is imposed upon him for
the benefit of an individual, the latter has bis private
action to recover damages for any failure in performance
whereby he is injured. The difference between the public
and the private duties is well illustrated in cases arising
under the post-office laws. The Postmaster-General has
duties to perform, which are of high importance to the nation and to all its people ; but they are public duties exclusively, and he never becomes charged with obligations
to any particular person, so as to be liable to individual
actions. 1 It is different with a local postmaster. When
mail matter is received at his office, directed to a particular person, it becomes his duty to that person to deliver it on demand, and he is liable to a suit for damages
in case of refusal. 2 A like distinction exists between the
duties of the Secretary of the Treasury and the collector
of the customs at a port : the former is responsible only to
the government for the faithful performance of duty ; but
the latter owes duties to those whose imported goods pass
through his hands, and he may become liable to private
suits for oppressive conduct and illegal charges. 8 So the
duties of the United States marshal, which resemble those
of the sheriff, are to a large extent duties to individuals,
and may frequently subject him to suits. So any federal
officer may become involved in private suits on allegations
that, in the pretended discharge of duty, he has tres1 Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 646; S. C. 12 Mod. 472, and 1 Salk.
17; Smith v. Powditch, Cowp. 182; Rowning v. Goodchild, 2 W. Bl.
006; Whitfield v. LeDespencer, Cowp. 754, 765.
2 Teall v. lfelton, 1 N. Y. 637; S. C. in error, 12 How. 284.
a Barry v. Arnaud, 10 Ad. & El. 646.
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passed on the rights of third parties. All these, and

many others which might be named, are cases coming

within the scope of the federal judicial power, and many

of them are cases in which it might be exceedingly impor-

tant to the federal authority that they be referred to the

federal courts for final adjudication.

For these cases it is provided by statute that causes

may be removed from state to federal courts where the

amount in controversy exceeds five hundred dollars, in

the following cases :1 —

1. Where the suit is against an alien, or is by a citizen

of the State wherein it is brought and against a citizen of

another State, it may be removed on petition of the

defendant.

2. Where the suit is against an alien and a citizen of

the State wherein it is brought, or is by a citizen of such

State against a citizen of the same and a citizen of another

State, it may be removed, as against such alien or citizen

of another State, on his petition, and the case may proceed

in the state court as against the other defendant or

defendants.2
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3. Where the suit is between a citizen of the State in

which it is brought and a citizen of another State, it may

be removed on petition of the latter, be he plaintiff or de-

fendant, on his filing an affidavit that he has reason to be-

lieve, and does believe, that from prejudice or local influence

he will not be able to obtain justice in such state court.8

1 Proceedings to appropriate property to public uses under the

eminent domain are cases removable to the federal courts, where the

alienage or citizenship is such as to give the right. Warren v. Rail-

road Co., 6 Biss. 425; Patterson v. Boom Co., 3 Dill. 465; Booto Co.

v. Patterson, 98 U. S. Rep. 403.

2 See Osgood v. Railroad Co., 6 Biss. 330; Warren v. Railroad Co.,

6 Biss. 425.

8 Rev. Stat, of U. S. (1878), § 639. See Barkley v. Levee Com-

missioners, 1 Woods, 254.

passed on the rights of third parties. All these, and
many others which might be named, are cases coming
within the scope of the federal judicial power, and many
of them are cases in which it might be exceedingly important to the federal authority that they be referred to the
federal courts for final adjudication.
For these cases it is provided by statute that causes
may be removed from state to federal courts where the
amount in controversy exceeds five hundred dollars, in
the following cases : 1 1. Where the snit is against an alien, or is by a citizen
of the State wherein it is brought and against a citizen of
another State, it may be removed on petitio~ of the
defendant.
2. Where the suit is against an alien and a citizen of
the State wherein it is brought, or is by a citizen of such
State against a citizen of the same and a citizen of another
State, it may be removed, as against such alien or citizen
of another State, on his petition, and the case may proceed
in the state court as against the other defendant or
defendants. 2
3. Where the suit is between a citizen of the State in
which it is brought and a citizen of another State, it may
be removed on petition of the latter, be he plaintiff or defendant, on his filing an affidavit that he has reason to believe, and does believe, that from prejudice or local influence
he will not be able to obtain justice in such state court. 8
1 Proceedings to appropriate property to public uses under the
eminent domain are cases removable to the federal courts, where the
alienage or citizenship is such as to give the right. Warren v. Railroad Co., 6 Biss. 425; Patterson v. Boom Co., 3 Dill. 465; Boom Co.
v. Patt~rson, 98 U. S. Rep. 403.
2 See Osgood v. Railroad Co., 6 Biss. 330; Warren v. Railroad Co.,
6 Biss. 425.
8 Rev. Stat. of U.S. (1878), § 639.
See Barkley v. Levee Commissioners, 1 Woods, 254.
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Also, any suit commenced against any corporation other

than a banking corporation organized under a law of the

United States, or against any member thereof, as such

member, for any alleged liability of such corporation, or

such member as a member thereof, may be removed on

petition of the defendant, verified by oath, stating that

such defendant has a defence arising under or by virtue

of the Constitution or any treaty or law of the United

States.1

Also, when any civil suit or criminal prosecution is

commenced in any state court, for any cause whatsoever,

against any person who is denied, or cannot enforce, in

the judicial tribunals of the State, or in the part of the

State where such suit or prosecution is pending, any right

secured to him by any law providing for the equal civil

rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons

within the jurisdiction of the United States; or against

any officer, civil or military, or other person, for any arrest

or imprisonment, or other trespasses or wrongs, made or

committed by virtue of or under color of authority derived

from any law providing for equal rights as aforesaid; or

for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be
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inconsistent with such law, — such suit or prosecution

may, upon the petition of the defendant stating the facts

and verified by oath, be removed for trial into the next

Circuit Court to be held in the district.2

Also, when any suit or criminal prosecution is com-

menced in any court of a State against any officer ap-

pointed under or acting by authority of any revenue law

of the United States; or against any person acting under

or by authority of such officer, on account of any act done

1 Rev. Stat. TJ. S. (1878), § 640; Turton v. Railroad Co., 3 Dill.

366.

2 Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 641. See Texas v. Gaines, 2 Woods,

342.

Also; any suit commenced against any corporation other
than a banking ~Qrporation organized under a law of the
United States, or against any member thereof, as such
member, for any alleged liability of such corporation, or
such member as a member thereof, may be removed on
petition of the defendant, verified by oath, stating that
such defendant has a defence arising under or by virtue
of the Constitution or any treaty or law of the· United
States. 1
Also, when any civil suit or criminal prosecution is
commenced in any state court, for any cause whatsoever,
against any person who is denied, or cannot enforce, in
the judicial tlibunals of the State, or in the part of the
State where such suit or prosecution is pending, any right
secured to him by any law providing for the equal civil
rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States ; or against
any officer, civil or military, or other person, for any arrest
or imprisonment, or other trespasses or wrongs, made or
committed by virtue of or under color of authority derived
from any law providing for equal rights as aforesaid; or
for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be
inconsistent with such law, - such suit or prosecution
may, upon the petition of the defendant stating the facts
and verified by oath, be removed for trial into the next
Circuit Court to be held in the district. 2
Also, when any suit or criminal prosecution is commenced in any court of a State against any officer appointed under or acting by authority of any revenue law
of the United States; or against any person acting under
or by authority of such officer, on account of any act done
1

Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 640; Turton v. Railroad Co., 3 Dill.

366.
2

342.

Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 641.

See Texas v. Gaines, 2 Wooda,
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under color of his officeor of any such law, or on account

of any right, title, or authority claimed by such officer or

person under any such law; or is commenced against any

person holding property or estate by title derived from

any such officer, and affects the validity of any such reve-

nue law; or is commenced against any officer of the

United States, or other person, on account of any act

done under the provisions of the laws of Congress respect-

ing the elective franchise, or on account of any right,

title, or authority claimed by such officer or other person

under any of said provisions, — such suit or prosecution

may be removed for trial into the Circuit Court of the

United States for the district, upon the petition of the de-

fendant setting forth the nature of the suit or prosecution,

and duly verified.1

Also, whenever a personal action is brought, in any

state court, by an alien, against a citizen of a State who

is, or when the action accrued was, a civil officer of the

United States, being a non-resident of the State where

suit is brought, the action may be removed into the

1 Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 643. This section is a modification
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and enlargement of Section 3 of what was known as the "Force

Bill" of March 2, 1833 (4 Stat, at Large, 632), which was passed to

provide the means for defeating attempts being made by state legis-

lation in South Carolina to nullify the federal revenue laws. The

Force Bill also contained a provision under which the defendant, if

in custody, might be brought before a federal court or judge on

habeas corpus, to be dealt with according to the rules of law and the

order of the court or judge. That act did not in terms apply to

criminal cases, but to " suit or prosecution," and it was enlarged to

embrace criminal cases by the act of Feb. 28,1871 (16 Stat. atLarge,

under color of his office. or of any such law, or on account
of any right, title, or authority claimed by such officer or
person under any such law ; or is commenced against any
person holding property or estate by title derived from
any such officer, and affects the validity of any such revenue law ; or is commenced against any officer of the
United States, or other person, on account of any act
done under the provisions of the laws of Congress respecting the elective franchise, or on acco~1mt of any right,
title, or authority claimed by such officer or other person
under a.ny of said provisions, - such suit or prosecution
may be removed for trial into the Circuit Court of the
United States for the district, upon the petition of the defendant setting forth the nature of the suit or prosecution,
and duly verified. 1
Also, whenever a personal action is brought, in any
state court, by an alien, against a citizen of a State who
is, or when the action accrued was, a civil officer of the
United States, being a non-resident of the State where
suit is brought, the action may be removed into the

438). While these sheets are passing through the press, it is decided

by the federal Supreme Court (March 2, 1880), in the cases of Stran-

der v. West Virginia and Tennessee v. Davis, that criminal prosecu-

tions for alleged offences against state laws may be removed from

the state to the federal court when the facts are such as to bring

them within the terms of Eev. Stat. U. S. § 643, above cited.

Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 643. This section is a modification
and enlargement of Section 3 of what was known as the "Force
Bill" of March 2, 1833 (4 Stat. at Large, 632), which was passed to
provide the means for defeating attempts being made by state legislation in South Carolina to nullify the federal revenue laws- The
Force Bill also contained a prov~sion under which the defendant, if
in custody, might be brought before a federal court or judge on
habeas corpus, to be dealt with according to the rules of law and the
order of the court or judge. That act did not in terms apply to
criminal cases, but to " suit or prosecution," and it was enlarged to
embrace criminal cases by the act of Feb. 28, 1871 (16 Stat. at Large,
438). While these sheets are passing through the press, it is decided
by the federal Supreme Court (March 2, 1880), in the cases of Strander v. West Virginia and Tennessee v. Davis, that criminal prosecutions for alleged offences against state laws may be removed from
the state' to the federal court when the facts are such as to bring
them within the terms of Rev. Stat. U. S. § 643, above cited.
1
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Circuit Court of the United States for the district, in the

manner provided for the cases last above mentioned.1 A

subsequent section makes provision for the removal of a

cause from the state court where one partv claims land in

dispute under a grant from another State than that in

which suit is brought.2

In some of the cases in which removal of causes is pro-

vided for, there is no act of Congress which would give

to the federal courts original jurisdiction. Nevertheless,

it is competent to give jurisdiction of cases removed, pro-

vided they come within the grant of judicial power by the

Constitution.8

The right of removal cannot be taken away or limited

by state laws. Therefore, a right to recover damages for

a personal injury arising under a state statute may be

enforced in the federal court by a citizen of another State

against a citizen of the State where suit is brought, not-

withstanding the state statute undertakes to limit the

remedy to suits in its own courts.4 And the right of a

foreign corporation to do business in a State cannot be

made conditional on its waiving the right to remove suits
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against it to the federal courts, and the waiver itself, if

made, would be void.6

The right to transfer a cause to the federal court being

statutory, the case shown by the petition must come

clearly within the statute, or it will be ineffectual.8 If the

transfer is actually made on insufficient papers, the federal

court will remand the case on its attention being called to

» Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 644.

2 Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 647.

3 Gaines v. Euentes, 92 U. S. Rep. 10.

* Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270.

s Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.

Doyle, 6 Biss. 461.

6 Insurance Co. v. Pechner, 95 V. S. Rep. 183; Gold Washing, &c.

Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. Rep. 199.

Circuit Court of the United States fo~ the district, in the
manner provided for the cases last above mentioned. 1 A
subsequent section makes provision for the removal of a
cause from the state court where one party claims land in
dispute under a grant from another State than that in
which suit is brought. 2
In some of the cases in which removal of causes is pro·
vided for, there is no act of Congress which would give
to the federal courts original jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
it is competent to give jurisdiction of cases removed, provided they come within the grant of judicial power by the
Constitution. 8
The right of removal cannot be taken away or limited
by state laws. Therefore, a right to recover damages for
a personal injury arising under a state statut.e may be
enforced in the federal court by a citizen of another State
against a citizen of the State where suit is brought, notwithstanding the state statute undertakes to limit the
remedy to suits in its own courts.• And the right of a
for~ign corporation to do business in a State cannot be
made conditional on its waiving the right to remove suits
against it to the federal courts, and the waiver itself, if
made, would be void. 6
The right to transfer a cause to the federal court being
statutory, the case shown by the petition must come
clearly within the statute, or it will be ineffectual. 6 If the
transfer is actual!y made on insufficient papers, the federal
court will remand the case on its attention being called to
Rev. Stat. U. S. ( 1878), § 644.
Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 647.
3 Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. Rep. 10.
4 Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270.
6 Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. "·
Doyle, 6 Biss. 461.
·
6 Insurance Co. v. Pechner, 95 U. S. Rep. 183; Gold Washing, &c.
Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. Rep. 199.
1
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the defect;1 but if they are sufficient, the state court can

take no further proceedings in the cause except such as

are incident to the removal.a

Habeas Corpus. — The Supreme Court and the Circuit

and District Courts have power to issue the writ of habeas

corpus, and the several justices and judges thereof, within

their respective jurisdictions, have also power to issue it,

for the purposes of an inquiry into the cause of restraint

upon liberty. But in no case shall the writ extend to a

prisoner in jail, unless where he is in custody under or by

color of the authority of the United States; or is com-

mitted for trial before some court thereof; or is in custody

for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the

United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court

or judge thereof; * or is in custody in violation of the Con-

1 Gold Washing, &c. Co. v. Keyes, 96 TJ. S. Eep. 199.

2 Where a case has once been tried in the state court, and the rule

of law settled for its determination in the highest state court, if after-

wards a new trial is granted, and the case then transferred to the fed-

eral court, the latter will apply the same rule of law in disposing of

it. Hazard v. Railroad Co., 4 Biss. 453.

8 This particular case was provided for by what was known as
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the " Force Bill," of March 2, 1833 (4 Stat, at Large, 632), passed to

counteract South Carolina measures looking to the nullification of

the defect ; 1 but if they are sufficient, the state court can
take no further proceedings in the cause except such as
are incident to the removal.~
Habeas Corpus. - The Supreme Court and the Circuit
and District Courts have power to issue the writ of ha'hea1
corpus, and the several justices and judges thereof, within
their respective jurisdictions, have also power to issue it,
for the purposes of an inquiry into the cause of restraint
upon liberty. But in no case shall the writ extend to a
•
prisoner in jail, unless where he is in custody under or by
color of the authority of the United States ; or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or is in custody
for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the
United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court
or judge thereof; 8 or is in custody in violation of the Con-

federal revenue laws. It was first called in requisition, however, to

prevent the nullification of the Fugitive Slave Law. The United States

Marshal for the District of Ohio, disregarding an order by a state

judge for the discharge from custody of a person held by him as a

fugitive slave, was proceeded against as for a contempt of court.

He was brought before Mr. Justice McLean at chambers, and dis-

charged. The proceedings showed on their face that the state judge

had no jurisdiction, and the discharge of the Marshal followed as of

course. Robinson ex parte, 6 McLean, 355. See Ex parte Bridges,

2 Woods, 428. In United States v. The Jailer of Fayette Co., Ky.,

2 Abb. U. S. 265, the same law was applied to a different case. The

relator who sued out the writ was in the custody of the jailer under

a regular commitment, made by a court of competent jurisdiction

under the laws of Kentucky, charging him with murder. Nothing

Gold Washing, &c. Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. Rep. 199.
t Where a case has once been tried in the state court, and the rule
of law settled for its determination in the highest state court, if afterwards a new trial is granted, and the case then transferred to the federal court, the latter will apply the same rule of law in disposing of
it. Hazard v. Railroad Co., 4 Biss. 453.
a This particular case was provided for by what was known as
the "Force Bill," of March 2, 1833 (4 Stat. at Large, 632), passed to
counteract South Carolina measures looking to the nullification of
federal revenue laws. It was first called in requisition, however, to
prevent the nullification of the Fugitive Slave Law. The United States
Marshal for the District of Ohio, disregarding an order by a state
judge for the discharge from custody of a person held by him as a
fugitive slave, was proceeded against as for a contempt of court.
He was brought before Mr. Justice McLean at chambers, and discharged. The proceedings showed on their face that the state judge
had no jurisdiction, and the discharge of the Marshal followed as of
course. Robinson ex pa.rte, 6 McLean, 355. See Ex parte Bridges,
2 Woods, 428. In United States v. The Jailer of Fayette Co., Ky.,
2 Abb. U. S. 265, the same law was applied to a different case. The
relator who sued out the writ was in the custody of the jailer under
a regular commitment, made by a court of competent jurisdiction
under the laws of Kentucky, charging him with murder. Nothing
1
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stitution, or of a law or treaty of the United States; or,

being a subject or citizen of a foreign state and domiciled

therein, is in custody for an act done or omitted under

any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or

exemption claimed under the commission or order or

sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the

validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of na-

tions ;1 or unless it is necessary to bring the prisoner into

court to testify.2 This last is a provision for facilitating

the investigation of facts in federal tribunals, and all the

other cases mentioned are cases in which the national au-

thority is in some way involved. The federal Supreme

Court also has authority to issue the writ in the exercise

of its appellate jurisdiction.-

The general authority to examine, by means of this

writ, into unlawful restraints upon personal liberty, has

on the face of the papers indicated that the case was any other than

a common case of the crime charged. The relator, however, offered

to show that the act with which he was charged was done by him

under the authority of the United States in the execution of its

revenue laws. Judge Ballard, United States District Judge, entered

upon an examination of the facts, and, reaching the conclusion that
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the prisoner was justified, ordered him discharged. See also Ex parte

Jenkins, 2 Wall. Jr. C. C. 521. The principal question which the

above cases present must be regarded as settled by Strander v. West

Virginia, The Commonwealth of Virginia, Petitioner, The Common-

stitution, or of a law or treaty of the United States ; or,
being a subject or citizen of a foreign state and domiciled
therein, is in custody tor an act done or omitted under
any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or
exemption claimed under the commission or order or
sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the
validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations ; 1 or unless it is necessary to bring the plisoner into
court to testify. 2 This last is a provision for facilitating
the investigation of facts in federal tribunals, and all the
other cases mentioned are cases in which the national authority is in some way involved. The federal Supreme
Court also has authority to issue the writ in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction. 8
The general authority to examine, by means of this
writ, into unlawful restraints upon personal liberty, has.

wealth and Coles, Petitioner, xa& Tennessee ». Davis, decided by the

federal Supreme Court, March 2, 1880. The decisions sustain the

power of Congress to provide for the removal of a criminal cause

from a state to a federal court for examination and trial, when a right

under the Constitution of the United States is denied to the accused

in the state court.

1 This provision was made by act of Aug. 29, 1842 (5 Stat, at

Large, 529), and was enacted in consequence of the prosecution in

New York of a British subject for an act which his government

avowed.

2 Kev. Stat. U. S. (1878), §§ 751-753.

» Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 568; Ex parte Milburn, 9 Pet. 704;

Matter of Eaine, 14 How. 103.

0

on the face of the papers indicated that the case was any other than
a common case of the crime charged. The relator, however, offered.
to show that the act with which he was charged was done by him
under the authority of the United States in the execution of its
revenue laws. Judge Ballard, United States District Judge, entered
upon an examination of the facts, and, reaching the conclusion that
the prisoner was justified, ordered him discharged. See also Ex pa rte
Jenkins, 2 Wall. Jr. C. C. 621. The principal question which the
above cases present must be regarded as settled by Strander v. West
Virginia, The Commonwealth of Virginia, Petitioner, The Commonwealth and Coles, Petitioner,' and Tennessee 11. Davis, decided by the
federal Supreme Court, March 2, 1880. The decisions sustain the
power of Congress to provide for the removal of a criminal cause
from a state to a federal court for examination and trial, when a right
under the Constitution of the United States is denied to the accused
in the state court.
l This provision was made by act of Aug. 29, 1842 (6 Stat. at
Large, 629), and was enacted in consequence of the prosecution in
New York of a British subject for an act which his government
avowed.
~ Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), §§ 751-753.
a Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 668 ; Ex parte Milburn, 9 Pet. 704: ;
Matter of Kaine, 14 How. 103.
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not been conferred upon the United States, and therefore

remains with the States.1 But if state tribunals issue

the writ for a prisoner detained under federal authority,

it must be dismissed when return is made showing the

facts.2 A prisoner held under state process for extradition

to another State may have a habeas corpus from a federal

court or judge; the process of extradition being provided

for by, and taken under, the Constitution of the United

States.8

Appellate Jurisdiction. — In all cases to which the federal

judicial power extends, except those in which original

jurisdiction is conferred upon it, the Supreme Court has

appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such

exceptions and under such reservations as Congress shall

make.4 What the cases are in which appeals may be taken

from the state courts has been shown; and provision has

also been made by various statutes for the exercise of

appellate jurisdiction in cases heard in the federal courts.

But many cases are allowed to be finally determined in

the Circuit and District Courts and the Court of Claims.

General Principles. — The federal courts exercise the
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jurisdiction conferred upon them, and restrain their action

within it, according to certain general principles, some of

which are declared by statute, but the most of which arise

from a consideration of the general nature of the consti-

tutional structure, and from rules of comity recognized

and acted upon between independent jurisdictions, or be-

tween jurisdictions having concurrent authority, according

as the case may be. The principal of these may be here

mentioned.

The Law administered. — It has been mentioned in

1 Ex parte Dorr, 3 How. 103; Dekrafft v. Barney, 2 Black, 704.

* Ablemat v. Booth, 21 How. 506; Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397.

8 Ex parte Smith, 3 McLean, 121.

4 Const., Art. III. § 2, cl. 2.

not been conferred upon the United States, and therefore
remains with the States. 1 But if state tribunals issue
the writ for a p1isoner detained under federal authority,
it must be dismissed when return is made showing the
facts. 2 A prisoner held under state process for extradition
to another State may have a habe(J,8 corpus from a federal
court or judge ; the process of extradition being provided
for by, and taken under, the Constitution of the United
States. 8
.Appellate Jurisdiction. - In all cases to which the federal
judicial power extends, except those in which original
jurisdiction is conferred upon it, the Supreme Court has
appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such
exceptions and under such reservations as Congress shall
make.• What the cases are in which appeals may be taken
from the state courts has been shown ; and provision has
also been made by various statutes for the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction in cases heard in the federal courts.
But many cases are allowed to be finally determined in
the Circuit and District Courts and the Court of Claims.
General Prinr.1ples. - The federal courts exercise the
jurisdiction conferred upon them, and restrain their action
within it, according to certain general principles, some or
which are declared by statute, but the most of which arise
from a consideration of the general nature of the constitutional structure, and from rules of comity recognized
and acted upon between independent jurisdictions, or between jurisdictions having concurrent authority, according
as the case may be. The principal of these may be here
mentioned.
·
The Law administered. - It has been mentioned in
Ex parte Dorr, 3 How. 103; Dekrafft t'· Barney, 2 Black, 704.
Ablcmar. v. Booth, 21 How. 506; Tarble's Case, 13 Wall 397.
s Ex pa.rte Smith, 3 McLean, 121.
' Const., Art. III. § 2, cl. 2.
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another place that each of the several States has a com-

mon law of its own, derived in the case of most of them

from the common law of England, but modified more

or less in adoption by circumstances, usage, or statutes.

This common law determines to a large extent the civil

rights of the people, and it also makes many acts punish-

able as crimes. But the United States as such can have

no common law. It derives its powers from the grant of

the people made by the Constitution, and they are all to

be found in the written law, and not elsewhere.1 It must

therefore find its power to punish crimes in laws of Con-

gress passed in pursuance of the Constitution, defining the

offences and prescribing what courts shall have jurisdiction

over them. No act can be a crime against the United

States which is not made or recognized as such by federal

constitution, law, or treaty.' But the federal courts sit-

ting in the several States, where their jurisdiction depends

upon the character or residence of the parties who sue or

are sued, administer for the most part the local law, and

they take notice of the state common law, usages, and

statutes, and apply them as the state courts would apply

them in like controversies.8 In all such cases if the de-
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cisions of the state courts afford precedents for their guid-

ance, the federal courts are to follow them for uniformity,

and the state decisions will thus become the final rule and

authority on questions of state law, for like reasons to

those which require finality to federal decisions on ques-

tions of federal law.4 And the federal courts will be

particularly careful to follow state decisions on questions

1 Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 658.

* United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32.

8 Livingston's Lessee v. Morse, 7 Pet. 469; Tioga R. R. Co. t>.

Blossburg, &o. R. R. Co., 20 Wall. 137.

4 Townsend v. Todd, 91 U. S. Rep. 452; Elmwood v. Marcy, 92

U. S. Rep. 289; Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. Rep. 359.

another place that each of the several States has a oommon law of its own, derived in the case of most of them
from the common law of England, but modified more
or less in adoption by circumstances, usage, or statutes.
This common law determines to a large extent the civil
rights of the people, and it also makes many acts punishable as crimes. But the United States as such can have
no common law. It derives its powers from the grant of
the people made by the Constitution, and they are all to
be found in the written law, and not elsewhere. 1 It must
therefore find its power to punish crimes in laws of Con":'
gress passccl in pursuance of the Constitution, defining the
offences and prescribing what courts shall have jurisdiction
over them. No act can be a crime a.gainst the United
States which is not made or recognized as such by federal
constitution, law, or treaty. 2 But the federal courts sitting in the several States, where their jurisdiction depends
upon the character or residence of the parties who sue or
are sued, administer for the most part the local law, and
they take notice of the state common law, usages, and
statutes, and apply them as the state courts would apply
them in like controversies. 8 In all such cases if the decisions of the state courts afford precedents for their guidance, the federal courts are to follow them for uniformity,
and the state decisions will thus become the final rule and
authority on questions of state law, for like reasons to
those which require finality to federal decisions on questions of federal law.' And the federal courts will be
particularly careful to follow state decisions on questions
Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 668.
United States "· Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32.
8 Livingston's Lessee v. Morse, 7 Pet. 469; Tioga R. R. Co. o.
Blossburg, &c. R. R. Co., 20 Wall. 137.
4 Townsend v. Todd, 91 U.S. Rep. 452; Elmwood v. Marcy, 9'A
U.S. Rep. 289; Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U.S. Rep. 359.
1
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involving the title to land or other permanent property.1

It is therefore a general rule, that, upon questions of the

construction, operation, or force of any provision of the

state constitution or laws, or of the validity of any state

enactment, or any power, right, privilege, or exemption

claimed under state authority, or of the force or applica-

tion of the local common law or usages, the decisions of

the state courts will furnish the rule of decision for the

federal courts,2 and if the judgments of the state court of

last resort are found to be in conflict, the federal courts

will follow the last settled adjudications.8

But there are certain cases in which this rule cannot be

applied, because the reasons on which it rests are inappli-

cable. It cannot, for example, be applied in any case

where the decision of the state court involved a question

of national authority, or any right, title, privilege, or

exemption derived from or claimed under the Constitution

or any law or treaty of the United States.4 Nor can it be

applied to questions not dependent upon local statutes or

usages; such as the construction, operation, and negotia-

bility of bills of exchange and other commercial contracts,
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contracts of insurance and bailment, and questions of in-

jury dependent on principles which are of general recog-

nition.6 Nor are state decisions upon the validity or

construction of a state statute binding when the statute is

1 Irvine v. Sim's Lessee, 3 Call. 425; Walker v. Harbor Commis-

sioners, 17 Wall. 648.

2 Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361; Elmwood v. Marcy, 92 TJ. S. Rep. 289.

8 Green v. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet. 291; Suydam v. Williamson, 24

How. 427.

* State Bank v. Enoop, 16 How. 369; Jefferson Branch Bank v.

Skelley, 1 Black, 436. The question in these cases was whether a

state statute impaired the obligation of a contract contained in the

charter of banks.

5 Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 418; Boyce v. Tabb, 18 Wall. 546;

Venice v. Murdock, 92 C S. Rep. 494.

involving the title to land or other permanent property .1
It is therefore a general rule, that, upon question~ of the
construction, operation, or force of any provisior. of the
state constitution or laws, or of the validity of any state
enactment, or any power, right, privilege, or exemption
claimed under state authority, or of the force or application of the local common law or usages, the decisions of
the state courts will furnish the rule of decision for the
federal courts, t and if the judgments of the state court of
last resort are found to be in conflict, the federal courts
will follow the last settled adjudications. 1
But there are certain cases in which this rule cannot be
applied, because the reasons on which it rests are inapplicable. It cannot, for example, be applied in any case
where the decision of the state court involved a question
of national authority, or any right, title, privilege, or
exemption derived from or claimed under the Constitution
or any law or treaty of the United States. 4 Nor can it be
applied to questions not dependent upon local statutes or
usages ; such as the construction, operation, and negotiability of bills of exchange and other commercial contracts,
contracts of insurance and bailment, and questions of injury dependent on principles which are of general recognition.1 Nor are state decisions upon the validity or
construction of a state statute binding when the statute is
Irvine v. Sim's Lessee, 3 Dall. 425 ; Walker v. Harbor Commissioners, 17 Wall. 648.
2 Shelby v. Guy, 11Wheat.361; Elmwood v. Marcy, 92 U.S. Rep. 289.
a Green v. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet. 291; Suydam v. Williamson, 24
How. 427.
4 State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Jefferson Branch Bank v.
Skelley, 1 Black, 436. The question in these cases was whether a
state statute impaired the obligation of a contract contained in the
charter of banks.
6 Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 418; Boyce v. Tabb, 18 Wall. M6;
Venice v. Murdock, 92 t: S. Rep. 494.
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in the nature of a contract, and private rights have accrued

under it, or when contracts have been made under it

sanctioned by state decisions afterwards overruled.1

The States cannot enlarge the federal jurisdiction, and

confer authority over new cases upon the federal courts.

But the federal laws, nevertheless, recognize such new

rights as are given by state statutes, and administer rem-

edies in respect to them when cases arise over which

they have jurisdiction under the laws of Congress.8 For

example, where a state statute gives an action in its courts

for the recovery of damages where death has been caused

by wrongful act, neglect, or default, the party entitled to

bring the action may at his option sue in the federal court,

if, by reason of citizenship or alienage, he would be at

liberty to enforce other rights in that court.8 On the

other hand, Congress can confer no part of the federal judi-

cial power on the state courts, or on any courts not estab-

lished by its own authority;4 and a State cannot give to its

own courts authority to enforce or assist in the enforce-

ment of a law of Congress, such, for example, as the Fu-

gitive Slave Law,6 nor can it authorize proceedings in its

own courts to enforce an exclusively national power.6
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Conflict of Jurisdiction. — In strictness there can be no

such thing as a conflict of laws between State and nation.

The laws of both operate within the same territory, but if

in any particular case their provisions are in conflict, one

1 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175; Oloott v. Supervisors, 16

Wall. 678.

2 Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236; Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195.

* Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270.

4 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304; Stearns v. United

States, 2 Paine, 300.

6 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet 539.

• Such as the power to take lands for some governmental purpose

of the United States, and assess the compensation to be paid by the

United States therefor. Kohl t». United States, 91 U. S. Rep. 367.

in the nature of a contract, and private rights have accrued
under it, or when contracts have been made under it
sanctioned by state decisions afterwards overruled. 1
The States cannot enlarge the federal jurisdiction, and
confer authority over new cases upon the federal courts.
But the federal laws, nevertheless, recognize such new
rights as are given by state statutes, and administer remedies in respect to them when cases arise over which
they have jurisdiction under the laws of Congress. 1 For
example, where a state statute gives an action in its court,s
for the recovery of damages where death has been caused
by wrongful act, neglect, or default, the party entitled to
bring the action may at his option sue in the federal court,
if, by reason of citizenship or alienage, he would be at
liberty to enforce other rights in that court. 8 On the
other hand, Congress can confer no part of the federal judicial power on the state courts, or on any courts not established by its own authority; 4 and a State cannot give to its
own courts authority to enforce or assist in the enforcement of a law of Congress, such, for example, as the Fugitive Slave Law, 6 nor can it authorize proceedings in its
own cour~ to enforce an exclusively national power. 8
Conflict of Jurisdiction. -In strictness there can be no
such thing as a conflict of laws between State and nation.
The laws of both operate within the same territory, but if
in any particular case their provisions are in conflict, one
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175; Olcott 11. Supervison, 16
Wall. 678.
s Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236 ; Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 196.
I Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270.
4 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 804; Stearns v. United
States, 2 Paine, 800.
6 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 5!39.
e Such as the power to take lands for some govemmental purpose
of the United States, and assess the compensation to be paid by the
United States therefor. Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. Rep. 367.
1
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or the other is void. If a law of Congress is passed upon

a subject which is within its constitutional powers, any

state legislation opposed to it is a mere nullity. For this

reason state statutes which in their operation would im-

pede the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law were mere

futile attempts to make laws, and were to be held void by

the state judiciary as well as by the federal.1 So are all

state laws which tend to impede or obstruct the laws

passed by Congress under its power to regulate commerce,*

all which undertake to levy taxes on the means selected by

the general government for use in the exercise of its es-

sential powers,8 and so on. On the other hand, a federal

enactment taxing a State or its municipal corporations is

inoperative,'4 and so is one undertaking to establish regu-

lations of local commerce within the States, and it cannot

interfere with the operation of state laws on the same sub-

ject.6 In these cases the federal and state courts, if the

question came before them, would recognize the same rule,

and each administer the same law. If they chanced to

differ in opinion, an appeal to the federal Supreme Court

must determine the controversy.
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But questions of much delicacy sometimes arise, when

the federal and state courts, under their concurrent au-

thority, may find their respective jurisdictions invoked in

the same controversy. This might lead to collisions, and

to unseemly and perhaps dangerous controversies, if the

action of the courts were not directed by certain rules of

1 Sims's Case, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 285; Bushnell's Case, 8 Ohio, N. S. 77.

2 State v. Steamship Constitution, 42 Cal. 578; Council Bluffs v.

Railroad Co., 45 Iowa, 338; Foster v. County Commissioners, 7 Minn.

140; State Treasurer v. Railroad Co., 4 Houst. (Del.) 158.

1 Palfrey v. Boston, 101 Mass. 329; Montgomery Co. v. Elston, 32

Ind. 27.

4 United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322.

• United States v. Be Witt, 9 Wall. 41; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall.

462.

or the other is void. If a law of Congress is passed upon
a subject which is within its· constitutional powers, any
state legislation opposed to it is a mere nullity. For this
reason state statutes which in their operation would impede the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law were mere
futile attempts to make laws, and were to be held void by
the state judiciary as well as by the federal. 1 So are all
state laws which tend to impede or obstruct the laws
passed by Congress under its power to regulate commerce, 1
all which undertake to levy taxes on the means selected by
the general government for use in the exercise of its essential powers, 8 and so on.- On the other hand, a federal
enactment taxing a State or its municipal corporations is
inoperative," and so is one undertaking to establish regulations of local commerce within the States, and it cannot
interfere with the operation of state laws on the same subject. 5 In these cases the federal and state courts, if the
question came before them, would recognize the same rule,
and each administer the same law. If they chanced to
differ in opinion, an appeal to the federal Supreme Court
must determine the controversy.
But questions of much delicacy sometimes arise, ·when
the federal and state courts, under their concurrent authority, may find their respective jurisdictions invoked in ,
the same controversy. This might lead to collisions, and
to unseemly and perhaps dangerous controversies, if the
action of the courts were not directed by certain rules of
1

Sims's Case, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 285; Bushnell's Case, 8 Ohio, N. S. 77.
State v. Steamship Constitution, 42 Cal. 578; Council Bluffs v.
Railroad Co., 45 Iowa, 338; Foster v. County Oommissioners,, 7 Minn.
140; State Treasurer v. Railroad Co., 4 Houst. (Del.) 158.
3 Palfrey v. Boston, 101 Mass. 329 ; Montgomery Co. v. Elston, 32
Ind. 27.
' United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322.
I United States v. De Witt, 9 Wall. 41; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall
462.
1
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good sense and comity devised to preserve harmony and

insure an orderly administration of justice.

The most important of these rules is that the court

which first obtains jurisdiction of a controversy by the

service of process, will not be interfered with by the other

in the exercise of that jurisdiction until final judgment and

execution.1 The federal courts will not therefore enjoin

the proceedings in a suit in a state court, nor a state court

those in a federal court.a In every respect except where

the acts of Congress have made special provision, the

courts of the State and of the United States are as distinct

and independent in the exercise of their powers as the

courts of two separate and independent nations.8 There-

fore, where property is in the official custody of the minis-

terial officer of the courts of one jurisdiction, it cannot be

taken from his custody on replevin or other process issued

by the courts of the other,4 even though it be alleged that

the officer holding it seized on process against one person

the property of another." The rule applies where the

property and franchises of a corporation have been taken

judicial control of by a state court aiyl ordered sold;6

1 Mallett v. Dexter, 1 Curt. 178; Tobey v. Bristol, 3 Story, 800;
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Wadleigh v. Veazie, 3 Sum. 165; Shoemaker v. French, Chase's Dec.

805; The Celestine, 1 Biss. 1; Ruggles v. Simonton, 3 Bias. 325;

Daly v. The Sheriff, 1 Woods, 175. This remark will of course be

understood as subject to the right to remove causes from the state to

the federal courts in the cases provided by law.

2 Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch, 179; City Bank of New York v.

Skelton, 2 Blatch. 14; Ex parte Cabrera, 1 Wash. C. C. 232 ; Borer's

Inter-State Law, 12-14.

• Rogers v. Cincinnati, 5 McLean, 337, 339; Kiggs v. Johnson

County, 6 Wall. 166.

* Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583.

6 Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450; The Oliver Jordan, 2 Curt. 414.

good sense and comity devised to preserve harmony and
insure an orderly administration of justice.
The most important of these rules is that the coUI1;
which first obtains jurisdiction of a controversy by the
service of process, will not be interfered with by the other
in the exercise of that jurisdiction until final judgment and
execution. 1 The federal courts will not therefore enjoin
the proceedings in a suit in a state court, nor a state court
those in a federal court.~ In every respect except where
the acts ot• Congress have made special provision, the
courts of the State and of the United States are as distinct
and independent in the exercise of their powers as the
courts of two separate and independent nations. 8 Therefore, where property is in the official custody of the ministerial officer of the courts of one jurisdiction, it cannot be
taken from his custody on replevin or other process issued
by the courts .of the other,• even though it be alleged that
the officer holding it seized on process against one person
the property of another. 6 The rule applies where the
property and franchises of a corporation have been taken
judicial control of by a state court an,d ordered sold ; 8

But the party claiming the property may at his election sue the

officer in trespass in such case. Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334.

6 Fox v. Hempfleld R. R. Co., 2 Abb. U. S. 151.

1 Mallett v. Dexter, 1 Curt. 178; Tobey v. Bristol, 3 Story, 800;
Wadleigh u. Veazie, 3 Sum. 165; Shoemaker v. French, Chase's Dec.
805; The Celestine, 1 Biss. 1 ; Ruggles v. Simonton, 3 Biss. 325;
Daly v. The Sheriff, 1 Woods, 175. This rema.rk will of course be
understood as subject to the right to remove causes from the state to
the federal courts in the cases provided by law.
2 Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch, 179; City Bank of New York v.
Skelton, 2 Blatch. 14; Ex parte Cabrera, 1 Wash. C. C. 232; Rorer's
Inter-State Law, 12-14.
• Rogers v. Cincinnati, 6 McLean, 337, 339; Riggs v. Johnson
County, 6 Wall. 166.
t Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583.
6 Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 460; The Oliver Jordan, 2 Curt. 414.
But the party claiming the property may at his election sue the
officer in trespass in such case. Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334.
6 Fox z:. Hempfield R. R. Co., 2 Abb. U. S. 151.
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and also where property is in the hands of a receiver ap-

pointed by a court;1 and any attempt to disturb the pos-

session, of the receiver, except by permission of the court

appointing him, -will be a contempt of the authority of the

court.2

The possession of the state courts, however, will not be

allowed to defeat claims under the United States revenue

laws, or under laws imposing forfeitures for offences.3

Essential Powers. — The federal courts have all the

powers which inhere in courts in general, and may exer-

cise them for the full enforcement of their jurisdiction,

until the judgments they render are performed or satisfied.4

For this purpose they are authorized by law to issue all

the customary writs.6 But they cannot exercise state

powers, even though without doing so they are powerless

to enforce their judgments. They may compel officers to

levy taxes in proper cases, to satisfy judgments rendered

by them against municipal corporations ; * but they cannot

appoint officers to make the levies when there are none

to act.7

Territorial Courts. — The provisions of the Constitution

which define the limits of the judicial power have no appli-
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cation to the Territories. It is therefore competent for

Congress to create courts for the Territories, and confer

upon them such jurisdiction as may seem necessary or

proper. And these courts are commonly empowered to

1 Wiswall v. Sampson, 14 How. 52.

2 DeVisser v. Blackstone, 6 Blatch. 235; Wiswall v. Sampson, 14

How. 52.

» United States v. The Reindeer, 2 Cliff. 57.

* Bank of United States v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51.

6 Rev. Stat, of U. S. (1878), § 716.

11 Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Memphis t>. Brown, 97

U. S. Rep. 300.

7 Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107; Heine v. Commissioners, 19

Wall. 655.

and also where property is in the hands of a receiver appointed by a court ; 1 and any attempt to disturb the posseasiot: of the receiver, except by permission of the court
appointing him, will be a contempt of the authority of the
court. 2
The possession of the state courts, however', will not be
allowed to defeat claims under the United States revenue
laws, or under laws imposing forfeitures for offences. 8
Essential, Powers. - The federal courts have all the
powers which inhere in courts in general, and may exercise them for the full enforcement of their jurisdiction,
until the judgments they render are performed or satisfied.'
For this purpose they are autho1ized by law to issue all
the customary writs. 6 · But they cannot exercise state
powers, even though without doing so they are powerless
to enforce their judgments. They -may compel officers to
levy taxes in proper cases, to satisfy judgments rendered
by them against municipal corporations ; 6 but they cannot
appoint officers to make the levies when there are none
to act.'
Territorial, Courts. -The provisions of the Constitution
which define the limits of the judicial power have no application to the Territories. It is therefore competent for
Congress to create courts for the Territories, and confer
upon them such jurisdiction as may seem necessary or
proper. And these courts are commonly empowered to
Wiswall"· Sampson, 14 How. 52.
t De Visser v. Blackstone, 6 Blatch. 235 ; Wiswall v. Sampson, 14:
How. 62.
a United States v. The Reindeer, 2 Cliff. 57.
' Bank of United States v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51.
6 Rev. Stat. of U. S. (1878), § 716.
G Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Memphis v. Brown, 97
U.S. Rep. 300.
., Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107; Heine ~. Commissioners, 19
Wall. 655.
1
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exercise within the Territories all the powers which within

the States are exercised by both the state and federal

courts.1 They are created by Congress, but the practice,

pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding, are left to

be regulated by the territorial legislatures.2

Courts-Martial. — It is competent for Congress, by the

rules and articles of war, to provide for the ordering of

courts-martial for the trial of offences arising in the mili-

tary and naval service ;8 and these courts, except as may

be otherwise provided, will execute their duties and regu-

late their mode of proceeding by the customary military

law.4 But a person not enrolled or liable to be enrolled

for service cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of such

courts ;6 nor can the courts proceed against those who are

liable without giving notice and an opportunity of defence

to the accused.* Where a court-martial proceeds without

authority, and restrains a party of his liberty or inflicts

punishment, all the parties responsible for the action are I

liable to suits therefor in the common-law courts.7

Military Courts or Commissions. — Offences against mar-

tial law and the laws of war, and all acts not justified by

the laws of war, which are calculated to impede or obstruct
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the operations of the military authorities, or to render

abortive any attempt by the government to enforce its

authority, may be punished by military courts or commis-

sions organized by the President as commander-in-chief,

or by the immediate military commander, or established

1 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511; Clinton v. Englebrecht,

13 Wall. 434.

a Hornbuckle ». Toombs, 18 Wall. 648.

'Re Bogert, 2 Sawyer, 396.

* Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19.

• Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranoh, 331.

s Meade v. Deputy Marshal, 2 Car. Law Repos. 320.

'Milligan t>. Hovey, 3 Bias. 13. See Mostyn v. Fabrigas, Cowp.

161.

exercise within the Territories all the powers which within
the States are exercised by both the state and federal
courts. 1 They are created by Congress, but the practice,
pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding, are left to
be regulated by the territotial legislatures. 2
Oourts-JJfartial. - It is competent for Congress, by the
rules and articles of war, to provide for the ordering of
courts-martial for the trial of offences arising in the military and naval service; 8 and these courts, except as may
be otherwise provided, will execute their duties and regulate their mode of proceeding by the customary military
law.' But a person not enrolled or liable to be enrolled
for service cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of such
courts; 6 nor can the courts proceed against those who are
liable without giving notice and an opportunity of defence
to the accused. 8 Where a court-ma1-tial proceeds without
authority, and restrains a party of his liberty or inflicts
punishment, all the parties responsible for the action are
liable to suits therefor in the common-law courts. 7
Military Courts or Commissions. -Offences against martial law and the laws of war, and all acts not justified by
the laws of war, which are calculated to impede or obstruct
the operations of the military authorities, or to render
abortive any attempt by the government to enforce its
authority, may be punished by military courts or commissions organized by the President as commander-in-chief,
or by the immediate military commander, or established
1 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 611 ; Clinton 11. Englebrecht,
13 Wall. 434.
2 Horn buckle ''· Toombs, 18 Wall. 648.
, Re Bogert, 2 Sawyer, 396.
t Martin i•. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19.
6 Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch, 331.
• Meade v. Deputy Marshal, 2 Car. Law Repos. 320.
T Milligan "· Hovey, 3 Biss. 13. See Mostyn v. Fabrigas, Cowp.
161.
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under the authority of Congress. But these tribunals

cannot try offences against the general laws when the

courts of the land are in the performance of their regular

functions, and no impediment exists to a lawful prosecu-

tion there.1 An impediment does exist, however, when

martial law is lawfully declared;a and this creates an

exception to the general rule that the military in times of

peace must be in strict subordination to the civil power,

and in times of war also, except on the theatre of warlike

movements.8 The military tribunals may also take cog-

nizance of offences alleged to have been committed by

soldiers upon citizens within the field of military opera-

tions against an armed rebellion, while the civil law is for

the time suspended, and to the exclusion of the ordinary

jurisdiction when restored.4

Political Questions. — Over political questions the courts

have no authority, but must accept the determination of

the political departments of the government as conclusive.

Such are the questions of the existence of war, the restora-

tion of peace,6 the de facto or rightful government of an-

other country,6 the authority of foreign ambassadors and

ministers,7 the admission of a State to the Union,8 the
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restoration to constitutional relations of a State lately in re-

bellion,9 the extent of the jurisdiction of a foreign power,10

the right of Indians to recognition as a tribe,11 and so on.

i Milligan's Case, 4 Wall. 2. 2 Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.

» 1 Bl. Com. 413-415.

4 Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. Rep. 509.

* United States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56.

6 The Hornet, 2 Abb. U. S. 85; Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246.

l Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253.

8 See Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Marsh v. Burroughs, 1 Woods, 463.

« Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50.

10 Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415.

"The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737; United States v. Holliday,

3 Wall. 407.

under the authority of Congress. But these tribunals
cannot try offences against the general laws when the
courts of the land are in the performance of their regular
functions, and no impediment exists to a lawful prosecution there. 1 An impediment does exist, however, when
martial law is lawfully declared; s and this creates an
exception to the general rule that the military in times of
peace must be in strict subordination to the civil power,
and in times of war also, except on the theatre of warlike
movements. 8 The military tribunals may also take cognizance of offences alleged to have been committed by
soldiers upon citizens within the field of military operations against an armed rebellion, whil~ the civil law is for
the time suspended, and to the exclusion of the ordinary
jurisdiction when restored.'
Political, Questions. - Over political questions the courts
have no authority, but must accept the determination of
the political departments of the government as conclusive.
Such are the questions of the existence of war, the restoration of peace, 6 the de facto or rightful government of another country, 6 the authority of foreign ambassadors and
ministers, 7 the admission of a State to the Union, 8 the
restoration to constitutional relations of a State lately in rebellion, 9 the extent of the jurisdiction of a foreign power, 10
.the right of Indians to recognition as a tribe, 11 and so on.
1

Milligan's Case, 4 W a.11. 2.

s Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.

a 1 Bl. Com. 413-415.

' Coleman t'. Tennessee, 97 U. S. Rep. 609.
6 United States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 66.
6 The Hornet, 2 Abb. U. S. 85; Gelston v. Hoyt; 3 Wheat. 246.
7 Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 258.
e See Luther v. Borden, 7 How .1; Marsh v. Burroughs, 1Woods,463.
' Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 60.
10 Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 18 Pet. 416.
11 The Kansas Indians, 6 W a.ll. 787; United States v. Holliday,
8 Wall. 407.
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Final Authority in Construction. — The several depart-

ments of the government are equal in dignity and of co-

ordinate authority, and neither can subject the other to

its jurisdiction, or strip it of any portion of its constitu-

tional powers. But the judiciary is the final authority

in the construction of the constitution and the laws, and

its construction should be received and followed by the

other departments. This results from the nature of its

jurisdiction; questions of construction arise in legal con-

troversies, and are determined by the courts, and when de-

termined the courts have power to give effect to their

conclusions. Their judgments thus become the law of

the land on the points covered by them, and a disregard

of them, whether by private citizens or by officers of the

government, could only result in new controversy, to be

finally determined by the judiciary in the same way. But

the courts have no authority to pass upon abstract ques-

tions, or questions not presented by actual litigation, and

have therefore nothing to do with questions which relate

exclusively to executive or legislative authority; nor is

there any method in which their opinions can be consti-

tutionally expressed, so as to have binding force upon

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:44 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

either the executive or the legislature when the question

presents itself, not as one of existing law, but as one

of what it is proper or politic or competent to make

law for the future. The judiciary, though the final judge

of what the law is, is not the judge of what the lav-

should be.1

It is very proper, however, that the judiciary, in passing

upon questions of law which have been considered and

acted upon by the other departments, should give great

1 Some few of the States make provision by their constitutions

whereby the executive or the legislature may call upon the highest

court of law of the State for its opinion upon important questions as

a guide to their own action.

Final .Authority in Construction. -The several departments of the government are equal in dignity and of coordinat,e authority, and neither can subject the other to
its jurisdiction, or strip it of any portion of its constitutional powers. But the judiciary is the final authority
in the construction of the constitution and the laws, and
its construction should be received and followed by the
other departments. This results from the nature of its
jurisdiction ; questions of construction arise in legal controversies, and are determined by the courts, and when determined the courts have power to give effect to their
conclusions. Their judgments thus become the law of
the land on the points covered by them, and a disregard
of them, whether by private citizens or by officers of the
government, could only result in new controversy, to be
finally determined by the judiciary in the same way. But
the courts have no authority to pass upon abstract questions, or questions not presented by actual litigation, and
have therefore nothing to do with questions which relate
exclusively to executive or legislative authority ; nor is
there any method in which their opinions can be constitutionally expressed, so as to have binding force upon
either the executive or the legislature when the question
presents itself, not as one of existing law, but as one
of what it is proper or politic or competent to make
law for the future. The judiciary, though the final judge
of what the law is, is not the judge of what the law
should be. 1
It is very proper, however, that the judiciary, in passing
upon questions of law which have been considered and
acted upon by the other departments, should give great
1 Some few of the States ntake provision by their constitutions
whereby the executive or the legislature may call upon the highest
court of law of the State for its opinion upon important questions as
a guide to their own action.
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weight to their opinions, especially if they have passed

unchallenged for a considerable period.1 The judiciary

have often yielded to it when the correctness of a practical

construction of the law by the executive departments, in

the performance of their own duties, was in question;1

but they cannot do this when, in the opinion of the court,

the construction is plainly in violation of the Consti-

tution.8

1 Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299; Bank of United States v. Hal-

stead, 10 Wheat. 51, 63.

2 Edwards's Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 210; Surgett t>. Lapice, 8

How. 48; Bissell v. Penrose, 8 How. 317; Union Ins. Co. v. Hoge,

weight to their opinions, especially if they have passed
unchallenged for a considerable period. 1 The judiciary
have often yielded to it when the correctness of a practical
construction of the law by the executive departments, in
the performance of their own duties, was in question ; •
but they cannot do this when, in the opinion of the court,
the construction is plainly in violation of the Constitution.•

21 How. 35; United States ». Gilmore, 8 Wall. 330; United States v.

Moore, 95 U. S. Kep. 760.
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8 Story on Const., § 407; Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 84.

1 Stuart v. Laird, 1Cranch,299; Bank of United States 11. Hal·
stead, 10 Wheat. 61, 63.
2 Edwards's Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. ~10; Surgett v. Lapice, 8
How. 48; Bissell v. Penrose, 8 How. 317; Union Ins. Co. v. Hoge,
21 How. 35 ; United States v. Gilmore, 8 Wall. 330; United States v.
Moore, 95 U.S. Rep. 760.
8 Story on Const.,§ 407; Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 84.

•

CHECKS AND BALANCES IN GOVERNMENT.

CHECKS AND BALANCES IN GOVERNMENT. 141

141

CHAPTER VII.

CHECKS AND BALANCES IN GOVERNMENT.

What they are. — The American system of government

is an elaborate system of checks and balances. As enu-

merated by one of the early statesmen of the country, these

are as follows: — First, tbe States are balanced against the

general government. Second, the House of Representa-

tives is balanced against the Senate, and the Senate against

CHAPTER VII.

the House. Third, the executive authority is in some de-

gree balanced against the legislature. Fourth, the judi-

ciary is balanced against the legislature, the executive,

CHECKS AND BALANCES IN GOVERNMENT.

and the state governments. Fifth, the Senate is balanced

against the President in all appointments to office, and in

all treaties. Sixth, the people hold in their own hands

the balance against their own representatives by periodical

What tlieg are. -The American system of government

elections. Seventh, the legislatures of the several States

are balanced against the Senate by sexennial elections.

Eighth, the Electors are balanced against the people in the

choice of President and Vice-President. And this, it is

added, is a complication and refinement of balances which

is an invention of our own, and peculiar to this country.1

The invention, nevertheless, was suggested by the Brit-
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ish constitution, in which a system almost equally elabo-

rate was then in force. In its outward forms that system

still remains; but there has been for more than a century

a gradual change in the direction of a concentration of

legislative and executive power in the popular House of

Parliament, so that the government now is sometimes said,

1 Letter of John Adams to John Taylor, Works, vi. 467.

is an elaborate system of checks and balances. As enumerated by one of the early statesmen of the country, these
are as follows : - First, the States are balanced ag~inst the
general government. Second, the House of Representatives is balanced against the Senate, and the Senate against
the House. Third, the executive authority is in some degree balanced against the legislature. Fourth, the judiciary is balanced against the legislature, the executive,
and the state governments. Fifth, the Senate is balanced
against the President in all appointments to office, and in
all treaties. Sixth, the people hold in their own hands
the balance against their own representatives by periodical
elections. Seventh, the legislatures of the several States
are balanced against the Senate by sexennial elections.
Eighth, the Electors are balanced against the people in the
choice of President and Vice-President. And this, it is
added, is a complication and refinement of balances which
is an invention of our own, and peculiar to this country .1
The invention, nevertheless, was suggested by the British constitution, in which a system almost equally elaborate was then in force. In its outward forms that system
still remo.ins ; but there has been for more than a century
a gradual change in the direction of a concentration of
legislative and executive power in the popular House of
Parliament, so that the government now is sometimes said,
1

Letter of John Adams to John Taylor, Works, vi. 467.
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with no great departure from the fact, to be a government

by the House of Commons. The judiciary, indeed, retains

its independence and power, and these have been some-

what strengthened as bills of attainder are discontinued,

and as the judicial authority of the House of Lords is

narrowed by legislation.

Electors of President. — Of the checks in American gov-

ernment above enumerated, some have proved wholly

illusory. This is emphatically true of the eighth. The

theory of the Constitution is that there shall be chosen by

each State a certain number of its citizens, enjoying the

general confidence of the people, who shall independently

cast their suffrages for President and Vice-President of the

United States, according to the dictates of their individual

judgments. This theory was followed in the first three

presidential elections, but from that time it fell into prac-

tical disfavor, and now not only is the theory obsolete,

but it would be thought in the highest degree dishonorable

if an Elector were to act upon it. In practice, the per-

sons to be voted for are selected by popular conventions,

in advance of the choice of Electors, and these officers act

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:44 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

as mere automata in registering the will of those who

selected them.

States and Nation. — The Constitution itself imposes

very effectual checks on the powers of the States for the

protection of federal jurisdiction, by expressly restraining

them from the exercise of some of the most important

powers of sovereignty, and by subordinating others to the

authority of Congress. These are all alluded to else-

where. To maintain these unimpaired, the federal gov-

ernment is made, as against the States, the final judge

of its own powers. Nothing more need be said to show

that encroachment upon the federal jurisdiction is effectu-

ally provided against.

On the other hand, there were various ways in which

with no great departure from the fact, to be a government
by the House of Commons. The judiciary, indeed, retains
its independence and power, and these have been somewhat strengthened as bills of attainder are discontinued,
and as the judicial authority of the House of Lords is
narrowed by legislation.
Electors of President. - Of the checks in American government above enumerated, some have proved wholly
illusory. This is emphatically true of the eighth. The
theory of the Constitution is that there shall be chosen by
each State a certain number of its citizens, enjoying the
general confidence of the people, who shall independently
cast their suffrages for President and Vice-President of the
United States, according to the dictates of their individual
judgments. This theory was followed in. the .first three
presidential elections, but from that time it fell into practical disfavor, and now not only is the theory obsolete,
but it would be thought in the highest degree dishonorable
if an Elector were to act upon it. In practice, the persons to be voted for are selected by popular conventions,
in advance of the cho~ce of Electors, and these officers act
as mere automata in registering the will of those who
selected them.
States and Nation. - The Constitution itself imposes
very effectual checks on the powers of the States for the
protection of federal jurisdiction, by expressly restraining
them from the exercise of some of the most important
powers of sovereignty, and by subordinating others to the
authority of Congress. These are all alluded to elsewhere. To maintain these unimpaired, the federal goTernruent is made, as against the States, the final judge
. of its own powers. Nothing more need be said to show
that encroachment upon the federal jurisdiction is effectually provided against.
On the other hand, there were various ways in which
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the States were expected to constitute a balance to the

powers of the federal government. First, in the division

of powers between States and nation, the larger portion,

including nearly all that touched the interests of the peo-

ple in their ordinary business relations and in their family

and social life, were reserved to the States. All that

related to the family and the domestic relations, the

administration and distribution of estates, the forms of

contract and conveyance, the maintenance of peace

and order in the States, the punishment of common-law

offences, the making provision for education, for public

highways, for the protection of personal liberty and lib-

erty of worship, — all these powers were withheld from

the jurisdiction of the federal government, and retained

by the States, and their retention was calculated to give

to the body of the people a larger interest in a proper

administration of state authority than in that of the nation.

Second, the States elected the representatives in Congress

and chose the senators, and these would naturally be ex-

pected to represent the opinions, feelings, and sentiments

of their constituents, and to so act in their official posi-

tions as to avoid all encroachments on the powers of the
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States. The President was also chosen by persons selected

by the States for the purpose, who would naturally reflect

the local views. Third, the States were given the privi-

lege to originate amendments to the Constitution of the

United States whenever they should be found necessary,

and it was expected that they would make use of this

privilege if at any time the federal government should be

found relatively too .strong, or should be thought to have

unwarrantably extended its jurisdiction. From the nature

of the case, however, it was impossible that the powers

reserved to the States should constitute a restraint upon

the increase of federal power, to the extent that was at

first expected. The federal government was necessarily

the States were expected to constitute a balance to the
powers of the federal government. First, in the division
of powers between States and nation, the larger portion,
including nearly all that touched the interests of the people in their ordinary business relations and in their family
and social life, were reserved to · the States. All that
related to the family and the domestic relations, the
administration and distribution of estates, the forms of
contract and conveyance, the maintenance of peace
and order in the States, the punishment of common-law
offences, the making provision for edncation, for public
highways, for the protection of personal liberty and liberty of worship, - all these powers were withheld from
the jurisdiction of the federal government, and retained
by the States, and their retention was calculated to give
to the body of the people a larger interest in a proper
administration of state authority than in that of the nation.
Second, the States elected the representatives in Congress
and chose the senators, and these would naturally be expected to represent the opinions, feelings, and sentiments
of their constituents, and to so act in their official positions as to avoid all encroachments on the powers of the
States. The President was also chosen by persons selected
by the States for the purpose, who would naturally reflect
the local views. Third, the States were given the privilege to originate amendments to the Constitution of the
United States whenever they should be found necessary,
and it was expected that they would make use of this
privilege if at any time the federal government should be
found relatively too .strong, or should be thought to have
unwarrantably extended its jurisdiction. From the nature
of the ca~e, however, it was impossible that the powers
reserved to the States should constitute a restraint upon
the increase of federal power, to the extent that was at
:first expected. The federal government was necessarily

144

144

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

made the final judge of its own authority, and the executor

of its own will, and any effectual check to the gradual am-

plification of its jurisdiction must therefore be found in the

construction put by those administering it upon the grants

of the Constitution, and in their own sense of constitu-

tional obligation. And as the true line of division between

federal and state powers has from the very beginning

been the subject of contention, and of honest differences of

opinion, it must often happen that to advance and occupy

some disputed ground will seem to the party having the

power to do so a mere matter of constitutional duty.

The effectual checks upon the encroachment of federal

upon state power must therefore be looked for, not in

state power of resistance, but in the choice of representa-

tives, senators, and presidents holding just constitutional

views, and in a federal Supreme Court with competent

power to restrain all departments and all officers within

the limits of their just authority, so far as their acts may

become the subjects of judicial cognizance.1 Such amend-

ments to the Constitution as have hitherto been made have

originated with the Congress, and, with the single excep-
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tion of that which takes from the federal judiciary the

power to take cognizance of suits by individuals against

States, none of them has taken from the United States

any real authority.

Some other checks which are continuous and more

effective are the following.

Judicial Restraints on Legislative Encroachments.—The

business of the courts is, to apply the law of the land in

such controversies as may arise and be brought before

them. Their authority is co-ordinate with that of the

1 It is no doubt true that, "in reference to all doubtful questions

incident to our governmental system, the line of approach [should]

be kept carefully in the foreground, and any intrusion thereon most

vigilantly avoided." — Rorer, Inter-State Law, p. 10.

made the final judge of its own authority, and the executor
of its own will, and any effectual check to the gradual amplification of its jurisdiction must therefore be found in the
construction put by those administering it upon the grants
of the Constitution, and in their own sense of constitutional obligation. And as the true line of division between
federal and state powers has from the very beginning
been the subject of contention, and of honest differences of
opinion, it must often happen that to advance and occupy
some disputed ground will seem to the party having the
power to do so a mere matter of constitutional duty.
The effectual checks upon the encroachment of federal
upon state power must therefore be looked for, not in
state power of resistance, but in the choice of representatives, senators, and presidents holding just constitutional
views, and in a federal Supreme Court with competent
power to restrain all departments and all officers within
the limits of their just authority, so far as their acts may
become the subjects of judicial cognizance. 1 Such amendments to the Constitution as have hitherto been made have
originated with the Congress, and, with the single exception of that which takes from the federal judiciary the
power to take cognizance of suits by individuals against
States, none of them has taken from the United States
any real authority.
Some other checks which are continuous and more
effective are the following.
Judicial Restraints on Legislative Encroachments. -The
business of the courts is, to apply the law of the land in
such controversies as may arise and be brought before
them. Their authority is co-ordinate with that of the
1 It is no doubt true that, "in reference to all doubtful questions
incident to our governmental system, the line of approach lshouldl
be kept carefully in the foreground, and any intrusion thereon most
vigilantly avoided." - Rorer, Inter-State Law, p. 10.
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legislature, neither superior nor inferior; but each with

equal dignity must move in its appointed sphere.1 But

the judiciary, in seeking to ascertain what the law is which

must be applied in any particular controversy, may pos-

sibly find that the will of the legislature, as expressed in

statute form, and the will of the people, as expressed in

the Constitution, are in conflict, and the two cannot stand

together. In such a case, as the legislative power is con-

v ferred by the Constitution, it is manifest that the delegate

has exceeded his authority; the trustee has not kept within

the limits of his trust. The excess is therefore inoperative,

and it is the dutj- of the court to recognize and give effect

to the Constitution as the paramount law, and, by refusing

to enforce the legislative enactment, practically nullify it.

The obligation to perform this duty, whenever the con-

flict appears, is imperative; but the duty is nevertheless a

delicate one, because the court in declaring a statute in-

valid must necessarily overrule the decision of the legis-

lative department, made in the course of the performance

of its peculiar duties, and where it must be assumed to

have acted on its best judgment. The task, therefore,
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is one to be entered upon with caution, reluctance, and

hesitation, and never until the duty becomes manifestly

imperative. The following general propositions will be

found to state the obligations of duty and of forbearance

for such cases which are generally recognized.

1. The duty to pass upon a question of constitutional

law may devolve upon a court of any grade, and of either

the federal or the state jurisdiction. Wherever the ques-

tion can arise in court of the conformity of a statute to

the Constitution, the court to whom the question is ad-

dressed must in some manner dispose of it, and the power

of the court to apply the law to the case necessarily em-

1 Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 Bay, (S. C.) 61; Bates v. Kimball,

2 Chip. (Vt.) 77.

10

legislature, neither superior nor inferior ; but each with
equal dignity must move in its appointed sphere. 1 But
the judiciary, in seeking to ascertain what the law is which
must be applied in any particular controversy, may possibly find that the will of the legislature, as expressed in
statute form, and the will of the people, as expressed in
the Constitution, are in conflict, and the two cannot stand
together. In such a case, as the legislative power is con' ferred by the Constitution, it is manifest that the delegate
has exceeded his authority ; the trustee has not kept within
the limits of his trust. The excess is therefore inoperative,
and it is the duty of the court to recognize and give effect
to the Constitution as the paramount law, and, by refusing
to enforce the legislative enactment, practically nullify it.
The obligation to perform this duty, whenever the conflict appears, is imperative; but the duty is nevertheless a
delicate one, because the court in declaring a statute invalid must necessarily overrule the decision of the legislative department, made in the course of the performance
of its peculiar duties, and where it must be assumed to
have acted on its best judgment. The task, therefore,
is one to be entered upon with caution, reluctance, and
hesitation, and never until the duty becomes manifestly
imperative. The following general propositions will be
found to state the obligations of duty and of forbearance
for such cases which are generally recognized.
1. The duty to pass upon a question of constitutional
law may devolve upon a court of any grade, and of either
the federal or the state jurisdiction. Wherever the question can arise in court of the conformity of a statute to
the Constitution, the court to whom the question is addressed must in some manner dispose of it, and the power
of the court to apply the law to the case necessarily em1 Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 Bay, (S. C.) 61; Bates v. Kimball,
2 Chip. (Vt.) 77.
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braces the power to determine what law controls. In the

absence of authoritative precedents, there can be no other

test of this than the judgment of the court. The va-

lidity of a federal statute may therefore be a necessary

question for consideration in a state court, and that of

a state statute in a federal court. Nevertheless, when the

court to whom the question is addressed is not the court

of last resort in respect thereto, it may well be expected

to proceed with more than ordinarj- caution and hesitation,

and to abstain altogether from declaring a statute invalid

unless in the clearest cases, especially if, without serious

detriment to justice, the decision can be delayed until

the superior court can have opportunity to pass upon it.

There may be cases where, by inadvertence or accident,

a bill which has gone through all the forms required

for valid legislation is, nevertheless, clearly and without

question invalid; but except in such cases the spectacle

of an inferior magistrate, having merely police or other

limited jurisdiction, assuming to pass judgment upon the

legislation of his State or country, and declare it invalid,

can only be ludicrous.1
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2. The judicial sense of propriety and of the importance

of the occasion will generally incline the court to refuse

a consideration of a constitutional question without the

presence of a full bench of judges. With many courts

this is a rule to which few exceptions are admitted, and

those only which seem to be imperative.2

3. Neither, as a rule, will a court express an opinion

adverse to the validity of a statute, unless it becomes abso-

lutely necessary to the determination of a cause before it.8

1 Some courts have intimated that only the superior courts should

assume to deny validity to a statute. Ortman v. Greenman, 4 Mich.

291. Compare Mayberry v. Kelly, 1 Kans. 116.

2 Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 8 Pet. 118.

» Hoover v. Wood, 9 Ind. 286; Smith v. Speed, 50 Ala. 277.

•

braces the power to determine what law controls. In the
absence of authoritative precedents, there can be no other
test of this than the judgment of the court. The validity of a federal statute may therefore be a necessary
question for consideration in a state court, and that of
a state statute in a federal court. Nevertheless, when the
court to whom the question is addressed is not the court
of last resort in respect thereto, it may well be expected
to proceed with more than ordinary caution and hesitation,
and to abstain altogether from declaring a statute invalid
unless in the clearest cases, especially if, without serious
detriment to justice, the decision can be delayed until
the superior court can have opportunity to pass upon it.
There may be cases where, by inadvertence or accident,
a bill which has gone through all the forms required
for valid legislation is, nevertheless, clearly and without
question invalid ; but except in such cases the spectacle
of an inferior magistrate, having merely police or other
limited jurisdiction, assuming to pass judgment upon the
legislation of his State or country, and declare it invalid,
can only be ludicrous. 1
2. The judicial sense of propriety and of the importance
of the occasion will generally incline the court to refuse
a consideration of a constitutional question without the
presence of a full bench of judges. With many courts
this is a rule to which few exceptions are admitted, and
those only which seem to be imperative. 1
3. Neither, as a rule, will a court express an opinion
adverse to the validity of a statute, unless it becomes absolutely necessary to the determination of a cause before it. 8
1 Some courts have intimated that only the superior courts should
assume to deny validity to a statute. Ortman v. Greenman, 4 Mich.
291. Compare Mayberry v. Kelly, 1Kans.116.
2 Briscoe v. Bnnk of Kentucky, 8 Pet. 118.
a Hoover v. Wood, 9 Ind. 286; Smith v. Speed, 60 Ala. 277.
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Therefore, in any case where a constitutional question is

raised, if the record presents some other and clear ground

upon which the court may rest its judgment, and thereby

render the constitutional question immaterial to the case,

the court will adopt that course, and the question of consti-

tutional power will be left for consideration until a case

arises which cannot be disposed of without considering it,

and when, consequently, a decision upon such question

will be unavoidable.1 This course has not always been

followed; but it has seldom occurred that a constitutional

question has been considered settled, or been allowed to

remain without further dispute and question, where the

opinion given upon it was rendered in a case not neces-

sarily requiring it. Want of jurisdiction of the particular

case is always reason why the court should abstain from

expressing opinions on other questions which parties may

attempt to raise.

4. The court will not listen to an objection made to the

constitutionality of an act by one whose rights are not

affected by it, and who consequently can have no interest

in defeating it.2 For example, one who has received

compensation for property appropriated by statute to a
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public use will not be suffered afterwards to dispute the

constitutional validity of the statute.8 The statute is

assumed to be valid until some one complains of it whose

rights it invades. The power of the court can be invoked

only when it is found necessary to secure and protect a

party before it against an unwarranted exercise of legisla-

tive power to his prejudice.4

i Ex parte Randolph, 2 Brock. 447; Freer r. Ford, 6 N. Y. 177.

a Marshall v. Donovan, 10 Bush, (Ky.) 681; Mobile, &c. R. R

Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 586.

* Embury v. Connor, 3 N. Y. 511; Haskell v. New Bedford, 108

Mass. 208.

* Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 96; State r. Rich, 20

Mo. 39a

Therefore, in any case where a constitutional question is
raised, if the record presents some other and clear ground
upon which the court may rest its judgment, and thereby
render the constitutional question immaterial to the case,
the court will adopt that course, and the question of constitutional power will be left for consideration until a case
arises which cannot be disposed of without considering it,
and when, consequently, a decision upon such question
will be unavoidable. 1 This course has not always been
followed; but it has seldom occurred that a constitutional
question has been considered settled, or been allowed to
remain without further dispute and question, where the
opinion given upon it was rendered in a case not necessarily requiring it. Want of jurisdiction of the particular
case is always reason why the court should abstain from
expressing opinions on other questions which parties may
attempt to raise.
4. The court will not listen to an objection made to the
constitutionality of an act by one whose rights are not ,
affected by it, and who consequently can have no interest
in defeating it. 2 For example, one who has received
compensation for property appropriated by statute to a
public use will not be suffered afterwards to dispute the
constitutional validity of the statute. 8 The statute is
assumed to be valid until some one complains of it whose
rights it invades. The power of the court can be invoked
only when it is found necessary to secure and protect a
party before it against an unwarranted exercise of legislative power to his prejudice. 4
Ex parte Randolph, 2 Brock. 447; Freer t•. Ford, 6 N. Y. 177.
Marshall v. Donovan, 10 Bush, (Ky.) 681; Mobile, &c. R.R.
Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 586.
a Embury v. Connor, 8 N. Y. 611 ; Haskell v. New Bedford, 108
Mass. 208.
' Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 00; State "· Rich, 20
Mo. 893.
1

·
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5. Nor can a court declare a statute unconstitutional

and void when the objection to it is merely that it is unjust

and oppressive, and violates rights and privileges of the

citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is prohib-

ited, or such rights and privileges guaranteed by the Con-

stitution. The propriety or justice or policy of legislation,

within the limits of the Constitution, is exclusively for the

legislative department to determine; and the moment a

court ventures to substitute its own judgment for that of the

legislature, it passes beyond its legitimate authority, and

enters a field where it would be impossible to set limits to

its interference, except as should be prescribed in its own

discretion.1 The protection against unwise or oppressive

legislation, within constitutional bounds, is by an appeal

to the justice and patriotism of the representatives of the

people. If this fail, the people in their sovereign ca-

pacity can correct the evil, but courts cannot assume their

rights.2 The judiciary can only arrest the execution of a

statute when it conflicts with the Constitution. It cannot

run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason, and

I It has been well said by one judge: "If the legislature should
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pass a law, in plain and unequivocal language, within the general

scope of their constitutional powers, I know of no authority in this

government to pronounce such an act void, merely because in the

opinion of the judicial tribunals it was contrary to the principles of

natural justice ; for this would be vesting in the court a latitudinarian

authority which might be abused, and would necessarily lead to col-

lisions between the legislative and judicial departments, dangerous

to the well-being of society, or at least not in harmony with the

structure of our ideas of natural government." Commonwealth v.

McCloskey, 2 Rawle, (Pa.) 374. See Bebee v. State, 6 Ind. 515, 528.

5. Nor can a court declare a statute unconstitutional
and void when the objection to it is merely that it is unjust
and oppressive, and violates rights and privileges of the
citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is prohibited, or such rights and plivileges guaranteed by the Constitution. The propriety or justice or policy of legislation,
within the limits of the Constitution, is exclusively for the
legislative department to determine ; and the moment a
court ventures to substitute its own judgment for that of the
legislature, it passes beyond its legitimate authority, and
enters a field where it would be impossible to set limits to
its interference, except as should be prescribed in its own
discretion. 1 The protection against unwise. or oppressive
legislation, within constitutional bounds, is by an appeal
to the justice and patriotism of the representatives of the
people. If this fail, the people in their sovereign ca..
pacity can correct the evil, but courts cannot assume their
rights. 2 The judiciary can only arrest the execution of a
statute when it conflicts with the Constitution. It cannot
run a race of opinions upon points·of right, reason, and

Many judges think laws laying protective duties are contrary to nat-'

ural justice; but if they were at liberty to decide the validity of

legislation on such grounds, the ordinary legislation could not be

carried on except with their assent.

II Bennett v. Bull, Baldw. 74; Pennsylvania E. R. Co. v. Kiblet,

66 Penn. St. 164.

t It has been well said by one judge: "If the legislature should
pass a law, in plain and unequivocal language, within the general
scope of their constitutional powers, I know of no authority in this
government to pronounce such an act void, merely because in the
opinion of the judicial tribunals it was contrary to the principles of
natural justice ; for this would be vesting in the court a latitudinarian
authority which might be abused, and would necessarily lead to collisions between the legislative and judicial departments, dangerous
to the well-being of society, or at least not in harmony with the
structure of our ideas of natural government." Commonwealth l~.
McCloskey, 2 Rawle, (Pa.) 374. See Bebee v. State, 6 Ind. 616, 528.
Many judges think laws laying protective duties are contrary to nat- ·
ural justice; but if they were at liberty to decide the validity of
legislation on such grounds, the ordinary legislation could not be
carried on except with their assent.
2 Bennett v. Bull, Baldw. 74; Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Riblet,
66 Penn. St. 164.
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expediency with the law-making power.1 The question of

the validity of a statute must always be one of legislative

competency to enact it; not one of policy, propriety, or

strict justice.

6. Nor can a statute be declared unconstitutional

merely because in the opinion of the court it violates one

or more of the fundamental principles of republican lib-

erty, unless it shall be found that those principles are

placed beyond legislative encroachment by the provisions

of the Constitution itself. The principles of republican

government are not a set of inflexible rules, vital and

active in the Constitution even when unexpressed; but

•they are subject to variation and modification from motives

of policy and public necessity, and it is only in those par-

ticulars in which experience has demonstrated that any

departure from the settled course must work injustice and

confusion, that it is customary to incorporate them in the

Constitution in such a way as to make them definite rules

of action and decision. The following are illustrations.

The principle that taxation and representation go together

is important and valuable, and should never be lost sight

of in legislation; but, as commonly understood, it can
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never be applied universally without admitting every per-

son to the elective franchise; for taxes in some form fall

upon all,—the rich and the poor, the infant and the

adult, the male and the female, — and federal taxes reach

the unrepresented Territories as well as the represented

States. So the principle that local affairs shall be man-

aged in local districts, and that these shall choose their

'own local officers, constitutes one of the chief excellencies

of our system of government; but in applying it the dif-

ficulty is at once encountered of determining what are

local concerns and what general; and it may perhaps be

1 Madison, &c. R. R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217; Bull v. Read,

13 Grat. (Va.) 98.

expediency with the law-making power. 1 The question of
the validity of a statute must always be one of legislative
competency to enact it ; not one of policy, propriety, or
strict justice.
6. Nor can a. statute be declared unconstitutional
merely because in the opinion of the court it violates one
or more of the fundamental principles of republican liberty, unless it shall be found ·that those principles are
placed beyond legislative encroachment by the provisions
of the Constitution itself. The principles of republican
government are not a set of inflexible rules, "ital and
active in the Constitution even when unexpressed ; but
•they are subject to variation and modification from motives
of policy and public necessity, and it is only in those particulars in which experience has demonstrated that any
departure from the settled course must work injustice and
confusion, that it is cust.omary to incorporate them in the
Constitution in such a way as to make them definite rules
of action and decision. The following are illustrations.
The principle that taxation and representation go together
is important and valuable, and should never be lost sight
of in legislation ; but, as commonly understood, it can
never be applied universally without admitting every person to the elective franchise ; for taxes in some form fall
upon all, -the rich and the poor, the infant and the
adult, the male and the female, - and federal taxes reach
the unrepresented Territories as well as the represented
States. So the principle that local affairs shall be mant1.ged in local districts, and that these shall choose their
·own local officers, constitutes one of the chief excellencies
of our system of government ; but in applying it the difficulty is at once encountered of determining what are
local concerns and what general ; and it may perhaps be
1 Madison, &c. R.R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217; Bull v. Read,
13 Grat. (Va.) 98.
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found in a given case that the concerns that are set apart

as local, if neglected or imperfectly performed, subject the

whole State to embarrassment, so that state intervention

becomes necessary. And it is obvious that, wherever a

recognized principle of free government requires legisla-

tion for its practical application and enforcement, the

body that passes laws for the purpose must determine, in

its discretion, what are the needs of legislation and what

its proper limits. The courts cannot take such principles

as abstract rules of law, and give them practical force.1

7. When a question of federal constitutional law is in-

volved, the purpose of the Constitution, and the object to

be accomplished by any particular grant of power, are •

often most important guides in reaching the real intent;

and the debates in the Constitutional Convention, the dis-

cussions in the Federalist and in the conventions of the

States, are often referred to as throwing important light

on clauses in the Constitution which seem blind or of am-

biguous import. We may discover from these what the

general drift of opinion was as to the division line between

federal and state power on many subjects, and we can
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sometimes judge from that whether a particular authority

lies on one side of the line or on the other. But we shall

be misled if we attempt in this manner to judge of state

legislative power when the limitations of the federal Con-

stitution are not in question. We cannot test the validity

of any state statute by a general spirit which is supposed

to pervade the state constitution, but is not expressed in

words. Presumptively, when the people of the State, by

their constitution, call into existence a legislative depart-

ment, and endow it with the function of making laws, they

confer upon it the full and complete legislative power, —

as full and complete as the people, in the exercise of sover-

1 People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376;

People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 498.

found in a given case that the concerns that are set apart
as local, if neglected or imperfectly performed, subject the
whole State to embarrassment, so that state intervention
becomes necessary. And it is obvious that, wherever a
recognized principle of free government requires legislation for its practical application and enforcement, the
body that passes laws for the purpose must determine, in
its discretion, what are the needs of legislation and what
its proper limits. The courts cannot take such principles
as abstract rules of law, and give them practical force. 1
7. When a question of federal constitutional law is involved, the purpose of the Constitution, and the object to
be accomplished by any particular grant of power, are •
often most important guides in reaching the real intent;
and the debates in the Constitutional Convention, the discussions in the Federalist and in the conventions of the
States, are often refeITed to as throwing important light
on clauses in the Constitution which seem blind or of ambiguous import. We may discover from these what the
general drift of opinion was as to the division line between
federal and state power on many subjects, and we can
sometimes judge from that whether a particular authority
lies on one side of the line or on the other. But we shall
be misled it' we attempt in this manner to judge of state
legislative power when the limitations of the federal Constitution are not in question. We cannot test the validity
of any state statute by a general spirit which is supposed
to pervade the state constitution, but is not expressed in
words. Presumptively, when the people of the State, by
their constitution, call into existence a legislatiYe depart-·
ment, and endow it with the function of making laws, they
confer upon it the full and complete legislative power, as full and complete as the people, in the exercise of sover1 People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 632; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376 ;
People v. Mahaney1 13 Mich. 498.
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eignty, could themselves have wielded it, — subject only to

such restrictions as were by the same instrument imposed.

"The law-making power of the State recognizes no re-

straints, and is bound by none except such as are imposed

by the Constitution. That instrument has been aptly

termed a legislative act by the people themselves, in their

sovereign capacity, and is therefore the paramount law.

Its object is, not to grant legislative power, but to confine

and restrain it. Without the constitutional limitations,

the power to make laws would be absolute. These limita-

tions are created and imposed by express words, or arise

by necessary implication. The leading feature of the

Constitution is the separation and distribution of the

powers of the government. It takes care to separate

the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and to

define their limits. The executive can do no legislative

act, nor the legislature any executive act, and neither can

exercise judicial authority." 1 Presumptively, therefore, if

an act of the legislative department is not an encroach-

ment upon executive or judicial power, it is valid. To

show its invalidity, it is necessary to point out some par-

ticular in which, either in form or substance, it is in-
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consistent with the Constitution. The inconsistency may

consist, either, (1.) in the failure to observe some constitu-

tional form which is made essential to a valid enactment,

such as the taking of the final-vote thereon by yeas and

nays when the Constitution requires it; or (2.) in the dis-

regard of an express prohibition, as where it consists

in a special charter of incorporation when the Constitu-

tion forbids incorporation except under general laws; or

(3.) in thte disregard of some fundamental right declared in

the bill of rights, as would be a statute compelling support

of sectarian worship or schools when the Constitution pro-

1 Sill v. Corning, 15 N. Y. 297; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251;

Danville v. Pace, 25 Grat. (Va.) 1.

eignty, could themselves have wielded it, - subject only to
such restrictions as were by the same instrument imposed.
'"The law-making power of the State recognizes no restraints, and is bound by none except such as are imposed
by the Constitution. That instrument has been aptly
termed a legislative act by the people themselves, in their
sovereign capacity, and is therefore the paramount law.
Its object is, not to grant legislative power, but to confine
and restrain it. Without the constitutional limitations,
the power to make laws would be absolute. These limitations are created and imposed by express words, or arise
by necessary implication. The leading feature of the
Constitution is the separation and distribution of the
powers of the government. It takes care to separate
the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and to
define their limits. The executive can do no legislative
act, nor the legislature any executive act, and neither can
exercise judicial authority." 1 Presumptively, therefore, if
an act of the legislative department is not an encroachment upon executive or judicial power, it is valid. To
show its invalidity, it is necessary to point out some particular in which, either in form or substance, it is inconsistent with the Constitution. The inconsistency may
consist, either, ( 1.) in the failure to observe some constitutional form which is made essential to a valid enactment,
such as the taking of the final- Yote thereon .by yeas and
nays when the Constitution requires it; or (2.) in the disregard of an express prohibition, as where it consists
in a special charter of incorporation when the Constitution forbids incorporation except under general laws ; or
(3.) int~ disregard of some fundamental right declared in
the bill of rights, as would be a statute compelling support
of sectarian worship or schools when the Constitution pro1 Sill v. Coming, 15 N. Y. 297 ; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251 ;
Danville v. Pace, 25 Grat. (Va.) 1.
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claims religious liberty. And in all these cases it is not

the spirit of the Constitution that must /be the test of

validity, but the written requirements, prohibitions, and

guaranties of the Constitution itself.1

8. A statute may sometimes be valid in part and invalid

in other particulars. This often happens under state con-

stitutions that require an act to contain but one object

which shall be expressed in the title. If in such a case

the act embraces two objects while the title expresses but

one, the act will be unconstitutional and void as to the

one not so expressed. So in the absence of such a re-

quirement the act might be void as to one object because

the legislation attempted was expressly forbidden by the

constitution, while in other particulars it was plainly

within the legislative competency. The general rule there-

fore is, that the fact that part of a statute is unconstitu-

tional does not justify the remainder being declared invalid

also, unless all the provisions are connected in subject-

matter, depending on each other, operating together for

the same purpose, or otherwise so connected together in

meaning that it cannot be presumed the legislature would
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have passed the act otherwise than as a whole. It is im-

material how closely the valid and invalid provisions are

associated in the act; they may even be contained in the

same section, and yet be perfectly distinct and separable,

so that the one may stand though the other fall.2 If, when

the unconstitutional portion is stricken out, that which re-

mains is complete in itself, and capable of being executed

in accordance with the apparent legislative intent, wholly

independent of that which was rejected, it must be sus-

tained. But if the intent of the act is to accomplish a

single purpose only, and some provisions are void, the

1 Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 208-214.

2 Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, (Mass.) 482; Hagerstown

v. Dechert, 32 Md. 369; State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17.

claims religious liberty. And in all these cases it is not
the spirit of the Constitution that must , be the test of
validity, but the written requirements, prohibitions, and
guaranties of the Constitution itself. 1
8. A statute may sometimes be valid in part and invalid
in other particulars. This often happens under state constitutions that require an act to contain but one object
which shall be expressed in the title. If in such a case
the act embraces two objects while the title expresses but
one, the act will be unconstitutional and void as to the
one not so expressed. So in the absence of such a requirement the act might be void as to one object because
the legislation attempted was expressly forbidden by the
constitution, while in other particulars it was plainly
within the legislative competency. The general rule therefore is, that the fact that part of a statute is unconstitutional does not justify the remainder being declared invalid
also, unless all the provisions are connected in subjectmatter, depending on each other, operating together for
the same purpose, or otherwise so connected together in
meaning that it cannot be presumed the legislature would
have passed the act otherwise than as a whole. It is immaterial how closely the valid and invalid provisions are
associated in the act ; they may even be contained in the
same section, and yet be perfectly distinct and separable,
so that the one may stand though the other fall.~ If, when
the unconstitutional portion is stricken out, that which remains is complete in itself, and capable of being executed
in accordance with the apparent legislative intent, wholly
independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained. But if the intent of the act is to accomplish a
single purpose only, and some provisions are void, the
Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 208-214.
Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, (Mass.) 482; Hagerstown
v. Dechert,, 32 Md. 369 ; State v. Clarke,, 64 Mo. 17.
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whole must fail unless sufficient remains to effect the object

without the invalid portion. And if they are so mutually

connected with and dependent on each other as conditions,

considerations, or compensations, as to warrant the belief

that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that, if

all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would

not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are

unconstitutional, all the provisions that are thus depend-

ent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.1

9. A doubt of the constitutional validity of a statute is

never sufficient to warrant its being set aside. "It is not

on slight implication and vague conjecture that the legis-

lature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers,

and its acts to be considered as void. The opposition

between the Constitution and the law should be such that

the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their in-

compatibility with each other."2 "It is but a decent

rfispect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriot-

ism of the legislative body by which any law is passed, to

presume in favor of its validity, until its violation of the

Constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt."8 To

be in doubt, therefore, is to be resolved, and the resolution
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must support the law.

This course is the opposite to that which is required of

the legislature in considering the question of passing a

proposed law. Legislators have their authority meas-

ured by the Constitution; they are chosen to do what it

permits, and nothing more, and they take solemn oath to

obey and support it. When they disregard its provisions,

they usurp authority, abuse their trust, and violate the

1 State v. Commissioners, 5 Ohio, N. S. 497; State v. Dousman, 28

Wis. 541; Campau v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 276; Willard v. People, 5 111.

461; Commonwealth v. Potts, 79 Penn. St. 164; Baker ». Braman,

6 Hill, (N. Y.) 47.

2 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 128.

» Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 270.

whole must fail unless sufficient remains to effect the object
without the invalid portion. And if they are so mutually
connected with and dependent on each other as conditions,
considerations, or compensations, as to warrant the belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that, if
all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would
not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions that are thus depend·
ent, conditional, or connected must fall with them. 1
9. A doubt of the constitutional validity of a statute is
never sufficient to warrant its being set aside. .'' It is not
on slight implication and vague conjecture that the legis·
lature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers,
and its acts to be considered as void. The opposition
between the Constitution and the law should be such that
the jndge feels a clear and strong conviction of their in·
compatibility with each other." 2 "It is but a decent
r~spect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriot..
ism of the legislative body by which any law is passed, to
presume in favor of its validity, until its violation of the
Constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt." 8 To
be in doubt, therefore, is to be resolved, and the resolution
must support the law.
This course is the opposite to that which is required of
the legislature in considering the question of passing a·
proposed law. Legislators have their authority measured by the Constitution ; they are chosen to do what it
permits, and nothing more, an<l they take solemn oath to
obey and support it. When they disregard its provisions,
they usurp authority, abuse their trust, and violate the
State v. Commissioners, 5 Ohio, N. S. 497; State v. Dousman, 28
Wis. 541; Campau v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 276; Willard v. People, 5 Ill.
461; Commonwealth v. Potts, 79 Penn. St. 164; Baker v. Braman,
6 Hill, (N. Y.) 47.
2 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 128.
a Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 270.
1
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promise they have confirmed by an oath. To pasg an act

when they are in doubt whether it does not violate the

Constitution, is to treat as of no force the most imperative

obligations any person can assume. A business agent who

would deal in that manner with his principal's business

would be treated as untrustworthy; a witness in court who

would treat his oath thus lightly, and affirm things con-

cerning which he was in doubt, would be held a criminal.

Indeed, it is because the legislature has applied the judg-

ment of its members to the question of its authority to

pass the proposed law, and has only passed it after being

satisfied of the authority, that the judiciary waive their

own doubts, and give it their support.1

10. The validity of legislation can never be made to

depend on the motives which have secured its adoption,

whether these be public or personal, honest or corrupt.

There is ample reason for this in the fact that the people

have set no authority over the legislators with jurisdiction

to inquire into their conduct, and to judge what have been

their purposes in the pretended discharge of the legislative

trust. This is a jurisdiction which they have reserved to
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themselves exclusively, and they have appointed frequent

elections as the occasions and the means for bringing these

agents to account. A further reason is, that to make

legislation depend upon motives would render all statute

law uncertain, and the rule which should allow it could not

logicallj' stop short of permitting a similar inquiry into

the motives of those who passed judgment. Therefore

the courts do not permit a question of improper legislative

motives to be raised, but they will in every instance assume

that the motives were public and befitting the station.2

1 Osburn v. Stanley, 5 W. Va. 85; Kellogg v. State Treasurer, 44

Vt. 356.

2 Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514; Doyle v. Insurance Co.,

04 U. S. Rep. 535.

promise they have confirmed by an oath. · To pass an act
when they are in doubt whether it does not viola~ the
Constitution, is to treat as of no force the most imperative
obligations any person can assume. A business agent who
would deal in that manner with his principal's business
would be treated as untrustworthy ; a witness in court who
would treat his oath thus lightly, and affirm things concerning which he was in doubt, would be held a criminal.
Indeed, it is because the legislature has applied the judgment of its members to the question of its authority to
pass the proposed law, and has only passed it after being
satisfied of the authority, that the judiciary waive their
own doubts, and give it their support. 1
10. The validity of legislation can never be made to
depend on the motives which have secured its adoption,
whether these be public or personal, honest or corrupt.
There is ample reason for this in the fact that the people
have set no authority over the legislators with jurisdiction
to inquire into their conduct, and to judge what have been
their purposes in the pretended discharge of the legislative
trust. This is a jurisdiction which they have reserved to
themselves exclusively, and they have appointed frequent
elections as the occasions and the means for bringing these
agents to account. A further reason is, that to make
legislation depend upon motives would render all statute
law uncertain, and the rule which should allow it could not
logically stop short of permitting a similar inquiry into
the motives of those who passed judgment. Therefore
the courts do not permit a question of improper legislative
motives to be raised, but they will in every instance assume
that the motives were public and befitting the station.~
1 Osburn ·v. Stanley, 5 W. Va. 85; Kellogg v. State Treasurer, 44
Vt. 856.
2 Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514; Doyle v. Insurance Co.,
94 U. S. Rep. 535.
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They will also assume that the legislature had before it

any evidence necessary to enable it to take the action it

did take.1

11. When a legislative enactment proves to be invalid,

it is for all legal purposes as if it had never been." It can

support no contract, it can create no right, it can give pro-

tection to no one who has acted under it, it can make no

one an offender who has refused obedience to it. And

this is true of any particular provision of a statute which

proves invalid, while the remainder is sustained.8 It is

true that one who assumes to disobey a statute as invalid

does so at the risk of being punished for his disobedience

if the law is sustained; but this is a risk which every one

takes when he acts in any matter in respect to which the

law is in doubt.

Suits against Officers. — The exemption of legislators

from inquiry into motives would of itself protect them

against suits by private individuals who may suffer dam-

age from their action; but they are also exempt on the

further ground that the duties they perform are of a public

nature exclusively, and they are therefore under responsi-

bility only to the public. There is a like exemption in
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favor of inferior bodies who exercise a quasi legislative

authority,* though it may be otherwise in respect to par-

ticular duties with which such bodies are sometimes

charged for the benefit of individuals, and which each

member is expressly required to recognize and perform.

The case of inferior officers exercising severally a discre-

tionary duty to individuals is 'different. They are pro-

tected while they act in good faith, but they are generally

held responsible if they take advantage of their position

1 Johnson v. Railroad Co., 23 111. 202; Lusher v. Scites, 4 \V. Va. 11.

2 Sumner v. Beeler, 50 Ind. 341.

* Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 227.

« Baker v. State, 27 Ind. 485; Freeport v. Marks, 59 Penn. St 253.

They will also assume that the legislature had before it
any evidence necessary to enable it to take the action it
did take. 1
11. When a legislative enactment proves to be invalid,
it is for all legal purposes as if it had never been. 2 It can
support no contract, it can create no right, it can give protection to no one who has acted under it, it can make no
one an offender who has refused obedience to it. And
this is true of any particular provision of a statute which
proves invalid, while the remainder is sustained. 8 It is
true that one who assumes to disobey a statute as invalid
does so at the risk of being punished for his disobedience
if the law is sustained ; but this is a risk which every one
takes when he acts in any matter in respect to which the
law is in doubt.
Suits against Officers. -The exemption of legislators
from inquiry into motives would of itself prot~ct them
against suits by private individuals who may suffer damage from their action ; but they are also exempt on the
further ground that the duties they perform are of a public
nature exclusively, and they are therefore under responsibility only to the public. There is a like exemption in
favor of inferior bodies who exercise a quasi legislative
authority, 4 though it may be otherwise in respect to particular duties with which such bodies are sometimes
charged for the benefit of individuals, and which each
member is expressly required to recognize and perform.
The case of inferior officers exercising severally a discretionary duty to individuals is· different. They are protected while they act in good faith, but they are generally
held responsible if they take advantage of their position
Johnson v. Railroad Co., 23 Ill. 202; Lusher v. Scites, 4 ,V. Va.11.
Sumner v. Beeler, 50 Ind. 341.
a Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 227.
' Baker v. State, 27 Ind. 485; Freeport v. Marks, 69 Penn. St. 253.
1
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to injure another maliciously and without cause.1 This is

the rule which is applied to election officers who are found

guilty of having wrongfully refused to register voters or

to receive their ballots.2 Mere ministerial officers must

always at their peril keep within the limits of the law, for

their duties are not discretionary, and the law is supposed

to make plain for them what their duty is. Nor will the

immunity of the legislative department cover the acts of its

ministerial agents with a like shield of protection. And

this is an important check which the judiciary holds upon

the law-making departments: if the members are not

directly responsible for exceeding their constitutional au-

thority, the ministerial agents and officers through whom

the legislature acts will always be so.8 *

Check on the Treaty-making Power. — The full treaty-

making power is in the President and Senate; but the

House of Representatives has a restraining power upon it

in that it may in its discretion at any time refuse to give

assent to legislation necessary to give a treaty effect.

Many treaties need no such legislation; but when moneys

are to be paid by the United States, they can be appropri-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:44 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ated by Congress alone; and in some other cases laws are

needful. An unconstitutional or manifestly unwise treaty

1 Bennett v. Fulmer, 49 Penn. St. 155; Billings v. Lafferty, 31 111.

318; Shoemaker v. Nesbit, 2 Bawle, 201; Parmelee v. Baldwin,

1 Conn. 313.

2 Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350; Jeffries v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio,

322; Bevard v. Hoffman, 18 Md. 479; Goetcheus v. Mathewson, 61

N. Y. 420; Weckerly v. Geyer, 11 S. & R. 35; Miller v. Eucker,

1 Bush, (Ky.) 135; Carter v. Harrison, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 138; Gordon v.

Farrar, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 411; Dwight v. Rice, 5 La. An. 580; State v.

Porter, 4 Harr. (Del.) 556; Wheeler v. Patterson, 1 N. H. 88; Fausler

v. Parsons, 6 W. Va. 486; Peavey v. Robbins, 3 Jones, (N. C.) 339;

Rail v. Potts, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 225. The Massachusetts and Ohio

cases hold the officers responsible for refusing a legal ballot, even

when they err in good faith.

to injure another maliciously and without cause. 1 This is
the rule which is applied to election officers who are found
guilty of having wrongfully refused to register voters or
to receive their ballots. 2 Mere ministerial officers must
always at their peril keep within the limits of the law, for
their duties :ire not discretionary, and the law is supposed
to make plain for them what their duty is. Nor will the
immunity of the legislative department cover the acts of its
ministerial agents with a like shield of protection. And
this is an important check which the judiciary holds upon
the law-making departments: if the members are not
directly responsible for exceeding the~r constitutional authority, the ministerial agents and officers through whom
"
the legislature acts will always be so. 8
Oheclc on the Treaty-making Power. -The full treaty. making power is in the President and Senate ; but the
House o( Representatives has a restraining power upon it
in that it may in its discretion at any time refuse to give
assent to legislation necessary to give a treaty effect.
Many treaties need no such legislation ; but when moneys
are to be paid by the United States, they can be appropriated by Congress alone ; and in some other cases laws are
needful. An unconstitutional or manifestly unwise treaty

8 Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & El. 1; Milligan v. Hovey, 3 Biss. 13.

1 Bennett v. Fulmer, 49 Penn. St. 155; Billings v. Lafferty, 31 Ill.
318; Shoem~ker v. Nesbit, 2 Rawle, 201; Parmelee v. Baldwin,
1 Conn. 313.
2 Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350; Jeffries v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio,
322; Be.vard v. Hoffman, 18 Md. 4 79 ; Goetcheus v. Mathewson, 61
N. Y. 420; Weckerly v. Geyer, 11 S. & R. 35; Miller t•. Rucker,
1 Bush, (Ky.) 135; Carter v. Harrison, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 138; Gordon v.
Farrar, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 411; Dwight v. Rice, 5 La. An. 580; State v.
Porter, 4 Harr. (Del.) 556; Wheeler v. Patterson, 1 N. H. 88; Fausler
v. Parsons, 6 W. Va. 486; Peavey v. Robbins, 3 Jones, (N. C.) 339;
Rail ''·Potts, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 225. The Massachusetts and Ohio
cases hold the officers responsible for ref using a legal ballot, even
when they err in good faith.
a Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & El. 1 ; Milligan v. Hovey, 3 Biss. 13.
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the House of Representatives may possibly refuse to aid;

and this, when legislation is needful, would be equivalent

to a refusal of the government, through one of its branches,

to carry the treaty into effect. This would be an extreme

measure, but it is conceivable that a case might arise in

which a resort to it would be justified.1

Judiciary and Executive. — From the foregoing it will

appear that the judiciary has no control whatever over

legislation, and no power whatever to question its pur-

pose or animus, provided always that legislation is kept

within the limits of the constitutional grant. The remark

is equally true when applied to executive power. Within

the sphere of his authority under the Constitution the Ex-

ecutive is independent, and judicial process cannot reach

him.2 But when he exceeds his authority, or usurps that

which belongs to one of the other departments, his orders,

commands, or warrants protect no one, and his agents be-

come personally responsible for their acts. The^ check of

the courts, therefore, consists in their ability to keep the

Executive within the sphere of his authority by refusing

to give the sanction of law to whatever he may do beyond

it, and by holding the agents and instruments of his un-
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lawful action to strict accountability.8

The Executive can have no corresponding authority to

pass upon the validity of either legislative or judicial ac-

tion. His judgment of proposed legislation may be ex-

pressed in his veto, but if that is overruled the Executive

is as much bound as is any private citizen. He is also

equally concluded by the judgment of a competent court,

1 See ante, p. 103.

2 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Hawkins v. Governor,

1 Ark. 570; State v. Governor, 25 N. J. 331; People v. Governor, 29

Mich. 320; Mauran ». Smith, 8 R. I . 192; State v. Warmouth, 22 La.

An. 1; Rice v. Austin, 19 Minn. 103.

» Milligan v. Hovey, 3 Biss. 13; Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet.

624; Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch, 170.

the House of Representatives may possibly refuse to aid ;
and this, when legislation is needful, would be equivalent
to a refusal of the government, through one of its branches,
to carry the treaty into effect. This would be an extreme
measure, but it is conceivable that a case might arise in
which a resort to it would be justified. 1
Judiciary and Executive. - From the foregoing it will
appear that the judiciary has no control whatever over
legislation, and no power whatever to question its purpose or animus, provided always that legislation is kept
within the limits of the constitutional grant. The remark
is equally true when applied to executive power. Within
the sphere of his authority under the Constitution the Executive is independent, and judicial process cannot reach
him. 2 But when he exceeds his authority, or usurps that
which belongs to one of the other departments, his orders,
commands, or warrants protect no one, and his agents become personally responsible for their acts. The. check of
the courts, therefore, consists in their ability to keep the
Executive within the sphere of his authority by refusing
to give the sanction of law to whatever he may do beyond
it, and by holding the agents and instruments of his unlawful action to strict accountability. 8
The Executive can have no corresponding authority to
pass upon the validity of either legislative or judicial action. His judgment of proposed legislation may be expressed in his veto, but if that is overruled the Executive
is as much bound as is any private citizen. He is also
equally concluded by the judgment of a competent court,
See ante, p. 103.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Hawkins v. Governor,
1 Ark. 670; State v. Governor, 25 N. J. 331 ; People "· Governor, 29
Mich. 320; Mauran v. Smith, 8 R. I. 192; State v. Warmouth, 22 La.
An. 1 ; Rice v. Austin, 19 Minn. 103.
8 Milligan v. Hovey, 3 Biss. 13; Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet.
624; Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch, 170.
1
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and it may become his duty as Executive to assist in en-

forcing a judgment he believes erroneous, should enforce-

ment by the ordinary process of the court and by its own

officers become impossible. Nevertheless it is conceivable

that the Executive may refuse to obey either a statute or

the judgment of a court. Indeed, such cases have occurred

in the history of the federal government, notably in the

case of the Georgia Indians,1 and in cases arising urider

the proclamation of President Lincoln purporting to sus-

pend the habeas corpus.2 It can be said of such cases

only this, that the responsibility of the President for a

refusal to regard the judicial mandate is on the one hand

to the people and on the other to the process of im-

peachment.

Impeachments. — The two very effective restraints which

the legislature may interpose to the abuse of executive

and judicial authority are, first, that which consists in its

control over their jurisdiction, and, second, the proceeding

by impeachment. Much of executive authority comes,

not from the Constitution, but from statute, and what

is thus given may at any time be taken away. The
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same is true of the courts. Some of them are purely

statutory courts, and may be modified or abolished; all of

them derive the most of their jurisdiction from statutes,

and whenever this is abused it can be restricted or taken

away.8 But it may also be modified or taken away on

grounds of expediency or policy merely. Impeachment is

for the purpose of punishing misconduct. By the Consti-

tution of the United States the House of Representatives

1 Worcester ». Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 ; Webster's Works, i. 268. The

papers and documents are collected in Niles's Register, vols, xxxix.-

xliv.

2 Merryman's Case, Taney's Dec. 246; S. C. 9 Am. Law Keg. 524;

14 Law Rep., N. S. 78.

8 Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506.

and it may become his duty as Executive to assist in enforcing a judgment he believes erroneous, should enforcement by the ordinary process of the court and by its own
officers become impossible. Nevertheless it is conceivable
that the Executive may r~fuse to obey either a statute or
the judgment of a court. Indeed, such cases have occurred
in the history of the federal government, notably in the
case of the Georgia Indians, 1 and in cases arising udder
the proclamation of President Lincoln purporting to suspend the liabeas corpus.'J It can be said of such cases
only this, that the responsibility of the President for a
refusal to regard the judicial mandate is on the one hand
to the people and on the other to the process of impeachment.
Impeachments. -The two very effective restraints which
the legislature may interpose to the abuse of executive
and judicial authority are, first, that which consists in its
control over their jurisdiction, and, second, the proceeding
.
by impeachment. Much of executive authority comes,
not from the Constitution, but from statute, and what
is thus given may at any time be taken· away. The
same is true of the courts. Some of them are purely
statutory courts, and may be modified or abolished ; all of
them derive the most of their jurisdiction from statutes,
and whenever this is abused it can be restricted or taken
away. 8 But it may also be modified or taken away on
grounds of expediency or policy merely. Impeachment is
for the purpose of punishing misconduct. By the Constitution of the United States the House of Representatives

.

Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 ; Webster's Works, i. 268. The
papers and documents are collected in Niles's Register, vols. xxxix.xliv.
'J Merryman's Case, Taney's Dec. 246; S.C. 9 Am. Law Reg. 524;
14 Law Rep., N. S. 78.
a Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506.
1
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has the sole power of impeachment,1 and the Senate the

sole power to try its presentments. When the President

is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside, and no person

shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds

of the members.2 Judgment in case of impeachment shall

not extend further than to removal from office and dis-

qualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust,

or profit under the United States; but the party convicted

shall nevertheless be liable, and subject to indictment,

trial, judgment, and punishment according to law, pro-

vided the impeachable offence is also an indictable offence.8

The President's power to grant reprieves and pardons

does not extend to impeachments.4

The offences for which the President or any other officer

may be impeached are any such as in the opinion of the

House are deserving of punishment under that process.

They are not necessarily offences against the general laws.

In the history of England, where the like proceeding ob-

tains, the offences have often been political, and in some

cases for gross betrayal of public interests punishment

has very justlj- been inflicted on cabinet officers. It is

often found that offences of a very serious nature by high
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officei's are not offences against the criminal code, but

consist in abuses or betrayals of trust, or inexcusable

neglects of duty, which are dangerous and criminal be-

cause of the immense interests involved and the greatness

of the trust which has not been kept. Such cases must

be left to be dealt with on their own facts, and judged ac-

cording to their apparent deserts.6

The Veto Power. — The view most commonly taken of

"Const., Art. I. § 2, cl. 5. 2 Const., Art. I. § 3, cl. 6.

» Const., Art. I. § 3, cl. 7. 4 Const., Art. II. § 2, cl. 1.

6 The law and the precedents on the subject were largely exam-

ined on the impeachment trial of President Johnson, and on the pre-

vious trials of Judges Chase and Feck.

has the sole power of impeachment, 1 and the Senate the
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or profit under the United States; but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable, and subject to indictment,
trial, judgment, and punishment according to law, provided the impeachable offence is also an indictable offence. 8
The President's power to grant reprieves and pardons
does not extend to impeachments.•
The offences for which the President or any other officer
may be impeached are any such as in the opinion of the
House are deserving of punishment under that process.
They are not nece.ssarily offences against the general laws.
In the history of England, where the like proceeding obtains, the offences have often been political, and in some
cases for gross betray11l of public interests punishment
has very justly been inflicted on cabinet officers. It is
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officers arc not offences against the criminal code, but
consist in abuses or betrayals of trust, or inexcusable
neglects of duty, which are dangerous and criminal because of the immense interests involved and the greatness
of the trust which has not been kept. Such cases must
be left to be dealt with on their own facts, and judged according to their apparent deserts. 6
The Veto Power. -The view most commonly taken of
1 Const., Art. I. § 2, cl. 6.
2 Co,nst., Art. I. § 3, cl. 6.
a Const., Art. I. § 3, cl. 7.
t Const., Art. II. § 2, cl. 1.
' The law and the precedents on the subject were largely examined on the impeachment trial of President Johnson, and on the preTious trials of Judges Chase and Peck.
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the veto power is perhaps that of Mr. Webster, that it is

"an extraordinary power, to be exercised only in peculiar

and marked cases "; that " it was vested in the President,

doubtless as a guard against hasty and inconsiderate legis

lation, and against any act, inadvertently passed, which

might seem to encroach on the just authority of other

branches of the government,"1 or, it may be added, on

the rights of the States or of individuals. The first six

Presidents made use of it very sparingly, —some of them

not at all; but for this an important reason is found in the

fact that the legislature and the President were generally

in accord on important measures. It was used more freely

by President Jackson, and still more freely by Presidents

Tyler, Johnson, and Hayes. This might well occur, even

with the same views of the proper functions of the veto,

since the Presidents last named were confronted with

Congresses of opposing political views, and had occasion

to consider and pass upon a large amount of legislation

that was not in accord with their own opinions of what

was right in policy or sound in constitutional law. The

reasons assigned for the vetoes have seldom been un-
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important, and have often been the unconstitutionality of

the legislation to which assent was withheld. In some

cases there has been a species of silent veto, through a

neglect of the President to return a bill transmitted to

him within the last ten days of the session, whereby it

would fail to become a law. It was not contemplated by

the Constitution that the President should purposely de-

feat legislation in that mode; and no doubt it has some-

times occurred through the impossibility of giving careful

examination to the provisions of bills referred to him, dur-

ing the last days of the session, in the limited time allowed.

To what extent the veto shall be resorted to must

always be matter of discretion with the President. The

i Webster's Works, i. 267.

the veto power is perhaps that of l\Ir. Webster, that it is
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and marked cases " ; that '' it was vested in the President,
doubtless as a guard against hasty and inconsiderate legis
lation, and against any act, inadvertently passed, which
might seem to encroach on the just authority of other
branches of the government," 1 or, it may be added, on
the rights of the States or of individuals. The first six
Presidents made use of it very sparingly, -some of them
not at all ; but for this an important reason is found in the
fact that the legislature and the President were generally
in accord on important measures. It was used more freely
by President Jackson, and still more freely by Presidents
Tyler, Johnson, and Hayes. This might well occur, even
with the same views of the proper functions of the veto,
since the Presidents last named were confronted with
Congresses of opposing political views, and had occasion
to consider and pass upon a large amount of legislation
that was not in accord with their own opinions of what
was right in policy or sound in constitutional law. The
reasons assigned for the vetoes have seldom been unimportant, and have often been the unconstitutionality of
the legislation to which assent was withheld. In some
cases there has been a species of silent veto, through a
neglect of the President to return a bill transmitted to
him within the last ten days of the session, whereby it
would fail to become a law. It was not contemplated by
the Constitution that the President should purposely defeat legislation in that mode ; and no doubt it has sometimes occurred through the impossibility of giving careful
examination to the provisions of bills referred to him, during the last days of the session, in the limited time allowed.
To what extent the veto shall be resorted to must
always be matter of discretion with the President. The
1
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writer in the Federalist evidently imagined that its chief

use would be the protection of the executive department

against attempted encroachments. He speaks of "the

propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon

the rights and to absorb the powers of the other depart-

ments," "the insufficiency of a mere parchment delinea-

tion of the boundaries of each," and "the necessity of

furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own de-

fence," and says: "From these clear and indubitable

principles results the propriety of a negative, either abso-

lute or qualified, in the executive, upon the acts of the

legislative branches. Without the one or the other, the

former would be absolutely unable to defend himself against

the depredations of the latter. He might gradually be

stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions, or

annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the

other the legislative and executive powers might speedily

come to be blended in the same hands. If even no pro-

pensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body

to invade the rights of the executive, the rules of just

reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves

teach us that the one ought not to be left at the mercy of
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the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effect-

ual power of self-defence."

It is added, however, that "the power in question has a

further use. It not only serves as a shield to the execu-

tive, but it furnishes an additional security against the

enaction of improper laws. It establishes a salutary

check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the

community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or

of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may

happen to influence a majority of that body."1

Occasions for frequent differences between the legisla-

1 No. 73, by Hamilton. And see Madison's Works, iv. 869, letter

to Edward Coles.
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legislative branches. Without the one or the other, the
former would be absolutely unable to defend himself against
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tare and the executive, on questions of constitutional right

or power, seem not to have been anticipated; but it i9 in

these that the use of the veto has been most important.

No one has ever questioned the right and duty of the

President to make use of his negative when it was believed

the proposed law was subject to objection on constitu-

tional grounds. It has been claimed, however, that when

the point of constitutional law which the case presents is

one which has previously received judicial examination

and decision, he may not rightfully disregard this decision

and base his negative on his own opinion opposed to that

of the judiciary.

That the President has a discretionary power to veto a

bill, for any reason that appears to him sufficient, is un-

doubted. The Constitution gives the power, and makes

no exceptions. That it is proper he should pay great def-

erence to the judicial authority on such questions as have

already been authoritatively determined, may also be con-

ceded. But that he is guilty of any violation of duty, or

is disrespectful to the judiciary, or disregards any just

principle of government, when he acts upon his own
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judgment of constitutional right, power, or obligation in-

volved in any proposed law, is not admitted. When he

does not approve a bill, he is to withhold his approval;

and when he may do so on grounds of mere expediency,

it would be remarkable if he were not at liberty to do so

when his objection goes to the very right of the legislature

to pass the bill at all.

The act making treasury notes a legal tender was

authoritatively passed upon, and finally sustained, by the

federal Supreme Court. The decision settled the law as

to that act, and was binding upon the President as much

as upon any private citizen. But should any great emer-

gency hereafter seem to present to Congress a sufficient

reason for passing a similar act, what possible reason

ture and the executive, on questions of constitutional right
or power, seem not to have been anticipated ; but it is in
these that the use of the veto has been most important.
No one has ever questioned the right and duty of the
President to make use of his negative when it was belieyed
the proposed law was subject to objection on constitutional grounds. It has been claimed, however, that when
the point of constitutional law which the case presents is
one which has previously received judicial examination
and decision, he may not rightfully disregard this decision
and base his negative on his own opinion opposed to that
of the judiciary.
That the President has a discretionary power to veto a
bill, for any reason that appears to him sufficient, is undoubted. The Constitution gives the power, and makes
no exceptions. That it is proper he should pay great deference to the judicial authority on such questions as have
already been authoritatively determined, may also be conceded. But that he is guilty of any violation of duty, or
is disrespectful to the judiciary, or disregards any just
principle of government, when he acts upon his own
judgment of constitutional right, power, or obligation involved in any proposed law, is not admitted. When he
does not approve a bill, he is to withhold his approval ;
and when he may do so on grounds of mere expediency,
it would be remarkable if he were not at liberty to do so
when his objection goes to the very right of the legislature
to pass the bill at all.
The act making treasury notes a legal tender was
autholitatively passed upon, and finally sustained, by the
federal Supreme Court. The decision settled the law as
to that act, and was binding upon the President as much
as upon any private citizen. But should any great emergency hereafter seem to present to Congress a sufficient
reason for passing a similar act, what possible reason
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could exist for the President withholding his approval

which would be more forcible than that in his opinion the

Constitution did not warrant it? He has deferred to the

judgment of the court as to what the law was; must he

now defer to it in deciding what the law shall be? The

court itself, in a new case, might overrule its own de-

cision, and it would be the plain duty of the court to do

so if the justices should reach the conclusion that so great

an error had been committed as the sanction of a violation

of the charter of government. But the President overrules

no decision in such a case: he simply acts upon his own

judgment as a legislator. And it can never be disrespect-

ful to the judiciary that any branch of the legislature

differs with it in opinion when acting within the sphere of
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its powers.

could exist for the President withholding his approval
which would be more forcible than that in his opinion the
Constitution did not warrant it? He has deferred to the
judgment of the court as to what the law was; must he
now defer to it in deciding what the law shall be? The
court itself, in a new case, might overrule its own decision, and it would be the plain duty of the court to do
so if the justices should reach the conclusion that so great
an error had been committed as the sanction of a violation
of the charter of government. But the President ovenules
no decision in such a case : he simply acts upon his own
judgment as a legislator. And it can never be disrespectful t.o the judiciary that any branch of the legislature
differs with it in opinion when acting within the sphere of
its powers.
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CHAPTER Vm.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TERRITORIES.

The Constitution.—By Article IV. of the Constitution

it is declared that Congress shall have power " to make

all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or

other property belonging to the United States." 1

The Purposes. — Rules and regulations for the territory

of the United States may be of two kinds: First, those

having regard to it as property merely, and intended to

CHAPTER VIII.

guard and improve it as such, and perhaps to prepare it

for sale and sell it; 2 and, second, those which concern the

government of the people who may reside within the terri-

tory before it is formed into States. This provision of the

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TERRITORIES.

Constitution differs from most others contained in that

instrument in this: that by it the States concede nothing,

at least so far as the territory outside their own limits is

concerned, since over this they had no power whatever to

make rules themselves. Indeed, as to such territory the

provision would be needless, for the United States as a

sovereignty would have inherent power to govern at dis-

cretion such territory as it possessed beyond state limits.
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The States could not restrict the right, and no restrictions

could come from any other authority.

Control by Congress.—The peculiar wording of the

provision has led some persons to suppose that it was

intended Congress should exercise in respect to the ter-

1 Const., Art. IV. § 3, cl. 2.

1 United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526.

The Oonstitu,tion. -By Article IV. of the Constitution

•
it is declared that Congress shall have power u to make
all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or
other property belonging to the United States." 1
The Purposes. - Rules and regulations for the territory
of the United States may be of two kinds: First, those
having regard to it as property merely, and intended to
guard and improve it as such, and perhaps to prepare it
for sale and sell it ; ~ and, second, those which concern the
government of the people who may reside within the territory before it is formed into States. This provision of the
Constitution differs from most others contained in that
instrument in this : that by it the States concede nothing,
at least so far as the territory outside their own limits is
concerned, since over this they had no power whatever to
make rules themselves. Indeed, as to such territory the
provision would be ne~dless, for the United States as a
sovereignty would have inherent power to goyern at discretion such territory as it possessed beyond state limits.
The States could not restrict the right, and no restrictions
could come from any other authority.
Oontrol hg Oongress. -The peculiar wording of the
provision has led some persons to suppose that it was
intended Congress should exercise in respect to the terConst., Art. IV. § 3, cl. 2.
s United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 626.
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ritory the rights only of a proprietor of property, and

that the people of the Territories were to be left at liberty

to institute governments for themselves. It is no doubt

most consistent with the general theory of republican in-

stitutions, that the people everywhere should be allowed

self-government; but it has never been deemed a matter

of right that a local community should be suffered to lay

the foundation of institutions, and erect a structure of gov-

ernment thereon, without the guidance and restraint of a

superior authority. Even in the older States, where society

is most homogeneous and has fewest of the elements of

disquiet and disorder, the State reserves to itself the right

to shape municipal institutions; and towns and cities are

only formed under its direction, and according to the rules

and within the limits the State prescribes. With still less

reason could the settlers in new territories be suffered

to exercise sovereign powers. The practice of the gov-

ernment, originating before the adoption of the Consti-

tution, has been for Congress to establish governments

for the Territories; and whether the jurisdiction over the

district has been acquired by grant from the States, or

by treaty with a foreign power, Congress has unquestion-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:44 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ably full power to govern it, and the people, except as

Congress shall provide therefor, are not of right entitled

to participate in political authority, until the territory

becomes a State.1 Meantime they are in a condition of

temporary pupilage and dependence; and while Congress

will be expected to recognize the principle of self-gov-

ernment to such extent as may seem wise, its discretion

alone can constitute the measure by which the partici-

pation of the people can be determined. If territory is

acquired from a foreign country with a de facto govern-

1 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 542; Territory v. Lee, 2

Montana, 124; Reynolds v. People, 1 Colorado, 179; Carpenter v.

Rogers, 1 Montana, 90.

ritory the rights only of a proprietor of property, and
that the people of the Territories were to be left at liberty
to institute governments for themselves. It is no doubt
most consistent with the general theory of republican institutions, that the people everywhere should be allowed
self-government ; but it has never been deemed a matter
of right that a local community should be suffered t.o lay
the foundation ·of institutions, and erect a structure of government thereon, without the guidance and restra.int of a
superior authority. Even in the older .States, where society
is most homogeneous and has fewest of the elements of
disquiet and disorder, the State reserves to itself the right
to shape municipal institutions ; and towns and cities are
only formed under its direction, and according to the rules
and within the limits the State prescribes. 'Vith still less
reason could the settlers in new territories be suffered
to exercise sovereign powers. The practice of the gov- ·
ernment, originating before the adoption of the Constitution, has been for Congress to establish governments
for the Territories; and whether the jurisdiction over the
district has been acquired by grant from the States, or
by treaty with a foreign power, Congress has unquestionably full power to govern it, and the people, except as
Congress shall provide therefor, are not of right entitled
to participate in political authority, until the territory
becomes a State. 1 Meantime they are in a condition of
temporary pupilage and dependence ; and while Congress
will be expected to recognize the principle of self-government to such extent as may seem wise, its discretion
alone can constitute the ~easure by which the participation of the people can be determined. If territory is
acquired from a foreign country with a de facto governAmerican Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 542; Territory v. Lee, 2
Montana, 124; H.eynolds v. People, 1 Colorado, 179; Carpenter v.
Rogers, 1 Montana, 90.
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ment in full operation, this government will continue,

with the presumed consent of the people, until Congress

shall provide for them a territorial government. "The

great law of necessity justifies this conclusion. The

consent of the people is irresistibly inferred from the

fact, that no civilized community could possibly desire to

abrogate an existing government, when the alternative

presented would be to place themselves in a state of an-

archy, beyond the protection of all laws, and reduce them

to the unhappy necessity of submitting to the dominion of

the strongest." The limitation to the power of this de facto

government is, that it shall " exercise no power inconsist-

ent with the provisions of the Constitution of the United

States, which is the supreme law of the land." 1

Forms of Territorial Governments. — Two general forms

of territorial government have from time to time been

established by Congress for different Territories. The first

of these is a government with an executive and judges

appointed by the President with the advice and consent of

the Senate, who together constitute the legislature for the

Territory. The second is a government in which, while the
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executive and judiciary will be of national appointment,

the legislature is composed of representatives chosen by

the people of the Territory. Some of the Territories have

had both forms, and also between the two a third, which

was a modification of both. By the Ordinance of 1787, for

the government of the Northwest Territory, the governor

and judges, or a majority of them, were empowered to

adopt for the Territory such laws of the original States,

criminal and civil, as might be necessary and best suited

to the circumstances of the district, and report them to

Congress from time to time, which laws were to be in force

until the organization of the General Assembly therein,

unless disapproved by Congress; but afterwards the legis-

1 Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164, 184.

ment in full operation, this government will continue,
with the presumed consent of the people, until Congress
shall provide for them a territorial government. '' The
great law of necessity justifies this conclusion. The
consent of the people is irresistibly inferred from the
fact, that no civilized community could possibly desire to
abrogate an existing government, when the alternative
presented would be to place themselves in a state of anarchy, beyond the protection of all laws, and reduce them
to the unhappy necessity of submitting to the dominion of
the strongest." The limitation to the power of this defacto
government is, that it shall '' exercise no power inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution of the United
States, which is the supreme law of the land." 1
Forms of Territorial Governmen~s. -Two general forms
of territorial government have from time to time been
established by Congress for different Territories. The first
of these is a government with an executive and judges
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate, who. together constitute the legislature for the
Territory. The second is a government in which, while the
executive and judiciary will be of national appointment,
the legislature is composed of representatives chosen by
the people of the Territory. Some of the Territories have
had both forms, and also between the two a third, which
was a modifioation of both. By the Ordinance of 1787, for
the government of the Northwest Territory, the governor
and judges, or a majority of them, were empowered to
adopt for the Territory such laws of the original States,
criminal and civil, as might be necessary and best suited
to the circumstances of the district, and report them to
Congress from time to time, which laws were to be in force
until the organization of the General Assembly therein,
unless disapproved by Congress ; but afterwards the legis1

Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164, 184.
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lature was to have authority to alter them as it should

think fit. And the people were to have the right to elect

representatives to a General Assembly so soon as there

should be five thousand free male inhabitants of full age

in the Territory. The legislative power of the governor

and judges, it is seen, was limited to a selection of laws

from the States; but when a territorial legislature has

been provided for, the authority conferred upon it has ex-

tended to all rightful subjects of legislation,1 and it might

therefore grant charters of incorporation,2 endow institu-

tions of learning,8 provide for the exercise of the right of

eminent domain,4 and so on. Congress may at any time

control the legislation of the Territories, or legislate inde-

pendently for them,6 but the territorial laws not in conflict

with the Constitution or any act of Congress would stand,

unless disapproved.8

The Public Domain. — Of that portion of the Territories

which belongs to the public domain, and of which, there-

fore, the United States has proprietary title, Congress pro-

vides for the disposition and sale, under such regulations

as are deemed important. In respect to this, the gov-

ernment occupies the two positions of proprietor and of
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sovereign of the country, and may deal with it at discre-

tion, and pass title to it in any manner it may choose.

1 Miners' Bank v. Iowa, 12 How. 1; Vincennes University v. In-

diana, 14 How. 268; Wisconsin v. Doty, 1 Pinney, (Wis.) 396; State

v. Young, 3 Kan. 445.

2 Miners' Bank v. Iowa, 12 How. 1.

8 Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268, 273.

4 Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427; Carson River, &c. Co. v. Barrett,

2 Nev. 249; Lewis Co. v. Hayes, 1 Wash. Ter. 128.

* Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. Rep. 145.

6 Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434. This case reviews and

explains the territorial legislation. And see Ferris v. Higley, 20

Wall. 375; Moore v. Koubly, 1 Idaho, 55; Smith v. Odell, 1 Pinney,

(Wis.) 449; Morton v. Sharkey, McCahon, (Kan.) 113.

lature was to have authority to alter them as it should
think fit. And the people were to have the right to elect
representatives to a General Assembly so soon as there
should be five thousand free male inhabitants of full age
in the Territory. The legislative power of the governor
and judges, it is seen, was limited to a selection of laws
from the States; but when a territorial legislature has
been provided for, the authority conferred upon it has extended to all rightful subjects of legislation, 1 and it might
therefore grant charters of incorporation, 2 endow institutions of learning, 8 provide for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain, 4 and so on. Congress may at any time
control the legislation of the Territories, or legislate independently for them, 5 but the teITitorial laws not in conflict
with the Constitution or any act of Congress would stand,
unless disapproved. 6
The Public Domain. - Of that portion of the Territories
which belongs to the public domain, and of which, therefore, the United States has proprietary title, Congress provides for the disposition and sale, under such regulations
as are deemed important. In respect to this, the government occupies the two positions of proprietor and of
sovereign of the country, and may deal with it at discretion, and pass title to it in any manner it may choose.
1 Miners' Bank v. Iowa, 12 How. 1; Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268; Wisconsin v. Doty, 1 Pinney, (Wis.) 396; State
v. Young, 3 Kan. 445.
2 Mintrs' Bank v. Iowa, 12 How. 1.
8 Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268, 273.
4 Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427 ; Carson River, &c. Co. v. Barrett,
2 Nev. 249; Lewis Co. t'. Hayes, 1 Wash. Ter. 128.
6 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. Rep. 145.
6 Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434.
This case reviews and
explains the territorial legislation. And see Ferris v. Higley, 20
Wall. 375; Moore"'· Koubly, 1 Idaho, 55; Smith v. Odell, 1 Pinney,
(Wis.) 449; Morton v. Sharkey, McCahon, (Kan.) 113.

168

168

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The proviso that " nothing in this Constitution shall be so

construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States,

or of any particular State," had in view claims, some of

which were recognized and some disputed, but all of which

were subsequently adjusted amicably.

The "other property belonging to the United States"

of which Congress is empowered to dispose, might be any

which was then, or in the course of time might become,

their propertj-, whether acquired as a government, or as

an individual or corporation might acquire it.

Judiciary of the Territories.—While the territorial con-

dition remains, the courts of the Territory exercise the cus-

tomary jurisdiction of both state and federal courts under

congressional and territorial legislation.1 Their powers

cease as soon as the Territory is admitted to the Union,

and judicial acts afterwards performed are void for want

of jurisdiction.2 Congress will provide, by appropriate

legislation, for the transfer of cases begun in the territorial

courts to the proper courts for further proceedings.8

1 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511.

a Benner v. Porter, 9 How. 235; Forsyth v. United States, 9 How.
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571; United States v. Simpson, 9 How. 578.

8 Express Co. v. Kountze, 8 Wall. 342.

\

✓

The proviso that '' nothing in this Constitution shall be so
construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States,
or of any particular State,'' had in view claims, some of
which were recognized and some disputed, but all of which
were subsequently adjusted amicably.
The '' other property belonging to the United States"
of which Congress is empowered to dispose, might be any
which was then, or in the course of time might become,
their property, whether acquired as a goyernment, or as
an individual or corporation might acquire it.
Judiciary of the Territories. -While the territorial condition remains, the courts of the Territory exercise the customary jurisdiction of both state and federal courts under
congressional and territorial legislation. 1 Their powers
cease as soon as the Territory is admitted to the Union,
and judicial acts afterwards performed are void for want
of jurisdiction. 2 Congress will provide, by appropriate
legislation, tor the transfer of cases begun in the territorial
courts to the proper courts for further proceedings. 8
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 611.
Benner v. Porter, 9 How. 235; Forsyth v. United States, 9 How.
671; United States v. Simpson, 9 How. 678.
a Express Co. v. Kountze, 8 Wall. 342.
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CHAPTER IX.

THE ADMISSION OF NEW STATES.

Original States. — The Constitution provided that the

ratification by the conventions of nine States should be

sufficient for the establishment of the Constitution between

the States so ratifying the same ;1 but it contemplated the

accession of all the thirteen States, if all should ratify,

even though some might delay until after the government

should have been put into operation.

New States. — The Constitution also provided that new

CHAPTER IX.

States may be admitted by Congress into the Union ;2 but

whether they should be formed of territory at that time

belonging to the States, or from territory that might there-

THE ADMISSION OF NEW STATES.

after be acquired, or taken in as existing States previously

independent, was not expressly determined by that in-

strument. By the Ordinance of 1787, however, which the

Constitution left in force,8 it had been agreed that States

not exceeding five might be formed from the Northwest

Territory, and received into the Union; and it may be

assumed as unquestionable that the constitutional pro-

vision contemplated that the territory then under the

dominion of the United States, but not within the limits of
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any one of them, was in due time to be formed and

organized into States and admitted into the Union, as has

since in many cases been done. Indeed, it could never

have been understood that any territory which by pur-

i Const., Art. VII. 2 Const, Art. IV. § 3.

8 Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean, 337.

Original, States. -The Constitution provided that the
ratification by the conventions of nine States should be
sufficient for the establishment of the Constitution between
the States so ratifying the same ; 1 but it co~templated the
accession of all the thirteen States, if all should ratify,
even though some might delay until after the government
should have been put into operation.
New States. -The Constitution also provided that new
States may be admitted by Congress into the Union; 2 but
whether they should be formed of territory at that time
belonging to the States, or from territory that might thereafter be acquired, or taken in as existing States previously
independent, was not expressly determined by that instrument. By the Ordinance of 1787, however, which the
Constitution left in force, 8 it had been agreed that States
not exceeding five might be formed from the Northwest
Territory, and received into the Union; and it may be
assumed as unquestionable that the constitutional provision contemplated that the territory then under the
<lo minion of the United States, but not within the limits of
any one of them, was in due time to be formed and
organized into States and admitted into the Union, as has
since in many cases been done. Indeed, it could never
have been understood that any territory which by purConst., Art. VII.
2 Const., Art. IV. § 3.
a Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean, 337.
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chase, cession, or conquest should at any time come under

the control of the United States, should permanently be

held in a territorial condition, and the new States, which

have been formed of territory acquired by treaty, must

be supposed to have been received into the Union in strict

compliance with the Constitution.1 So must Texas,

which as an independent State was annexed to the Union.

It is true that nothing in the express terms of the Con-

stitution indicates that it was contemplated, by those who

framed and adopted it, that the bounds of the Union

should be extended by the acquisition of territory, either

by purchase or annexation. Nevertheless, the power in

any sovereignty to acquire territory is indisputable, and

of right pertains to the power to declare war and form

treaties. It therefore belongs to the United States, and

is denied to the States, which are forbidden to enter into

treaties.2 And when territory is acquired, the right to

suffer States to be formed therefrom, and to receive them

into the Union, must follow of course, not only because

the Constitution confers the power to admit new States

without restriction, but also because it would be incon-
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sistent with institutions founded on the fundamental idea

of self-government that the federal government should re-

tain territory under its own imperial rule, and deny the

people the customary local institutions. The power to

admit to the Union existing States, as in the case of

Texas, may be questioned with more reason;3 but the

dealings of one sovereignty with another must always be

1 Compare Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 447.

2 Const., Art. I. § 10.

8 The debates which took place in Congress while the subject of

the annexation of Texas was under discussion, and the contempora-

neous political discussions elsewhere, give the opposing views on this

subject. Most of the discussions, however, involved policy rather

than constitutional power.

chase, cession, or conquest should at any time come under
the control of the United States, should permanently be
· held in a territorial condition, and the new States, which
have been formed of territory acquired by treaty, must
be supposed to have been received into the Union in strict
compliance with the· Constitution. 1 So m~t Texas,
which as an independent State was annexed to the Union.
It is true that nothing in the ·express terms of the Constitution indicates that it was contemplated, by those who
framed and adopted it, that the bounds of the Union
should be extended by the acquisition of teJTitory, either
by purchase or annexation. Nevertheless, the power in
any sovereignty to acquire territory is indisputable, and
of right pertains to the power to declare war and form .
treaties. It therefore belongs to the United States, and
is denied to the States, which are forbidden to enter into
treaties. 1 And when territory is acquired, the right to
suffer States to be formed therefrom, and to receive them
into the Union, must follow of course, not only because
the Constitution confers the power to admit new States
without restriction, but also because it would be inconsistent with institutions founded on the fundamental idea
of self-government that the federal government should retain territory under its own imperial rule, and deny the
people the customary local institutions. The power to
admit to the Union existing States, as in the case of
Texas, may be questioned with more reason ; 3 but the
dealings of one sovereignty with another must always be
I

Compare Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 447.
I Const., Art. I. § 10.
a The debates which took place in Congress while the subject of
the annexation of Texas was under discussion, and the contemporaneous political discussions elsewhere, give the opposing views on this
subject. Most of the discussions, however, involved policy rather
than constitutional power.
1
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under subjection to the great law of necessity, and what

the requirements of that law may be in any particular

case only the sovereignty itself can judge when the emer-

gency is upon it. If, therefore, an independent State is

received into the Union, it must be supposed to have been

accepted on sufficient and conclusive reasons.

Preliminary Steps. — The Constitution does not point

out what steps shall be taken for the admission of a State

to the Union, but, the power having been conferred upon

Congress without limitation, it is left to the discretion of

that body to determine the circumstances under which the

admission shall be allowed, and the steps that shall be

taken to obtain it. Nevertheless, certain requisites are

necessarily implied. There must be a State to admit;

and a State must have a government and laws; and the

government must be republican in form because States

with such a government can alone be members of the

Union. But how the State shall come into existence; who

shall be its electors and form its government and establish

its laws; how many of the electors there shall be; what

shall be the extent of territory incorporated within the
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limits of their State; and whether any constitution the

people may have formed shall be received as satisfactory

or shall be required to be amended, — these and many

other questions must be determined under the discretion-

ary power conferred upon Congress.

States have been admitted, — (1.) where the people

of a Territory of suitable size have, either by spontaneous

action or in accordance with some territorial statute or

executive proclamation, formed a constitution and elected

officers to administer it, and presented the constitution to

Congress and applied for admission under it; (2.) where

Congress has first passed an enabling act, authorizing the

people to form a constitution, prescribing rules of suffrage

and other conditions, and providing for the admission

under subjection to the great law of necessity, and what
the requirements of that law may be · in any particular
case only the sovereignty itself can judge when the emergency is upon it. If, therefore, an independent State is
received into the Union, it must be supposed to have been
accepted on sufficient and conclusive reasons.
Preliminary Steps. -The· Constitution does ·not point
out what steps shall be taken for the admission of a State
to the Union, but, the power having been conferred upon
Congress without limitation, it is left to the discretion of
that body to determine the circumstances under which the
admission shall be allowed, and the steps that shall be
taken to obtain it. Nevertheless, certain requisites are
necessarily implied. There must be a State to admit ;
and a State must have a government and laws ; and the
government must be republican in form because States ·
with such a government can alone be members of the
Union. But how the State shall come into existence; who
shall be its electors and form its government and establish
its laws; how many of the electors there shall be; what
shall be the extent of territory incorporated within the
limits of their State ; and whether any constitution the
people may have formed shall be received as satisfactory
or shall be required to be amended, - these and many
other questions must be determined under the discretionary power conferred upon Congress.
States have been admitted, - ( 1.) where the people
of a Territory of suitable size have, either by spontaneous
action or in accordance with some territorial statute or
executive proclamation, formed a constitution and elected
officers to administer it, and presented the constitution to
Congress and applied for admission under it; (2.) where
Congress has first passed an enabling act, authorizing the
people to form a constitution, prescribing rules of suffrage
and other conditions, and providing for the admission
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of the State when the constitution should be adopted and

the conditions complied with; (3.) when a constitution,

formed with or without previous congressional authority,

has been presented to Congress, and that body has ac-

cepted it conditionally, requiring the consent of the peo-

ple, evidenced in some form indicated, to some condition

precedent to the admission, such as the consent to yield

some portion of the territory claimed, or some rule of

suffrage established by the state constitution, &c. Besides

these there have been other peculiarities of admission,

but this statement is sufficient to show that the control of

Congress is exercised according .to the circumstances. In

one instance, admission has been refused, though the pop-

ulation was ample, because of objection to local laws and

usages.1

With full discretionary power over the admission of

States, it must be expected that the action of Congress

will not always be governed by uniform sentiments and

uniform rules, and it has at times confessedly been con-

trolled by party or sectional considerations. The Consti-

tution neither does nor can establish effectual safeguards
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against the control of such influences.

Seceded States. — Those States whose people undertook

to sever them from the Union, under claim of a right to

secede, were nevertheless not released from their constitu-

tional relations.2 Until the rebellion was overthrown their

position was peculiar; they had disloyal governments

exercising all the ordinary powers of sovereignty, with

courts administering justice between man and man, and

1 The case of Utah. The facts concerning the admission of

States to the Union are all collected, and the principles discussed, in

Jameson on Constitutional Conventions.

* White v. Cannon, 6 Wall. 443; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700;

Shortridge v. Macon, Chase's Dec. 136; Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. Rep.

454.

of the State when the constitution should be adopted and
the conditions complied with; (3.) when a constitution,
formed with or without previous congressional authority,
has been presented to Congress, and that body has accepted it conditionally, requiring the consent of the people, evidenced in some form indicated, to some condition
precedent to the admission, such as the consent to yield
some portion of the territory claimed, or some rule or
suffrage established by the state constitution, &c. Besides
these there have been other peculiarities of admission,
but this statement is sufficient to show that the control of
Congress is exercised according .to the circumstances. In
one instance, admission has been refused, though the population was ample, because of objection to local laws and
usages. 1
"\iVith full discretionary power over the admission of
States, it must be expected that the action of Congress
will not always be governed by uniform sentiments and
µniform rules, and it has at times confessedly been controlled by party or sectional considerations. The Constitution neither does nor can establish effectual safeguards
against the control of such inftuences.
Seceded States. -Those States whose people undertook
to sever them from the Union, under claim of a right to
secede, were nevertheless not released from their constitutional relations. 2 Until the rebellion was overthrown their
position was peculiar ; they had disloyal governments
exercising all the ordinary powers of sovereignty, with
courts administering justice between man and man, and
t The case of Utah.
The facts concerning the admission of
States to the Union are all collected, and the principles discussed, in
Jameson on Constitutional Conventions.
1 White v. Cannon, 6 Wall. 443; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700;
Shortridge t'. Macon, Chase's Dec. 136; Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. Rep.

454.
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legislatures passing laws of general, but also of purely

local concern. When resistance to the federal government

ceased, regard to the best interests of all concerned

required that such governmental acts as had no connection

with the disloyal resistance to government, and upon the

basis of which the people had acted and had acquired

rights, should be suffered to remain undisturbed.1 But all

acts done in furtherance of the rebellion were absolutely

void, and private rights could not be built up under, or

in reliance upon them.2 To restore the States to their

former place in the Union, no new admission was required,

but they were restored to their full constitutional powers

as rightful members of the Union, when the fact was rec-

ognized by the political departments of the government,

and their senators and representatives were admitted to

seats in Congress.8

States from other States. — The Constitution further pro-

vides that "no new State shall be formed or erected

within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State

be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts

of States, without the consent of the legislatures of the
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States concerned, as well as of the Congress."4 The

political departments of the government practically decided

in the case of Virginia that, when a State goes into rebel-

lion, any part of it, however small, which remains loyal,

may with the consent of Congress maintain a loyal state

government for the whole State, and that this government

1 Keppel v. Railroad Co., Chase's Dec. 167; Cook v. Oliver, 1

Woods, 437; Hatch v. Burroughs, 1 Woods, 439; Thorington v.

Smith, 8 Wall. 1; Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570; Sprott v.

United States, 20 Wall. 459; Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. Rep. 594.

* Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 342; Hanauer v. Woodruff, 15 Wall.

439; Sprott v. United States, 20 Wall. 459; Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S.

Rep. 594.

» Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700; Keith o. Clark, 97 U. S. Rep. 454.

♦ Const., Art. IV. § 3, cL 1.

legislatures passing laws of general, but also of purely
local concern. 'Vhen resistance to the federal government
ceased, regard to the best interests of all concerned
required that such governmental acts as had no connection
with the disloyal resistance to government, and upon the
basis of which the people had acted and had acquired
iights, should be suffered to remain undisturbed. 1 But all
acts done in furtherance of the rebellion were absolutely
void, and private rights could not be built up under, or
in reliance upon them. i To restore the States to their
former place in the Union, no new admission was required,
but they were restored to their full constitutional powers
as rightful members of the Union, when the fact was recognized by the political departments of the government,
and thefr senators and representatives were admitted to
seats in Congress. 8
States from other States. - The Constitution further provides that '' oo new State shall be formed or erected
within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State
be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts
of States, without the consent of the legislatures of the
States concerned, as well as of the Congress." 4 The
political departments of the government practically decided
in the case of Virginia that, when a State goes into rebellion, any part of it, however small, which remains loyal,
may with the consent of Congress maintain a loyal state
government for the whole State, and that this government
1 Keppel i·. Railroad Co., Chase's Dec. 167; Cook v. Oliver, 1
Woods, 437; Hatch v. Burroughs, 1 Woods, 439; Thorington i•.
Smith, 8 Wall. 1; Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570 ; Sprott v.
United States, 20 Wall. 459; Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. Rep. 594.
t Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 342 ; Hanauer v. Woodruff, 15 Wall.
439; Sprott v. United States, 20 Wall. 459; Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S.
Rep. 694.
a Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700; Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. Rep. 464.
t Const., Art. IV. § 8, cl. 1.
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may give consent to the erection of a new State within the

limits of the old, and the legislatures of the old and new

States may agree upon conditions. It is competent in

such a case to make the annexing of a certain part of the

old State to the new depend upon a favorable vote of the

electors within such territory; and when that is done, and

the governor is given power to certify the result, his cer-

tificate that the vote was favorable, especially if accepted

and acted upon by the new State by the extension of

jurisdiction over the territory, is conclusive.1 It is not

necessary that the consent of Congress to the formation

of the new State should be given in express terms, but

it may be implied from its legislation recognizing such

State.2

Territorial Laws. — A State coming into the Union

brings with it the pre-existing law, except so far as ex-

pressly or by necessary implication it is changed by the

Constitution, or by the passage from a territorial to a

state condition. All those laws which relate to the terri-

torial condition and circumstances exclusively become of

necessity inoperative.
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Conditions to Admission.—In several instances Con-

gress has prescribed conditions to the admission of States

to the Union. When Missouri applied for admission, the

constitution which was presented contained a clause re-

quiring the legislature to pass such laws as might be

found necessary " to prevent free negroes and mulattoes

from coming to and settling in this State, under any

pretext whatsoever." The State was received into the

1 Virginia «. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39; Kanawha Coal Co. v.

Kanawha, &c. Coal Co., 7 Blatch. 391.

2 Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39. There is a provision in

the joint resolution for the annexation of Texas for the formation of

four other States from its territory, with the consent of the State;

but no action to that end was ever taken.

may give consent to the erection of a new State within the
limit~ of the old, and the legislatures of the old and new
States may agree upon conditions. It is competent in
such a case to make the annexing of a certain part of the
old State to the new depend upon a favorable vote of the
electors within such territory ; and when that is done, and
the governor is given power to certify the result, his certificate that the vote was favorable, especially if accepted
and acted upon by the new State by the extension of
jurisdiction over the territory, is conclusive. 1 It is not
necessary that the consent of Congress to the formation
of the new State should be given in express terms, but
it may be implied from its legislation recognizing such
State. 2
Territorial Laws. -A State coming into the Union
brings with it the pre-~xisting law, except so far as expressly or by necessary implication it is changed by the
Constitution, or by the passage from a tetTitorial to a
state condition. All those laws which relate to the tenitorial condition and circumstances exclusively become of
necessity inoperative.
Conditions to Admission. -In several instances Congress has prescribed conditions to the admission of States
to the Union. When Missouri applied for admission, the
constitution which was presented contained .a clause requiring the legislature to pass such 'laws as might be
found necessary ''to prevent free negroes and mulattoes
from coming to and settling in this State, under any
pretext whatsoever." The State was received into the

.

1 Virginia u. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 89; Kanawha Coal Co. v.
Kanawha, &c. Coal Co., 7 Bla.tch. 391.
2 Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39.
There is a provision in
the joint resolution for the anbexation of Texas for the formation of
four other States from its territory, with the consent of the State;
but no action to that end was ever taken.
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Union on condition that a solemn pledge should be given

by its legislature that the constitution should never be

construed to authorize the passage of any act, and that

no act should be passed, by which any of the citizens of

other States should be excluded from the enjoyment of

any of the privileges and immunities to which they are en- t

titled under the Constitution of the United States. Pre-

sumably this would cover the privilege of colored citizens

of other States to emigrate into Missouri, if they should

see fit.1

The State of Michigan was admitted to the Union upon

the express condition that she should surrender to the

State of Ohio certain territory which had been the subject

of dispute between them, and her assent thereto was re-

quired to be given by a convention of delegates chosen by

the people for the sole purpose of giving such assent.2

The State of Arkansas was admitted to representation

in Congress, June 22, 1868, on the fundamental condition

"that the constitution of Arkansas shall never be so

amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class

of citizens of the United States of the right to vote,

who are entitled to vote by the constitution [then pre-
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sented by the State], except as a punishment for such

crimes as are now felonies at common law, whereof they

shall have been duly convicted, under laws equally applica-

ble to all the inhabitants of said State." The purpose

was to protect colored citizens in the enjoyment of the

elective franchise. The States of North Carolina, South

Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, and Florida were admitted

to representation, the same month, on a similar condition.

On the State of Georgia the same condition was imposed;

also the further conditions, that the fourteenth amendment

to the federal Constitution should be ratified, that certain

1 Benton's Thirty Years' View, ch. 2.

a Campbell's Hist, of Mich., ch. 14.

Union on condition that a solemn pledge should be given
by its legislature that the constitution should never be
construed to authorize the passage of any act, and that
no act should be passed, by which any of the citizens of
other States should be excluded from the enjoyment of
any of the privileges and immunities to which they are entitled under the Constitution of the United States. Presumably this would cover the privilege· of colored citizens
of other States to emigrate into Missouri, if they should
see fit. 1
The State of Michigan was admitted to the Union upon
the express condition that she should surrender to the
State of Ohio certain territory which had been the subject
of dispute between them, and her assent thereto was required to be given by a convention of delegates chosen by
the people for the sole purpose of giving such assent. i
The State of Arkansas was admitted to representation
in Congress, June 22, 1868, on the fundamental condition
'' that the constitution of Arkansas shall never be so
amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class
of citizens of the United States of the right to vote,
who are entitled to vote by the constitution [then presented by the State], except as a punishment for such
crimes as are now felonies at common law, whereof they
shall have been duly convicted, under laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State." The purpose
was to protect colored citizens in the enjoyment of the
elective franchise. The States of North Carolina, South
Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, and Florida were admitted
to representation, the same month, on a similar condition.
On the State of Georgia the same condition was imposed ;
also the further conditions, that the fourteenth amendment
to the federal Constitution should be ratified, that certain
1
1

Benton's Thirty Years' View, ch. 2.
Campbell's Hist. of Mich., ch. 14.
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provisions in her own constitution, not important to be

here repeated, should be " null and void," and that the

General Assembly of the State should by solemn public

act declare the assent of the State to the condition. The

State of Virginia was admitted to representation in Con-

gress, January 28, 1870, on the same condition with the

others mentioned, in respect to suffrage, and on the fur-

ther conditions, "that it shall never be lawful for the

said State to deprive any citizen of the United States, on

account of his race, color, or previous condition of servi-

tude, of the right to hold office under the constitution and

laws of said State, or upon any such ground to require of

him any other qualification for office than such as are re-

quired of all other citizens"; and "that the constitution

of Virginia shall never be so amended or changed as to

deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United

States of the school rights and privileges secured by

the constitution of said State." The States of Missis-

sippi and Texas were admitted to representation in the

following month, on the like conditions to those imposed

on Virginia.
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The State of Nebraska was admitted to the Union in

1868, with a proviso in the act of admission that it should

not take effect " except upon the fundamental condition

that within the State of Nebraska there shall be no denial

of the elective franchise, or of any other right, to any per-

son by reason of race or color, except Indians not taxed,

and upon the further fundamental condition that the legis-

lature of said State, by a solemn public act, shall declare

the assent of said State to the said fundamental condition,

and shall transmit to the President of the United States'

an authentic copy of said act. Upon receipt whereof the

President by proclamation shall forthwith announce the

fact; whereupon said fundamental condition shall be held

as a part of the organic law of the State; and thereupon,

provisions in her own constitution, not important to be
here repeated, should be "null and void," and that the ·
General Assemhly of the State should by solemn public
act declare the assent of the State to the condition. · The
State of Virginia was admitted to representation in Congress, January 28, 1870, on the same condition with the
others mentioned, in respect to suffrage, and on the further conditions, '' that it shall never be lawful for the
said State to deprive any citizen of the United States, on
account of his race, color, or previous cond.ition of servitude, of the right to hold office under the constitution and
laws of said State, or upon any such ground to require of
him any other qualification for office than such as are required of all other citizens"; and ''that the constitution
of Virginia shall never be so amended or changed as to
deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United
States of the school rights and privileges secured by
the constitution of said State." The States of Mississippi and Texas were admitted to representation in the
following month, on the like conditions to those imposed
on Virginia.
The State of Nebraska was admitted to the Union in
1868, with a proviso in the act of admission that it should
not take effect "except upon the fundamental condition
that within the State of Nebraska there shall be no denial
of the elective franchise, or of any other right, to any person by reason of race or color, except Indians not taxed,
and upon the further fundamental condition that the legislature of said State, by a solemn public act, shall declare
the assent of said State to the said fundamental condition,
and shall transmit to the President of the United States·
an authentic copy of said act. Upon receipt whereof the
President by proclamation shall forthwith announce the
fact ; whereupon said fundamental condition shall be held
as a part of the organic law of the State ; and thereupon,
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and without any further proceeding on the part of Con-

gress, the admission of said State into the Union shall

be considered as complete." The proclamation of the

President announcing the passage of such an act, and the

receipt of an authentic copy thereof, was issued on March

1, 1868.1

Other conditions have been imposed; and a common

requirement on the admission of a State is, that it shall

waive all right to impose taxes on the lands of the United

States. Some of these conditions are beyond question

irrevocable by the States. Such, for example, are those

last mentioned, which are irrevocable because they consti-

tute articles of compact between the State and the nation,

which would render the taxation void. Such also would

be a condition respecting boundary, as in the case of

Michigan. The condition in the case of Missouri merely

required the State to observe one of the stipulations in

the federal Constitution, which was as much obligatory

upon the State without the condition as with it. Whether

the legislature can give binding effect to a condition which

changes the constitution established by the people, is at

least doubtful. But when a State comes into the Union,
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it is received on an equal footing with the original States,

and with all their rights and privileges.2 It must there-

fore have the same power to amend its constitution which

is possessed by the other States, and a condition which

should undertake to limit its power in this regard must, in

a legal sense, be wholly inoperative. It is to be observed

of those which have been imposed, and which would limit

the power of amendment, that they have since been ren-

dered unimportant by amendments to the federal Consti-

tution.

1 See Butler v. People, 2 Nebraska, 198.

* Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Strader v. Graham, 10

How. 82; Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57.
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and without any further proceeding on the part of Congress, the admission of said State into the Union shall
be considered as complete." The proclamation of the
President announcing the passage of such an act, and the
receipt of an authentic copy thereof, was issued on March
1, 1868. 1
Other conditions have been imposed ; and a common
requirement on the admission of a State is, that it shall
waive all right to impose taxes on the lands of the United
States. Some of these conditions are beyond question
irrevocable by the States. Such, for example, are those
last mentioned, which are irrevocable because thev constitute articles of compact between the State and the nation,
which would render the taxation void. Such also would
be a condition respecting boundary, as in the case of
Michigan. The condition in the case of Missouri merely
required the State to observe one of the stipulations in
the federal Constitution, which was as much obligatory
upon the State without the condition as with it. Whether
the legislature can give binding effect to a condition which
changes the constitution established by the people" is at
least doubtful. But when a State comes into the Union,
it is received on an equal footing with the original States,
and with all their rights and privileges.~ It must therefore have the same power to amend its constitution which
is possessed by the other States, and a condition which
should undertake to limit its power in this regard must, in
a legal sense, be wholly inoperative. It is to be observed
of those which have been imposed, and which would limit
the power of amendment, that they have since been rendered unimportant by amendments to the federal Constitution.
See Butler v. People, 2 Nebraska, 198.
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 ; Strader t•. Graham, 10
How. 82 ; Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 67.
1
t
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CHAPTER X.

CONSTITUTIONAL RULES OF STATE COMITY.

Conflict of Laws. — It often happens that a right as-

serted or privilege claimed in one State will depend for its

validity upon something done by the parties concerned, or

by one of them, in some other State, whereby the right or

privilege became initiate, or perhaps perfected. In such

case the laws of both States are to be considered in order

to determine how they respectively affect the claims made.

In these cases the questions which arise are questions of

CHAPTER X.

inter-state comity, and, except as the provisions of the

federal Constitution affect and modify them, they are to be

governed by the rules of private international law, as they

CONSTITUTIONAL RULES OF STATE COMITY.

would be if the two States had been to each other foreign

nations.

The rules of private international law are taken notice

of and enforced by the courts just as are the general prin-

ciples of the common law; and the federal courts, like

those of the States, when administering justice within a

State between suitors entitled to bring suits therein, will

recognize and be governed by them. But, like other rules
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of law, they are subject to be varied and controlled by

state legislation, and there may be and often is a general

state policy upon some particular subject before which the

rules of private international law which are opposed to it

must give way.

A familiar instance of these rules is that which concerns

the title and transmission of personal property. The doc-

Oonftict of Laws. - It often happens that a iight asserted or privilege claimed in one State will depend for its
validity upon something done by the parties concerned, or
by one of them, in some other State, whereby the right or
privilege became initiate, or perhaps perfected. In such
case the laws of both States are to be considered in order
to determine how they respectively affect the claims made.
In these cases the questions which arise are questions of
inter-state comity, and, except as the provisions of the
federal Constitution affect and modify them, they are to be
governed by the_ rules of private international law, as they
would be if the two States had been to each other foreign
nations.
The rules of private international law are taken notice
of and enforced by the courts just as are the general principles of the common law ; and the federal courts, like
those of the States, when administering justice within a
State between suitors entitled to bring suits therein, will
recognize and. be governed by them. But, like other rules
•
of law, they are subject to be varied and controlled by
state legislation, and there may be and often is a general
state policy upon some particular subject before which the
rules of private international law which are opposed to it
must give way.
A familiar instance of these rules is that which concerns
the title and transmission of personal property. The doc-
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trine universally accepted is that chattels have no sitm,

but in contemplation of law adhere to the person of the

trine universally accepted is that chattels have no situ.1~
but in contemplation of law adhere to the person of the
owner, wherever he may be. 1 If actually in one State
while the owner has his domicile in another, the latter may
dispose of them according to the law of the domicile, and
his contracts or conveyances which are sufficient under
the law there will be held sufficient everywhere. So
his will, valid according to the laws of his domicile,
will be sufficient to dispose of them, and, if he dies
intestate, they will be distributed as they would be if
actually with him in. fact, as they were in contemplation
of law. 2 But while this case illustrates the general law, it
also enables us to appreciate and understand some important exceptions. One of these is that no sovereignty is
bound to recognize and give effect to a transfer of property which at the time is within its jurisdiction, unless all
just claims ivhich it may have, or which any of its citizens
may have, in respect to such property, are first satisfied.
Therefore, in a case of intestacy, if the State where the
property is has unsatisfied claims upon it for taxes, or if
any of its citizens have demands against the estate, it
may justly provide that all such claims and demands shall ·
be satisfied before the property will be handed over to an
administrator for distribution at the forum of the domicile. 8
Another is that a transfer actually made abroad, in which
both parties contemplate some use of the property in contravention of the· laws of the State where it has its situs,
and participate in a purpose to violate those laws, will not

owner, wherever he may be.1 If actually in one State

while the owner has his domicile in another, the latter may

dispose of them according to the law of the domicile, and

his contracts or conveyances which are sufficient under

the law there will be held sufficient everywhere. So

his will, valid according to the laws of his domicile,

will be sufficient to dispose of them, and, if he dies

intestate, they will be distributed as they would be if

actually with him in fact, as they were in contemplation

of law.2 But while this case illustrates the general law, it

also enables us to appreciate and understand some impor-

tant exceptions. One of these is that no sovereignty is

bound to recognize and give effect to a transfer of prop-

erty which at the time is within its jurisdiction, unless all

just claims which it may have, or which any of its citizens

may have, in respect to such property, are first satisfied.

Therefore, in a case of intestacy, if the State where the

\

property is has unsatisfied claims upon it for taxes, or if

any of its citizens have demands against the estate, it

may justly provide that all such claims and demands shall
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be satisfied before the property will be handed over to an

administrator for distribution at the forum of the domicile.8

Another is that a transfer actually made abroad, in which

both parties contemplate some use of the property in con-

travention of the laws of the State where it has its situs,

and participate in a purpose to violate those laws, will not

1 Harvey v. Richards, 1 Mason, 381; Oakey v. Bennett, 11 How.

33; Story, Confl. L., §§ 376-382.

2 Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Black. 665; Bank of Augusta v. Earle,

13 Pet. 519; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400; Despard v. Churchill,

53 N. Y. 192; Fuller v. Steiglitz, 27 Ohio.N. S. 355; 4 Kent, 513;

Whart., Confl. L., § 585; Story, Confl. L., § 464.

8 Swearingen v. Morris, 14 Ohio, N. S. 424; Grattan v. Appleton,

8 Story, 755; Hill v. Townsend, 24 Tex. 575.

1 Harvey v. Richards, 1 Mason, 381; Oakey v. Bennett, 11 How.
83; Story, Confl. L., §§ 376-882.
2 Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Black. 665; Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
13 Pet. 619; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400; Despard v. Churchill,
63 N. Y. 192; Fuller v. Steiglitz, 27 Ohio, N. S. 355; 4 Kent, 618;
Whart., Confl. L., § 585; Story, Conft. L., § 464.
1 Swearingen v. Morris, 14 Ohio, N~ S. 424; Grattan v. Appleton,
8 Story, 755; Hill v. Townsend, 24 Tex. 676.
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be recognized and supported in the last-mentioned State.1

In neither of these cases can there be any ground of inter-

state comity that could require the one sovereignty to sur-

render its own claims, or those of its citizens, in favor of

claims abroad which could be no more substantial or equi-

table, or that could call upon it to waive its local laws in

favor of those who might choose a foreign territory as the

theatre of their operations, for the express purpose of

evading and defeating them. But the general rule is, that,

when made in good faith, the validity and interpretation of

contracts are to be governed by the law of the State

where they are made, unless they are to be performed in

another State, in which case they will be governed by the

law of the State of performance.2 And under these rules

all States will furnish suitable remedies for the enforce-

ment of contracts within their own limits, as it may be-

come necessary. The remedies in any case, however,

will be such only as are provided by its own laws.8

The cases of marriage and divorce raise frequent ques-

tions growing out of differences in the law where a mar-

riage or a divorce may take place, and the law where the
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parties may afterwards be found domiciled. The rule of

la*w with respect to marriages is, that, if they are valid

where entered into, they are valid everywhere ;4 but this is

1 Waymell v. Reed, 5 T. R. 599; Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat.

258; Webster v. Munger, 8 Gray, (Mass.) 584; Smith v. Godfrey,

28 N. H. 379; Wilson v. Stratton, 47 Me. 120; Rorer, Inter-State

Law, 198; Story, Confl. L., § 246 et seq.

2 Bank of United States v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 361; Andrews v.

Pond, 13 Pet. 65; De Wolf v. Johnson, 10 Wheat. 367; Story, Confl.

L., § 242.

» Bank of United States v. Donnally, 8 Pet 361; Wilcox v. Hunt,

13 Pet. 378; Scudder v. National Bank, 91 U. S. Rep. 406, 413; Story,

Confl. L, § 556.

* Medway ». Needham, 16 Mass. 157; Ponsford ». Johnson, 2

Blatch. 51; Whart., Confl. L., § 127.

be recognized and supported in the last-mentioned State. 1
In neither of these cases can there be any ground of interstate comity that could require the one sovereignty to surrender its own claims, or those of its citizens, in favor of
claims abroad which could be no more substantial or equitable, or that could call upon it to waive its local laws in
favor of those who might choose a foreign territory as the
theatre of their operations, for the express purpose of
evading and defeating them. But the general rule is, that,
when made in good faith, the validity and interpretation of
contracts are to be governed by the law of the State
where they are made, unless they are to be performed in
another State, in which case they will be governed by the
law of the State of performance. 2 And under these rules
all States will furnish suitable remedies for the enforcement of contracts within their own limits, as it may become necessary. The remedies in any case, however,
will be such only as are provided by its own laws. 8
The cases of marriage and divorce raise frequent questions growing out of differences in the law where a marriage pr a divorce may take place, and the law where the
parties may afterwards be found domiciled. The rule of
litw with respect to marriages is, that, if they are valid
where entered into, they are valid everywhere;' but this is
1 Waymell v. Reed, 6 T. R. 699; Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat.
258; Webster v. Munger, 8 Gray, (Mass.) 684; Smith v. Godfrey,
28 N. H. 379; Wilson v. Stratton, 47 Me! 120; Rorer, Inter-State
Law, 198; Story, Conft. L., § 246 et seq.
t Bank of United States v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 361 ; Andrews v.
Pond, 13 Pet. 65; De Wolf v. Johnson, 10 Wheat. 367; Story, Conft.
L., § 242.
I Bank of United States v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 861 ; Wilcox t'. Hunt,
18 Pet. 878; Scudder v. National Bank, 91 U.S. Rep. 406, 418; Story,
Conft. L., § 656.
' Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 167; Ponsford v. Johnson, 2
Blatch. 61 ; Whart., Conft. L., § 127.
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subject to exceptions in the case of polygamous marriages,

and marriages which would be incestuous according to the

laws of nature as commonly understood, by which we must

perhaps understand only marriages between brothers and

sisters, and marriages in the direct lineal line of consan-

guinitj-.1 The importance of this relation is so great, and

the mischiefs that would flow from its being held invalid

where the parties have intended that it should exist, are

so serious, that marriages are sustained even where par-

ties, who are not allowed to marry by the laws of the

State of their domicile, have gone abroad and been mar-

ried, subsequently returning to reside.2 In respect to

divorce a like rule prevails, that a divorce valid where

granted is valid everywhere; but every State will pro-

tect any of its own citizens against being defrauded by

a divorce obtained abroad by fraud, or granted without

iurisdiction.8

Penal Actions. — In some cases rights of action are

given by a sovereignty which others are not expected to

recognize, and which therefore can only be enforced within

the territorial limits of the sovereignty creating or giving

the right. Of these is the right to recover a statutory
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penalty. Being given by statute, this is recoverable only

where the statute is law.4 So where by statute an action

is given against one who, by wrongful act, neglect, or de-

fault, shall cause the death of another, a recovery in such

a case not being allowed at the common law, the courts of

1 Sutton v. Warren, 10 Met. (Mass.) 451; Wightman v. Wightman,

4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 343.

2 Sutton r. Warren, 10 Met. (Mass.) 451; State ». Ross, 76 N. C.

242; Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458; Bishop, Mar. and Div.,

ch. 21.

8 Rorer, Inter-State Law, 181, 182.

« First National Bank v. Price, 33 Md. 487; Barnes v. Whittaker,

22 111. 606; Graham v. Monseigh, 22 Vt. 543; Richardson v. Burling-

ton, 33 N. J. 100.

subject to exceptions in the case of polygamous marriages,
and marriages which would be incestuous according to the
laws of nature as commonly understood, by which we must
perhaps understand only marriages between brothers and
flisters, and marriages in the direct lineal line of consanguinity . 1 The importance of this relation is so great, and
the mischiefs that would flow from its being held invalid
where the parties have intended that it should exist, are
so serious, that marriages are sustained even where parties, who are not allowed to marry by the laws of the
State of their domicile, have gone abroad and been married, subsequently returning to reside. 2 In respect to
divorce a like rule prevails, that a divorce valid where
granted is valid everywhere ; but every State will protect any of its own citizens against being defrauded bJ
a divorce obtained abroad by fraud, or granted without
iurisdiction. 8
Penal .Actions. - In some cases rights of action are
given by a sovereignty which others are not expected to
recognize, and which therefore can only be enforced within
the territolial limits of the sovereignty creating or giving
the right. Of these is the right to recover a statutory
penalty. Being given by statute, this is recoverable only
where the statute is law} So where by statute an action
is given against one who, by wrongful act, neglect, or default, shall cause the death of another, a recovery in such
a case not being allowed at the common law, the courts ot
1 Sutton v. Warren, 10 Met. (Mass.) 451; Wightman v. Wightman,
4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 343.
2 Sutton r'. 'Varren, 10 Met. (Mass.) 451 ; State v. Ross, 76 N. C.
242 ; Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458; Bishop, Mar. and Div.,
ch. 21.
8 Rorer, Inter-State Law, 181, 182.
' First National Barnk v. Price, 33 Md. 487; Barnes v. Whittaker,
22 Ill. 606 ; Graham v. Monseigh, 22 Vt. 643; Richardson v. Burlington, 33 N. J. 100.
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other states and countries will not recognize and en

force the right.1

Local and Transitory Actions. — There are also some

cases of common-law actions in which the remedy was

always held to be local, and which consequently must be

brought within the jurisdiction where the injury complained

of was committed. From the necessity of the case, actions

for the recovery of lands must belong to this class, since

process to enforce the right when it should be established

could be served only where the land was situated. But all

actions for injuries to real estate are in the same category,

and, even when they may be instituted in the federal

courts, they must be brought in the district within which

the land lies.2 On the other hand, all actions for merely

personal injuries, or for injuries to personal estate, and all

actions upon contract, may be brought wherever personal

service may be obtained, and it is immaterial to the rem-

edy in what jurisdiction the cause of action arose, though

the local law must be looked to in order to determine the

validity and construction of the contract, and the liability

of the party sued in respect to that which is complained of.
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In cases of contract the remedies which other States give

are not usually limited to those in which a personal service

is obtained, but attachment and garnishment process are

allowed to reach property and debts where personal ser-

vice cannot be had; though in cases of tort process for

attaching property and demands when the defendant him-

self cannot be found is not commonly allowed.

Corporations. — In strict law the corporations chartered

1 Selma, &c. R. R. Co. v. Lacy, 43 Geo. 461; Whitford ». Pan-

ama R. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 465; McCarthy v. Railroad Co., 18 Kan. 46;

Richardson v. Railroad Co., 98 Mass. 85.

2 Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock. 203; McKenna v. Fiske, 1 How.

241; Rundle v. Del. & Rar. Canal, 1 Wall. C. C. 275; Worster v. Lakti

Co., 25 N. H. 525.

other states and countries will not recognize and en
force the right. 1
Local and Transitory .Actions. -There are also sorue
cases of common-law actions in which the remedy was
always held to be local, and which consequently must be
brought within the jurisdiction where the injury complained
of was committed. From the necessity of the case, actions
for the recovery of lands must belong to this class, since
process to enforce the right when it should be established
could be served only where the land was situated. But all
actions for injuries to real estate are in the same category,
and, even when they may be instituted in the federal
courts, they must be brought in the district within which
the land lies. 2 On the other hand, all actions for merely
personal injuries, or for injuries to personal estate, and all
actions upon contract, may be brought wherever personal
service may be obtained, and it is immaterial to the remedy in what jurisdiction the cause of action arose, though
the local law must be looked to in order to determine the
validity and construction of the contract, and the liability
of the party sued in respect to that which is complained of.
In cases of con tract the remedies which other States give
are not usually limited to those in which a personal service
is obtained, but attachment and garnishment process are
allowed to reach property and debts where personl 1 service cannot be had ; though in cases of tort process for
attaching property and demands when the defendant himself cannot be found is not commonly allowed.
Corporations. - In strict law the corporations chartered
1 Selma, &c. R. R. Co. v. Lacy, 43 Geo. 461; Whitford v. Panama. R. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 465; McCarthy t'. Railroad Co., 18 Kan. 46 ;

Richardson v. Railroad Co., 98 Mass. 85.
2 Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock. 203; McKenna v. Fiske. 1 How.
241 ; Rundle "·Del. & Ra.r. Canal, 1 Wall. C. C. 276; Worster v. La ku
Co., 25 N. H. 626.
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by one sovereignty have no authority to exercise their

franchises in another, except as the latter shall permit;1

but by comity they are suffered to do so, where it would

not contravene any principle of local policy, or any gen-

eral statute, but subject to such restrictions as the State

may see fit to impose.2 The power to impose restrictions,

however, must be subordinate to the Constitution and laws

of the United States. A State could not, for example,

interpose a restriction that would in effect constitute a reg-

ulation of inter-state commerce,8 or that would restrain the

corporation from resorting to the federal jurisdiction in

cases within the laws of Congress.4 But no corporation

can of right hold real property in a State except by per-

mission of the State; and though the permission will be

implied wherever there appears no state statute or policy

to the contrary,6 yet, as against an express inhibition to

give lands by will to any but natural persons, not even the

United States can receive a valid devise.6

The Constitution.—There are some cases which it was

deemed wise, in framing the Constitution, not to leave to

comity merely, because they concerned so intimately the

relations of the people of the several States to each other
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that any differences in legislation in respect to them, or

any divergency in judicial decision, might lead to infi-

nite contentions and mischiefs. One of these concerned

the use in the States respectively of the statutes, records,

1 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404; Bank of Augusta

v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Ducat v. Chi-

cago, 10 Wall. 410; Whart,, Confl. L., § 48.

2 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410;

Re Comstock, 3 Sawyer, 218; 2 Kent, 284, 285.

» Pensacola Tel. Co. v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. Rep. 1.

* Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445.

6 Runyan v. Coster, 14 Pet. 122; Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich.

6 United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. Rep. 315.
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by one sovereignty have no authority to exercise their
franchises in another, except as the latter shall permit; 1
but by comity they are suffered to do so, where it would
not contravene any principle of local policy, or any general statute, but subject to such restrictions as the State
may see fit to impose.~ The power to impose restrictions,
however, must be subordinate to the Constitution and laws
of the United States. A State could not, for example,
interpose a restriction that would in effect constitute a regulation of inter-state commerce, 8 or that would restrain the
corporation from resorting to the federal jurisdiction in
cases within the laws of Congress.• But no corporation
can of right hold real property in a State except by permission of the State ; and though the permission will be
implied wherever there appears no state statute or policy
to the contrary, 6 yet, as against an express inhibition to
give lands by will to any but natural persons, not even the
United States can receive a valid devise. 6
The Gonst1~tution. -There are some cases which it was
deemed wise, in framing the Constitution, not to leave to
comity merely, because they concerned so intimately the
relations of the people of the several States to each other
that any differences in legislation in respect to them, or
any divergency in judicial decision, might lead to infinite contentions and mischiefs. One of these concerned
the use in the States respectively of the statutes, records,
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404; Bank of Augusta
v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Paul t'. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410; Whn.rt., Confl. L., § 48.
2 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410;
Re Comstock, 3 Sawyer, 218; 2 Kent, 284, 285.
a Pensacola Tel. Co. v. West. Un. Tel. Qo., 96 U.S. Rep. 1.
' Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445.
6 Runyan v. Coster, 14 Pet. 122; Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich.
214.
e United States 1'. Fox, 94 U. S. Rep. 315.
1
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and judicial proceedings of other States, whether as mat-

ters of evidence or as muniments of title. The common

law had rules under which these might be proved, but

these rules were subject to legislative modification at dis-

cretion, and it was not improbable that, if the States were

left to themselves to establish independent regulations,

those made by them would not only be wanting in uni-

formity, but they would tend to breed discord, instead of

preserving fraternal feeling, among the States. It is easy

to understand how a State, from temporary prejudices or

adverse interests, or even from more reprehensible rea-

sons, might legislate to prevent the reception in evidence

of the records, and especially the judicial proceedings,

of other States. It is conceivable, for example, that,

in a time of great financial distress in a new State, legis-

lation might be obtained to protect people emigrating to

and settling within the State even as against the just

judgments rendered against them in the States from

which they came, and still remaining unsatisfied. This

would not only be unjust in itself and disgraceful to the

State, but it would almost certainly lead to retaliatory

legislation.
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State Acts, Records, fyc. — Among the preventive meas-

ures of the Constitution is the provision that "Full faith

and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts,

records, and judicial proceedings of every other State.

And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the

manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings

shall be proved, and the effect thereof."1

By this provision a rule of comity becomes a rule of

constitutional obligation. It also becomes a uniform rule,

and the common authority is empowered to pass laws

whereby the courts may govern their action in receiving

or rejecting the evidences presented to them of the public

1 Const., Art. IV. § 1.

and judicial proceedings of other States, whether as matters of evidence or as muniments of title. The common
law had rules under which these might be proved, but
these rules were subject to legislative modification at discretion, and it was not improbable that, if the States were
left to themselves to establish independent regulations,
those made by them would not only be wanting in uniformity, but they would tend to breed discord, instead of
preserving fraternal feeling, among the States. It is easy
to understand how a State, from temporary prejudices or
adverse interests, or even from more reprehensible reasons, might legJslate to prevent the reception in evidence
of· the records, and especially the judicial proceedings,
of other States. It is conceivable, for example, that,
in a time of great financial distress in a new State, legislation might be obtained to protect people emigrating to
and · settling within the State even as against the just
judgments rendered against them in the States from
which they came, and still remaining unsatisfied. This
would not only be unjust in itself and disgraceful to the
State, but it would almost certainly lead to retaliatory
legislation.
State Acts, Records, ~c. -Among the preventive measures of the Constitution is the provision that '" Full faith
and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of eyery other State.
And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the
manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings
shall be proved, and the effect thereof." 1
By this provision a rule of comity becomes a rule of
constitutional obligation. It also becomes a uniform rul~,
and the common authority is empowered to pass laws
whereby the courts may govern their action in receiving
or rejecting the evidences presented to them of the public
1

Const., Art. IV. § 1.

CONSTITUTIONAL EXILES OF STATE COMITY. 185

CONSTITUTIONAL RULES OF STATE COMITY.

185

acts, records, and judicial: proceedings of other States.

Nor is this of more importance to the States as such,

than to those whose individual interests may be involved

or affected; and indeed the interests involved are usually

private and individual, rather than public.

The full faith and credit to which the public acts,

records, and proceedings are entitled in other States is

the same faith and credit to which they are entitled in

the State whose acts, records, and judicial proceedings

they are.1 When, therefore, suit is brought in one State

upon a judgment rendered by a court of another State,

and it appears that by the law of the last-mentioned State

it is conclusive upon the defendant, it must be held

equally conclusive in the court in which suit upon it is

brought.2 Whatever pleas would be good to it in the State

where it was pronounced, and none others, might be

pleaded to it in any other court within the United States.8

But the judgment can have no greater or other force

abroad than at home, and therefore it is alwaj-s competent

to show that it is invalid for want of jurisdiction in the

court rendering it.* So anything that goes in release or

discharge of the judgment may be shown ;6 and the stat-
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ute of limitations of the State where suit is brought will

,be available, if the case comes within it.6 But it is not

competent for any State to pass an act of limitations

1 Armstrong v. Carson, 2 Dall. 302; Mills v. Duryea, 7 Cranch,

481; Hampton v. McConnell, 3 Wheat. 234; Field v. Gibbs, Pet. C. C.

155; Bryant v. Hunters, 3 Wash. C. C. 48; Nations v. Johnson, 24

How. 195, 203.

2 Mills o. Duryea, 7 Cranch, 481.

8 Hampton v. McConnell, 3 Wheat. 234; Green v. Van Buskirk,

7 Wall. 139.

* Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 334; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall.

108; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall.

457; Arnott v. Webb, 1 Dillon, 362; Whart, Confl. L., §§ 811, 819.

f Jacquette b. Hugunon, 2 McLean, 129.

acts, records, and judicial proceedings of other States.
Nor is this of more importance to the States as such,
than to those whose individual interests may be involved
or affected ; and indeed the interests involved are usually
piivate and individual,· rather than public.
The full faith and credit to which the public acts,
records, and proceedings are entitled in other States is
the same faith and credit to which they are entitled in
the State whose acts, records, and judicial proceedings
they are. 1 When, therefore, suit is brought in one State
upon a judgment rendered by a court of another State,
and it. appears that by the law of the last-mentioned State
it is conclusive upon the defendant, it must be held
equally conclusive in the court in which suit upon it is
brought. 2 Whatever pleas would be good to it in the State
where it was pronounced, and none others, might be
pleaded to it in any other court within the United States. 8
But the judgment can have no greater or other force
abroad than at home, and therefore it is always competent
to show that it is invalidr for want of jurisdiction in the
court rendering it.~ So anything that goes in release or
discharge of the judgment may be shown ; 6 and the statute of limitations of the State where suit is brought will
JJe available, if the case comes within it. 6 But it is not
competent for any State to pass an act of -limitations
1 Armstrong v. Carson, 2 Dall. 302 ; Mills v. Duryea, 7 Cranch,
481 ; Hampton v. McConnell, 3 Wheat. 234; Field v. Gibbs, Pet. C. C.
165; Bryant v. Hunters, 3 Wash. C. C. 48; Nations v. Johnson, 24
How. 195, 203.
2 Mills v. Duryea, 7 Cranch, 481.
3 Hampton v. McConnell, 3 Wheat. 234:; Green v. Van Buskirk,
7 Wall. 139.
' Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 334; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall.
108; Calpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall.
467; Arnott v. Webb, 1 Dillon, 362; Whart., Confi. L., §§ 811, 819.
" Jacquette v. Hugunon, 2 McLean, 129.
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which would in effect nullify judgments rendered in other

States, and allow no remedy upon them whatever. Rea-

sonable opportunity to enforce a demand must always be

afforded.1

Constructive service of process by publication or attach-

ment of property is sufficient to enable the courts of a

State to subject property within it to their jurisdiction, in

such cases as the statutes of the State may provide there-

for; but such a service cannot be the foundation of a per-

sonal judgment.2 Process from the tribunals of one State

cannot run into another State and summon parties there

domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings

against them. Publication of process or notice within the

State where the tribunal sits cannot create any greater

obligation upon the non-resident to appear. Process sent

to him out of the State, and process published within it,

are equally unavailable in proceedings to establish his per-

sonal liability.8 But in respect to the res, a judgment in

rem, rendered with competent jurisdiction, is conclusive

everywhere.4

Legislation. — Congress has legislated upon this subject

by providing that "The acts of the legislature of any
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State or .Territory, or of any country subject to the juris-

diction of the United States, shall be authenticated by,

having the seal of such Territory, State, or countrj- affixed

thereto. The records and judicial proceedings of the

courts of any State or Territory, or of any such country,

ishall be proved or admitted, in any other court within the

United States, by the attestation of the clerk and the seal

of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with the

1 Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290.

2 Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 9 How. 336; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10

Wall. 308.

8 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. Rep. 714, 727.

4 D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165; Williams v. Armroyd, 7

Cranch, 42a

which would in effect nullify judgments rendered in other
')tates, and allow no remedy upon them whatever. Reasonable opportunity to enforce a demand must always be
afforded. 1
Constructive service of process by publication or attachment of property is sufficient to enable the courts of a
State to subject property within it to their jurisdiction, in
such cases as the statutes of the State may provide therefor ; but such a service cannot be the foundation of a personal judgment. 2 Process from the tribunals of one State
cannot run into another State and summon parties there
domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings
against them. Publication of process or notice within the
State where the tribunal sits cannot create any greater
obligation upon the non-resident to appear. Process sent
to him out of the State, and process published within it,
are equally unavailable in proceedings to establish his personal liability. 8 But in respect to the res, a judgment in
rem, rendered with competent jurisdiction, is conclusive
,
everywhere. 4
Legislation. - Congress has legislated upon this subject
by providing that '' The acts of the legislature of any
State or ,Territory, or of any country subject to the jmisdiction of the United States, shall be authenticated by.
having the seal of such Territory, State, or country affixed
thereto. The records and judicial proceedings of the
courts of any State or Terlitory, or of any such country,
1shall be proved or admitted, in any other court within the
United States, by the attestation of the clerk and the seal
of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with the
Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290.
Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 9 How. 336; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10
Wall. 308.
a Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. Rep. 714, 727.
' D' Arey v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165 ; Williams v. Armroyd, 7
Cranch, 423.
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certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magis-

trate, that the said attestation is in due form. And the

said records and judicial proceedings, so authenticated,

shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court

within the United States as they have by law or usage in

the courts of the State from which they are taken."1 This

law provides what shall be sufficient in all cases, but it

does not preclude the States making other regulations, not

in conflict with these, for themselves, nor does it prevent

making proof of records in common-law modes.2

Privileges and Immunities of Citizens.—The next suc-

ceeding provision is that "the citizens of each State

shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of

citizens of the several States." 8

The privileges and immunities here in question are those

only which belong to state citizenship, and which, but for

this provision, might be within the reach of unfriendly

state legislation. A complete enumeration of them has

never been attempted. Mr. Justice Washington thought

thej- might be '' all comprehended under the following gen-

eral heads: protection by the government, the enjoyment

of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
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property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain hap-

piness and safety, subject nevertheless to such restraints

as the government may justly prescribe for the general

good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one State to

pass through or to reside in any other State, for purposes

of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise, to

claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus, to institute and

maintain actions of every kind in the courts of the State,

to take, hold, and dispose of property, either real or per-

sonal, and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions

1 Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 905.

2 Gaines v. Relf, 12 How. 472; White v. Burnley, 20 How. 235.

8 Const., Art. IV. § 2, cl. 1.

certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, that the said attestation is in due form. And the
said records and judicial proceedings, so authenticated,
shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court
within the United States as they have by law or usage in
the courts of the State from which they are taken." 1 This
law provides what shall be sufficient in all cases, but it
does not preclude the States making other regulations, not
in conflict with these, for themselves, nor does it prevent
making proof of records in common-law modes. 2
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens. - The next succeeding provision is that '' the citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the several States." 8
The privileges and immunities here in question are those
only which belong to state citizenship, and which, but for
this pi'ovision, might be within the reach of unfriendly
state legislation. A complete enumeration of them has
never been attempted. Mr. Justice Washington thought
they might be '' all comprehended under the following general heads : protection by the government, the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject nevertheless to such restraintet
as the government may justly prescribe for the general
good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one State to
pass through or to reside in any other State, for purposes
of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise, to
claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus, to instit~te and
maintain actions of every kind in the courts of the State,
to take, hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal, and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions
Rev. Stat. U.S. (1878), § 905.
Gaines v. Relf, 12 How. 472; White v. Burnley, 20 How. 235.
a Const., Art. IV. § 2, cl. 1.
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than are paid by the citizens of other States, may be men-

tioned as some of the principal privileges and immunities

of citizens which are clearly embraced by the general de-

scription of privileges deemed to be fundamental."1 Other

judges, while approving of this general enumeration, have

been careful to say that they deem it safer and more in

accordance with the duty of a judicial tribunal to leave

the meaning "to be determined in each case upon a

view of the particular rights asserted and denied therein.

And especially is this true when we are dealing with so

broad a provision, involving matters not only of great

delicacy and importance, but which are of such a character

that any merely abstract definition could scarcely be cor-

rect; and a failure to make it so would certainly produce

mischief." a

This much it is safe to say, that, "according to the ex-

press words and clear meaning of this clause, no privileges

are secured by it but those which pertain to citizenship." *

And the term citizens, as here used, applies only to nat-

ural persons, members of the bodj- politic, owing allegiance

to the State, and not to corporations, which are artificial
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persons created by the legislature, and possessing only the

attributes which the legislature has prescribed. It is true

that corporations are permitted to sue in the federal courts

on an assumption that their members are citizens of the

State in which they have corporate being; but it has

never been held that they are citizens in the sense here

intended.4

It is not a privilege of a citizen of Mississippi that he

1 Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371, 380. And see Smith ».

Maryland, 18 How. 71; Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591; Ward v. Mary-

land, 12 Wall. 418.

2 Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591, 593; McCready v. Virginia, 94

U. S. Rep. 391, 395.

» Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591, 593.

* Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 177, 178.

than are paid by the citizens of other States, may be mentioned as some of the principal ptivileges and immunities
of citizens which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental." 1 Other
judges, while approving of this general enumeration, have
been careful to say that they deem it safer and more in
accordance with the duty of a judicial tribunal to leave
the meaning ''to be determined in each case upon a
view of the particular rights asserted and denied therein.
And especially Is this true when we are dealing with so
broad a provision, involving matters not only of great
delicacy and importance, but which are of such a character
that any merely abstract de~nition could scarcely be correct ; and a failure to make it so would certainly produce
mischief." t
This much it is safe to say, that, '' according to the express words and clear meaning of this clause, no pri'vileges
are secured by it but those which pertain to citizenship." 8
And the term citizens, as here used, applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic, owing allegiance
to the State, and not to corporations, which are artificial
persons created by the legislature, and possessing only the
attributes which the legislature has prescribed. It is true
that corporations are permitted to sue in the federal courts
on an assumption that their members are citizens of the
State in which they have corporate being ; but it has
never been held that they are citizens in the sense here
intended.•
It is not a privilege of a citizen of Mississippi that he
1

Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 871, 880. And see Smith v.
Maryland, 18 How. 71; Connerv. Elliott, 18 How. 591; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418.
9 Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591, 593; McCready v. Virginia, 94
U. S. Rep. 891, 895.
• Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591, 698.
' Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 177, 178.
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shall have in Louisiana such rights in property under and

by virtue of the marriage relation as are given by the laws

of the latter State to those who are married or reside

therein. Every State regulates these rights for its own

people according to its own views of right and policy.1

Neither is it a privilege of state citizenship to take fish in

the public waters of other States. Fisheries in public

waters belong to the State in /which they are, and the

State may provide how they may be made available for'

the advantage of its people. Therefore a state enact-

ment by which others than citizens of the State are for-

bidden to plant 0j-sters in the soil covered by tide waters,

is not unconstitutional. The people of the State, and they

alone, own the property; and they own it, not by virtue

of citizenship merely, but of citizenship and domicile

united; that is to say, by virtue of a citizenship confined

to that particular locality.2

That the taxation of a State which discriminates against

the citizens of other States is repugnant to the provision

under consideration, has been generally conceded. A stat-

ute imposing license fees on those carrying on mercantile

business, but discriminating against those not permanent
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residents of the State, is therefore invalid.8

Extradition of Offenders. — The Constitution further pro-

vides that " a person charged in any State with treason,

felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be

found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive

authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered

1 Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591.

a McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. Rep. 391,396; State v. Medbury,

3 R. I. 138; Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 340; Slaughter v. Common-

wealth, 13 Grat. 767; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46. Before slavery

was abolished, it was not one of the privileges of state citizenship for

a master to take his slaves with him in passing through a free State,

and hold them there in servitude. Lemmon v. People, 20 N. Y. 562.

8 Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418.

shall have in Louisiana such rights in prop~rty under and
by virtue of the marriage relation as are given by the laws
of the latter State to those who are married or reside
therein. Every State regulates these rights for its own
people according to its own views qf right and policy. 1
Neither is it a privilege of state citizenship to take fish in
the public waters of other States. Fisheries in public
waters belong to the State in ,which they are, and the
State may provide how they may be made available for '
the advantage of its · people. Therefore a state enactment by which others than citizens of the State are forbidden to plant oysters in the soil coYered by tide waters,
is not unconstitutional. The people of the State, and they
alone, own the property ; and they own it, not by virtue
of citizenship merely, but of citizenship and domicile
united; that is to say, by virtue of a citizenship confined
to that particular locality. t
That the taxation of a State which discriminates against
. the citizens of other States is repugnant to the provision
under consideration, has been generally conceded. A statute imposing license fees on those carrying on mercantile
business, but discriminating against those not permanent
residents of the State, is therefore invalid. 8
Extradition of Offenders. -The Constitution further provides that ''a person charged in any State with treason,
felony, or other crime, who' shall flee from justice and be
found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive
authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered
Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 691.
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. Rep. 891, 896; State v. Medbury,
8 R. I. 138; Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 840; Slaughter v. Common·
wealth, 13 Grat. 767 ; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46. Before slavery
was abolished, it was not one of the privileges of state citizenship for
a master to take his slaves with him in passing through a free State,
and hold them there in servitude. Lemmon v. People, 20 N. Y. 662.
a Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418.
1
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up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the

crime."1

Whatever doubt there may have been formerly on the

subject, it is now settled that statutory crimes, though of

recent creation, are as much within this provision as crimes

existing at the common law or created by statute previous

to the adoption of the Constitution.2 It is not clear, how-

ever, that every possible offence against the laws was

meant to be included. The word crime is made use of

very commonly as embracing only serious offences, in con-

tradistinction to misdemeanor, which is given to such

trivial offences as are but lightly punished ;8 but the line

of division between the two is not clearly drawn, and is

not the same in different States.

No case comes within the Constitution unless there has

been a fleeing from justice. This implies that the person

accused must have been within the jurisdiction of the State

accusing him, and must have fled therefrom. If in fact he

was never within it, he cannot have fled from its justice;

and therefore a person who in another State may have

conspired with others to commit an offence in Missouri,
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is not demandable by Missouri as a fugitive.4 But if he

was within the State at the time of committing the offence,

he is to be held a fugitive if he left without awaiting the

consequences of his conduct.6

The charge against the accused must be made in some

due form of law, in some species of judicial proceeding

instituted in the State from which he is a fugitive. It will

i Const., Art. IV. § 2, cl. 2.

2 Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66; Matter of Clark, 9 Wend.

(N. Y.) 212.

8 Hughes's Case, 1 Phil. (N. C.) 57, 64 ; Morton v. Skinner, 48 Ind.

123; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366.

4 Ex parte Smith, 3 McLean, 133.

6 Matter of VoorheeB, 82 N. J. 141; Spear on Extradition, 313,

314.

up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the
crime." 1
Whatever doubt there may have been formerly on the
subject, it is now settled that statutory crimes, though of
recent creation, are as much within this provision as crimes
existing at the common law or created by statute previous
to the adoption of the Constitution.~ It is not clear, however, that every possible offence against the laws was
meant to be included. The word crime is made use of
very commonly as embracing only serious offences, in contradistinction to misdemeanor, which is given to such
trivial offences as are but lightly punished ; 8 but the line
of division between the two is not clearly drawn, and is
not the same in different States.
No case comes within the Constitution unless there has
been a fleeing from justice. This implies that the person
accused must have been within the jurisdiction of the State
accusing him, and must have fled therefrom. If in fact he
was never within it, he cannot have fled from its justice ;
and therefore a person who in another State may have
conspired with others to commit an offence in Miggouri.,
is not demandable by Missouri as a fugitive.' But if he
was within the State at the time of committing the offence,
he is to be held a fugitive if he left without awaiting the
consequences of his conduct. 6
The charge against the accused must be made in some
due form of law, in some species of judicial proceeding
instituted in the State from which he is a fugitive. It will
Const., Art. IV. § 2, cl. 2.
Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66; Matter of Clark, 9 Wend.
(N. Y.) 212.
a Hughes's Case, 1 Phil. (N. C.) 67, 64; Morton v. Skinner, 48 Ind.
128; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366.
' Ex parte Smith, 8 McLean, 188.
6 Matter of Voorhees, 82 N. J. 141 ; Spear on Extradition, 818,
814.
1
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not be sufficient unless it contains all the legal requisites

for the arrest of the accused and his detention for trial, if

he were then within the State. Therefore, nothing short

of an indictment, or a complaint under oath, making out a

prima facie case, can be sufficient.1 This is to be pre-

sented to the executive of the same State as the foundation

for his demand; but the fact that he makes a requisition

based upon it is not conclusive of its sufficiency, and this

may be inquired into, not only by the executive on whom

demand is made, but also by the courts on habeas corpus in

case the accused is arrested. It has been decided in some

cases, however, that the courts of the State making the

demand should be left to decide on the sufficiency of their

own papers ;2 and this is a very proper course unless the

defects are very clear and unquestionable.

When demand is made in due form, it is the duty of the

executive on whom it is made to respond to it, and he has

no moral right to refuse.8 Nevertheless, if he does refuse,

no power has been conferred on the federal courts to com-

pel obedience,* and the governors of States have often

refused compliance with the demand, when in their opin-

ion substantial justice did not require it. The process is
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no doubt sometimes made use of to compel the settlement

of private demands; but this is an abuse which it is spe-

cially incumbent on the authorities of the State making

the demand to guard against, and if the executive of the

other State assumes to decide upon the good faith of the

demand, he takes upon himself a questionable responsi-

1 People v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182; State v. Hufford, 28 Iowa, 391;

Kingsbury's Case, 106 Mass. 223; Ex parte Cubreth, 49 Cal. 436;

Commonwealth v. Deacon, 10 S. & R. 125.

2 Johnson v. Riley, 13 Geo. 97; State v. Buzine, 4 Harr. (Del.)

672; Matter of Voorhees, 32 N. J. 141; Davis's Case, 122 Mass. 324;

Matter of Manchester, 5 Cal. 237; Ex parte Thornton, 4 Texas, 635.

• Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66.

* Kentucky ». Dennison, 24 How. 66.

not be sufficient unless it contains all the legal requisites
for the arrest of the accused and his detention for trial, if
he were then within the State. Therefore, nothing short
of an indictment, or a complaint under oath, making out a
prim a f acie case, can be sufficient. 1 This is to be presented to the executive of the same State as the foundation
for his demand ; but the fact that he makes a requisition
based upon it is not conclusive of its sufficiency, and this
may be inquired into, not only by the executive on whom
demand is made, but also by the courts on habeas corpus in
case the accused is arrested. It has been decided in some
cases, however, that the courts of the State making the
demand should be left to decide on the sufficiency of their
own pap_ers ; 2 and this is a yery proper course unless the
defects are very clear and unquestionable.
When demand is made in due form, it is the duty of the
executive on whom it is made to respond to it, and he has
no moral right to refuse. 8 Nevertheless, if he does refuse,
no power has been conferred on the federal courts to compel obedience,' and the governors of States have often
refused compliance with the demand, when in their opinion substantial justice did not require it. The process is
no doubt sometimes made use of to compel the settlement
of private demands ; but this is an abuse which it is specially incumbent on the authorities of the State making
the demand to guard against, and if the executive of the
other State assumes to decide upon the good faith of the
demand, he takes upon himself a questionable responsi1 People v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182; State v. Hufford, 28 Iowa, 301 ;
Kingsbury's Case, 106 Mass. 223; Ex parte Cubreth, 49 Cal. 436;
Commonwealth v. Deacon, 10 S. & R. 125.
2 Johnson v. Ril<'y, 13 Geo. 97; State v. Buzine, 4 Harr. (Del.)
672; Matter of Voorhees, :t2 N. J. 141 ; Davis's Case, 122 Mass. 324;
Matter of Manchester, 5 Cal. 237; Ex parte Thornton, 4 Texas, 635.
a Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66.
' Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66.
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bility, with very inadequate means of discharging it intelli-

gently and justly.

A person brought into a State on process of extradition,

it would seem, should be held privileged from prosecution

on any other charge until he has had opportunity to return

to the State which has surrendered him.1 But this priv-

ilege has not always been recognized.

If the State to which an offender has fled has herself

against him some unsatisfied demand of justice, it is

proper for her to proceed to enforce it before honoring a

requisition. No higher duty can be imposed upon her

than that to satisfy the demands of her own laws.2

Legislation.—The extradition of fugitives as between

the States has commonly been made under state legisla-

tion, and the States in passing laws on the subject appear

to have assumed that the duty imposed by the Consti-

tution was a state duty, performance of which was to be

demanded by one State and made by the other. Whether

this is strictly true, or whether, on the other hand, the

principles apply which govern in the surrender of fugi-

tives from service, and which would exclude legislation
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by the States,8 has never been decided. Congress, how-

ever, at an early day enacted that, " Whenever the execu-

tive authority of any State or Territory demands any

person, as a fugitive from justice, of the executive author-

ity of any State or Territory to which such person has

fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found, or an

affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Terri-

tory, charging the person demanded with having com-

mitted treason, felony, or other crime, certified as

1 Commonwealth v. Hawes, 13 Bush, (Ky.) 697; Wharton, Confl.

of Laws, § 2965. Contra, United States v. Lawrence, 13 Blatch. 295.

2 Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366; Matter of Troutman, 24 N. J.

8 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539.

634.

bility, with very inadequate means of discharging it intelligently and justly.
A person brought into a State on process of extradition,
it would seem, should be held privileged from prosecution
on any other charge until he has bad opportunity to return
to the State which has surrendered him. 1 But this privilege has not always been recognized.
If the State to which an offender bas fled bas herself
against him some unsatisfied demand of justice, it is
proper for her to proceed to enforce it before honoring a
requisition. No higher duty can be imposed upon her
than that to satisfy the demands of her own laws. 1
Legislation. -The extradition of fugitives as between
the States has commonly been made under state legislation, and the States in passing laws on the subject appear
to have assumed that the duty imposed by the Constitution was a state duty, performance of which was to be
demanded by one State and made by the other. Whether
this is strictly true, or whether, on the other hand, the
principles apply which govern in the surrender of fugitives from service, and which would exclude legislation
by the States, 8 has never been decided. Congress, however, at an early day enacted that,'' Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any
person, as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State or Territory to which such person has
tied, and produces a copy of an indictment found, or an
affida\it made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as
1 Commonwealth v. Hawes, 13 Bush, (Ky.) 697; Wharton, Conft.
of Laws, § 2965. Contra, United States v. Lawrence, 13 Blatch. 295.
i Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366; Matter of Troutman, 24 N. J.

634.
• Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 689.
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authentic by the Governor or chief magistrate of the

State or Territory from whence the person so charged

has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority

of the State or Territory to which such person has fled

to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause

notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority

making such demand, or to the agent of such authority

appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive

to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If

no such agent appears within six months from the time of

the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged." "Any agent

so appointed, who receives the fugitive into his custody,

shall be empowered to transport him to the State or Terri-

tory from which he has fled." 1

Fugitives from Service.—The provision that "no per-

son held to service or labor in one State, under the laws

thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of

any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such ser-

vice or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the

party to whom such service or labor may be due,"2 was

intended for the case of fugitive slaves, and is of little

value or force since slavery was abolished. The States
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cannot legislate for the enforcement of this provision, but

Congress may.8

» Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), §§ 5278, 5279.

a Const., Art. IV., § 2, cl. 3.

8 Prigjj v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539.

IS

authentic by the Governor or chief magistrate of the
State or Territory from whence the person so charged
has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority
of the State or Territory to which such person has fled
to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause
notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority
making such demand, or to the agent of such authority
appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive
· to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If
no such agent appears within six months from the time of
the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged." '' Any agent
so appointed, who receives the t•ugitive into his custody,
shall be empowered to transport him to the State or Territory from which he has fled." 1
Fugitit'es from Servi"ce. -The provision that ''no person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of
any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the
party t.o whom such service or labor may be due,"~ was
intended for the case of fugitive slaves, and is of little
value or force since slavery was abolished. The States
cannot legislate for the enforcement of this provision, but
Congress may. 1
Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), §§ 6278, 6279.
s Const., Art. IV., § 2, cl. 3.
a Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 639.
1
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CHAPTER XI.

THE GUARANTY OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT TO

THE STATES.

The Constitution. — It is imposed as a duty upon the

United States to guarantee to every State in the Union a

republican form of government.1 The requirement sprang

from a conviction that governments of dissimilar princi-

ples and forms were less adapted to a federal union than

CHAPTER XI.

those which were substantially alike, and that the super-

intending government ought to possess authority to defend

the system agreed upon against innovations which would

bring with them discordant and antagonistic principles.2

The terms of this provision " presuppose a pre-existing

government of the form that is to be guaranteed. As

THE GUARANTY OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT TO .
THE STATES.

long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are con-

tinued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal

Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substi-

tute other republican forms, they have a right to do so,

apd to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The

only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not

exchange republican for anti-republican constitutions."8
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What is Republican. — By republican government is un-

derstood a government by representatives chosen by the

people; and it contrasts on one side with a democracy, in

which the people or community as an organized whole

wield sovereign powers of government, and on the other

1 Const., Art. IV. § 4. 2 Federalist, Nos. 21 and 43.

8 Federalist, No. 43.

It is imposed as a duty upon the
United States to guarantee to every State in the Union a
republican form of government. 1 The requirement sprang
from a conviction that governments of dissimilar principles -and forms were less adapted to a federal union than
those which were substantially alike, and that the superintending government ought to possess authority to defend
the system agreed upon against innovations which would
bring with them discordant and antagonistic principles. t
The terms of this provision '' presuppose a pre-existing
government of the form that is to be guaranteed. As
long, thererore, as the existing republican fbrms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal
Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so,
apd to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The
only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not
exchange republican for anti-republican constitutions." 8
What is Republican. - By republican government is understood a government by representatives chosen by the
people ; and it contrasts on one side with a democracy, in
which the people or community as an organized whole
wield sovereign powers of government, and on the other
'l'he Oonstitut'ton. -

Const., Art. IV. § 4.
s Federalist, No. 43.

1

1

Federalist, Nos. 21 and 43.
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with the rule of one man, as king, emperor, czar, or sul-

tan, or with that of one class of men, as an aristocracy.

In strictness a republican government is by no means in-

consistent with monarchical forms, for a king may be

merely an hereditary or elective executive while the pow-

ers of legislation are left exclusively to a representative

body freely chosen by the people. It is to be observed,

however, that it is a republican form of government that

is to be guaranteed; and in the light of the undoubted

fact that by the Revolution it was expected and intended

to throw off monarchical and aristocratic forms, there can

be no question but that by a republican form of govern-

ment was intended a government in which not only would

the people's representatives make the laws, and their

agents administer them, but the people would also, di-

rectly or indirectly, choose the executive. But it would

by no means follow that the whole body of the people, or

even the whole body of adult and competent persons,

would be admitted to political privileges; and in any re-

publican State the law must determine the qualifications

for admission to the elective franchise.

As the original States must be understood to have had
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the proper form of government when the Constitution was

adopted, so the subsequent admission of a State to the

Union by Congress must be received as a decision that its

constitution is not objectionable. •

Changes in Government. — A republican government

once established in a State may be endangered or set

aside, so as to demand the action of Congress under this

provision, in the following several ways : —

First. By the hostile action of some foreign power, in

taking military possession of the territory of a State and

setting up some government therein not established by the

people themselves. Such a government would not be re-

publican, whatever its form, because not expressing the

with the rule of one man, as king, emperor, czar, or sultan, or with that of one class of men, as an aristocracy.
In strictness a republican government is by no means inconsistent with monarchical forms, for a king may be
merely an hereditary or elective executive while the powers of legislation are left exclusively to a representative
body freely chosen by the people. It is to be observed,
however, that it is a republican form of government that
is to be guaranteed ; and in the light of the undoubted
fact that by the RevolutiQn it was expected and intended
to throw off monarchical and aristocratic forms, there can
be no question but that by a republican form of gove1"nment was intended a government in which not only would
the people's representatives make the laws, and their
agents administer them, but the people would also, directly or indirectly, choose the executive. But it would
by no means follow that the whole body of .the people, or
even the whole body of adult and competent persons,
would be admitted to political privileges; and in any republican State the law must determine the qualifications
for admission to the elective franchise.
As the original States must be understood to have had
the proper form of government when the Constitution was
adopted, so the subsequent admission of a State to the
Union by Congress must be received as a decision that its
constitution is not objectionable. .
Ohanges in Government. - A republican government
once established in a State may be endangered or set
aside, so as to demand the action of Congress under this
provision, in the following several ways : First. By the hostile action of some foreign power, in
taking military possession of the territory of a State and
setting up some government therein not established by the
people themselves. Such a government would not be republican, whatever its form, because not expressing the
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will of the people governed, but of the foreign power es-

tablishing it.

Second. By the revolutionary action of the people them-

selves in forcibly rising against the constituted authorities,

and setting the government aside, or attempting to do so,

for some other. In this case the United States would be

called upon to act, whatever the form of the government

proposed. Adequate provision having been made for

changes in constitutions under regular and peaceful forms,

and without resort to revolution, it is not contemplated

that revolution by force shall ever be suffered. The theory

that the people at will may change their institutions is for

the time subordinated to their constitution, which they

provide may be changed in a certain specified mode, but

by implication agree shall not be changed otherwise.

When an attempt is made to change institutions in either

of the modes above specified, it will become the duty of the

federal government to interpose and protect the people of

the State in their existing government by the employment

of the military force, to the full extent, if need be, of the

national power.1
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Third. In strict observance of the forms prescribed by

a state constitution for revising or amending it, it would

be possible for the people of the State to effect such

changes as would deprive it of its republican character.

Thus they might in that manner set up a monarchy, or so

restrict suffrage as to deprive representation altogether of

its popular character, and thereby establish an aristocracy;

and it would then become the duty of Congress to inter-

fere. But first the question would present itself, whether

the changes made are so radical in their nature as to ren-

der the government unrepublican; and a decision by Con-

gress in the negative would be final and conclusive against

interference.

1 Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.

will of the people governed, but or the foreign power establishing it.
Second. By the revolutionary action of the people themselves in forcibly rising against the constituted authorities,
and setting the government aside, or attempting to do so,
for some other. In this case the United States would be
called upon to act, whatever the form of the government
proposed. Adequate provision haying been made for
changes in constitutions under regular and peaceful forms,
and without resort to revolutiqn, it is not contemplated
that revolution by force shall ever be suffered. The theory
that the people at will may change their institutions is for
the time subordinated to their constitution, which they
provide may be changed in a certain specified mode, but
by implication agree shall not be changed otherwise.
When an attempt is made to change institutions in either
of the modes above specified, it will become the duty of the
federal government to interpose and protect the people ot
the State in their existing government by the employment
of the military force, to the full extent, if need be, of the
national power .1
Third. In strict observance of the forms prescribed by
a state constitution for revising or amending it, it would
be possible for the people of the State to effect such
changes as would deprive it or its republican character.
Thus they might in that manner set up a monarchy, or so
restrict suffrage as to deprive representation altogether of
its popular character, and thereby establish an aristocracy;
and it would then become the duty of Congress to interfere. But first the question would present itself, whether
the changes made are so radical in their nature as to render the government unrepublican ; and a decision by Congress in the negative would be final and conclusive against
interference.
1

Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.
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It is always possible that Congress may assume changes

in state government to bt unwarranted when they are not,

and thereupon interfere to overturn institutions with which

they have no right to meddle. This is only saying that

any power, however necessary and however well guarded,

may be abused; but in every State there must be some

final tribunal for the determination of all probable con-

troversies; and as Congress is made the final judge in

this case, there can be no appeal from its decision except

to forcible resistance.

Reconstruction. — Whenever a state government has been

displaced by rebellion or other force, it will become ne-

cessary for some existing authority to institute proceedings

for restoring it. The proper authority for this purpose

would seem to be the legislature of the Union. As in the

case of Territories, if the people of the State by sponta-

neous action should originate an unexceptionable govern-

ment for themselves, it might be recognized, and the State

admitted to representation under it. But to prevent con-

fusion some enabling action would generally be found ad-

visable, if not absolutely essential.

Conflicting Claims to Government.—When a dispute
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arises respecting whether a particular instrument has be-

come established as the constitution of a State, and there

are parties claiming under and in opposition to it, or when

the executive or legislative offices of a State are the sub-

ject of contest, it is always supposed that there exists

within the State itself proper, legitimate, and effectual au-

thority for determining the contest. It is not the business

of the federal authority to interfere in such cases, unless

regularly called upon to give protection against violence.

Such contests must be settled by the state judicial tribu-

nals when the case is such as to admit of it, or by the

legislature, or even by the acquiescence of the people in the

claims of one of the parties; and the federal government

It is always possible that Congress may assume changes
in state government to bt: unwarranted when they are not,
and thereupon interfere to overturn institutions with which
they have no right to meddle. This is only saying -that
any power, however necessary and however well guarded,
may be abused ; but in every State there must be some
final tiibunal for the determination of all probable controversies; and as Congress is made the final judge in
this case, there can be no appeal from its decision except
to forcible resistance.
Reconstruction. -Whenever a state government has been
displaced by rebellion or other force, it will become necessary for some existing authority to institute proceedings
for restoring it. The proper authority for this purpose
would seem to be the legislature of the Union. As in the
case of Territories, if the people of the State by sponta- ·
neons action should originate an unexceptionable government for themselves, it might be recognized, and the State
admitted to representation under it. But to prevent confusion some enabling action would generally be found advisable, if not absolutely essential.
Conflicting (J/aims to Government. -When a dispute
, arises respecting whether a particular instrument has become established as the constitution of a State, and there
are parties claiming under aQd in opposition to it, or when
the executive or legislative offices of a State are the subject of contest, it is always supposed that there exists
within the State itself proper, legitimate, and effectual authority for determining the contest. It is not the business
of the federal authority to interfere in such cases, unless
regularly called upon to give protection against violence.
Such contests must be settled by the state judicial tribunals when the case is such as to admit of it, or by the
legisla ~.1re, or even by the acquiescence of the people in the
claims of one of the parties ; and the federal government
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should accept the settlement as final. The federal author-

ities can have no concern with questions of regularity in

state proceedings, or with questions of what is proper or

just in state affairs. Nevertheless in the case of a dis-

puted state government it may become necessarj- for the

political departments of the United States government, in

the performance of their own duties, to recognize one of

the two as rightful; and when this takes place the recog-

nition will bind the government of the United States in all

its departments, and also the people.1

Invasion and Insurrection.—The United States are also

required to protect each State against invasion, and, on

application of the legislature, or of the executive when the

legislature cannot be convened, against domestic violence.8

This article, as has been truly said, becomes an immense

acquisition of strength and additional force to the aid of

any state government in case of internal rebellion or insur-

rection against lawful authority; while, on the other hand,

by the requirement of a demand for aid. every pretext for

intermeddling with the internal concerns of any State,

under color of protecting her against unlawful violence, is
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taken away.8

Titles of Nobility. —The States are prohibited, as Con-

gress is, from bringing an anti-republican feature into

American institutions by the grant of titles of nobility.4

The prohibition executes itself, as the titles, should a grant

be attempted, would be simply void.

1 Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.

a Const, Art. IV. § 4; Federalist, No. 43.

» 1 Tuck. Bl., App. 367. « Const., Art. I. § 10, cL 1.

should accept the settlement as final. The federal authorities can have no concern with questions of regularity in
state proceedings, or with questions of what is proper or
just in state affairs. Nevertheless in the case of a disputed state government it may become necessary for the
political departments of the United States government, in
the performance of their own duties, to recognize one of
the two as rightful ; and when this takes place the recognition will bind the government of the United States in all
its departments, and also the people. 1
Invasion and Imurrection. -The United States are also
l·equired to protect each State against invasion, and, on
application of the legislature, or of the executive when the
legislature cannot be convened, against domestic violence. 1
This article, ·as has been truly said, becomes an immense
acquisition of strength and additional force to the aid of
any state government in case of internal re hellion or insurrection against lawful authority; while, on the other hand,
by the requirement of a demand for aid. every pretext for
intermeddling with the internal concerns of any State,
under color of protecting her against unlawful violence, is
taken away. 8
Titles of Nobility. -The States are prohibited, as Congress is, from bringing an anti-republican feature into
American institutions by the grant of titles of nobility. 4
The prohibition executes itself, as the titles, should a grant
be attempted, would be simply void.
Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.
~ Const., Art. IV.§ 4; Federalist, No. 43.
a 1 Tuck. Bl.1 App. 367.
' Const., Art. I. § 101 cl. 1.
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CHAPTER XII.

THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.

Amendments adopted. — The Constitution provides a sim-

ple, easy, and peaceful method of modifying its own pro-

visions,1 in order that needed reforms may be accepted

and violent changes forestalled. Fifteen amendments have

already been made. The most of these have for their

object to give new rights, or further protection to rights

before existing. The eleventh amendment merely im-

poses a restriction upon the federal judicial power, so as

to exclude from it all cognizance of suits against States

brought by citizens of other States, or citizens or subjects

CHAPTER XII.

of foreign states; and the twelfth introduces a change in

the mode of making choice of President and Vice-Presi-

THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.

dent. The first ten amendments and the last three natu-

rally range themselves in two classes, each of which, by

its subject-matter and purpose, is distinctly referable to a

particular period in the constitutional history of the coun-

try. One class consists of those which impose limitations

on the powers of the seyeral departments of the federal

government, with a view more completely to protect the

liberties of the people and the reserved rights of the States;
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and the other is confined in the main to taking from the

Statea the power to oppress particular classes of the peo-

ple, to discriminate unjustly between classes, and to take

away such rights as are fundamental. The first ten be-

long to the one class, and the last three to the other.

1 Const., Art. V.'

.Amendments adopted. -The Constitution provides a simple, easy, and peaceful method of modifying its own provisions,1 in order that needed reforms may be accepted
and violent changes forestalled. Fifteen amendments have
already been made. The most of these have for their
object to give new rights, or further protection to rights
before existing. The eleventh amendment merely imposes a restriction upon the federal judicial power, so as
to exclude from it all cognizance of suits against States
brought by citizens of other States, or citizens or subjects
of foreign states ; and the twelfth introduces a change in
the mode of making choice of President and Vice-President. The first ten amendments and the last three natut·ally range themselves in two classes, each of which, by
\ts subject-matter and purpose, is distinctly referable to a
particular period in the constitutional history of the country. One class consists of those which impose limitations
on the powers of the se,veral departments of the federal
government, with a view more completely to protect the
liberties of the people and the reserved rights of the States ;
and the other is confined in the main to taking from the
State.a the power to oppress particular classes of the people, to discriminate unjustly between classes, and to take
away such rights as are fundamental. The first ten belong to the one class, and the last three to the other.
i

Const., Art. V.
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The First Ten Amendments. — The ten amendments the

purpose of which was to establish guaranties against an

abuse of the powers which had been granted to the gen-

eral government, were adopted in pursuance of recom-

mendations by state conventions when giving assent to

the Constitution.1 They all sprung from a distrust of

power remote from the people, — a distrust which the

colonial experience had inculcated, and which the events

leading to the Revolution had intensified. The central

government, in exchanging the Articles of Confederation

for the Constitution, was receiving an immense accession

of power, and it was possible to abuse this power to the

oppression of the citizen, and to the destruction of rights

in the States which had never been surrendered. Up to

that time the States were the special objects of the regard

and affection of their people respectively. They had en-

joyed liberty and a large measure of prosperitj- under

state laws, they held their property and protected them-

selves in their domestic relations under the same laws,

and when oppression had come and grown until it seemed

intolerable, its source was to be traced to a distant au-
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thority, which overruled or displaced the local laws and

took away the protection they would have given. Jeal-

ousy of centralization was therefore a strong, if not a

paramount sentiment, and it found expression in these

amendments, in which it is declared that certain enu-

merated liberties of the people shall not be taken away or

abridged; that the enumeration in the Constitution of cer-

tain rights should not be construed to deny or disparage

others retained by the people; and that the powers not

delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor

prohibited by it to the States, were reserved to the States

respectively or to the people.

1 They were ratified by a sufficient number of the States to secure

their adoption before December 15, 1791.

The First Ten .Amendments. -The ten amendments the
purpose of which was to establish guaranties against an
abuse of the powers which had been granted to the general government, were adopted in pursuance of recommendations by state conventions when giving assent to
the Constitution. 1 They all sprung from a distrust of
power remote from the people, - a distrust which the
colonial experience had inculcated, and which the events
leading to the Revolution had intensified. The central
government, in exchanging the Articles of Confederation
for the Constitution, was receiving an immense accession
of power, and it was possible to abuse this power to the
oppression of the citizen, and to the destruction of rights
in the States which had never been surrendered. Up to
that time the States were the special objects of the regard
and affection of their people respectively. They had enjoyed liberty and a large measure of prosperity under
state laws, they held their property and protected themselves in their domestic relations under the same laws,
and when oppression had come and grown until it seemed
intolerable, its source was to be traced to a distant authority, which overruled or displaced the local laws and
took away the protection they would have given. Jealousy of centrnlization was therefore a strong, if not a
paramount sentiment, and it found expression in these
amendments, in which it is declared that certain enumerated liberties of the people shall not be taken away or
abridged ; that the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights should not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people ; and that the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, were reserved to the States
respectively or to the people.
They were ratified by a sufficient number of the States to secure
their adoption before December 15, 1791.
1
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The Last Three Amendments. — In the lapse of ninety

years, a stage in political history is reached in which the

fears and anxieties of the people took a new direction. In

rapid succession one State after another in one third of the

Union had rejected and thrown off the federal authority,

and it had only been restored through a war prosecuted on

both sides with great bitterness and with enormous de-

struction of life and property. The temporary displace-

ment of federal power had been accomplished by the action

of the States in their corporate capacity, and the admira-

ble system of self-government had naturally and most

effectively co-operated in the action. Wide divergencies

in sentiment regarding matters of internal policy, ripening

into great estrangement of feeling between the sections,

had led to the disruption, and when the exhausting war

was over the same divergence in sentiment and a like es-

trangement in feeling still prevailed, and were now found

to centre on the policy to be adopted for restoring and

strengthening the shattered fabric of government. The

sentiment of national unity had encountered on the field of

arms the sentiment of devotion to State and section, and,

though the struggle was over, the causes to some extent
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remained, and might possibly produce like fruit in the

future. It had been found in vain that the federal au-

thorities held, and the federal courts decided, that under

the Constitution a State had no right to withdraw from

the Union; it was undeniable that for a time certain of

the States had succeeded in severing their relations and

setting up a new government; and though the federal

authority had demonstrated that it had, under the Consti-

tution, ample power for self-defence and protection, it was

deemed wise and prudent to require the States to surren-

der the institution that was the immediate occasion of the

civil war, as well as the power to deal unjustly and par-

tially with classes of the people against whom there might

The Last Three .Amendments. - In the lapse of ninety
years, a stage in political history is reached in which the
fears and anxieties of the people took a new direction. In
rapid succession one State after another in one third of the
Union had rejected and thrown off the federal authority,
and it had only been restored through a war prosecuted on
both sides with great bitterness and with enormous destruction of life and property. The temporary displacement of federal power had been accomplished by the action
of the States in their corporate capacity, and the admirable system of self-government had naturally and most
effectively co-operated in the action. Wide divergencies
in sentiment regarding matters of internal policy, ripening
into great estrangement of feeling between the sections,
had led to the disruption, and when the exhausting war
was over the same divergence in sentiment and a like estrangement in feeling still prevailed, and were now found
to centre on the policy to be adopted for restoring and
strengthening the shattered fabric of government. The
sentiment of national unity had encountered on the field of
arms the sentiment of devotion to State and section, and,
though the struggle was over, the causes to some extent
remained, and might possibly produce like fruit in the
future. It had been found in vain that the federal authorities held, and the federal courts decided, that under
the Constitution a State had no right to withdraw from
the Union; it was undeniable that for a time certain of
the States had succeeded in severing their relations and
setting up a new government ; and though the federal
authority had demonstrated that it had, under the Constitution, ample power for self-defence and protection, it was
deemed wise and prudent to require the States to surrender the institution that was the immediate occasion of the
civil war, as well as the power to deal unjustly and partially with classes of the people against whom there might
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be jealousies, prejudices, or antipathies, growing out of

the struggle through which the country had passed, or out

of some of the antecedent or concomitant circumstances.

While, therefore, the first amendments were for the pur-

pose of keeping the central power within due limits, at a

time when the tendency to centralization was alarming to

many persons, the last were adopted to impose new re-

straints on state sovereignty, at a time when state powers

had nearly succeeded in destroying the national sover-

eignty.1

Justice of the Amendments. — Of these amendments it

may be safely affirmed that the first ten took from the

Union no power it ought ever to have exercised, and that

the last three required of the States the surrender of no

power which any free government should ever employ.2

If the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments

are subject to any just criticism, it must concern not

what the States are required to surrender so much as the

incidental expansion of federal legislative and judicial

power.

How adopted. — It is a valuable tribute to the general
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excellency of the Constitution that no convention for its

revision has ever been convened, nor indeed ever very

seriously proposed except at a time immediately before

the civil war, and when a settlement of existing contro-

versies in that mode seemed to most people an impossi-

bility. All the amendments originated in Congress, were

proposed by Congress to the States, and by the States

were ratified. The questions which their proposal raised

1 These amendments were declared adopted as follows: the thir-

teenth, Dec. 18,1865; the fourteenth, July 28, 1868; and the fifteenth,

March 30, 1870.

2 Those .who claim that emancipated slaves should be paid for

have generally agreed that the United States, and not the States,

should make the payment.

be jealousies, prejudices, or antipathies, growing out ·or
the struggle through which the country had passed, or out
of some of the antecedent or concomitant circumstances.
While, therefore, the first amendments were for the purpose of keeping the central power within due limits, at a
time when the tendency to centralization was alarming to
many persons, the last were adopted to impose new restraints on state sovereignty, at a time when state powers
had ,nearly succeeded in destroying the national sovereignty.1
Justice of ths Amendments. - Of these amendments it
may be safely affirmed that the first ten took from the
Union no power it ought ever to have exercised, and that
the last three required of the States the surrender of no
power which any free government should ever employ. 2
If the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments
are subject to any just criticism, it must concern not
what the States are required to surrender so much as the
incidental expansion of federal legislative and judicial
power.
How adopted. - It is a valuable tribute to the general
excellency of the Constitution that no convention for its
reyision has ever been convened, nor indeed ever very
seriously proposed except at a time immediately before
the civil war, and when a settlement of existing controversies in that mode seemed to most people an impossibility. All the amendments originated in Congress, were
proposed by Congress to the States, and by the States
were ratified. The questions which their proposal raised
These amendments were declared adopted as follows: the thirteenth, Dec. 18, 1865; the fourteenth, July 28, 1868; and the fifteenth,
March 30, 1870.
2 Those .;who claim that emancipated slaves should be paid for
have generally agreed that the United States, and not the States,
should make the payment.
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were in the main political, but there were two questions of

law of no little importance and nicety. Neither of these,

however, received authoritative settlement, because in the

end such a settlement became unnecessary. These ques-

tions were the following: —

1. The Constitution1 requires for the adoption of any

proposed amendment that it shall be ratified by the legis-

latures or conventions of three fourths of the States. At

the time when amendments were first proposed some of

the States had not been restored to their normal and con-

stitutional relations to the Union, and had not been ad-

mitted to representation in Congress. Until they should

be, it was by no means certain that the assent of three

fourths of all the States could be obtained to any amend-

ment, and the question was made whether States not then

holding their constitutional relations to the others in the

Union were to be counted at all. Fortunatety, in the de-

lay that occurred while ratification was in progress, enough

of the States were admitted to representation in Congress,

and joined in the ratification, to render the question unim-

portant.

2. Two States after giving their consent to the foui-
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teenth amendment, afterwards, but before three fourths of

all had ratified, through their legislatures declared the con-

sent withdrawn.2 It was scarcely pretended that this

could have been done if the proper majority-of the States

had previously ratified; but it was insisted that it might

be done at any time before the amendment had become

incorporated in the Constitution. This question also was

rendered immaterial, and in the same way with the other.

» Const., Art. V.

a The two States were Ohio and New Jersey. New York declared

her consent to the fifteenth amendment withdrawn under like circum-

stances. Oregon made a like declaration in respect to the fourteenth

amendment, some time after the proclamation of the Secretary of

State announcing its ratification.

were in the main political, but there were two questions of
law of no little importance and nicety. Neither of these,
however, received authoritative settlement, because in the
end such a settlement became unnecessary. These questions were the following : 1. The Constitution1 requires for the adoption of any
proposed amendment that it shall be ratified by the legis- ·
latures or conventions of three fourths of the States. At
the time when amendments were first proposed some of
the States had not been restored to their normal and constitutional relatiomi to the Union, and had not been admitted to representation in Congress. Until they should
be, it was by no means certain that the assent of three
fourths of all the States could be obtained to any amendment, and the question was made whether States not then
holding their constitutional relations to the others in the
Union were to be counted at all. Fortunately, in the delay that occurred while ratification was in progress, enough
of the States were admitted to representation in Congress,
and joined in the ratification, to render the question unimportant.
2. Two States after giving their consent to the fowteenth amendment, afterwards, but before three fourths of
all had ratified, through their legislatures declared the consent withdrawn.~ It was scarcely pretended that this
could have been done if the proper majority-of the States
had previously ratified ; but it was insisted that it might
be done at any time before the amendment had become
incorporated in the Constitution. This question also was
rendered immaterial, and in the same way with the other.
Const., Art. V.
The two States were Ohio and New Jersey. New York declared
her consent to the fifteenth amendment withdrawn under like circum·
stances. Oregon made a like declaration in respect to the fourteenth
amendment, some time after the proclamation of the Seer etary of
State announcing its ratification.
1
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It is interesting, however, to note that, in a somewhat

analogous case, it has been repeatedly decided that consent

once given is given finally. Where by statute a munici-

pality is permitted, with the consent of a majority of its

electors, to raise exceptional taxes or assume exceptional

burdens, an election once held which results in a favorable

vote is conclusive. If, however, the first election results

in a majority against the proposal, and there is nothing in

the law which negatives the right to vote again, the case

stands as if no election had been had, and the sense of

the people may be taken again and again, and a favorable

vote at the last election is as effectual as if it had been

obtained at first.1

1 Woods v. Lawrence County, 1 Black, 386; Woodward v. Super-

visors, 2 Cent. Law Jour. 396; Society for Savings v. New London,
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29 Conn. 174.

It is interesting, however, to note that, in a somewhat
analogous case, it has been repeatedly decided that consent
once given is given finally. Where by statute a municipality is permitted, with the consent of a majority of its
electors, to raise exceptional taxes or assume exceptional
burdens, an election once held which results in a favorable
·vote is conclusive. If, however, the first election results
in a majority against the proposal, and there is nothing in
the law which negatives the right to vote again, the case
stands as if no election had been had, and the sense of
the people may be taken again and again, and a favorable
v0.te at the last election is as effectual as if it had been
obtained at first. 1
1 Woods v. Lawrence County, 1 Black, 386; Woodward v. Supervisors, 2 Cent. Law Jour. 396; Society for Savings v. New London,
29 Conn. 174.

CIVIl.. RIGHTS.

CIVIL EIGHTS.

205

205

CHAPTER XIII.

CIVIL RIGHTS AND THEIR GUARANTIES.

Section I.—Religious Liberty.

The Constitution. —The Constitution as originally adopt-

ed declared that " no religious test shall ever be required

as a qualification to any office or public trust under the

United States."1 By amendment it was further pro-

vided that'' Congress shall make no law respecting an es-

CHAPTER XIII.

tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise

thereof." 2 Both these provisions, it will be seen, are lim-

itations upon the powers of Congress only. Neither the

CIVIL RIGHTS AND THEIR GUARANTIES.

original Constitution nor any of the early amendments

undertook to protect the religious liberty of the people

of the States against the action of their respective state

SECTION

governments. The fourteenth amendment is perhaps

I. -

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.

broad enough to give some securities if they should be

needful.

Establishment of Religion. — By establishment of re-

ligion is meant the setting up or recognition of a state

church, or at least the conferring upon one church of spe-

cial favors and advantages which are denied to others.*

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:44 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

It was never intended that by the Constitution the gov-

ernment should be prohibited from recognizing religion,

or that religious worship should never be provided for in

cases where a proper recognition of Divine Providence in

the working of government might seem to require it, and

1 Const., Art. VI. cl. 3. 8 Const, Amendment I

.

'1 Tuck. Bl. Com., App. 296; 2 Ibid., App., Note G.

The Oonstitution. -The Constitution as originally adopted declared that '' no religious test shall ever be required
as a qualification to any office or public trust under the
United States." 1 By amendment it was further provided that " Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the fr(}e exercise
thereof." 2 Both these provisions, it will be seen, are limitations upon the powers of Congress only. Neither the
original Constitution nor any of the early amendments
undertook to protect the religious liberty of the people
of the States against the action of their respective state
governments. The fourteenth amendment is perhaps
broad enough to give some securities if they should be
needful.
Establishment of Religion. - By establishment of religion is meant the setting up or recognition of a state
church, or at least the conferring upon one church of special favors and advantages which are denied to others. 1
It was never intended that by the Constitution the government should be prohibited from recognizing r_eligion,
or that religious worship should never be provided for in
cases where a proper recognition of Divine Providence in
the working of government might seem to require it, and
1
1

Const., Art. VI. cl. 3.
t Const., Amendment L
1 Tuck. Bl. Com.• App. 296; 2 Ibid., App., Note G.
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where it might be done without drawing any invidious dis-

tinctions between different religious beliefs, organizations,

or sects. The Christian religion was always recognized

in the administration of the common law; and so far as

that law continues to be the law of the land, the funda-

mental principles of that religion must continue to be rec-

ognized in the same cases and to the same extent as

formerly. The propriety of making provisions for the

appointment of chaplains for the two houses of Congress,

and for the army and navy, has been sometimes ques-

tioned; but the general sentiment of the country has ap-

proved it, and the States make corresponding provision

for legislative bodies and state institutions. The federal

legislation has never gone farther; it has never undertaken

to prescribe a religious test for any purpose. Neither has

it ever assumed the authority to prohibit the free exercise

of religion anywhere.

State Guaranties.—With the exception of the provis-

ions above made, the preservation of religious liberty is

left to the States, and these without exception have con-

stitutional guaranties on the subject. In the main these

are alike, and they may be summed up as follows : —
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1. They establish a system, not of toleration merely, but

of religious equality. All religions are equally respected

by the law; one is not to be favored at the expense of

others, or to be discriminated against, nor is any distinc-

tion to be made between them, either in the laws, in

positions under the law, or in the administration of the

government.

2. They exempt all persons from compulsory support

of religious worship, and from compulsory attendance upon

the same.

3. They forbid restraints upon the free exercise of re-

ligion according to the dictates of conscience, or upon the

free expression of religious opinions.

•

where it might be done without drawing any invidious distinctions between different religious beliefs, organizations,
or sects. The Christian religion was always recognized
in the administration of the common law ; and so far as
that law continues to be the law of the land, the fundamental principles of that religion must continue to be recognized in the same cases and to the same extent as
formerly. The propriety of making provisions for the
appointment of chaplains for the two houses of Congress,
and for the army and navy, has been sometimes questioned; but the general sentiment of the country has approved it, and the States make corresponding provision
for legislative bodies and state institutions. The federal
legislation has never gone farther ; it has never undertaken
to prescribe a religious test for any purpose. Neither has
it ever assumed the authority to prohibit the free exercise
of religion anywhere.
State Guaranties. -With the exception of the provisions above made, the preservation of religious liberty is
left to the States, and these without exception have constitutional guaranties on the subject. In the main these
are alike, and they may be summed up as follows : 1. They establish a system, not of toleration merely, but
of religious equality. All religions are equally respected
by the law; one is not to be favored at the expense of
others, or to be discriminated against, nor is any distinction to be made between them, either in the laws, in
positions under the law, or in the administration of the
government.
2. They exempt all persons from compulsory _support
of religious worship, and from compulsory attendance upon
the same.
3. They forbid restraints upon the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience, or upon the
free expression of religious opinions.
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These are adopted as fundamental principles. No man

in religious matters is to be discriminated against by the

law, or subjected to the censorship of the State or of any

public authority; and the State is not to inquire into or

take notice of religious belief or expression so long as the

citizen performs his duty to the State and to his fellows,

and is guilty of no breach of public morals or public de-

corum.1

Blasphemy, Sfc.—But the courts of the Union and of

the States, in administering the common law, find it

necessary to take notice that the prevailing religion of the

country is Christian,2 and that because of that fact certain

conduct may constitute a breach of public decorum, and

therefore be illegal, though it might not be where aj differ-

ent religion prevailed. The law of blasphemy depends

largely for its definition and application upon the generally

accepted religious belief of the people; and in the law of

contracts many provisions might be found to be illegal in

a Christian country which would be enforced where the

Mohammedan or some other form of religion prevailed.

Questions of public policy, as they arise in the common
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law, must always be largely dependent upon the prevailing

system of public morals, and the public morals upon the

prevailing religious belief.8 Legislation may also recognize

the general religious sentiments of the people in the police

regulations it establishes and in the statutory offences it

defines. Thus, it may prohibit secular employments on

the first day of the week, that day being observed as a day

of rest and worship by religious people generally;4 and it

1 Cooley, Const. Lim., ch. 13.

2 Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 127.

8 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 290; Commonwealth v. Knee-

land, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 206; State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. (Del.) 553.

4 Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 S. & R. (Penn.) 48; Frolickstein v.

Mobile, 40 Ala. 725.

These are a'-foptied as fundamental principles. No man
in religious matters is to be discriminated against by the
law, or subjected to the censorship of the State or of any
public authority; and the State is not to inquire into or
take notice of religious belief or expression so long as the
citizen perform~ his duty to the State and to his fellows,
and is guilty of no breach of public morals or public decorum.1
Blasphemy, ~c. -But the courts of the Union and of
the States, in administering the common law, find it
necessary to take notice that the prevailing religion of the
country is Christian, 2 and that because of that fact certain
conduct may constitute a breach of public decorum, and
therefore be illegal, though it might not be where ~differ
ent religion prevailed. The law of blasphemy depends
largely for its definition and application upon the generally
accepted religious belief of the people ; and in the law of
contracts many provisions might be found to be illegal i.n
a Christian country which would be enforced where the
Mohammedan or some other form of religion prevailed.
Questions of public policy, as they arise in the common
law, iµust al ways be largely dependent upon the prevailing
system of public morals, and the public morn.ls upon the
prevailing religious belief. 8 Legisla.tion may also recognize
the general religious sentiments of the people in the police
regulations it establishes and in the statutory offences it
defines. Thus, it may prohibit secular employments on
the first day of the week, that day being observed as a <lay
of rest nnd worship by religious people generally ; • and it
Cooley, Const. Lim., ch. 13.
Viual v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 127.
8 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 200; Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 206; State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. (Del.) 553.
• Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 S. & R. (Penn.) 48; Frolickstein "·
Mobile, 40 Ala. 726.
l
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may condemn and provide for the punishment of any con-

duct which is condemned by the common voice of Christian

nations, though admitted elsewhere, such as cruel sacrifices,

the practice of polygamy, &c.1 And it may require that

all religious worship and observances shall be conducted

in accordance with the ordinary rules of order, and pun-

ish whatever extravagances tend to a breach of the public

peace. But even the law of blasphemy must be so admin-

istered as to preserve liberty of discussion and argument

upon the most vital points.2

Exemptions. — Whether or not it be wise or politic to

exempt the property used for religious purposes from tax-

ation, as is commonly done, it cannot be said to be in

a legal sense unconstitutional to do so. As has before

been said, the selection of subjects for taxation is always

a matter of policy, and the legislation will exempt from

the burden such as a general regard to the interests of the

political community may seem to render advisable.8 If it

be unwise or unjust, legislation must correct the evil.

But exemptions, to be valid, must be impartial as between

sects.

Suction II. — Security of the Dwelling, and op
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Person and Papers.

Quartering Soldiers, Sfc. — The third article of the

amendments provides that "no soldier shall, in time of

peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of

the owner; nor in time of war but in a manner to be pre-

scribed by law.'1 The evil at which this is aimed has been

1 Spear, Religion and the State, 315-318.

2 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 290, 293.

* But such exemptions are mere favors; they are to be strictly

construed. Matter of Mayor, &c. of New York, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 77;

Broadway Baptist Church t>. McAtee, 8 Bush, (Ky.) 608. And they

may be repealed. Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300.

may condemn and provide for the punishment of any conduct which is congemned by the common voice of Christian
nations, though admitted elsewhere, such as cruel sacrifices,
the practice of polygamy, &c. 1 And it may require.that
all religious worship and observances shall be conducted
in accordance with the ordinary rules of order, and punish whatever extravagances tend to a breach of the public
peace. But even the law of blasphemy must be so administered as to preserve liberty of discussion and argument
upon the most vital points.~
Exemptions.-_ Whether or not it be wise or politic to
exempt the property used for religious purposes from taxation, as is commonly done, it cannot be said to be in
a legal sense unconstitutional to do so. As has before
been said, the selection of subjects for taxation is always
a matter of policy, and the legislatio1:1 will exempt from
the burden such as a general regard to the interests of the
political community may seem to render advisable. 8 If it
be unwise or unjust, legislation must correct the evil.
But exemptions, to be valid, must be impartial as between
sects.

.

SECTION

II. -

SECURITY OF THE DWELLING, AND OF
PERSON AND

p APERS.

Quarteri11g Soldiers, ~c. - The third article of the
amendments provides that '' no soldier shall, in time of
peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of
the owner ; nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by law.'~ The evil at which this is aimed has been
Spear, Religion and the State, 315-818.
People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 290, 293.
a But such exemptions are mere favors ; they are to be strictly
construed. Matter of Mayor, &c. of New York, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 77;
Broadway Baptist Church t'. McAtee, 8 Bush, (Ky.) 608. And the~
may be repealed. Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300.
1
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so long unpractised in this country, that it is difficult to

suggest to the mind the possibility that security against it

may be necessary in a country governed by settled princi-

ples of law. Nevertheless, a declaration of the indefeasi-

ble right of the citizen can never be wholly needless.

Soldiers will be quartered upon the people, if at all,

under the orders of a superior, and either because of

some supposed imperious necessity, or in order to annoy

and injure those who are compelled to receive them. The

plea will always be that of necessity; but this can never

be a truthful plea in time of peace, and if the necessity is

likely to arise in time of war, the first principles of justice

demand that it should be provided for by law, and limita-

tions and restraints imposed. At best it is an arbitrary

proceeding: it breaks up the quiet of home; it appropri-

ates the property of the citizen to the public use without

previous compensation, and without assurance of compen-

sation in the future, unless the law shall have promised

it. It is difficult to imagine a more terrible means of op-

pression than would be the power in the executive, or in

a military commander, to fill the house of an obnoxious
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person with a company of soldiers, who shall be fed'and

warmed at his expense, under the direction of an officer

accustomed to the exercise of discretionary authority

within the limits of his command, and in whose presence

the ordinary laws of courtesy, not less than the rules of

law which protect person and property, may be made to

bend to whim or caprice.1 Such oppressions were fresh

in the minds of the people when the Declaration of Inde-

pendence was made, and they then denounced what thej-

prohibited by this amendment. It is proper to add that

this protection has no application in time of war to the

enemies of the country.

Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.—The fourth article

1 Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 378.

14

so long unpractised in this country, that it is difficult to
suggest to the mind the possibility that ~ecurity against it
may be necessary in a country governed by settled principles of law. Nevertheless, a declaration of the indefeasible right of the citizen can never be wholly needless.
Soldiers_ will be quartered upon the people, if at all,
under the orders of a superior, and either because of
some supposed imperious necessity, or in order to annoy
and injure those who are compelled to receive them. The
plea will al ways be that of necessity ; but this can never
be a truthful plea in time of peace, and if the necessity is
likely to arise in time of war, the first principles of justice
demand that it should be provided for by law, and limitations and restraints imposed. At best it is an arbitrary
proceeding : it breaks up the quiet of home ; it appropriates the property of the citizen to the public use without
previous compensation, and without assurance of compensation in the future, unless the law shall have promised
it. It is difficult to imagine a more terrible means of oppression than would be the power in the executive, or in
a military commander, to fill the house of an obnoxious
person with a company of soldiers, who shall be fed 'and
warmed at his expense, under the direction of an officer
accustomed to the exercise of discretionary authority
within the limits of his command, and in whose presence
the ordinary laws of courtesy, not less than tile rules of
law which protect person and property, may be made to
bend to whim or caprice. 1 Such oppressions were fresh
in the minds of the people when the Declaration of Independence was made, and they then denounced what they
prohibited by this amendment. It is proper to add that
this protection has no application in time of war to the
enemies of the country.
Unrea,sonable Searches and Seizures. -The fourth article
1

Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 878.
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of the amendments has in view invasions of right 'which are

more frequent, and of which others may be guilty besides

those who command the military force of the 8tate. Most

commonly, perhaps, they consist in a disregard of that

maxim of constitutional law which finds expression in the

common saj-ing that every man's house is his castle. The

meaning of this is that every man under the protection of

the laws may close the door of his habitation, and defend

his privacy in it, not against private individuals merely,

but against the officers of the law and the state itself.

The amendment declares that '' The right of the people to

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable

cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or

things to be seized."

The latter clause of the amendment sufficiently indicates

the circumstances under which a reasonable search and

seizure may be made. First, a warrant must issue; and

this implies, (a.) a law which shall point out the circum-
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stances and conditions under which the warrant may be

granted; (J.) a court or magistrate empowered by the

law to grant it; (c.) an officer to whom it may be issued

for service. Second, a showing of probable cause; by

which is meant the production of satisfactory evidence to

the court or magistrate, (a.) showing that a case exists in

which the issue of a warrant would be justified by the law;

(b.) pointing out the place to be searched, and the persons

or things to be seized if they shall be found there. Third,

a particular description, in the warrant, of place, person,

or things sufficient to guide the officer in executing it.

Nothing less than this can be sufficient.1

The law providing for search-warrants should be limited

» Bishop, Crim. Procedure, §§ 240-246.

of the amendments has in view invasions of right which are
more frequent, and of which ot~ers may be guilty besides
those who command the military force of the State. Most
commonly, perhaps, they consist in a disregard of that
maxim of constitutional law which finds expression in the
common saying that every man's house is his castle. The
meaning of this is that every man under the protection of
the faws may close the door of his habitation, and defend
his privacy in it, not against private individuals merely,
but against the officers of the law and the state· itself.
The amendment declares that ''The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
. against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated ; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
The latter clause of the amendment sufficiently indicates
the circumstances under which a reasonable search and
seizure may be made. Fi"rst, a warrant must issue; and
this implies, (a.) a law which shall point out the circum.:
stances and conditions under which the warrant may be
granted ; ( b.) a court or magistrate empowered by the
law to grant it; (c.) an officer to whom it may be issued
for service. &cond, a showing of probable cause ; by
which is meant the production of satisfactory e,;dence to
the court or magistrate, (a.) showing that a case exists in
which the issue of a warrant would be justified by the law ;
( b.) pointing out the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized if they shall be found there. Thfrd,
a particular description, in the warrant, or pince, person,
or things sufficient to guide the officer in executing it.
Nothing less than this can be sufficient. 1
The law providing for search-warrants should be limited
1

Bishop, Crim. Procedure, §§

~246.
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to cases of actual crime, in which the thing which was the

to cases of actual crime, in which the thing which was the

subject or the instrument of the crime, or the supposed

criminal, is concealed, or supposed to be concealed, on in-

sub:ect or the instrument of the crime, or the supposed
criminal, is conce.aled, or supposed to be concealed, on individual premises. The following are the most frequent
cases : for property stolen, and the supposed thief; for
property brought into the country in violation of the revenue laws, and the supposed smuggler ; for implements of
gaming unlawfully kept; and for liquors unlawfully stored
for sale. No doubt the right of search may be extended by
statute to other offences ; but any search to obtain evidence
of an intent to commit a crime can never be legalized. 1
The warrant must be executed by a search in the very
place described, and not elsewhere ; the service should be
made in the day-time, and without the presence of a
crowd of people ; 2 and the subject of the search must be
brought before the court or magistrate, to be disposed of
according to law. 8 If the officer obeys the command of
his warrant, and is guilty of no excess or departure, he is
protected, even though the search proves to be fruitless
and the showing of cau~e unfounded.
Without a search-warrant the doors of a man's dwelling
may be forced for the purpose of arresting a person known
to be therein, for ·treason, felony, or breach of the peace,
or in order to dispossess the occupant when another, by
the judgment of a competent court, has been awarded the
possession. In extreme cases this may also be done for
the enforcement of sanitary and other police regulations ;
but, in general, the owner may close the outer door against
any unlicensed entry, and defend it even to the taking of
life if that should become necessary.'

dividual premises. The following are the most frequent

cases: for property stolen, and the supposed thief; for

property brought into the country in violation of the reve-

nue laws, and the supposed smuggler; for implements of

gaming unlawfully kept; and for liquors unlawfully stored

for sale. No doubt the right of search may be extended by

statute to other offences ; but any search to obtain evidence

of an intent to commit a crime can never be legalized.1

The warrant must be executed by a search in the very

place described, and not elsewhere; the service should be

made in the day-time, and without the presence of a

crowd of people ; 2 and the subject of the search must be

brought before the court or magistrate, to be disposed of

according to law.8 If the officer obeys the command of

his warrant, and is guilty of no excess or departure, he is

protected, even though the search proves to be fruitless

and the showing of cause unfounded.

Without a search-warrant the doors of a man's dwelling
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may be forced for the purpose of arresting a person known

to be therein, for treason, felony, or breach of the peace,

or in order to dispossess the occupant when another, by

the judgment of a competent court, has been awarded the

possession. In extreme cases this may also be done for

the enforcement of sanitary and other police regulations;

but, in general, the owner may close the outer door against

i any unlicensed entry, and defend it even to the taking of

life if that should become necessary.4

1 Wilkes's Case, 2 Wils. 151, and 19 State Trials, 1405; Broom,

Const. Law, 613; De Lolme, Const, of England, ch. 18.

2 2 Hale, P. C. 150; Arch. Cr. Law, 7th ed., 145.

8 Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, (Mass.) 1; Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curt. 311.

* Bohannon v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush, (Ky.) 481; S. C, 8 Am.

Rep. 474; Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150.

•

1

Wilkes's Case, 2 Wils. 151, and 19 State Trials, 1405; Broom,
Const. Law, 613; De Lolme, Const. of England, ch. 18.
2 2 Hale, P. C. 150; Arch. Cr. Law, 7th ed., 145.
8 Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, (Mass.) 1; Greene v. Briggs, 1Curt.811.
' Bohannon v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush, (Ky.) 481; S. C., 8 Am.
Rep. 474; Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 160.
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The protection of the Constitution is not, however, con-

fined to the dwelling-house, but it extends to one's person

and papers, wherever they may be. It is justly assumed

that every man may have secrets pertaining to his busi-

ness, or his family or social relations, to which his books,

papers, letters, or journals may bear testimony, but with

which the public, or any individuals of the public who may

have controversies with him, can have no legitimate con-

cern; and if they happen to be disgraceful to him, they

are nevertheless his secrets, and are not without justifiable

occasion to be exposed.1 Moreover, it is as easy to abuse

a search for the purpose of destroying evidence that

might aid an accused party, as it is for obtaining evidence

that would injure him, and the citizen needs protection on

the one ground as much as on the other. Even a search-

warrant to seize private papers, letters, and memoranda,

must be wholly unwarranted, except possibly in cases of

frauds upon the revenue, where the papers to be searched

for have been the agencies or instruments by means of

which the frauds have been accomplished or aided.2

General Warrants. — A general warrant is one which
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either, (1.) describes or names no offender, but leaves the

ministerial officer to discover and apprehend at discretion;

or (2.) describes no place to be searched, but gives the

officer unlimited authority to invade the privacy of indi-

» Cooley on Torts, 295.

2 The seizure of the papers of Algernon Sidney, which were

made use of as the means of convicting him of treason, and of those

of Wilkes about the time that the controversy between Great Britain

and the American Colonies was assuming threatening proportions,

was probably the immediate occasion for this constitutional pro-

vision. See Leach v. Money, Burr. 1742; S. C, 1 W. Bl. 555,19 State

Trials, 1001, and Broom, Const. Law, 525; Entick v. Carrington,

2 Wils. 275; S. C, 19 State Trials, 1030, and Broom, Const. Law,

558; May, Const Hist., ch. 10; Trial of Algernon Sidney, 9 State

Trials, 817.

The protection of the Constitution is not, however, confined to the dwelling-house, but it extends to one's person
and papers, wherever they may be. It is justly assumed
that every man may have secrets pertaining to his business, or his family 6r social relations, to which his books,
papers, letters, or journals may bear testimony, but with
which the public, or any individuals of the public who may
have controversies with him, can have no legitimate concern ; and if they happen to be disgraceful to him, they
are nevertheless bis secrets, and are not without justifiable
occasion to be exposed. 1 Moreover, it is as easy to abuse
a search for the purpose of destroying eVidence that
might aid an accused party, as it is for obtaining evidence
that would injure him, and the citizen needs protection on
the one ground as much as on the other. Even a search·
warrant to seize private papers, letters, and memoranda.,
must be wholly unwarranted, except possibly in cases of
frauds upon the revenue, where the papers to be searched
for have been the agencies or instruments by means of
which the frauds have been accomplished or aided. s
General Warrant&. - A general warr~nt is one which
either, (1.) describes or names no offender, but leaves the
ministerial officer to discover and apprehend at discretion ;
or (2.) describes no place to b~ searched, but gives the
officer unlimited authority to. invade the privacy of indi·
Cooley on Torts, 295.
s The seizure of the papers of Algernon Sidney, which were
made use of as the means of convicting him of treason, and. of those
of Wilkes about the time that the controversy between Great Britain
and the American Colonies was assuming threatening proportions,
'W&S probably the immediate occasion for this constitutional provision. See Leach v. Money, Burr.1742; S. C., 1 W. Bl. 656, 19 State
Trials, 1001, and Broom, Const. Law, 625; Entick v. Carrington,
2 Wils. 275; S. C., 19 State Trials, 1030, and Broom, Const. Law,
668; May, Const. Hist., ch. 10 ; Trial of Algernon Sidney, 9 State
Trials, 817.
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viduals without restraint. Such warrants were not un-

common in England previous to the decision in Wilkes's

case, which forever determined their illegality;1 and there

were instances in the Colonies also which were among the

grievances complained of when the Revolution was in-

augurated.2

Arresls without Warrant. — There are a few cases in

which arrests may be made without warrant; but the law

gives little countenance to such arrests, and whoever

makes one must show that the exceptional case existed

which would justify it. Any one may arrest another

whom he sees committing or attempting to commit a

felony or forcible breach of the peace; and a peace officer

may arrest, on reasonable grounds of suspicion of felony;

but the person arrested must be at once taken before some

court or magistrate of competent jurisdiction to take cog-

nizance of the offence. A peace officer maj- also make

arrests without warrant when municipal by-laws are being

violated in his presence;8 but he will be a trespasser if

he handcuffs or confines without necessity a person so

arrested.4
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Section in.—The Prohibition of Slavery.

Historical. — When the Constitution was adopted slavery

existed in every State save one. The exception was the

State of Massachusetts, in which it had been judicially

held, that a provision in the constitution which declared

that " all men are born free and equal, and have certain

natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which

may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their

1 See last note.

2 Quincy's Mass. Rep. 51 and 395. A form for a writ of assist-

ance, prepared by Gov. Hutchinson, is given in these Reports, on p. 418.

8 Mitchell v. Lemon, 34 Md. 176.

viduals without restraint. Such warrants .were not uncommon in England previous to the decision in Wilkes's
case, which forever determined their illegality; 1 and there
were instances in the Colonies also which were among the
grievances complained of when ·the Revolution was in~ ugurated. 9
Arrests without Warrant. -There are a few cases in
which arrests may be made without warrant; but the law
gives little countenance to such arrests, and whoever
makes one must show that the exceptional case existed
which would justify it. Any one may arrest another
whom he sees committing or attempting to commit a
felony or forcible breach of the peace ; and a peace officer
may arrest, on reasonable grounds of suspicion of felony ;
but the person arrested must be at once taken before some
court or magistrate of competent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. A peace officer may also make
arrests without warrant when municipal by-laws are being
violated in his presence ; 8 but he will be a trespasser if
he handcuffs or confines without necessity a person so
arrested.'

♦ Griffin v. Coleman, 4 H & N. 265.

SECTION

III. -THE

PROHIBITION OF SLAVERY.

Historical. -When the Constitution was adopted slavery

existed in every State save one. The exception was the
State of Massachusetts, in which it had been judicially
held, that a provision in the constitution which declared
that '' all men are born free and equal, and have certain
natural, essential, and unalienable rights ; among which
may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their
See last note.
Quincy's Mass. Rep. 51and395. A form for a writ of assistance, prepared by Gov. Hutchinson, is given in these Reports, on p. 418.
a Mitchell v. Lemon, 34 Md. 176.
4 Griffin 1:. Coleman, 4 H. & N. 265.
1

2
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lives and liberties ; that of acquiring, possessing, and pro-

tecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their

safety and happiness," — was inconsistent with the status

of slavery, and therefore entitled every man to his freedom.1

It is not certain that this provision was deliberately adopted

in this sense, and it is probable that in other States it

would not have been construed as conferring freedom upon

slaves; but neither the clause itself, nor the fact that a

few slaves obtained their liberty under it, attracted gen-

eral attention at the time, and the relation of slavery else-

where was not sensibly affected.

But although slavery prevailed in twelve of the original

States, the interest in and feeling towards it in the north-

ern and southern portions of the country were so radically

different, that it became exceedingly difficult to agree upon

the method in which it should be dealt with by the Consti-

tution. Its very existence seemed to some persons a re-

proach to those who had just emerged from a successful

struggle for their own liberties, and were now framing a

government for their further protection; and the compro-

mises upon the subject which were finally agreed upon,
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after much difficulty, would perhaps have been impossible,

had it not been believed by many people in all sections

that the institution could have but a temporary existence,

and must before many years be wholly done away with.2

And it is a significant fact that the word slave or slavery

does not appear in the Constitution, but servitude and the

slave-trade are vaguely referred to under other designa-

1 Draper, Civil War in America, vol. i. p. 317; Bancroft's Hist, of

U. S., vol x. p. 365. Slavery thus disappeared in Massachusetts

very much as it did in England under the decision in Sommersett's

Case, 20 State Trials, 1; Lofft's Reports, 18; Broom, Const. Law,

105.

2 It was prohibited by common consent in the Northwest Territory

In 1787.

lives and liberties ; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property ; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their ·
safety and happiness," -was inconsistent with the status
of slavery, and thei:efore entitled every man to his freedom. 1
It is not certain that this provision was deliberately adopten
in this sense, and it is probable that in other States it
would not have been construed as conferring freedom upon
slaves; but neither the clause itself, nor the fact that a
few slaves obtained their liberty under it, attracted general attention at the time, and the relation of slavery elsewhere was not sensibly atrected.
But altho~gh slavery prevailed in twelve of the original
States, the interest in and feeling towards it in the northern and southern portions of the country were so ~adically
different, that it became exceedingly difficult to agree upon
the method in which it should be dealt with by the Constitution. Its very existence seemed to some persons a reproach to those who had just emerged from a successful
struggle for their own liberties, and were now framing a
government for their further protection ; and the compromises upon the subject which were finally agreed upon,
after much difficulty, would perhaps have been impossible,
had it not been believed by many people in all sections
that the institution could have but a temporary existence,
and must before many years be wholly done away with. 1
And it is a significant fact that the word slave or slavery
docs not appear in the Constitution, but servitude and the
slave-trade are vaguely referred to under other designa1 Draper, Civil War in America, vol. i. p. 317 ; Bancroft's Hist. of
U. S., vol x. p. 365. Slavery thus disappeared in Massachusetts
very much as it did in England under the decision in Sommersett's
Case, 20 State Trials, 1; Lofft's Reports, 18; Broom, Const. Law,
105.
2 It was prohibited by common consent in the Northwest Territory
In 1787.
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tions, as if they were things not to be more plainly men-

tioned in a free constitution.1

The foreign slave-trade was abolished in 1808, — as soon

«s the compromise in the Constitution on that subject would

permit, — and the existence of slavery in the States did

not become the subject of serious national controversy and

disturbance until the application made in 1819 by the Ter-

ritory of Missouri for admission to the Union as a State.

The immediate occasions for excitement at that time were

the provisions in the constitution which was oifered for

acceptance, which not only recognized the existence of

slavery, but excluded from the legislature the power to

abolish it, and, in order to give additional security to the

institution, required the adoption of legislation to prohibit

the admission of free negroes within the State. The con-

troversy, which for a time seemed to threaten the exist-

ence of the Union, was quieted by the admission of the

State upon the fundamental condition that no law should

be passed " by which any citizen of either of the States

in the Union shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any

of* the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is
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entitled under the Constitution of the United States," and

by providing that "in all that territory ceded by France

to the United States under the name of Louisiana, which

lies north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north lati-

tude, excepting only such parts thereof as are included

within the limits [of Missouri], slavery and involuntary ser-

vitude, otherwise than in the punishment of crime whereof

the party shall have been duly convicted, shall be and is

hereby expressly prohibited." a This compromise proved

eventually unsatisfactory to both sections; the one insist-

1 Everett's Orations, vol. iv. p. 390; Madison's Works, vo1. iii.

p. 150; Frothingham, Rise of the Republic, 602.

2 Benton, Thirty Years' View, ch. 2; Writings of Madison, iii.

156-199; Stephens, War between the States, ii. 131-175.

tions, as if they were things not to be more plainly mentioned in a free constitution. 1
The foreign slave-trade was abolished in 1808, - as soon
"8 the compromise in the Constitution on that subject would
permit, - and the existence of slavery in the States did
not become the subject of serious national controversy and
disturbance until the application made in 1819 by the Territory of Missouri for admission to the Union as a State.
The immediate occasions for excitement at that time were
the provisions in the constitution which was offered for
acceptance, which not only recognized the existence of
slavery, but excluded from the legislature the power to
abolish it, and, in order to give additional security to the
institution, required the adoption of legislation to prohibit
the admission of free negroes within the State. The controversy, which for a time seemed to threaten the existence of the Union, was quieted by the admission of the
State upon the fundamental condition that no law should
be passed "by which any citizen of either of the States
in the Union shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any
of• the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is
entitled under the Constituti~n of the United States," and
by providing that '' in all that territory ceded by France
to the United States under the name of Louisiana, which
lies north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, excepting only such parts thereof as are included
within the limits [of :Missouri], slavery and involuntary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment of crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall be and is
hereby expressly prohibited.'~ 2 This compromise proved
eventually unsatisfactory to both sections ; the one insistEverett's Orations, vol. iv. p. 300; Madison's Works, vol. iii.
p. 150; Frothingham, Rise of the Republic, 602.
2 Benton, Thirty Years' View, ch. 2; Writings of Madison, iii.
166-199; Stephens, War between the States, ii. 131-175.
1
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ing that citizens of any of the States were of right entitled

to settle in the Territories with every species of property

recognized by the state laws, and to be protected therein,

'while in the other the sentiment grew and became domi-

nant that the federal government ought to prohibit slavery

in any territory subject to its jurisdiction, and to discoun-

tenance it in every way. A new and further compromise

became necessary in 1850, but this was followed, two j'ears

later, by the repeal of the prohibition of slavery north of

the Missouri Compromise line, and in the rapidly settling

Territory of Kansas armed conflicts took place between

those who proposed to introduce slavery and those who

determined to exclude it. During the decade beginning

with 1850 the animosity and estrangement between the

sections inereased, until in 1860 a President was chosen as

an avowed opponent of any further extension of slave ter-

ritory; and, taking this as conclusive evidence of a deter-

mination to make unconstitutional war upon their interests,

all the slaveholding States, with the exception of Delaware,

Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, announced their with-

drawal from the Union, and in the two States last named

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

there were also proceedings which assumed to do the same.

It had never been claimed by any considerable number

of persons that, as matter of constitutional law, the United

States could interfere with slavery within the States. The

whole subject of the domestic relations was left exclusively

by the Constitution to the States.1 Only when slaves es-

caped from service and fled into other States did the

power of the United States attach, and then it had exclu-

sive jurisdiction to legislate for their return to their mas-

ters.2 The point chiefly in dispute as a proposition of law

was that Congress might prohibit or abolish slavery in the

1 Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 103; Ex rel. Hobbs & Johnson, 1

Woods, 537.

2 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539.

ing that citizens or any of the States were of right entitled
to settle in the Territories with every species of property
recognized by the state laws, and to be protected therein,
while in the other the sentiment grew and became dominant that the federal government ought to prohibit slavery
in any territory subject to its jurisdiction, and to discountenance it in every way. A new and further compromise
became necessary in 1850, but this was followed, two years
later, by the repeal of the prohibition of slavery north of
the Missouri Compromise line, and in the rapidly settling
Territory of Kansas armed conflicts took place between
those who proposed to introduce slavery and those who
determined to exclude it. During the decade beginning
with 1850 the animosity and estrangement between the
sections inereased, until in 1860 a President was chosen as
an avowed opponent of any further extension of slave territory ; and, taking this as conclusive evidence of a determination to make unconstitutional war upon their interests,
all the slaveholding States, with the exception of Delaware,
Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, announced their withdrawal from the Union, and in the two States last named
there were also proceedings which assumed to do the same.
It had never been claimed by any considerable number
of persons that, as matter of constitutional law, the United
States could interfere with slavery within the States. The
whole subject of the domestic relations was left exclusively
by the Constitution to the States. 1 Only when slaves escaped from service and fled into other States did the
power of the United States attach, and then it had exclusive jurisdiction to legislate for their return to their masters. 2 The point chiefly in disput.e as a proposition of law
was that Congress might prohibit or abolish slaYery in the
Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 108; Ex rel. Hobbs & Johnson, 1
Woods, 637.
~ Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 639.
1
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Territories and in the District of Columbia. This was de-

nied, as being opposed to the spirit of the constitutional

compromises, and as establishing differences in right and

privilege as between the citizens of the several States de-

siring to remove into such Territories or District with

their property, or having occasion to visit or pass through

them and take their servants. Some of the subjects of

dispute were less mooted; and among these were the right

of the United States to regulate and prohibit the traffic in

slaves as between the States, and the right of colored

persons to the privileges of citizenship in the States. The

latter was denied by the federal Supreme Court in a case

decided in 1857, and the court, though that particular

point disposed of the case, took occasion to go further,

and to deny the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in

the Territories.1 By those who disputed this last position

the opinion of the court was denounced as an unwarrant-

able attempt of the court to settle a political controversy by

an ex cathedra and extrajudicial opinion, and a new bitter-

ness was brought into the existing excitement, much to the

detriment of the proper influence and authority of the court.
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The war ended in the practical destruction of slavery in

all the States which had been in rebellion. The President

had declared emancipation by proclamation, and the armies

had accomplished it as they advanced.2 The provisional

governments all recognized it, and, when the reorganized

States came with new constitutions for admission to repre-

sentation in Congress, these contained an express prohibi-

tion of slavery. Still slavery existed in the border States,

and in order to abolish it there, as well as to give consti-

tutional formality to the national antislavery proceedings,

the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution was proposed

and adopted.

1 Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393.

1 Story on Const., 4th ed., § 1923.

Territories and in the District of Columbia. This was denied, as being opposed to the spirit of the constitutional
compromises, and as establishing differences in right and
privilege as between the citizens of the several States desiring to remove into such Territ.ories or District with
their property, or having occasion to visit or pass through
them and take their servants. Some of the subjects ot
dispute were less mooted ; and among these were the right
of the United States to regulate and prohibit the traffic in
slaves as between the States, and the right of colored
persons to the privileges of citizenship in the States. The
latter was denied by the federal Supreme Court in a case
decided in 185 7, and the, court, though that particular
point disposed of the case, took occasion to go further,
and to deny the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in
the Tcrritories. 1 By those who disputed this last position
th_e opinion of the court was denounced as an unwarrantable attempt of the court to settle a political controversy by
an ex cathedra and extrajudicial opinion, and a new bitterness was brought into the existing excitement, much to the
detriment of the proper influence and authority of the court.
The war ended in the practical destruction of slavery in
all the States which had been in rebellion. The President
had declared emancipation by proclamation, and the armies
had accomplished it as they advanced. 2 The provisional
governments all recognized it, ~nd, when the reorganized
States came with new constitutions for admission to representation in Congress, these contained an express prohibition of slavery. Still slavery existed in the border States,
and in order to abolish it there, as well as to give constitutional formality to the national antislavery proceedings,
the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution was proposed
and adopted.
1
2

Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 303.
Story on Const., 4th ed.,§ 1923.
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The Constitution.—This amendment declares, adopting

the language of the Ordinance of 1787, that " neither

slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment

for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,

shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to

their jurisdiction." The word slavery in this country has

acquired a somewhat technical meaning, and is limited to

that sort of servitude which has prevailed under the state

laws, namely, to servitude for life. The prohibition of

slavery merely might therefore seem to be limited to this

sort of service, leaving the legislative authorities at liberty

to establish compulsory service for terms of years at dis-

cretion. Indeed, such servitude had existed in the early

history of the country in cases of immigrants known as

redemptioners, and of some others, and it would be easy

to suggest exceptional cases in which excuses might exist

to enact laws for compulsory service, were the legislature

so disposed. It was deemed important, therefore, that the

prohibition should include, not slavery merely, but all

classes of involuntary servitude not imposed as a punish-

ment.
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Involuntary Servitude. — The prohibition was not unim-

portant. Immediately following emancipation, laws were

passed in some of the late slaveholding States for the

compulsory apprenticeship of colored persons, on terms

which were made applicable to them alone; and the pro-

visions of the indenture were such as evidently assumed

the inferior and degraded condition of this class of persons,

and had a strong tendency to perpetuate it. In some

States, also, colored persons were forbidden to engage in

certain ordinary employments except on payment of a

large license-fee, or on producing to the authorities satis-

factory proof of good moral character. It was soon de-

cided that compulsory apprenticeship under these partial

and invidious laws was involuntary servitude within the

The Constitution. -This amendment declares, adopting
the language of the Ordinance of 1787, that " neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction." The word slavery in this country lias
acquired a somewhat technical meaning, and is limited to
that sort of servitude which has prevailed under the state
laws, namely, to servitude for life. The prohibition of
slavery merely might therefore seem to be limited to this
sort of senice, leaving the legislative authorities at liberty
to establish compulsory service for terms of years at discretion. Indeed, such servitude had existed in the early
history of the country in cases of immigrants known as
redemptioners, and of some others, and it would be easy
to suggest exceptional cases in which excuses might exist
to enact laws for compulsory service, were the legislature
so disposed. It was deemed important, therefore, that the
prohibition should include, not slavery merely, but all
classes of inYoluntary servitude not imposed as a punishment.
Involuntary Seroitude. -The prohibition was not unimportant. Immediately following emancipation, laws were
passed in some of the late slaveholding States for the
compulsory apprenticeship of colored persons, on terms
which were made applicable to them alone ; and the provisions of the indenture were such as evidently assumed
the inferior and degraded condition of this class of persons,
and had a strong tendency to' perpetuate it. In some
States, also, colored persons were forbidden to engage in
certain ordinary employments except on payment of a
large license-fee, or on producing to the authorities satisfactory proof of good moral character. It was soon decided that compulsory apprenticeship under these partial
and invidious laws was involuntary servitude within the
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meaning of this amendment, and was therefore forbidden.1

It can scarcely be doubted that exclusion from employ-

ment may as effectually establish involuntary servitude as

any use of physical force. In so far as one is excluded

from entering upon common vocations, the sphere of his

choice is narrowed; and if the prohibition may be made

applicable to one or two employments, it may be extended

to all but one, and at last the class discriminated against

may be forced to serve in a menial employment, and the

nominal freedom then becomes degrading slavery. It is

therefore a just conclusion, that any discrimination which

narrows to one class, while leaving unrestricted to others,

the freedom of choice in employments, must be regarded

as the establishment of involuntary servitude, and there-

fore forbidden.

But the amendment is not designed to interfere with

such regulations of service in the domestic relations as

were formerly admissible, including the service of minors

in apprenticeship under general laws. The involuntary

servitude forbidden was such as would not be tolerated by

the free principles of the common law, and not such as

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

that code permitted in the case of dependent relations.

Enforcement Laws. — The same amendment also pro-

vides that "Congress shall have power to enforce this

article by appropriate legislation." Whether this pro-

vision has any importance must depend upon whether the

prohibitory clause itself falls short of furnishing a com-

plete and sufficient protection. A constitutional provision

is sometimes, of itself, a complete law for the accom-

plishment of the purpose for which it was established,

and sometimes it merely declares a principle which will be

dormant until legislation is had to give it effect. When

the former is the case, the provision is sometimes spoken

of as self-executing.

1 Matter of Turner, 1 Abb. TJ. S. 84.

meaning of this amendment, and was therefore forbidden. 1
It can scarcely be doubted that exclusion from employment may as effectually establish involuntary servitude as
any use of physical force. In so fur as one is excluded
from entering upon common vocations, the sphere of his
choice is narrowed ; and if the prohibition may be made
applicable to one or two employments, it may be extended
to all but one, and at last the class discriminated against
may be forced to serve in a menial employment, and the
nominal freedom then becomes degrading slavery. It is
therefore a just conclusion, that any discrimination which
narrows to one class, while leaving unrestricted to others,
the freedom of choice in employments, must be regarded
as the establishment of involuntary servitude, and therefore forbidden.
But the amendment is not designed to interfere with
such regulations of service in the domestic relations as
were formerly admissible, including the service of minors
in apprenticeship under general laws. The involuntary
servitude forbidden was such as would not be tolerated by
the free principles of the common law, and not such as
that code permitted in the case of dependent relations.
Enforcement Laws. -The same amendment also provides that '' Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation." Whether this provision has any importance must depend upon whether the
prohibitory clause itself falls short of furnishing a complete and sufficient protect~on. A constitutional provision
is sometimes, of itself, a complete law for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was established,
and sometimes it merely declares a principle which will be
dormant until legislation is had to give it effect. When
the former is the case, the provision is sometimes spoken
of as self-executing. ·
1

Matter of Turner, 1 Abb. U.S. 84.
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Nearly all the provisions of the federal Constitution,

which confer legislative or judicial power, are inoperative

for the practical purposes intended until legislation under

them has given the means, and pointed out the methods, by

which the powers shall be exercised. The case of the

judicial power is an apt illustration: it extends to contro-

versies between citizens of different States, but, before it

can be applied in actual suits, there must be legislation

which prescribes what classes of these controversies the

federal courts shall be permitted to take cognizance of. In

like manner, the courts do not take cognizance of cases of

bankruptcy until the jurisdiction is expressly conferred by

law, though the judicial power is extended to those cases

by the Constitution itself.

With some provisions of the Constitution, however, and

especially the prohibitory clauses, it is different. A pro-

hibition of a power in the federal Constitution defeats any

attempt at its exercise, and any court, state or federal,

that may have cognizance of a case in which the powei

can come in controversy, whether directly or incidentally,

must take notice of, and act upon, the prohibition. Thus
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the mere declaration that "no bill of attainder shall be

passed" has been found ample to protect all the people

against legislative punishment, in cases not within their

proper cognizance, though no legislation has ever been

had looking to its enforcement. The case of the prohibi-

tion of laws impairing the obligation of contracts is a still

more striking illustration of the force of certain provisions

standing independently. In a multitude of forms- laws

have appeared which were supposed to violate this provis-

ion, and in no case has a court, either state or national,

had any difficulty in dealing with it, or in declaring the

law null if it was believed to be within the prohibition.

Such a provision may well be declared self-executing: it

is a complete and perfect law in itself, which all courts

Nearly all the provisions of the federal Constitution,
which confer legislative or judicial power, are inoperative
for the practical purposes intended until legislation under
them has given the means, and pointed out the methods, by
which the powers shall be exercised. The case of the
judicial power is an apt illustration : it extends to controversies between citizens of different States, but, before it
can be applied in actual suits, there must be legislation
which prescribes what classes of these controvez:sies the
fcderal courts shall be permitted to take cognizance of. In
like manner, the courts do not take cognizance of cases of
bankruptcy until the jurisdiction is expressly conferred by
law, though the judicial power is extended to those cases
by the Constitution itself.
'Vith some provisions of the Constitution, however, and
especially the prohibitory clauses, it is different. A prohibition of a power in the federal Constitution defeats any
attempt at its exercise, and any court, state or federal,
that may have cognizance of a case in which the powe1
can come in controversy, whether directly or incidentally,
must take notice of, and act upon, the prohibition. Thus
the mere declaration that '' no bill of attainder shall be
passed" has been found ample to protect all the people
against legislative punishment, in cases not within their
proper cognizance, though no legislation has ever been
bad looking to its enforcement. The case of the prohibition of laws impairing the obligation of contracts is a still
more striking illustration of the force of certain provisions
standing independently. In a multitude of forms. laws
_have appeared which were supposed to violate this proyision, and in no case has a court, either state or national,
had any difficulty in dealing with it, or in declaring the
law null if it was believed to be within the prohibition.
Such a provision may well be declared self-executing: it
is a complete and perfect law in itself, which all courts
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must take notice of and enforce whenever a disregard

of it comes to their judicial notice, without any statute

requiring or expressly permitting it.

The prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude is

self-executing in this sense. All state laws then in exist-

ence which were inconsistent with it were by its inherent

force nullified, and all state legislation which should

thereafter be attempted inconsistent with it was rendered

null in its incipiency. And while courts shall be in exist-

ence competent to issue the writ of habeas corpus and to

administer common-law remedies, it seems difficult to im-

agine a case of attempt at a violation or evasion of this

declaration of universal liberty that shall be wanting in

appropriate redress.

Section IV.—The Guaranties op Life, Liberty, and

Equality.

The Constitution. — It is declared by the fourteenth arti-

cle of the amendments, that " no State shall deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property without due process of

law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws." This provision is directed
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at state action only ; but state action in violation of it may

must take notice of and enforce whenever a disregard
of it comes to their judicial notice, without any statute
requiring or expressly permitting it.
The prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude is
self-executing in this sense. All state laws then in existence which were inconsistent with it were by its inherent
force nullified, and all state legislation which should
thereafter be attempted inconsistent with it was rendered
null in its incipiency. And while courts shall be in existence competent to issue the writ of habeas corpus and to
'administer common-law remedies, it seems difficult to imagine a case of attempt at a violation or evasion of this
declaration of universal liberty that shall be wanting in
appropriate redress.

be taken by any of the departments of state government,

and it is competent for Congress to legislate for its preven-

tion, and for the punishment of state agents who partici-

SECTION

IV. -THE

GUARANTIES OF LIFE, LIBERTY, AND
EQUALITY.

pate in it. A state officer may therefore be punished for

excluding persons from jury service because of their race.1

Due Process of Law. —To a proper appreciation of this

guaranty it is important, first, to have correct understand-

ing of the terms made use of. The terms are general,

and can only be understood when their known and custom-

ary application is explained. This is especially the case

with the phrase "due process of law." It has long been in

1 Coles, Petitioner, U. S. Sup. Court, March 2, 1880.

The Constitution. - It is declared by the fourteenth article of the amendments, that '' no State shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." This provision is directed
at state action only ; but state action in violation of it may
be taken by any of the departments of state government,
and it is competent for Congress to legislate for its prevention, and for the punishment of state agents who participate in it. A state officer may therefore be punished for
excluding persons from jury service because of their race. 1
Due Process of La·w. -To a proper appreciation of this
guaranty it is important, first, to have correct understanding of the term~ made use of. The terms are general,
and can only be understood when their known and customary application is explained. This is especially the case
with the phrase "due process of law." It has long been in
l

Coles, Petitioner, U. S. Sup. Court, March 2, 1880.
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use among law writers, and in judicial decisions, as imply-

ing correct and orderly proceedings, which are due because

they observe all the securities for private right which are

applicable in the particular case. In this sense it is sy-

nonymous with " law of the land," as used in the famous

twenty-ninth chapter of Magna Charta, which declared

that "no freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or dis-

seized, or outlawed, or banished, or anyways destroyed,

nor will the king pass upon him or commit him to prison,

unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the

land." The identity of the two in meaning and purpose

is now well settled.1

Admitting the identity of meaning, however, does not

of itself bring us to an understanding of the purpose and

effect of this guaranty. "What is the law of the land?

It cannot be the common law merety. Statute law is

in the highest sense the law of the land; and the legis-

lative department, created for the very purpose of de-

claring from time to time what shall be the law, possesses

ample powers to make, modify, and repeal, as public

policy or the public need shall demand. Such being the
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case, the question presents itself whether anything may

be made the law of the land, or may become due pro-

cess of law, which the legislature under proper forms

may see fit to enact? To solve this question we have

only to consider for a moment the purpose of the clause

under examination. That purpose, as is apparent, was

individual protection by limitation upon power; and any

construction which would leave with the legislature this

unbridled authority, as has been well said by an eminent

jurist, 'would render the restriction absolutely nugatory,

and turn this part of the Constitution into mere nonsense.

The people would be made to say to the two Houses, You

shall be vested with the legislative power of the State, but

i Murray's 1 -ssee v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272, 276.

use among law writers, and in judicial decisions, as implying correct and orderly proceedings, which are due because
they observe all the securities for private right which are
applicable in the particular case. In this sense it is synonymous with " law of the land," as used in the famous
twenty-ninth chapter of Magna Charta, which declared
that "no freeman shall be taken, or impriso~ed, or disseized, or outlawed, or banished, or anyways destroyed,
nor will the king pass upon him or commit him to prison,
unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the
land." The identity of the two in meaning and purpose
is now well settled. 1
Admitting the identity of meaning, however, does not
of itself bring us to an understanding of the purpose and
effect of this guaranty. "What is· the law of the land?·
It cannot be the common law merely. Statute law is
in the highest sense the law of the land; and the legislative department, created for the very purpose of declaling from time to time what shall be the law, possesses
ample powers to make, modify, and repeal, as public
policy or the public need shall demand. Such being the
case, the question presents itself whether anything may
be made the law of the land, or may become due process of law, which the legislature under proper forms
may see fit to enact? To solve this question we have
only to consider for a moment the purpose of the clause
under examination. That purpose, as is apparent, was
individual protection by limitation upon power; and any
construction which would leave with the legislature this
unbridled authority, as has been well said by an eminent
jurist, ' would render the restriction absolutely nugatory,
and tum this part of the Constitution into mere nonsense.
The people would be made to say to the tiyo Houses, You
shall be vested with the legislative power of the State, but
1

Murray·, 1 ;.~ssee v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272, 276.
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no one shall be disfranchised or deprived of the rights or

privileges of a citizen unless you pass a statute for that

purpose. In other words, You shall not do the wrong

unless you choose to do it.'1

1' To quote the words of an eminent advocate and

statesman, 'Everything which may pass under the forms

of an enactment is not to be considered the law of the

land. If this were so, acts of attainder, bills of pains and

penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments,

and acts directly transferring one man's estate to another,

legislative judgments, decrees, and forfeitures in all possi-

ble forms, would be the law of the land. Such a strange

construction would render constitutional provisions of the

highest importance completely inoperative and void. It

would tend directly to establish the union of all the powers

in the legislature. There would be no general permanent

law for courts to administer or men to live under. The

administration of justice would be an empty form, an idle

ceremony. Judges would sit to execute legislative judg-

ments and decrees, not to declare the law or administer

the justice of the country.' And he gives us a definition,
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of his own, in the concise and comprehensive language of

which he was so eminently the master: 'By the law of the

land is most clearly intended the general law, — a law

which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon in-

quiry, and renders judgment only after trial. The mean-

ing is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property,

and immunities under the protection of the general rules

Which govern society.'1 'As to the words from Magna

1 Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, (N. Y.) 140, 143. See Hoke v. Hender-

son, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 1; Kinney v. Beverley, 1 Hen. & M. (Va.) 531;

Norman v. Heist, 5 W. & S. (Penn.) 171; Janes v. Reynolds, 2 Tex.

250. Also the recent case of Davidson v. New .Orleans, 96 U. S.

Rep. 97.

2 Webster in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518;

Webster's Works, v. 487.

no one shall be disfranchised or deprived of the rights or
privileges of a citizen unless you pass a statute for that
purpose. In other words, You shall not do the wrong
unless you choose to do it.' 1
'' To quote the words of an eminent advocate and
statesman, ~ Everything which may pass under the forms
of an enactment is not to be considered the law of the
land. If this were so, acts of attainder, bills of pains and
penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments,
and acts directly transferring one man's estate to another,
legislative judgments, decrees, and forfeitures in all possible forms, would be the law of the land. Such a strange
construction would render constitutional provisions of the
highest importance completely inoperative and void. It
would tend directly to establish the union of all the powers
in the legislature. There would be no general permanent
law for courts to administer or men to live under. The
administration of justice would be an empty form, an idle
ceremony. Judges would sit .to execute legislative judgments and decrees, not to declare the law or administer
the justice of the country.' And he gives us a definition.
of his own, in the concise and comprehensive language of
which he was so eminently the master: ' By the law of the
land is most clearly intended the general law, - a law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property,
and immunities under the protection of the general rules
which govern society.'~ 'As to the words from ·Magna
I Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, (N. Y.) 140, 143.
See Hoke v. Hender·
son, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 1; mnney v. Beverley, 1 Hen. & M. (Va.) 631;
Norman v. Heist, 6 W. & S. (Penn.) 171; Janes v. Reynolds, 2 Tex.
260. Also the recent case of Davidson v. New .Orleans, 96 U. S.
Rep. 97.
2 Webster in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 618;
Webster's Works, v. 487.
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Charta,' says another eminent jurist, 'after volumes spo-

ken and written with a view to their exposition, the good

sense of mankind has at length settled down to this: that

they were intended to secure the individual from the arbi-

trary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained

by the established principles of private right and dis-

tributive justice.'1

"Such have been the views of able jurists and states-

men; and the deduction is that life, liberty, and property

are placed under the protection of known and established

principles, which cannot be dispensed with either gen-

erally or specially; either by courts or executive officers,

or by legislators themselves. Different principles are ap-

plicable in different cases, and require different forms

and proceedings ; in some they must be judicial; in others

the government may interfere directly, and ex parte; but

due process of law in each particular case means such an

exertion of the powers of government as the settled max-

ims of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards

for the protection of individual rights as those maxims

prescribe for the class of cases to which the one being
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dealt with belongs.

"When life and liberty are in question, there must in

every instance be judicial proceedings; and that require-

ment implies an accusation, a hearing before an impartial

tribunal, with proper jurisdiction, and a conviction and

judgment before the punishment can be inflicted." 1 But

the States will prescribe their own modes of proceeding

and trial; the accusation may be by grand jury or without

one; the trial, by jury or by court;8 and whatever is

established will be due process of law, so that it be gen-

eral and impartial in operation, and disregard no provision

i Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235.

a Story on Const., 4th ed., §§ 1943-1946.

» Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. Eep. 90.

Charta,' says another eminent jurist, 'after volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the good
sense of mankind has at length settled down to this : that
they were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained
by the established principles of private right and distributive justice.' 1
"Such have been the views of able jurists and statesmen; and the deduction is that life, liberty, and property
are placed under the protection of known and established
principles, which cannot be dispensed with either generally or specially ; either by courts or executive officers,
or by legislators themselves. Different principles are applicable in different cases, and require different forms
and proceedings ; in some they must be judicial ; in others
the government may interfere directly, and ex parte; but
due process of law in each particular case means such an
exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards
for the protection of individual rights as those maxi~s
.prescribe for the class of cases to which the one being
dealt with belongs.
"When life and liberty are in question, there must in
every instance be judicial proceedings ; and that requirement implies an accusation, a hearing before an impartial
tribunal, with proper jurisdiction, and a conviction and
judgment before the punishment can be inflicted." i But
the States will prescribe their own- modes of proceeding
and tiial; the accusation may be by grand jury or without
one; the trial, by jury or by court; 8 and whatever is
established will be due process of law, so that it be general and impartial in operation, and disregard no provision
Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235.
Story on Const., 4th ed., §§ 1943-1946.
a Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. Rep. 00.
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of federal or state constitution. In general, however, an

accused person will be entitled to the judgment of his

peers, unless that mode of trial is expressly dispensed

with by law. There may be military tribunals for the

trial of military offences, but these must keep strictly

within the limits of their legal authority. The common

law is over and above all tribunals administering any

other code, and is watchful and vigilant to keep them

within the limits of their jurisdiction, and to punish their

members if they usurp authority not belonging to them.1

Life and Liberty. — These words are used in constitu-

tional law as standing for and representing all personal

rights whatsoever, except those which are embraced in the

idea of property. The comprehensive word is liberty;

and by this is meant, not merely freedom to move about

unrestrained, but such liberty of conduct, choice, and action

as the law gives and protects. Liberty is sometimes clas-

sified as natural liberty, civil liberty, and political liberty.

The first term is commonly employed in a somewhat vague

and indeterminate sense. One man will perhaps under-

stand by it a liberty to enjoy all those rights which are usu-
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ally regarded as fundamental, and which all governments

should concede to all their subjects; but as it would be

necessary to agree what these are, and the agreement could

only be expressed in the form of law, the natural liberty,

so far as the law could take notice of it, would be found

at last to resolve itself into such liberty as the government

of every civilized people would be expected by law to de-

fine and protect. Another by natural liberty may under-

stand that freedom from restraint which exists before any

government has imposed its limitations. But as without

government only a savage state could exist, and any lib-

erty would be only that of the wild beast, in which every

i Story on Const., § 1947; Cooley, Const. Lim., ch. 11; Milligan's

Case, 4 Wall. 2.

15

of federal or state constitution. In general, however, an
accused person will be entitled to the judgment of his
peers, unless that mode of trial is expressly dispensed
with by law. There may be military tribunals for the
trial of military offences, but these must keep strictly
within the limits of their legal authority. The common
law is over and above all tiibunals administering any
other code, and is watchful and vigilant to keep them
within the limits of their jurisdiction, and to punish their
members if they usurp authority not belonging to them. 1
Life and Liberty. -These words are used in constitutional law as standing for and representing all personal
rights whatsoever, except those which are embraced in the
idea of property. The comprehensive word is liberty;
and by this is meant, not merely freedom to move about
unrestrained, but such liberty of conduct, choice, and action
as the law gives and protects. Liberty is some~mes classified as natural liberty, civil liberty, and political liberty.
The first term is commonly employed in a somewhat vague
and indeterminate sense. One man will perhaps understand by it a liberty to enjoy all those rights which are usually regarded as fundamental, and which all governments
should concede to all their subjects ; but as it would be
necessary to agree what these are, and the agreement could
only be expressed in the form of law, the natural liberty,
so far as the law could take notice of it, would be found
at last to resolve itself into such liberty as the government
of every civilized people would be expected by law to define and protect. Another by natural liberty may understand that freedom from restraint which exists before any
government has imposed its limitations. But as without
government only a savage state could exist, and any liberty would be only that of the wild beast, in which every
1 Story on Const., § 1947 ; Cooley, Const. Lim., ch. 11 ; Milligan'e
Case, 4 Wall. 2.
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man would have an equal right to take or hold whatever

his agility, courage, strength, or cunning could secure, but

no available right to more, it is obvious that a natural

liberty of the sort would be inconsistent with any valuable

rigW whatever. A right in any valuable sense can only

be that which the law secures to its possessor, by requiring

others to respect it, and to abstain from its violation.

Rights, then, are the offspring of law; they are born of

legal restraints; by these restraints every man may be

protected in their enjoyment within the prescribed limits;

without them possessions must be obtained and defended

by cunning or force.

Civil Liberty and Political Liberty. — Civil liberty may be

defined as that condition in which rights are established

and protected, by means of such limitations and restraints

upon the action of individual members of the political so-

ciety as are needed to prevent what would be injurious to

other individuals, or prejudicial to the general welfare.

This condition may exist in any country, but its extent

and securities must depend largely upon the degree of po-

litical liberty which accompanies it. Political liberty may
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be defined as consisting in an effectual participation of the

people in the making of the laws.

Equality. — The theory of our institutions is, that every

man's civil liberty is the same with that of others, — that

all men are equal before the law in rights, privileges, and

legal capacities. This theorj^ is expressed and emphasized

in the fourteenth amendment. A State, therefore, has no

business to bestow favors or to establish unjust discrimi-

nations. It nevertheless becomes important to the general

welfare that special privileges should be granted in some

cases, because from the nature of the case there cannot be

a general participation. If a national bank is essential,

everybody cannot be a corporator; if a railroad is to be

built, the franchise must necessarily be given into the hands

man would have an equal right to take or hold whate\er
his agility, courage, strength, or cunning could secure, but
no available right to more, it is obvious that a natural
liberty of the sort would be inconsistent with any valuable
righ1 whatever. A right in any valuable sense can only
be that which the law secures to its possessor, by requiring
others to respect it, and to abstain from its violation.
Rights, then, are the offspring of law ; they are born of
legal restraints ; by these restraints every man may be
protected in their enjoyment within the presmibed limits ;
without them possessions must be obtained and defended
by cunning or force.
Oivil Liberty and Political Liberty. - Civil liberty may be
defined as that condition in which rights are established
and protected, by means of such limitations and restraints
upon the action of individual members of the political society as are needed to prevent what would be injurious to
other individuals, or prejudicial to the general welfare.
This condition may exist in any country, but its extent
and securities must depend largely upon the degree of political liberty which accompanies it. Political liberty may
be defined as consisting in an effectual participation of the
people in the making of the laws.
Equality. -The theory of our institutions is, that every
man's civil liberty is the same with that of others, -that
all men are equal before the law in rights, privileges, and
legal capacities. This theory is expressed nnd empha.sized
in the fourteenth amendment. A Stnte, therefore, has no
business to bestow favors or to establish unjust discriminations. It ncyertheless becomes important to the general
welfare that special privileges should be granted in some
cases, because from the nature of the case there cannot be
a general participation. If a national bnnk is essential,
everybo<ly cannot lJe a corporator; if a railroad is to be
huilt, the franchise must necessarily be given into the hands
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of a few persons. In these and other cases falling within

similar reasons, special charters may be granted without

giving cause for complaint. But it is a just rule of con-

struction that all grants of franchise and privilege are to

be strictly construed; the State will be presumed to have

granted in plain terms all it intended to grant at all.1

The Police Power. — The authority to establish, for the

intercourse of the several members of the body politic with

each other, those rules of good conduct and good neigh-

borhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights

and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his

own, so far as is reasonably consistent with a correspond-

ing enjoyment by others, is usually spoken of as the au-

thority or power of police. This is a most comprehensive

branch of sovereignty, extending as it does to every person,

every public and private right, everything in the nature

of property, every relation in the State, in society, and in

private life.1 The use of the public highways is regulated

under it; so are the public fisheries and mines if any, and

so are all the occupations of life. The domestic relations

are formed, regulated, sustained, and dissolved under the
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rules it prescribes: the age at which a child becomes

emancipated, the terms under which he may be allowed to

apprentice himself or be forced by the public authorities to

do so, and the measure of independent action in the mar-

riage relation, are all determined by its rules. These rules

seldom raise any question of constitutional authority, but

it is possible for them to be pushed to an extreme that

shall deny just liberty.

Marriage. — This is a relation formed by the consent of

two persons of opposite sexes under natural laws, and in

1 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 544; Per-

rine r. Canal Co., 9 How. 172.

a Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53; Thorpe v. Railroad

Co., 27 Vt. 140.

of a few persons. In these and other cases falling within
similar reasons, special charters may be granted without
giving cause for complaint. But it is a just rule of construction that all grants of franchise and privilege are to
be strictly construed; the State will be presumed to have
granted in plain terms all it intended to grant at all. 1
The Police Power. - The authority to establish, for the
intercourse of the several members of the body politic with
each other, those rules of good conduct and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights
and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his
own, so far as is reasonably consistent with a corresponding enjoyment by others, is usually spoken of as the authority or power of police. This is a most comprehensive
branch of sovereignty, extiending as it does to every person,
every public and private right, everything in the nature
of property, every relation in the State, in society, and in
private life. 2 The use of the public highways is regulated
under it ; so are the public fisheries and mines if any, and
so are all the occupations of life. The domestic relations
are formed, regulated, sustained, and dissolved under the
rules it prescribes : the age at whfoh a child becomes
emancipated, the terms un<l:er which he may be allowed to
apprentice himself or be forced by the public au th01ities to
do so, and the measure of independent action in the mar..
riage relation, are all determined by its rules. These rules
seldom raise any question of constitutional authority, but
it is possible for them to be pushed to an extreme that
shall deny just liberty.
Marriage. -This is a relation formed by the consent of
two persons of opposite sexes under natural laws, and in
1

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 544; Perrine v. Canal Co., 9 How. 172.
t Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Maas.) 53; Thorpe v. Railroad
Co., 27 Vt. 140.
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a general sense the right to form it is universal. But, as

with every other conventional right, circumstances create

exceptions, and general rules become necessary by means

of which the exceptions may be determined. The relation

is the most important that can exist in the State; the well-

being of society depends on its preservation in its puritj-,

and it is of the highest importance that those marriages

should be prohibited that would be unfit, and that would

tend to demoralize the community, or in their progeny to

give to society a debased offspring. On these grounds the

marriages of immature persons are prohibited, and also

those of persons unsound in mind. No doubt these regu-

lations might go much farther than they do; and they are

supplemented by others which require certain forms, in

order to publicity and certainty of evidence, and to guard

against frauds. The legal right may therefore be ex-

pressed thus: every one has lawful right to marry, who

possesses the capacity and qualifications required by law,

with a person of the opposite sex having the like capacity

and qualifications, whose consent is obtained, and with

whom the legal conditions to marriage are observed.
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If the regulations apply universally and impartially, a

question of constitutional law can scarcely arise upon

them, for every independent State must be at liberty to

regulate the domestic institutions of its people as shall

seem most for the general welfare. A regulation, how-

ever, that should apply to one class exclusively, and which

should not be based upon any distinction between that

class and others which could be important to the relation,

must be wholly unwarranted and illegal. This principle is

conceded, but it is not easy to determine what regulation

would come within it. Many States prohibit the inter-

marriage of white persons and negroes; and since the

fourteenth amendment this regulation has been contested

as the offspring of race prejudice, as establishing an un-

a general sense the right to form it is universal. But, as
with every other conventional right, circumstances create
exceptions, and general rules become necessary by means
of which the exceptions may be determined. The relation
is the most important that can exist in the State; the wellbeing of society depends on its preservation in its purity,
and it is of the highest importance that those marriages
should be prohibited that would be unfit, and that would
tend to demoralize the community, or in their progeny to
give to society a debased offspring. On these grounds the
marriages· of immature persons are prohibited, and also
those of persons unsound in mind. No doubt these regulations might go much farther than they do ; and they are
supplemented by others which require certain forms, in
order to publicity and certainty of evidence, and to guard
against frauds. The legal right may therefore be expressed thus: every one has lawful right to marry, who
possesses the capacity and qualifications required by law,
with a person of the opposite sex having the like capacity
and qualifications, whose consent is obtained, and with
whom the legal conditions to marriage are observed.
If the regulations apply universally and impartially, a
question of constitutional law can scarcely arise upon
them, for every independent State must be at liberty to
regulate the domestic institutions of its people as shall
seem most for the general welfare. A regulation, however, that should apply to one class exclusively, and which
should not be based upon any distinction between that
class and others which could be important to the relation,
must be wholly unwarranted and illegal. This principle is
conceded, but it is not easy tO determine what regulation
would come within it. Many States prohibit the intermarriage of white persons and negroes; and· since the
fourteenth amendment this regulation has been contested
as the offspring of race prejudice, as establishing an un-
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reasonable discrimination, and as depriving one class of

the equal protection of the laws. Strictly, however, the

regulation discriminates no more against one race than

against the other: it merely forbids marriages between

the two. Nor can it be said to so narrow the privilege

of marriage as practically to impede or prevent it. Race

prejudice no doubt has had something to do with establish-

ing it, but it cannot be said to be so entirely without rea-

• son in its support as to be purely arbitrary. The general

current of judicial decision is, that it deprives a citizen of

nothing that he can claim as a legal right, privilege, or

exemption.1

Divorce. — As with marriage, so with divorce; every

State will establish such rules as seem best for the asso

ciated people. The following rules of law may be con

side red settled: — 1. That the legislature may lay down

general rules of divorce, or it may prescribe a particular

rule for a particular case; in other words, may grant spe-

cial divorces at will. This is the rule in the absence of

constitutional provisions on the subject, but in a major

ity of the States legislative divorces are now prohibited.
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2. That the idea of vested rights, as it applies to property,

has no application to the domestic relations. Therefore,

one cannot complain that he is deprived of a vested right

though the rule prescribed under which his marriage is dis-

solved seems to him unreasonable or unjust.2 3. That a

mere legislative act, where legislative divorces are not pro-

hibited, is due process of law for this purpose, and, as in

the case of the passage of any other law, its justice cannot

become the subject of judicial inquiry. 4. That, when

1 State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389; State v. Halrston, 63 N. C. 451;

Lonas v. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 287; Ex parte Hobbs and Johnson,

1 Woods, 537.

2 Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541; Crane v. Meginnis, 1 Gill & J. (Md.)

463.

reasonable discrimination, and as depriving one class ot
the equal protection of the laws. Strictly, however, the
regulation discriminates no more against one race than
against the other : it merely forbids marriages between
the two. Nor can it be said to so narrow the privilege
of marriage as practically to impeoo or prevent it. ·Race
prejudice no doubt has had something to do with establishing it, but it cannot be said to be so entirely without rea• son in its support as to be purely arbitrary. The general
current of judicial decision is, that it deprives a citizen of
nothing that he can claim as a legal right, privilege, or
exemption. 1
Divorce. -As with marriage, so with divorce ; every
State will establish such rules as seem best for the asso
ciated people. The following rules of law may be con
sidered settled : - 1. That the legislature may lay <1.own
general rules of divorce, or it may prescribe a particular
rule for a particular case; .in other words, may grant special divorces at will. This is the rule in the absence of
constitutional provisions on the subject, but in a major
ity of the States legislative divorces are now prohibited.
2. That the idea of vested rights, as it applies to property,
has no application to the domestic relations. Therefore,
one cannot complain that he is deprived of a vested right
though the rule prescribed under which his marriage is dissolved seems to him unreasonable or unjust. 2 3. That a
mere legislative act, where legislative divorces are not prohibited, is due process of law for this purpose, and, as in
the case of the passage of any other law, its justice cannot
become the subject of judicial inquiry. 4. That, when
State v. Gibson, 86 Ind. 889; State v. Hairston, 68 N. C. 451 ;
Lonas v. State, 8 Heisk. (Tenn.) 287; Ex parte Hobbs and Johnson,
1 Woods, 537.
2 Starr o. Pease, 8 Conn. Ml; Crane v. Meginnis, 1 Gill & J. (Md.)
I
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divorce is by law made a judicial proceeding, the right to a

hearing is the same that exists in controversies over prop-

erty rights, and is indefeasible. 5. No State can establish

rules for divorce for any but its own people, nor grant di-

vorces to those not domiciled within its own limits. It is

under this principle that questions of constitutional right

are likely to arise. The principle is clear, but attempts are

often made to avoid it by going from one jurisdiction, and

obtaining a merely colorable residence in another, for the 1

purposes of divorce. A divorce obtained under such cir-

cumstances is wholly unauthorized, and void for want of

authority in the State whose courts assume to grant it.1

Nor can the constitutional provision that full faith and

credit shall be given in each State to the judicial proceed-

ings, &c. of every other State require such a divorce to be

respected elsewhere, because it is not entitled to respect

in the State in which it takes place.2

Education. —That civil liberty would be exceedingly im-

perfect that did not permit the citizen to educate himself

in such proper ways as might be open to him, and to such

extent as he should choose. The State, however, usually
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makes provision for public education, establishing schools

and laying down rules respecting those who shall be re-

ceived into them. Formerly it was held that such a pro-

vision was in the nature of state bounty, and that the

State might limit the bounty at discretion. Therefore col-

ored children might be excluded from the public schools.8

But since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment this

is unlawful,4 though it seems to be admissible to require

1 Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227; Leith v. Leith, 39 N. H. 20;

People v. Da well, 25 Mich. 247; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 48 N. Y. 30;

Reel v. Elder, 62 Penn. St. 308.

2 Chase v. Chase, 6 Gray, (Mass.) 157.

8 Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 198.

« Ward o. Flood, 48 Cal. 36.

•

divorce is by law made a judicial proceeding, the right to a
hearing is the same that exists in controversies over property rights, and is indefeasible. 5. No State can establish
roles for divorce for any but its own people, nor grant divorces to those not domiciled within its own limits. It is
under this principle that questions of constitutional right
are likely to arise. The principl~ is clear, but attempts are
often made t,o avoid it by going from ·one jurisdiction, and
obtaining a merely colorable residence in another, for the •
purposes of divorce. .A divorce obtained under such circumstances is wholly unauthorized, and void for want of
authority in the State whose courts assume to grant it. 1
Nor can the constitutional provision that full faith and
credit shall be given in each State to the judicial proceedings, &c. of every other State require such a divorce to be
respected elsewhere, because it is not entitled to respect
in the State in which it takes place. 2
Education. -That civil liberty would be exceedingly imperfect that did not permit the citizen to educate himself
in such proper ways as might be open to him, and to such ,
extent as he should choose. The State, however, usually
makes provision for public education, establishing schools.
and laying down rules respecting those who shall be received into them. Formerly it was held that such a provision was in the nature of state bounty, and that the
State might limit the bounty at discretion. Therefore colored children might be excluded from the public schools.•
But since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment this
is unlawful, 4 though it seems to be admissible to require
1

1 Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227; Leith "· Leith, 89 N. H. 20;
People v. Da well, 25 Mich. 24 7 ; Hoilman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30;
Reel v. Elder. 62 Penn. St. 308.
t Chase v. Chase, 6 Gray, (Mass.) 157.
a Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 198.
' Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36.
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colored persons to attend separate schools, provided the

schools are equal in advantages, and the same measure of

privilege and opportunity is afforded in each.1

Employment. — The general rule is that every person sui

juris has a right to choose his own employment, and to de-

vote his labor to any calling, or at his option to hire it out

in the service of others, This is one of the first and highest

of all civil rights, and any restrictions that discriminate

against persons or classes are inadmissible. The right to

reside in a country implies the right to labor there, and

therefore if by treaty with a foreign country its people are

given the liberty to reside in this, no State can have the

right to forbid their employment, as this would be in con-

flict with the rights given by the treaty.2

Employments are nevertheless subject to control under

the state power of police, and may be regulated in various

ways, and to some extent restricted.

1. The State may forbid certain classes of persons being

employed in occupations which their age, sex, or health

renders unsuitable for them; as women and young chil-

dren are sometimes forbidden to be employed in mines and
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certain kinds of manufacture.

2. The State may require special training for some em-

ployments, and forbid persons engaging in them who have

not proved their fitness on examination, and been duly

licensed. Such are the cases of practitioners of law and

of medicine. Similar regulations cannot be extended to

members of the clerical profession, since it is a part of

the religious freedom of the people that they should be left

at liberty to listen to such ministrations as they please,

1 Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327; State v. McCann, 21 Ohio, N. S. 198;

County Court v. Robinson, 27 Ala. 116.

2 Baker v. Portland (U. S. Dist. Ct. Oregon), 8 Reporter, 392;

12 Chicago Legal News, 375; Chapman v. Toy Long, 4 Saw-

yer, 36.

colored persons to attend separate schools, provided the
schools are equal in advantages, and the same measure or
•
privilege and opportunity is afforded in each. 1
Employment. - The general rule is that every person sui
juris has a right to choose his own employment, and to devote his labor to any calling, or at his option to hire it out
in the service of others, This is one of the first and highest
of all civil rights, and any restrictions that discriminate
against persons or classes a_re inadmissible. The right to
reside in a country implies the right to labor there, and
therefore if by treaty with a foreign country its people are
given the liberty to reside in this, no State can have the
right to forbid their employment, as this would be in conflict with the righ~ given by the treaty. 2
Employments are nevertheless subject to control under
the state power of police, and may be regulated in various
ways, and to some extent restricted.
1. The State may forbid certain classes of persons being
employed in occupations which their age, sex, or health
r~nders unsuitable for them ; as women and young children are sometimes for bidden to be employed in mines and
certain kinds of manufacture.
2. The State may require special training for some employments, and forbid persons engaging in them who have
not proved their fitness on examination, and been duly
licensed. Such are the cases of practitioners of law and
of medicine. Similar regulations cannot be extended to
members of the clerical profession, since it is a part of
the religious freedom of the people that they should be left
at liberty to listen to such ministrations as they please,
1

Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 ; State v. McCann, 21 Ohio, N. S. 198;
County Court v. Robinson, 27 Ala. 116.
2 Baker t•. Portland (U. S. Dist. Ct. Oregon), 8 Reporter, 392;
12 Chicago Legal News, 375; Chapman v. Toy Long, 4 Saw-

yer, 36.
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and to select their own teachers, whether learned or un-

learned, wise or foolish.

Where an employment is in the nature of a privilege,

as is the practice of the law, it may be restricted, as suf-

frage is, to persons of the male sex.1

3. An occupation opposed to public policy, like that of

gaming, may be prohibited altogether. And where one is

peculiarly liable to abuses, it may be surrounded by all

such securities as may seem calculated to prevent them.

The case of the sale of intoxicating drinks is an illustra-

tion. Sometimes this is prohibited altogether,2 because

the evils are supposed to exceed any possible benefits;

and the prohibition invades no principle of constitutional

liberty.8 Sometimes the business is only subjected to strin-

gent regulations; such as that the dealer shall give evidence

of good moral character, be approved by some local board,

give security not to sell to minors or habitual drunkards,

&c. Recently statutes have gone much further, and made

dealers responsible for all injuries, direct and indirect, that

may result from their sales, to the wife, child, parent, or

employer of the purchaser; and it is held competent for
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the State to impose this severe responsibility.4 Some stat-

utes even make the owners of property on which liquors

are sold by others responsible for the resulting injury.

Innkeepers and Common Carriers. — In general every

person may make rules for the regulation of his own busi-

ness, and may deal with whomsoever he pleases, and refuse

to deal with others. Exceptional rules have grown up at

1 Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130; Matter of Goodell, 39 Wis. 232;

Ex parte Spinney, 10 Nev. 323.

2 Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. Rep. 25; License Tax

Cases, 5 Wall. 462.

3 License Cases, 5 How. 504; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328; Rey-

nolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179.

* Wilkerson v. Rust, 57 Ind. 172; State v. Ludington, 33 Wis. 107.

and to select their own teachers, whether learned or unlearned, wise or foolish.
Where an employment is in the nature of a privilege,
as is the practice of the law, it may be restricted, as suffrage is, to persons of the male sex. 1
3. An occupation opposed to public policy, like that of
gaming, may be prohibited altogether. And where one is
·peculiarly liable to abuses, it may be surrounded by all
such securities ·as may seem calculated to prevent them.
The case of the sale of intoxicating drinks is an illustra- '
tion. Sometimes this is prohibited altogether, 1 because
the evils are supposed to exceed any possible benefits ;
and the prohibition invades no principle of constitutional
liberty. 8 Sometimes the business is only subjected to stringent regulations ; such as that the dealer shall give evidence
of good moral character, be approved by some local board,
give security not to sell to minors or habitual drunkards,
&c. Recently statutes have gone much further, and made
dealers responsible for all injuries, direct and indirect, that
may result from their sales, to the wife, child, parent, or
employer of the purchaser ; and it is held competent for
the State to impose this severe responsibility.• Some statutes even make the owners of property on which liquors
are sold by others responsible for tµe resulting injury.
Innkeepers and Oommon Carriers. - In general every
person may make rules for the regulation of his own business, and may deal with whomsoever he pleases, and refuse
to deal with others. Exceptional rules have grown up at
1 Bradw_ell v. State, 16 Wall. 130; Matter of Goodell, 39 Wis. 232;
Ex parte Spinney, 10 Nev. 323.
2 Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. Rep. 25; License Tax
Cases, 5 Wall. 462.
3 License Cases, 5 How. 504; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328; Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179.
• Wilkerson v. Rust, 57 Ind. 172; State v. Ludington, 33 Wis. 107.
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the common law in respect to certain occupations, on ac-

count of their public nature. One of these is that of an

innkeeper, whose obligation at the common law is to re-

ceive all who come, and entertain them impartially, pro-

vided he has sufficient accommodations, and they come in

an orderly and decent manner, not intoxicated or subject

to a contagious or infectious disease.1 A common carrier

is under similar obligations, and has similar rights. But

he may discriminate in the accommodations he affords, so

long as the distinctions are not wholly unreasonable; as

some railroad companies do in furnishing different car-

riages for male and female passengers ;2 and it has been

decided in some cases that the carrier may discriminate in

the same way between persons of different races, provided

the accommodations afforded to all are equal.8 No doubt

state legislation might lawfully forbid such discriminations,4

and Congress might do the same, so far as concerns the

commerce that falls within its control; 6 but Congress can

have no power within the States to legislate for equal and

impartial accommodations in public inns, theatres, &c.6

Where the common carrier is a railroad company, ex-
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isting and operating its road under a grant of important

state franchises, among which is that of exercising the

right of eminent domain for the acquisition of right of

way, &c, and especially if by the charter the State has

1 Howell ». Jackson, 6 C. & P. 723; Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H.

523.

2 Chicago, &c. R. E. Co. v. "Williams, 55 111. 185; Hutchinson on

Carriers, § 542.

> Westchester, &c. E. E. Co. v. Miles, 55 Penn. St. 209; Green v.

Bridgeton (U. S. Dist. Ct. Georgia), 9 Cent. Law Jour. 206.

* DeCuir v. Benson, 27 La. An. 1.

'See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. Eep. 485.

8 Charge of Emmons, U. S. Circt. Judge, 2 Am. Law Times E.,

N. S. 198. Contra, United States v. Newcomer, E. Dist. Pa., 22 Int.

Eev. Eec. 115.

the common law in respect to certain occupations, on account of their public nature. One of these is that of an
innkeeper, whose obligation at the common law is to receive all who come, and entertain them impartially, provided he has sufficient accommodations, and they come in
an orderly and decent manner, not intoxicated or subject
to a contagious or infectious disease. 1 A commou carrier
is under similar obligations, and has similar rights. But
he may discriminate in the accommodations he affords, so
long as the distinctions are not wholly unreasonable ; as
some railroad companies do in furnishing different carriages for male and female passengers ; 2 and it has been
decided in some cases that the carrier may discriminate in
the same way between persons of different races, provided
the accommodations afforded to all are equal. 1 No doubt
state legislation might lawfully forbid such discriminations, 4
and Congress might do the same, so far as concerns the
commerce that falls within its control ; 1 but Congress can
have no power within the States to legislate for equal and
impartial accommodations in public inns, theatres, &c. 6
'Vhere the common earlier is a railroad company, existing and operating its road under a grant oi important
state franchises, among which is that of exercising the
right of eminent domain for the acquisition of right of
way, &c., and especially if by the charter the State has
1

Howell v. Jackson, 6 C. & P. 723; Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H.

623.
2

Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185; Hutchinson on
Carriers, § 642.
.
8 Westchester, &c. R. R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Penn. St. 209; Green v.
Bridgeton (U. S. Dist. Ct. Georgia), 9 Cent. Law Jour. 206.
' DeCuir i·. Benson, 27 La. An. 1.
6 See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. Rep. 485.
6 Charge of Emmons, U. S. Circt. Judge, 2 Am. Law Times R.,
N. S. 198. Contra, United States v. Newcomer, E. Dist. Pa., 22 Int.
Rev. Rec. 115.
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reserved the right of alteration and repeal, the State may

extend its regulations so far as to fix the rates of trans-

portation, and to compel submission to the constant super-

vision of commissioners, whose duty it shall be to see that

the laws are obeyed, and that absolute impartiality is

observed.1

Regulation of Prices. — Formerly it was common by

legislation to regulate wages, and the prices of merchan-

dise, or whatever any one person might have to dispose

of to another. To some extent this was done in this

country in colonial days, but never generally; and the old

laws on the subject were unquestionably innovations on

common right, and usurpations of authority. In some

cases, however, the right to regulate charges is still exer-

cised, and in the following cases may be justified on prin-

ciple : —

1. Where the business is one the following of which is

not a matter of right, but is permitted by the State as a

privilege or franchise. Under this head may be classed

the business of setting up lotteries, of giving shows, &c.,

of keeping billiard-tables for hire, of selling intoxicating
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drinks, and of keeping a ferry or toll bridge.

2. When the State on public grounds renders to the

business special assistance by taxation, or under the emi-

nent domain, as is done in the case of railroads.

3. When, for the accommodation of the business, special

privileges are given in the public streets, or exceptional use

allowed of public property or public easements, as is the

case with hackmen, draymen, &c.

4. When exclusive privileges are granted in considera-

tion of some special return to the public, or in order to

secure something to the public not otherwise attainable.2

1 Chicago, &o. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. Rep. 155; Peik ». Chi-

cago, &c. R. R. Co., 94 U. S. Rep. 164.

2 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.

reserved the right of alteration and repeal, the State may
extend its regulations so far as to fix the rates of transportation, and to compel submission to the constant supervision of commissioners, whose duty it shall be to see that
the laws are obeyed, and that absolute impartiality is
observcd. 1
Regulation of Prices. - Formerly it was common by
legislation to regulate wages, and the prices of merchandise, or whatever any one person might have to. dispose
of to another. To some extent this was done in this
country in colonial days, but never generally ; and the old
laws on the subject were unquestionably innovations on
common right, and usurpations of authority. In some
cases, however, the right to regulate charges is still exercised, and in the following cases may be justified on principle: 1. Where the business is one the following of which is
not a matter of right, but is permitted by the State as a
privilege or franchise. Under this head may be classed
the business of setting up lotteries, of giving shows, &c.,
of keeping billiard-tables for hire, of selling intoxicating
drinks, and of keeping a ferry or toll bridge.
2. When the State on public grounds renders to the
business special assistance by taxation, or under the eminent domain, as is done in the case of railroads.
3. When, for the accommodation of the business, special
privileges are given in the public streets, or exceptional use
allowed of public property or public easements, as is the
case with hackmen, draymen, &c.
4. When exclusive privileges are granted in consideration of some special return to the public, or in order to
secure something to the public not otherwise attainable. 1
Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. Rep. 155; Peik v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 94 U. S. Rep. 164.
1 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.
1
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To these may be added: —

5. Those employments which are quasi public, and es-

sential to the business of the country, but of which the

circumstances give to a few persons a virtual monopoly at

each important commercial centre, — such as those who

own elevators for the storage of grain have in the city

of Chicago.1

6. The case of money loans. This last is an exception

difficult to defend on principle; but the power to regulate

the rate of interest has been employed from the earliest

days, and has been too long acquiesced in to be questioned

now.

Monopolies. — Every exclusive privilege is to some ex-

tent an infringement upon equal rights, and therefore

ought to be capable of being defended on? some ground that

under the circumstances justifies it. But monopolies are

undoubtedly admissible in some cases. An illustration is

had in the case of a patent, and another in the case of a

copyright of a book or print. Monopolies in all kinds of

business were at one time common in England; but they

were held to be illegal at length, the court declaring that

"the sole trade of any mechanical artifice, or any other
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monopoly, is not only a damage and prejudice to those

who exercise the same trade, but also to all other subjects;

for the end of all these monopolies is for the private gain

of the patentees."2 It is certain that they cannot be

granted in such ordinary vocations as can be left open to

all to the common benefit; but they sometimes may be

given as a matter of regulation, where the business is

such that the public interest can be best subserved and

protected by confiding it to one person, or association of

persons, who shall manage it exclusively. For example,

the exclusive right to supply water or gas-light in a city or

1 Munn o. People, 69 111. 80; Munn v. Illinois, 95 U. S. Rep. 113.

* Darcy v. Allain, 11 Rep. 84; Broom, Const. Law, 500.

To these may be added : 5. Those employments which are quasi public, and essential to the business of the country, but of which the
circumstances give to a few persons a virtual monopoly at
each important commercial centre, - such as those who
own elevators for the storage of grain have in the city
of Chicago. 1
6. The case of money loans. This last is an exception
difficult to defend on principle ; but the power to regulate
the rate of interest has been employed from the earliest
days, and has been too long acquiesced in to be questioned
now.
1lfonopolies. -Every exclusive privilege is to some extent an infringement upon equal rights, and therefore
ought to be capable of being defended OIP some ground that
under the circumstances justifies it. But monopolies are
undoubtedly admissible in some cases. An illustration is
had in the case of a patent, and another in the case of a
copyright of a book or print. Monopolies in all kinds of
business were at one time common in England ; but they
were held to be illegal at length, the court declaring that
" the sole trade of any mechanical artifice, or any other
monopoly, is not only a damage and prejudice to those
who exercise the same trade, but also to all other subjects;
fbr the end of all these monopolies is for the private gain
of the patentees." 2 It is certain that they cannot be
granted in such ordinary vocations as can be left open to
all to the common benefit; but they sometimes may be
given as a matter of regulation, where the business is
such that the public interest can be best subserved and
protected by confiding it to one person, or association of
persons, who shall manage it exclusively. For example,
the exclusive right to supply water or gas-light in a city or
l

I

Munn v. People, 69 Ill. 80; Munn v. Illinois, 95 U. S. Rep. 113.
Darcy v. Allain, 11 Rep. 84; Broom, Const. Law, 500.
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part of a city is sometimes granted,1 or the exclusive right

to lay railway tracks in its streets; and it has been held

that a corporation may be given the exclusive right to

slaughter cattle for the markets of a city, it being re-

quired to do so impartially for all who apply, and at reason-

able rates.2 This obligation to serve the public impartially

would seem to be an essential incident to any grant of a

monopoly, since without it it would be impossible to justify

the grant on public grounds.

Combinations to effect monopolies are opposed to the

public interest, and may be forbidden and punished. So

combinations to prevent men being employed by others,

through force or threats or any other means beyond the

employment of reason or solicitation, are illegal, and if

successful will be actionable at the common law.8

Sumptuary Laws. — Montesquieu thought sumptuary

laws essential to prevent extravagance in a republic,4 but

the notion has long been exploded. They are plain inva-

sions of individual liberty, and therefore are forbidden.

Every person must be allowed to judge of his own table,

and to dress as he pleases, subject to such police regula-

tions as may be established for the preservation of public
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order and public morals. Women, for example, may be

forbidden to go about in the ordinary garb of men, as a

necessary regulation against immorality and indecency.

So every person must be allowed to deal with his prop-

erty as he pleases, subject to reasonable regulations for

the protection of others. He cannot, for example, be

compelled against his will to improve his real estate.6

1 State v. Milwaukee Gas Co., 29 Wis. 454

2 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.

8 Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1. See Hornby v. Close, L. R.

2 Q. B. 153.

4 Spirit of the Laws, b. 7.

5 Gaines v. Buford,' 1 Dana, (Ky.) 479; Violett v. Violett, 2 Dana,

(Ky.) 323.

part of a city is sometimes granted, 1 or the exclusive right
to lay railway tracks in its streets ; and it has been held
that a corporation may be given the exclusive right to
slaughter cattle for the markets of a city, it being required to do so impartially for all who apply, and at reasonable rates. 9 This obligation to serve the public impartially
would seem to be an essential incident to any grant of a
monopoly, since without it it would be impossible to justify
the grant on public grounds.
Combinations to effect monopolies are opposed to the
public interest, and may be forbidden and punished. So
combinations to prevent men being employed by others,
through force or threats or any other means beyond tJ:ie
employment of reason or solicitation, are illegal, and it
auccessful will be actionable at the common law. 8
Sumptuarg Laws. - Montesquieu thought sumptuary
laws essential to prevent extravagance in a republic,' but
the notion has long been exploded. They are plain invasions of individual liberty, and therefore are forbidden.
Every person must be allowed to judge of his own table,
and to dress as he pleases, subject to such police regulations as may be established for the preservation of public
order and public morals. Women, for example, may be
forbidden to go about in the ordinary garb of men, as a
necessary regulation against immorality and indecency.
So every person must be allowed to deal with his property as he pleases, subject to reasonable regulations for
the protection of others. He cannot, for example, be
compelled against his will to improve his real estate.6
State v. Milwaukee Gas Co., 29 Wis. 454.
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.
a Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1. See Hornby 11. Close, L. R.
2 Q. B. 163.
' Spirit of the Laws, b. 7.
1 Gaines v. Buford,' 1 Dana, (Ky.) 479; Violett v. Vi9lett, 2 Dana,
(Ky.) 823.
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Impartial Protection.—Every person, however low, or

degraded, or poor, is entitled to have his rights tested by

the same general laws which govern others. A supposed

pauper is as much entitled to a hearing before he can be

consigned to the workhouse, as is any other person whose

liberty is threatened.1 A supposed insane person cannot

be committed to an asylum against his will without a

judicial investigation;2 nor can a man's property be seized

and destroyed, or moved off as a nuisance, at the mere dis-

cretion or on the judgment of a ministerial officer.8

Suffrage. — Participation in the suffrage is not of right,

but it is granted by the State on a consideration of what

is most for the interest of the State. Nevertheless, the

grant makes it a legal right until it is recalled, and it is

protected by the law as property is. In the following

chapter the conditions of suffrage and of the holding of

office will be noticed.

Section V.—Jury Trial in Civil Cases.

The Constitution. — The seventh amendment provides

that "in suits at common law, where the value in contro-

versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
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jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried by a jury shall

be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United

States than according to the rules of the common law."

The right of persons accused of crimes to be tried by jury

is secured by another provision, and will be examined in

another place.

Impartial Protection. - Every person, however low, or
degraded, or poor, io entitled to have his rights tested by
the same general laws which govern others. A supposed
pauper is as much entitled to a hearing before he can be
consigned to the workhouse, as is any other person whose
liberty is thre~tened. 1 A supposed insane person cannot
be committed to an asylum against his will without a
judicial investigation; 2 nor can a man's property be seized
and destroyed, or moved off as a nuisance, at the mere discretion or on the judgment of a ministerial officer. 8
Suffrage. - Participation in the suffrage is not of right,
but it is granted by the State on a conside.ration of what
is most for the interest of the State. Nevertheless, the
grant makes it a legal right until it is ·recalled, and it is
protecte~ by the law as property is.
In the following
chapter the conditions of suffrage and of the holding of
office will be noticed.

"The trial by jury," it has been said, "is justly dear

to the American people. It has always been an object of

SECTION

deep interest and solicitude, and every encroachment

1 Portland v. Bangor, 65 Me. 120.

2 Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90.

» Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, (Mass.) 1; Darst v. People, 51 111. 286;

State v. Paul, 5 R. I . 185; Miller ». Burch, 32 Tex. 208.

v. -JURY

TRIAL IN CIVIL CASES.

The Oonstituti"on. -The seventh amendment provides
that "in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved ; and no fact tried by a jury shall
be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United
States than according to the rules of the common law.''
The right of persons accused of crimes to be tried by jury
is secured by another provision, and will be examined in
another place.
'' The trial by jury," it has been said, '' is justly dear
to the American people. It has always been an object of
deep interest and solicitude, and every encroachment
Port!and v. Bangor, 65 Me. 120.
Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90.
I Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, (Ma88.) 1; Darst v. People, 61 Ill. 286;
State v. Paul, 6 R. L 186; Miller v. Burch, 32 Tex. 208.
1
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upon it has been watched with great jealousy."1 The

privilege in criminal cases has been looked upon as a ne-

cessary part of the liberties of the people, and a sentiment

attaches to it which will scarcely suffer its value to be

questioned. Every state constitution preserves it for

suits in the state courts, and every new or revised consti-

tution repeats a guaranty of it. Even the common-law

requirement of unanimity in the verdict, which is of more

than doubtful value, is retained without inquiry or question,

because it has existed from time immemorial.

The tribunal was almost peculiar to the common-law

courts, and issues joined in other courts went to a jury

only under peculiar circumstances and in exceptional

cases. It is important to know, however, that the form

of the proceeding will not determine the right of the party

to this method of trial. By the common law in this

amendment " is meant what the Constitution denominated

in the third article ' law'; not merely suits which the com-

mon law recognized among its old and settled proceedings,

but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and

determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable
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rights alone were recognized and equitable remedies were

administered; or where, as in the admiralty, a mixture of

public law and of maritime law and equity was often

found in the same suit." 2 It is immaterial, therefore,

what changes may be made in the forms of action or

pleadings, since the nature of the controversy and the right

in dispute must determine the privilege, and not the form

of remedy provided.8 But as the amendment only pre-

serves the right, and does not extend it, the privilege is

demandable of right only in those cases in which the law

gave it before.4

1 Parsons v. Bedford, 8 Pet. 433, 446.

2 Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447.

» Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 9; Tabor ». Cook, 15 Mich. 322.

« Rbines v. Clark, 51 Fenn. St. 93.

upon it has been watched with great jealousy." 1 The
privilege in criminal cases has been looked upon ns a necessary part of the liberties of the people, and a sentiment
t.Lttaches to it which will scarcely suffer its value to be
questioned. Every state constitution preserves it for
suits in the state courts, and every new or revised constitution repeats a guaranty of it. EYen the common-law
requirement of unanimity in the verdict, which is of more
than doubtful value, is retained without inquiry or question,
because it has existed from time immemorial.
The tribunal was almost peculiar to the common-law
courts, and issues joined in other courts went to a jury
only under peculiar circumstances and in exceptional
cases. It is important to know, however, that the form
of the proceeding will not determine the right of the party
to this method of trial. By the common law in this
amendment ''is meant what the Constitution denominated
in the third article ' law ' ; not merely suits which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings,
but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and
determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable
rights alone were recognized and equitable remedies were
adm.inistered ; or where, as in the admiralty, a mixture of
public law and of maritime law and equity was often
found in the same suit." 2 It is immaterial, therefore,
what changes may be made in the forms of action or
pleadings, since the nature of the controversy and the right
in dispute must determine the privilege, and not the form
of remedy provided. 8 But as the amendment only preserves the right, and does not extend it, the privilege is
demandable of right only in those cases in which the law
gave it before. 4
Parsons v. Bedford, 8 Pet. 433, 446.
Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 483, 447.
a Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 9; Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 822.
' Rhines v. Clark, 51 Penn. St. 96.
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Waiver. — In criminal cases — at least in cases of felony

Wa'lver. -In criminal cases-at least in cases of felony

— the accused cannot waive this privilege, the jury being

a necessary part of the tribunal that tries him;1 nor can it

be made to depend on any condition, as, for example,

upon an appeal from a court that sits without a jury to a

court which allows one.2 But civil rights in general may

be waived, and a provision for civil cases that trial by

jury should be deemed waived unless demanded would

seem unobjectionable. It has been held, also, that it suf-

ficiently preserves the privilege to make provision by law

for jury trial in an appellate court.8

Incidents. — The peculiar characteristic of jury trial is

this: that the jury sit with the judge to try the facts of

the controversy, receiving from him the law, and apptying

it, according as they find the facts to be, in a verdict which

embodies both fact and law in a general conclusion. Or,

at their option, the jury may find the facts specially, and

report them to the court, who will then determine what

judgment the facts require. The court is thus the trier of

the law, and the jury are the triers of the facts; but the

judge may nevertheless rightfully express his opinion upon

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the facts to the jury, who will be at liberty to accept his

conclusions, or to disregard them, as their judgment shall

dictate.4 The jury have also the legal power to disregard

the instructions in matter of law, and to render a verdict

which the instructions would not warrant; but their doing

so would be misconduct, which the judge should correct by

granting a new trial.6 But the judge will not grant a new

trial merely because his opinion upon disputed or uncertain

i Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128.

1 Matter of Dana, 7 Benedict, 1.

8 Many cases are collected in Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 513,

note. Compare Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curt. C. C. 311.

* Consequa ». Willings, Pet. C. C. 225.

» Wilkinson e. Greely, 1 Curt C. C. 63.

- the accused cannot waive this privilege, the jury being
a necessary part of the tribunal that tries him ; 1 nor can it
be made to depend on any condition, as, tor' example,
upon an appeal from a court that sits without a jury to a
court which allows one. 2 But civil rights in general may
be waived, and a provision for civil cases that trial by
jury should be deemed waived unless demanded would
seem unobjectionable. It has been held, also, that it sufficiently preserves the privilege to make provision by law
for jury trial in an appellate court. 1
Incidents. -The peculiar characteristic of jury trial is
this : that the jury sit with the judge to try the facts of
the controversy, receiving from him the law, and applying
it, according as they find the facts to be, in a verdict which
embodies both fact and law in a general conclusion. Or,
at their option, the jury may find the facts specially, and
report them to the court, who will then determine what
judgment the facts require. The court is thus the trier of
the law, and the jury are the triers of the facts ; but the
judge may nevertheless rightfully express his opinion upon
the facts to the jury, who will be at liberty to accept his
conclusions, or to disregard them, as their judgment shall
dictate.' The jury have also the legal power to disregard
the instructions in matter of law, and to render a verdict
which the instructions would not warrant ; but their doing
so would be misconduct, which the judge should correct by
granting a new trial. 6 But the judge will not grant a new
trial merely because his opinion upon disputed or uncertain
Cancemi lJ. People, 18 N. Y. 128.
Matter of Dana., 7 Benedict, 1.
Many cases are collected in Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 513,
ll!>te. Compare Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curt. C. C. 311.
' Consequa. Z'. Willings, Pet. C. C. 225.
'J Wilkinson i·. Greely, 1 Curt. C. C. 63.
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facts differs from that of the jury;1 though, if there were no

evidence fairly tending to support their verdict, it will be

erroneous not in point of fact merely, but in law, and it

will be the duty of the judge to set it aside, and, if he

shall refuse to do so, then for a court of error to reverse

it on that ground.2

Rehearings. —The rule that the facts shall not be other-

wise re-examined than according to the rules of the com-

mon law, is essential to a preservation of the right. It

could be of no importance that one should have a jury

trial in the first instance, if his adversary might then re-

move the case to another court to be tried by the judge

himself. The finding of the jury upon the facts when no

error has intervened to influence it, and no fraud or sur-

prise, must be taken as conclusive. When it becomes

necessary to re-examine the facts tried by a jury, it must

be' done by another jury on a new trial. An appellate

court examines the facts only so far as may be necessary

to ascertain whether any error of law has been committed

to the prejudice of the party complaining of the verdict; *

but the trial court may, in its discretion, grant a new trial
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where for any reason it is believed justice was not done by

the first verdict.

The seventh amendment applies not only to cases tried

by jury in the federal courts, but also to such as are tried

by jury in the state courts and afterwards removed to the

federal Supreme Court for review under its appellate juris-

diction.4

1 Stanley v. Whipple, 2 McLean, 35; Carr v. Gale, 3 Wood. & M. 38.

a Insurance Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. Rep. 232.

» Hickman v. Jones, 9 Wall. 197.

4 The Justices ». Murray, 9 Wall. 274.

facts differs from that of the jury ; 1 though, if there were no
evidence fairly tending to support their verdict, it will be
erroneous not in point of fact merely, but in law, and it
will be the duty of the judge to set it aside, and, if he
shall refuse to do so, then for a court of error to reverse
it on that ground. t
Rehearin.qs. -The rule that the facts shall not be otherwise re-examined than according to the rules of the common law, is essential to a preservation of the right. It
could be of no importance that one should have a jury
trial in the first instance, if his adversary might then remove the case to another court to be tried by the judge
himself. The finding of the jury upon the facts when no
error has intervened to influence it, and no fraud or surprise, must be taken as conclusive. When it becomes
necessary to re-examine the facts tried by" a jury, it must
be · done by another jury on a new trial. An appellate
court examines the facts only so far as may be necessary
to ascertain whether any error of law has been committed
to the prejudice of the party complaining of the verdict ; 1
but the trial court may, in its discretion, grant a new trial
where for any reason it is believed justice was not done by
the first verdict.
The seventh amendment applies not only to cases tried
by jury in the federal courts, but also to such as are tried
by jury in the state courts and afterwards removed to the
federal Supreme Court for review under its appellate jurisdiction.•
Stanley 11. Whipple, 2 McLean, 35; Carr 11. Gale, 8 Wood. & M. 38.
Insurance Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. Rep. 232.
• ffickman 11. Jones, 9 Wall. 197.
' The Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274.
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CHAPTER XTV.

POLITICAL PRIVILEGES AND THEIR PROTECTIONS.

Political Privileges in General. — In the main, political

privileges arise under state constitutions and laws, and

are left to their protection. The few exceptions will be

specified in the pages which follow.

Section I. — Citizenship.

The Fourteenth Amendment. — The fourteenth article of

the amendments declares that "all persons born and

CHAPTER XIV.

naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-

diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of

the State wherein they reside." The importance of this

POLITICAL PRIVILEGES AND THEIR PROTECTIONS.

provision connects itself with the earnest and violent con-

troversy vMch for more than ten years previous to its

adoption had agitated the country respecting the status of

colored persons. Such persons, when not enslaved, had

been considered citizens in one section of the Union; and

whether they were or were not citizens in the other States

had been the subject of very little discussion or considera-

tion previous to the disturbing and exciting events of

Political, Privileges in General. - In the main, political
privileges arise under state constitutions and laws, and
are· left to their protection. The few exceptions will be
specified in the pages which follow.

which the repeal of the restriction upon the extension of
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slavery, imposed by the legislation known as the Mis-

souri Compromise, was most important. In the case in

SECTION

I. -

CITIZENSHIP.

which the federal Supreme Court expressed the opinion

that that restriction was unconstitutional, it was decided

that a colored person of the African race, whose ancestors

were imported into this country and sold as slaves, could

16

The Fourteenth .Amendment. -The fourteenth article of
the amendments declares that ''all persons born and
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside." The importance of this
provision connects itself with the earnest and violent controversy " . .hlch for more than ten years previous to its
adoption had agitated the country respecting the status of_
colored persons. Such persons, when not enslaved, had
been considered citizens in one section of the Union ; and
whether they were or were not citizens in ~he other States
had been the subject of very little discussion or consideration previous to the disturbing and exciting events of
which the repeal of the restriction upon the extension of
slavery, imposed by the legislation known as the ~Iis
souri Compromise, was most important. In the case in
which the federal Supreme Court expressed the opinion
that that restriction was unconstitutional, it was decided
that a colored person of the African race, whose ancestors
were imported into this country and sold as slaves, could
16
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not become a member of the political community brought

into existence by the Constitution of the United States,

and as such entitled to the rights, privileges, and immuni-

ties guaranteed by that instrument to citizens, and that he

could not therefore, as a citizen, bring suits in the courts

of the United States.1 To this extent the opinion of the

court was authoritative, and was entitled to respect and

observance as such so long as it stood unreversed. A

very large party in the country, however, was not satisfied

with the reasoning of the court, but protested against it;

and when the government of the country, by the election of

1860, passed into the hands of this party, the decision was

wholly ignored by the political departments of the govern-

ment. It may perhaps be said that it was ignored by the

judicial department also, since persons of African descent

were admitted to practice in the federal courts on the same

terms with others.2 But a mere tacit recognition of rights

which are still disputed cannot be the most satisfactory

settlement of a question so important. A ruling of the

executive department under one administration may be

set aside under the next. Even an act of Congress might
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be repealed when another party succeeded to power; or it

might be adjudged unconstitutional by the courts, as had

been done with the Missouri Compromise. But as the

solemn adjudication already had was still standing un-

reversed, it obviously constituted a most serious and dan-

gerous impediment to the peaceful and full enjoyment of

rights which it denied. Under these circumstances the

propriety and importance of having the controversy settled

in the most authoritative and conclusive mode are ap-

parent.

How Citizenship is acquired. — The fourteenth amend-

ment indicates the two methods in which one may become

1 Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393.

2 This was without objection or discussion.

not become a member of the political community brought
into existence by the Constitution of the United States,
and as such entitled to the rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by that instrument to citizens, and that he
could not therefore, as a citizen, bring suits in the courts
of the United States. 1 To this extent the opinion of the
court was authoritative, and was entitled to respect and
observance as such so long as it stood unreversed. A
' very large pnrty in the country, however, was not satisfied
with the reasoning of the court, but protested against it ;
and when the government of the country, by the election of
1860, passed into the hands of this party, the decision was
wholly ignored by the political departments of the government. It may perhaps be said that it was ignored by the
judicial department also, since persons of African descent
were admitted to practice in the federal courts on the s~me
terms with others. 2 But a mere tacit recognition of rights
which are still disputed cannot be the most satisfactory
settlement of a question so important. A ruling of the
executive department under one administration may be
set aside under the next. Even an act of Congress might
be repealed when another party succeeded to power ; or it
might be adjudged unconstitutional by the courts, as had
been done with the Missouri Compromise. But as the
solemn adjudication already had was still standing unreversed, it obviously constituted a most serious and wmgerous impediment to the peaceful and full enjoyment of
rights which it denied. Under these circumstances the
propriety and importance of having the controversy settled
in the most authoritative and conclusive mode are apparent.
How Oiti·zensMp is acquired. -The fourteenth amendment indicates the two methods in which one may become
1

2

Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393.
This was without objection or discuaaion.
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a citizen : first, by birth in the United States ;1 and, second,

by naturalization therein. But a citizen by birth must not

only be born within the United States, but he must also

be subject to the jurisdiction thereof; and by this is meant

that full and complete jurisdiction to which citizens gener-

ally are subject, and not any qualified and partial jurisdic-

tion, such as may consist with allegiance to some other

government. The aboriginal inhabitants of the country

may be said to be in this anomalous condition, so long

as they preserve their tribal relations and recognize the

headship of their chiefs, even when thoy reside within a

State or an organized Territory, and owe a qualified alle-

giance to the government of the United States. It would

obviously be inconsistent with the semi-independent char-

acter of such a tribe, and with the obedience yielded by

them to their tribal head, that they should be vested with

the complete rights, or, on the other hand, charged with the

full responsibilities of citizens.2 But when the tribal rela-

tions are dissolved, or when any individual withdraws and

makes himself a member of the civilized community,

adopting the habits of its people and subjecting himself
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fully to the jurisdiction, his right to protection in per-

son, property, and privilege becomes as complete as that

of any other native-born inhabitant.8

Naturalization.—Naturalization may be effected, first,

by special laws which confer the privilege upon individuals

named; second, by proceedings under general laws, where-

by individuals severally renounce any foreign allegiance,

and take upon themselves the obligations of citizenship;

1 This would include, also, birth abroad of children of American

citizens temporarily residing or travelling in other countries. Eev.

Stat. U. S. (1878), § 1993.

a Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 693, 710; McKay v. Camp-

bell, 2 Sawyer, 118; Ex parte Reynolds, 18 Alb. Law Jour. 18.

• Story on Const., 4th ed., § 1933.

a citizen : first, by birth in the United States ; 1 and, second,
by naturalization therein. But a citizen by birth must not
only be born within the United States, but he must also
be subject to the jur1sdiction thereof; and by this is meant
that full and complete jurisdiction to which citizens generally are subject, and not any qualified and partial jurisdiction, such as may consist with allegiance to some other
government. The aboriginal inhabitants of the country
may be said to be in this anomalous condition, so long
as they preserve their tribal relations and recognize the
headship of their chiefs, even when they reside within a _
State or an organized Territory, and owe a qualified allegiance to the government of the United States. It would
obviously be inconsistent with the semi-independent character of such a tribe, and with the obedience yielded by
them to their tribal head, that they should be vested with
the complet~ rights, or, on the other hand, charged with the
full responsibilities of citizens. 2 But when the tribal relations are dissolved, or when any individual withdraws and
makes himself a member of the civilized community,
adopting the habits of its people and subjecting himself
fully to the jurisdiction, his right to protection in person, property, and privilege becomes as complete as that
of any other native-born inhabitant. 8
Naturalization. - Naturalization may be effected, first,
by special laws which confer the privilege upon individuals
named; second, by proceedings under general laws, whereby individuals severally renounce any foreign allegiance,
and take upon themselves the obligations of citizenship ;
1 This would include, also, birth abroad of children of American
citizens temporarily residing or travelling in other countries. Rev.
Stat. U. S. (1878), § 1993.
2 Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 693, 710; McKay v. Campbell, 2 Sawyer, 118; Ex parte Reynolds, 18 Alb. Law Jour. 18.
1 Story on Const., 4th ed., § 1983.
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third, by the acquisition by the United States of foreign

territory, with its people, who thereby become citizens of

the United States. In this manner the people brought

within the jurisdiction of the Union by the acquisition of

Louisiana, Florida, and portions of Mexico, became citi-

zens. The second method above named is that provided

bj' acts of Congress; and the first and third must always

be exceptional.

Loss of Citizenship. — It is declared by act of Con-

gress that " expatriation is a natural and inherent right of

all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of

life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and that " any

declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of

any officer of the United States, which denies, restricts,

impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is incon-

sistent with the fundamental principles of the republic." 1

The judicial doctrine had previously been, that no one

could expatriate himself without express authority of law.2

It is also provided by act of Congress, that desertion from

military or naval service, and going abroad to avoid being

lawfully drafted into the same, shall be deemed a volun-

tary relinquishment and forfeiture of the rights of citizen-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ship.8

Citizenship in State and Union. — The fourteenth amend-

ment recognizes the fact that there is a citizenship of the

United States, and also a citizenship of the several States,

and that the two coexist in the same persons. Both gov-

ernments owe a duty of protection to the persons who are

subject to their jurisdiction, and both are entitled to the

allegiance of such persons, and may punish breaches of

this allegiance. It is impossible to conceive of such a

status as citizenship of a State unconnected with citizen-

i Kev Stat. U. 8. (1878), § 1999.

> 2 Kei.t, 48-50, and notes.

» Eev. Stat U. S. (1878), §§ 1996-1998.

· third, by the acquisition by the United States of foreign
territory, with its people, who thereby become citizens of
the United States. In this manner the people brought
within the jurisdiction of the Union by the ac~cisition of
Louisiana, Florida, and portions of Mexico, became citizens. The second method above named is that provided
by acts of Congress ; and the first and third must always
be exceptional.
.Loss of Oitizenship. - It is declared by act of Congress that '' expatriation is a. natural and inherent right of
all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and that "any
declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of
any officer of the United States, which denies, .restricts,
impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the republic." 1
The judicial doctrine had previously been, that no one
could expatriate himself without express authority of law. j
It is also provided by act of Congress, that desertion from
military or naval service, and going abroad to avoid being
lawfully drafted into the same, shall be deemed a voluntary relinquishment and forfeiture of the rights of citizenship. 8
Oit1:zensMp in State and Union. -The fourteenth amendment recognizes the fact that there is a citizenship of the
United States, and also a citizenship of the several States,
and that the two coexist in the same persons. Both governments owe a duty of protection to the persons who are
subject to their jurisdiction, and both are entitled to the
allegiance of such persons, and may punish breaches of
this allegiance. It is impossible to conceive of such a
status as citizenship of a State unconnected with citizenReT. Stat U. 8. (1878), § 1999.
2 Ke1,t, 4&-.50, and notes.
a Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), §§ 1996-1998.
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ship of the United States, or of citizenship of the United

States within a State unconnected with citizenship of the

State. The States cannot naturalize, though they may

confer special privileges upon aliens; and the act of natu-

ralization by the United States is the grant of citizenship

within the State where the naturalized person, resides. It

is only in the Territories and other places subject to their

exclusive jurisdiction that there can be a citizenship of

the United States unconnected with citizenship of a State.1

Abridgment of Privileges and Immunities. — In a previ-

ous chapter, the section of the Constitution which entitles

the citizens of each State to all the privileges and immu-

nities of citizens of the several States has been examined,

and some attempt made to describe those privileges and

immunities.2 By the fourteenth amendment it is declared

that " no State shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States." The line of distinction between the

privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States

and those of citizens of the several States must be traced

along the boundary of their respective spheres of action,
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and the two classes must be as different in their nature aa

are the functions of their respective governments. A citi-

zen of the United States as such has a right to participate

in foreign and inter-state commerce, to have the benefit

of the postal laws, to make use in common with others of

the navigable waters of the United States, and to pass

from State to State, and into foreign countries, because

over all these subjects the jurisdiction of the United States

extends, and they are covered by its laws.8 These, there-

1 Prentiss ». Brennan, 2 Blatch. 162. The inhabitants of districts

within a State over which the State has ceded exclusive jurisdiction

to the United States are not citizens of the State. Sinks v. Keese,

19 Ohio, N. S. 306; Commonwealth n. Clary, 8 Mass. 72.

2 See page 187. 8 Story on Const., 4th ed., § 1937.

ship of the United States, or of citizenship of the United
States within a State unconnected with citizenship of th~
State. The States cannot naturalize, though they may
confer special privileges upon aliens ; and the act of naturalization by the United States is the grant of citizenship
within the State where the naturalized person. resides. It
is only in the Territories and other places subject to their
~xclusive jurisdiction that there can be a citizenship of
the United States unconnected with citizenship of a State. 1
Abridgment of P~ foileges and Immuniti"es. -In a previous chapter, the section of the Constitution which entitles
the citizens of eat:h State to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States has been examined,
and some attempt made to describe those privileges and
immunities. 2 By the fourteenth amendment it is declared
that " no State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States." The line of distinction between the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States
and those of citizens of the several States must be traced
along the boundary of their respective spheres of action,
and the two classes must be as different in their nature as
are the functions of their respective governments. A citizen of the United States as such has a right to participate
in foreign and inter-state commerce, to hav~ the benefit
of the postal laws, to make use in common with others of
the navigable waters of the United States, and to pass
from State to State, and into foreign countries, because
over all these subjects the jurisdiction of the United States
·~xtends, and they are covered by its laws. 8 These, there1

Prentiss v. Brennan, 2 Blatch. 162. The inhabitants of districts
within a State over which the State has ceded exclusive jurisdiction
to the United States are not citizens of the State. Sinks v. Reese,
19 Ohio, N. S. 306 ; Common weal th ''· Clary, 8 Mass. 72.
2 See page 187.
a Story on Const., 4th ed.,§ 1937.
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fore, are among the privileges of citizens of the United

States. So every citizen may petition the federal authori-

ties which are set over him in respect to any matter of

public concern; may examine the public records of the

federal jurisdiction ; may visit the seat of government with-

out being subjected to the payment of a tax for the privi-

lege ;1 may be purchaser of the public lands on the same

terms wityi others; may participate in the government if he

comes within the conditions of suffrage; and may demand

the care and protection of the United States when on the

high seas, or within the jurisdiction of a foreign govern-

ment.2 The privileges suggest the immunities. Wherever

it is the duty of the United States to give protection to

a citizen against any harm, inconvenience, or deprivation,

the citizen is entitled to an immunity which pertains to

federal citizenship.

One very plain and unquestionable immunity is exemp-

tion from any tax, burden, or imposition under state laws,

as a condition to the enjoyment of any right or privilege

under the laws of the United States. A State therefore

cannot require one to pay a tax as importer, under the laws
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of Congress, of foreign merchandise,8 nor impose a tax

upon travellers passing by public conveyances out of the

State,4 nor impose conditions to the right of citizens of

other States to sue its citizens in the federal courts.8

These instances sufficiently indicate the general rule.

Whatever one may claim as of right under the Constitu-

tion and laws of the United States by virtue of his citi-

zenship, is a privilege of a citizen of the United States.

Whatever the Constitution and laws of the United States

» Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35.

* Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.

» Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 163.

« Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35.

6 Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445.

fore, are among the privileges of citizens of the United
States. So every citizen may petition the federal authorities which are set over him in respect to any matter of
public concern ; may examine the public records of the
federal jurisdiction ; may visit the seat of government without being subjected to the payment of a tax for the privilege ; 1 may be purchaser of the public lands on the same
terms witJi others ; may participate in the government if he
comes within the conditions of suffrage ; and may demand
the care and protection of the United States when on the
high seas, or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government. 2 The privileges suggest the immunities. Wherever
it is the duty of the United States to give protection to
a citizen against any harm, inconyenience, or deprivation,
the citizen is entitled to an immunity which pertains to
federal citizenship.
One very plain and unquestionable immunity is exemption from any tax, burden, or imposition under state laws,
as a condition to the enjoyment of any right or privilege
under the law& of the United States. A State therefore
cannot require one to pay a tax as importer . under the laws
of Congress, of foreign merchandise, 8 nor impose a tax
upon travellers passing by public conveyances out of the
State,• nor impose conditions to the right of citizens of
other States to sue its citizens in the federal courts.'
These instances sufficiently indicate the general rule.
Whatever one may claim as. of right under the Constitution and laws of the United States by viI·tue of his citizenship, is a prhilege of a citizen of the United States.
Whatever the Constitution and laws of the United States
I Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35.
s Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 86.
a Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 163.
' Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35.
6 Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445.
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entitle him to exemption from, he may claim an immunity

in respect to.1 And such a right or privilege is abridged

whenever the state law interferes with any legitimate

operation of federal authority which concerns his interest,

whether it be an authority actively exerted, or resting

only in the express or implied command or assurance of

the federal Constitution or laws. But the United States

can neither grant nor secure to its citizens rights or privi-

leges which are not expressly or by reasonable implication

placed under its jurisdiction; and all not so placed are left

to the exclusive protection of the States.2

Necessity of the Provision. — It may well be questioned

whether the provision just considered was necessary. It

is certainly not clear that there can exist any privilege or

immunity of a citizen of the United States which, inde-

pendent of the fourteenth amendment, is not beyond state

control. The mere fact that the Constitution and laws of

the United States have created a privilege, or given an im-

munity, is of itself sufficient to put it beyond the reach of

unfriendly legislation. The reason is obvious. State laws

operate, and can only operate, within the sphere of state
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sovereignty; but privileges and immunities of citizens of

the United States arise within the sphere of national sover-

eignty, where in express terms the Constitution and laws of

the United States are made paramount and supreme.8 It is

plain that state laws cannot impair what they cannot reach.

The right, for example, of every citizen to have the benefit

of postal facilities, was as little open to question before

the amendment as it is now. The law must have been

then as it is now, — namely, that state law is powerless

1 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.

2 United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. Rep. 214; United States v.

Cruikshanks, 92 U. S. Rep. 542; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. Rep. 485;

Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, Sup. Ct. U. S. Oct. Term, 1879.

» Const., Art. VI. cl. 2; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506.

entitle him to exemption from, he may claim an immunity
in respect oo. 1 And such a rigLt or privilege is abridged
whenever the state law interferes with any legitimate
operation of federal authority which concerns his interest,
whether it be an authority actively exerted, or resting
only in the express or implied command or assurance of
the federal Constitution or laws. But the United States
can neither grant nor secure to its citizens rights or privileges which are not expressly or by reasonable implication
placed under its jurisdiction ; and all not so placed are left
to the exclusive protection of the States. 2
Necessity of th.e Provis1~on. - It may well be questioned
whether the provision just considered was necessary. It
is certainly not clear that there can exist any privilege or
immunity of a citizen of the United States which, .independent of the fourteenth amendment, is not beyond state
control. The mere fact that the Constitution and laws of
the United States have created a privilege, or given an immunity, is of itself sufficient to put it beyond the reach of
unfriendly legislation. The reason is obvious. State laws
operate, and can only operate, within the sphere of state
sovereignty ; but privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States arise within the sphere of national sovereignty, where in express terms the Constitution and laws of
the United States are made paramount and supreme. 8 It is
plain that s_tate laws cannot impair what they cannot reach.
The right, for example, of every citizen oo have the benefit
of postal facilities, was as little open to question before
the amendment as it is now. The law must have been
then as it is now, - namely, that state law is powerless
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.
United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. Rep. 214; United States v.
Cruikshanks, 9'2 U.S. Rep. 642; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. Rep. 486;
Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, Sup. Ct. U. S. Oct. Term, 1879.
3 Const., Art. VI. cl. 2; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 606.
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to take away, restrain, or abridge that which the federal

authority has lawfully given. And it is immaterial whether

to take away, restrain, or abridge that which the federal

the privilege or immunity exists as an implication under

authority has lawfully given. And it is immaterial whether
the privilege or immunity exists as an ·implication under
dome provision of the Constitution or laws, or is expressly
declared and established. The right to visit the national
capital is nowhere expressly declared, but it results from
the very nature of free government; 1 and for a State to
undertake to deny or obstruct the right, would as plainly
be an intrusion on federal sovereignty, as would an attempt
to encroach on the war power, or the power over foreign
commerce. Nevertheless this portion of the fourteenth
amendment has its importance in the fact that it embodies
in express law what before, to some extent, rested in implicatiQn merely ; just as in the Constitution bills of attainder are forbidden, though without the prohibition they
would undoubtedly be incompetent, because of the separation of legislative and judicial authority which has been
made by the American constitutions. Many abuses of
power are forbidden more than once in the federal Constitution, under different forms of expression.

etome provision of the Constitution or laws, or is expressly

declared and established. The right to visit the national

capital is nowhere expressly declared, but it results from

the very nature of free government;1 and for a State to

undertake to deny or obstruct the right, would as plainly

be an intrusion on federal sovereignty, as would an attempt

to encroach on the war power, or the power over foreign

commerce. Nevertheless this portion of the fourteenth

amendment has its importance in the fact that it embodies

in express law what before, to some extent, rested in im-

plication merely; just as in the Constitution bills of at-

tainder are forbidden, though without the prohibition they

would undoubtedly be incompetent, because of the separa-

tion of legislative and judicial authoritjT which has been

made by the American constitutions. Many abuses of

power are forbidden more than once in the federal Consti-

tution, under different forms of expression.

Section II. — Suffrage and Elections.

Basis of Suffrage. — During the last quarter of a century,
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while the agitation for an enlargement of civil rights has

been violent, sentiment has had a great and extraordinary

influence on public affairs in America. It has much af-

fected the discussion of political privileges, and consider-

able numbers have insisted that suffrage was a natural

right, corresponding to the right to life and liberty, and

equally unlimited. Unless such a doctrine is susceptible

of being given practical effect, it must be utterly without

substance; and so the courts have pronounced it.2 In

1 Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35.

2 Spencer v. Board of Registration, 1 M'Arthur, (D. C.) 169;

United States v. Anthony, 11 Blatch. 200.
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&sis of Suffrage. - During the last quarter of a century,
while the agitation for an enlargement of civil rights has
been viol~nt, sentiment has had a great and extraordinary
influeuce on public affairs in America. It has much affected the discussion of political privileges, and considerable numbers have insisted that suffrage was a natural
right, corresponding to the right to life and liberty, and
equally unlimited. Unless such a doctrine is susceptible
of being given practical effect, it must be utterly without
substance ; and so the courts have pronounced it. 2 In
Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35.
Spencer v. Board of Registration, 1 M'Arthur, (D. C.) 169;
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another place it has been shown that liberty itself must

come from law, and not in any institutional sense from

nature;1 and still less can that come from nature in which

all the people cannot possibly participate, and in respect

to which, therefore, positive law becomes absolutely essen-

tial in order to prescribe qualifications, the possession of

which shall be the test of right to enjoyment. A gift by

nature must be absolute, and not contingent upon the State,

coming forward afterwards with uncertain and changeable

enactments to name conditions, and point out the persons

who may enjoy the bounty. But there is a further objec-

tion which is equally insurmountable: suffrage cannot be

the natural right of the individual, because it does not

exist for the benefit of the individual, but for the benefit

of the State itself.

Suffrage is participation in the government: in a repre-.

sentative country it is taking part in the choice of officers,

or in the decision of public questions. The purpose is to

keep up the continuity of government, and to preserve and

perpetuate public order and the protection of individual

rights. The purpose is therefore public and general, not

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

private and individual. Whatever suffrage is calculated to

defeat the general purpose, —whatever, if permitted, would

tend to break up the government, to introduce anarchy,

and to bring upon the people the innumerable mischiefs

which would follow from the destruction of public order, —'

is not only inadmissible on reason, but is proved by the

consequences which follow to be condemned by the great

Author of government. To say that one whose participa-

tion in government would bring danger to the State, and

probable disaster, has nevertheless a right to participate,

is not only folly in itself, but it is to set the individual

above the State, and above all the manifold interests which

are represented by it and bound up in its destiny. Such

i Ante, pp. 225, 226.

another place it has been shown that liberty itself must
come from law, and not in any institutional sense from
nature ; 1 and still less can that come from nature in which
all the people cannot possibly participate, and in respect
to which, therefore, positive law becomes absolutely essential in order to prescribe qualifications, the possession of
which shall be the test of right to enjoyment. A gift by
nature must be absolute, and not contingent upon the State,
coming forward afterwards with uncertain and changeable
enactments to name conditions, and point out the persons
who may enjoy the bounty. But there is a further objection which is equally insurmountable : suffrage cannot be
the natural right of the individual, because it does not
exist for the benefit of the individual, but for the benefit
of the State itself.
Suffrage is participation in the government: in a repre-.
sentative country it is taking part in the choice of officers,
or in the decision of public questions. The purpose is to
keep up the continuity of government, and to preserve and
perpetuate public order and the protection of individual
rights. The purpose is therefore public and general, not
private and individual. Whatever suffrage is calculated to
defeat the general purpose, -whatever, if permitted, would
tend to break up the government, to introduce anarchy,
and to bring upon the people the innumerable mischiefs
which would follow from the destruction of public order, is not only inadmissible on reason, but is proved by the
consequences which follow to be condemned by the great
Author of government. To say that one whose participation in government would bring danger to the State, and
probable disaster, has nevertheless a right to participate,
is not only folly in itself, but it is to set the in di vidqal
above the State, and above all the manifold interests which
are represen~d by it and bound up in its destiny. Such
l

Ante, pp. 225, 226.
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a doctrine is idle. Suffrage must come to the individual,

not as a right, but as a regulation which the State estab-

lishes as a means of perpetuating its own existenoe, and

of insuring to the people the blessings it was intended to

secure.

Suffrage a State Privilege.—The Constitution of the

United States, except in particulars specified further on in

this chapter, does not in any manner intermeddle with state

and municipal elections, and they are consequently in most

respects left exclusively to state regulation and control.

States establish for their own people the rules of suffrage,

and it is in state constitutions and laws, and in the decis-

ions of state courts, that the rules and principles are to be

looked for which govern such elections. Suffrage is never

a necessary accompaniment of state citizenship, and the

great majority of citizens are always excluded, and are

represented by others at the polls. Sometimes, also, suf-

frage is given to those who are not citizens; as has been

done by no less than twelve of the States, in admitting

persons to vote who, being aliens, have merely declared

their intention to become citizens.
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Congressional Elections.—Under the Constitution each

State elects such number of representatives as is appor-

tioned to it by the laws of Congress, and the qualifications

of electors for such representatives are to be the same as

those for the most numerous branch of the state legisla-

ture.1 The State is therefore left to fix these qualifica-

tions without any restraint or limitation, except that which

.s imposed by the fifteenth amendment. The legislature

of each State also prescribes the times, places, and manner

of holding elections for senators and representatives in

Congress; but Congress is also empowered to make or

alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing

senators.2 When the constitution of the State and the

1 Const., Art. I. § 2. 3 Const., Art. I. § 4.

a doctrine is idle. Suffrage must come to the individual,
not as a right, but as a regulation which the State establishes as a means of perpetuating its own ex:istenoe, and
of insuring to the people the blessings it was intended to
secure.
Suffrage a State Pnvilege. -The Constitution of the
United States, except in particulars specified further on in
this.chapter, does not in any manner intermeddle with state
and municipal elections, and they are consequently in most
respects left exclusively to state regulation and control.
States establish for their own people the rules of suffrage,
and it is in state constitutions and laws, and in the decisions of state courts, that the rules and principles are to be
looked for which govern such elections. Suffrage is never
a necessary accompaniment of state citizenship, and the
. great majority of citizens are always excluded, and are
represented by others at the polls. Sometimes, also, suffrage is given to those who are not citizens; as has been
done by no less than twelve of the States, in admitting
persons to vote who, being aliens, have merely declared
their intention to become citizens.
Oongressional Elections. -Under the Constitution each
State elects such number of representatives as is apportioned to it by the laws of Congress, and the qualifications
of electors for such representatives are to be the same as
those for the most numerous branch of the state legislature.1 The State is therefore left to fix these qualifications without any restraint or limitation, except that which
,s imposed by the :fifteenth amendment. The legislature
of each State also prescribes the times, places, and manner
of holding elections for senators and representatives in
Congress ; but Congress is also empowered to make or
alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing
senators.~ When the constitution of the State and the
1

Const., Art. I.§ 2.

t

Const., Art. I. § 4.
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legislation of the State conflict respecting the times and

places when and where votes may be cast for the elec-

tion of representatives in Congress, the legislation, under

the provision of the Constitution last referred to, must

control.1

Qualifications of Electors. — As elections are the means

whereby the people express their sovereign will, the quali-

fications for taking part therein are usually prescribed by

constitution, that they may not be subject to continual

changes from year to year by legislators of differing views.

When the qualifications are once fixed by the constitution,

it is not in the power of the legislature to add to or modify

them, but they must remain until the constitution is re-

vised or amended,a and whoever claims the right must

show that he comes within the intent of the existing law.8

A provision giving the right generally to persons possess-

ing certain qualifications must be understood as excluding

idiots and insane persons, even though not expressly men-

tioning them as exceptions, since these persons are inca-

pable of exercising legal volition.4

It is competent to provide by law for a forfeiture of the
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right to participate in elections, as a punishment for con-

duct which the law forbids; but such punishment can only

be imposed after trial and conviction. The election judges

1 Baldwin v. Trowbridge, 2 Bartlett, 46.

2 State v. Williams, 5 Wis. 308; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio, N. S.

655; Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161; Randolph v. Good, 8 W. Va. 551;

St. Joseph, &c. R. R. Co. v. Buchanan Co. Court, 39 Mo. 485; Green

v. Shumway, 39 N. Y. 418; State w. Baker, 38 Wis. 71; Quinn o.

State, 35 Ind. 485; People v. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198; Brown v. Gro-

ver, 6 Bush, (Ky.) 1; Da vies v. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369; McCafferty v.

Guyer, 57 Penn. St. 109.

'Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162.

4 Cushing, Legislative Assemblies, §§ 24, 27; Cooley, Const

Lim., 4th ed., 753; McCrary, Am. Law of Elections, §§ 4, 50,

78.

legislation of the State conflict respecting the times and
places when and where votes may be cast for the election of representatives in Congress, the legislation, under
the provision of the Constitution last referred to, must
control. 1
Qualifications of Electors. -As elections are the means
whereby the people express their sovereign will, the quali-.
fications for taking part therein are usually prescribed by
constitution, that they may not be subject to continual
changes from year to year by legislators of differing views.
When the qualifications are once fixed by the constitution,
it is not in the power of the legislature to add to or modify
them, but they must remain until the constitution is revised or amended,~ and whoever claims the right must
show that he comes within the intent of the existing law. 8
A provision ghing the right generally to persons possessing certain qualifications must be understood as excluding
idiots and insane persons, even though not expressly mentioning them as exceptions, since these persons are incapable of exercising legal volition.•
It is competent to provide by law for a forfeiture of the
right to participate in elections, as a punishment for conduct which the law forbids ; but such punishment can only
be imposed after trial and conviction. The election judges
Baldwin v. Trowbridge, 2 Bartlett, 46.
State v. Williams, 5 Wis. 308; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio, N. S.
655; Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161; Randolph v. Good, 3 W. Va. 551;
St. Joseph, &c. R.R. Co. v. Buchanan Co. Court, 39 Mo. 485; Green
v. Shumway, 39 N. Y. 418; State v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71; Quinn v.
State, 35 Ind. 485; People v. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198; Brown v. Grover, 6 Bush, (Ky.) 1; Davies v. McKeeby, ~Nev. 369; McCafferty v.
Guyer, 67 Penn. St. 109.
a Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162.
' Cushing, Legislative Assemblies, §§ 24, 27; Cooley, Const.
Lim., 4th ed., 753; McCrary, Am. Law of Elections, §§ 4, 601
1
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cannot be authorized for supposed guilt to inflict the

forfeiture.1

Regulations of the Franchise. — Even where qualifications

are fixed by the constitution, it is competent for the legis-

lature to prescribe by law such conditions to the exercise

of the elective franchise as shall seem reasonable to pro-

tect the privilege, and to prevent impositions and other

frauds; and also to prescribe all proper regulations for re-

ceiving and canvassing the votes. One very proper con-

dition is, that every voter, previous to the day of election,

shall cause his name to be entered on a registry of voters,

which is provided for as a guide to the judges of election

in receiving the votes, and that no ballots shall be received

from those not registered. The power of the legislature

to require such a registry is settled,2 and the voter has no

cause for complaint if he fails to register. If a board of

registration neglects or refuses to perform its duty as re-

quired by law, the members may be compelled to do so by

mandamus, or they may be punished as public offenders;

but their misconduct cannot entitle unregistered electors

to vote unless by law provision is made for such cases.8
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Secrecy in Voting. — Election by ballot is now practically

universal in this country, and representatives in Congress

are required to be chosen by that method.4 The ballot

is provided because it is believed most effectually to pro-

tect the elector against improper influences, as it enables

him to exercise the right without any person, even the

officers of election, having a knowledge for whom his suf-

1 Huber ». Reilly, 53 Penn. St. 112; State v. Symonds, 57 Me.

148; Burkett v. McCarty, 10 Bush, (Ky.) 758. Compare Delano v.

Bartlett, 2 Bartlett, 168.

2 Hyde v. Brush, 34 Conn. 454; McCrary, Am. Law of Elections,

§§ 7-10; Cooley, Const. Lira., 4th ed., 757.

a People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich. 342; Zeiler v. Chapman, 54 Mo.

502; Nefzger v. Railroad Co., 36 Iowa, 642.

« Rev. Slat. U. S. (1878), § 27.

cannot be authorized for supposed guilt to indict the
forfeiture. 1
Regulations of the Franchise. - Even where qualifications
are fixed by the constitution, it is competent for the legislature to prescribe by law such conditions to the exercise
of the elective franchise as shall seem reasonable to protect the privilege, and to prevent impositions and other
frauds ; and also to prescribe all proper regulations for receiving and canvassing the votes. One very proper condition is, that every voter, previous to the day of election,
shall cause his name to be entered on a registry of voters,
which is provided for as a guide to the judges of election
in receiving the votes, and that no ballots shall be received
from those not registered. The power of the legislature
to require such a registry is settled, 2 and the voter has no
cause for complaint if he fails to register. If a board of
registration neglects or refuses to perform its duty as required by law, the members may be compelled to do so by
mandamus, or they may be punished as public offenders ;
but their misconduct cannot entitle unregistered electors
to vote unless by law provision is made for such cases. 8
Secrecy in Voting. - Election by ballot is now practically
universal in this country, and representatives in Congress
are required to be chosen by that method.' The ballot·
is provided because it is believed most effectually to protect the elector against improper influences, as it enables
him to exercise the right without any person, even the
officers of election, having a knowledge for whom his sufHuber v. Reilly, 53 Penn. St. 112; State v. Symonds, 57 Me.
148; Burkett v. McCarty, 10 Bush, (Ky.) 758. Compare Delano v.
Bartlett, 2 Bartlett, 168.
2 Hyde v. Brush, 34 Conn. 454; McCrary, Am. Law of Elections,
§§ 7-10; Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 757.
a People v. Kopplckom, rn Mich. 342 ; Zeiler v. Chapman, 64 Mo.
602; Nefzger v. Railroad Co., 36 Iowa, 642.
' U.ev. Slat. U.S. (1878), § 27.
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frage is given. To fully protect the constitutional right

to secrecy as against the importunities, browbeatings, or

inquisitive intermeddling of others, it is provided by law

in some States that the ballots shall be written or printed

on white paper, without any marks or figures thereon

to distinguish one ballot from another; and where such

a regulation exists, all ballots not in conformity with it

when cast are to be rejected, and all contrivances of politi-

cal managers or election officials to evade it are illegal.1

Notice of Elections. — Notices of the times and places

when and where elections are appointed to be held are

generally required to be given by some public officer, in

some method designated by law. If the election to be

held is exceptional or special, the failure to give this notice

must be fatal, even should there be a general attendance

of electors, since every one has the same right to partici-

pate with all others. But if the election is one which is

provided for bj- public law, and the law itself gives all the

particulars of time and place, the failure to give the notice

will not defeat the election, since every one is supposed to

take notice of what is in the law.2
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Ballots, Sufficiency of. — In elections by ballot, the voter

must take care that his ballot shall be complete in itself,

so that it shall express his intention without resort to ex-

traneous evidence for explanation of apparent ambiguities.

The general rules of law do not permit a written instru-

ment to be varied or added to by parol; and in case of

ballots, the parol evidence would be specially objection-

able and dangerous, since public interests of the highest

importance depend upon the elections, and the induce-

i Williams v. Stein, 38 Ind. 89; Opinions of Judges, 45 Me. 602;

Brisbin v. Cleary (Minn.), 20 Alb. Law Jour. 250.

a People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 350; People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich.

608; State v. Orvis, 20 Wis. 235; People v. Brenahm, 3 Cal. 477.

Compare Foster v. Scarff, 15 Ohio, N. 8. 532.

fra~e

is given. To fully protect the constitutional right
to secrecy as against the importunities, browbeatings, or
inquisitive intermeddling of others, it is provided by law
in some States that the ballots shall be written or printed
on white paper, without any marks or figures thereon
to distinguish one ballot from another ; and where such
a regulation exists, all ballots not in conformity with it
when cast are to be rejected, and all contrivances of political managers or election officials to evade it are illegal. 1
Notice of Elections. -Notices of the times and places
when and where elections are appointed to be held are
generally required to be given by some public officer, in
some method designated by law. If the election to be
held is exceptional or special, the failure to give this notice
must be fatal, even should there be a general attendance
of electors, since every one has the same right to participate with all others. But if the election is one which is
proYided for by public law, and the law itself gives all the
particulars of time and place, the failure to give the notice
will not defeat the election, since every one is supposed to
take notice of what is in the law. 2
Ballots, SuffiCiency of-In elections by ballot, the voter
must take care that his ballot shall be complete in itself,
so that it shall express his intention without resort to extraneous evidence for explanation of apparent ambiguities.
The general rules of law do not permit a written instrument to be varied or added to by parol ; and in case of
ballots, the parol evidence would be specially objectionable and dangerous, since public interests of the highest
importance depend upon the elections, and the induce1 Williams v. Stein, 88 Ind. 89; Opinions of Judges, 45 Me. 602;
Brisbin v. Cleary (Minn.), 20 Alb. Law Jour. 260.
~ People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 350; People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich.
608; State v. Orvis, 20 Wis. 235; People v. Brenahm, 3 Cal. 477.
Compare Foster v. Scarff, 15 Ohio, N. S. 632.
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ments to corruption and perjury would sometimes be

enormous. Therefore, if one places upon his ballot two

names for one office when only one is to be voted for, the

ballot, so far as concerns that office, must be rejected for

ambiguity, from the obvious impossibility of determining

the voter's intention without resorting to parol explana-

tion.1 So, if the voter puts one name upon his ballot

where he intends to put another, he will not be allowed to

explain the mistake, but it must be counted as he wrote

and deposited it.2 But the fact that a name is abbreviated

should not prevent its being counted where the intent is

clear.8 Neither should the fact that the office is not

described with precise accuracy, if the description is such

that no doubt concerning it can exist.4 And in any case

where a doubt in applying a ballot perfect in itself is raised

upon extraneous facts, it may be removed by showing all

such facts surrounding the canvass and election as would

tend to throw light upon it. For example, if two persons

of the same name reside within a certain election district,

and ballots are cast having that name upon them for a

specific office, it may be shown, in order to enable the
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ballots to be applied, that one of these persons was pub-

licly known and understood to be a candidate for the

office specified, and the other was not.6

Irregularities in Elections. — All the rules of law govern-

ing elections should aim at obtaining the full and free

expression of the views of those entitled to vote; and

whenever there is reasonable ground for believing that

1 People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, (N. Y.) 409. Compare People v.

Saxton, 22 N. Y. 309.

2 Hart v. Evans, 8 Penn. St. 13.

3 People v. Ferguson, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 102; Attorney-General v. Ely,

4 Wis. 429; State v. Gates, 43 Conn. 533; Talkington v. Lurner, 71

111. 234. Compare People v. Cieotte, 16 Mich. 283.

4 People v. Ma'teson, 17 H1. 167; People v. McManus, 34 Barb. 620.

* People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67.

ments to corruption and perjury would sometimes be
enormous. Therefore, if one places upon his ballot two
names for one office when only one is to be voted for, the
ballot, so far as concerns that office, must be rejected for
ambiguit)' , from the obvious impossibility of determining
the voter's intention without resorting to parol explanation.1 · So, if the voter puts one name upon his ballot
where he intends to put another, he will not be allowed to
explain the mistake, but it must be counted as he wrote
and deposited it. 2 But the fact that a name is abbreviated
should not prevent its being cou.nted where the intent is
clear. 8 Neither should the fact that the office is not
described with precise accuracy, if the description is such
that no doubt concerning it can exist. 4 And in any case
where a doubt in applying a ballot perfect in itself is raised
upon extraneous facts, it may be removed by showing all
such facts surrounding the canvass and election as would
tend to throw light upon it. For example, if two persons
of the same name reside within a certain election district,
and ballots are cast having that name upon them for a
specific office, it tnay be shown, in order to enable the
ballots to be applied, that one of these persons was pub·
licly known and understood to be a candidate for the
office specified, and the other was not. 6
Irregularities in Election&. -All the rules of law governing elections should aim at obtaining the full and free
expression of the views of those entitled to vote ; and
whenever there is reasonable ground _for believing that
'

People v. Seaman, 6 Denio, (N. Y.) 409. Compare People "·
Saxton, 22 N. Y. 309.
2 Ha.rt v. Evans, 8 Penn. St. 13.
a People v. Ferguson, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 102; Attorney-General v. Ely,
4 Wis. 429; State v. Gates, 43 Conn. 533; Talkington v. Lurner, 71
Ill. 234. Compare People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283.
' People v. Ma 'teson, 17 Ill. 167; People v. McManus, 34: Barb. 620.
6 People t'. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67.
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this has been had, a ballot should not be set aside be-

cause of mere irregularities. The following are illustra-

tions. The erroneous rejection by the judges of election

of the ballot offered by a qualified voter;1 the accidental

substitution of another book for the Bible in the adminis-

tration of an oath; the holding of the election by persons

who were not officers de jure, but were officers de facto,

and acted as such in good faith; the neglect of the judges

to appoint clerks of the election; the closing at sundown

of the outer door of the room in which the election was

held, and then permitting the electors within the room to

vote, it not appearing that illegal votes were received or

legal excluded; the failure of the judges and clerks to

take the prescribed oath of office, they being nevertheless

de facto officers ;2 the neglect of the judges to certify the

result within the time fixed by statute;8 or any other

irregularity which does not cast uncertainty on the result,

or affect the interests of the party complaining of it.4 But

the following are not mere irregularities. The submission

of a question to vote in such manner as to exclude a por-

tion of those who are entitled to take part in the election,6
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1 Newcum v. Kirtley, 13 B. Monroe, (Ky.) 515.

2 People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; Taylor ». Taylor, 10 Minn. 112; Day

v. Kent, 1 Oreg. 123. This doctrine has not always been recognized

in Congress; but the cases of Barnes v. Adams (2 Bartlett, 760), and

Eggleston v. Strader (2 Bartlett, 897), in the House of Representa-

tives (1870) support it in approving careful reports of the committee

on elections.

'Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42; People v. Sackett, 14 Mich. 320.

4 People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. An. 175;

Dobyns v. Weadon, 50 Ind. 298; Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161;

McKinney v. O'Connor, 26 Tex. 5; Pike Co. v. Barnes, 51 Miss. 305;

Wheelock Election Case, 82 Penn. St. 297; Loomis v. Jackson, 6 W.

this has been had, a ballot should not be set aside because of mere irregularities. The following are illustrations. The erroneous rejection by the judges of election
of the ballot offered by a qualified voter ; 1 the accidental
substitution of another book for the Bible in the administration of an on.th ; the holding of the election by persons
who were not officers de jure, but were officers de facto,
and acted as such in good faith ; the neglect of the judges
to appoint clerks of the election ; the closing at sundown
of the outer door of the room in which the election was
held, and then permitting the electors within the room to
vote, it not appearing that illegal votes were received or
legal excluded ; the failure of the judges and clerks to
take the prescribed oath of office, they being nevertheless
de facto officers ; 2 the neglect of the judges to certify the
result within the time fixed by statute; 8 or any other
irregularity which does not cast uncertainty on the result,
or affect the interests of the party complaining of it.• But
the following are not mere irregularities. The submission
of a question to vote in such manner as to exclude a portion of those who are entitled to take part in the election, 6

Va. 613; Chicago v. People, 80 111.496; Reid v. Julian, House of

Rep.,. 2 Bartlett, 822.

6 Attorney-General v. Supervisors, 11 Mich. 63. See People v.

Salomon, 46 111. 415; Fort Dodge v. District Township, 17 Iowa, 85;

Barny v. Lauck, 5 Cold. (Tenn.) 588.

Newcum ''· Kirtley, 13 B. Monroe, (Ky.) 515.
People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 112; Day
v. Kent, 1 Oreg. 123. This doctrine has not always been recognized ...
in Congress; but the cases of Barnes v. Adams (2 Bartlett, 760), and
Eggleston v. Strader (2 Bartlett, 897), in the House of Representatives (1870) support it in approving careful reports of the committee
on elections.
3 Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42 ; People v. Sackett, 14 Mich. 320.
" People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. An. 175;
Dobyns v. Weadon, 50 Ind. 298; Bourland v. Hildreth, 20 Cal. 101;
McKinney v. O'Connor, 26 Tex. 5; Pike Co. v. Barnes, 51 Miss. 305;
Wheelock Election Case, 82 Penn. St. 297; Loomis v. Jackson, 6 W.
Va. 613; Chicago v. People, 80 Ill. 496 ; Reid v. Julian, House of
Rep.,. 2 Bartlett, 822.
6 Attorney-General v. Supervisors, 11 Mich. 63.
See People v.
Salomon, 46 Ill. 415; Fort Dodge v. District Township, 17 Iowa, 85;
Barny v. Lauck, 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 588.
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holding the polls open but forty minutes when the law re-

quires three hours,1 and holding it at a different time or

different place from that fixed by law,2 though even in

these cases an election may be supported if it is made to

appear that no one lost his vote as a consequence of the

law being disobeyed.8 When an election is contested be-

cause of the reception of illegal votes, the effect which

shall be allowed to that circumstance must depend very

much upon other facts. If the judges have erroneously,

but in good faith, received incompetent votes, the elec-

tion will not in general be defeated thereby;4 but when

it can be shown for whom they were cast they will be de-

ducted from the count, and the case determined without

them.6 If, however, they have been received fraudulently,

and the whole number is so great that the entire poll is

tainted with the illegality, the election in that precinct may

be set aside altogether, as has frequently been done in

Congress.6 If a legal vote is wrongfully rejected, it cannot

be counted on any showing of the intent to cast it for a

particular candidate ;7 though if the number rejected is so

great that they might possibly have changed the result, the
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election may be declared void for that reason.8

1 State v. Wollem, 37 Iowa, 131.

2 Dickey v. Hurlburt, 5 Cal. 343.

• Dale v. Irwin, 78 111. 170.

4 Ex parte Murphy, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 153; Judkins v. Hill, 50 N. H.

140.

* State v. Hilmantel, 21 Wis. 566; Harbaugh v. Cicotte, 33 Mich. 241.

■ Howard v. Cooper, 1 Bartlett, 275; Dodge v. Brooks, 2 Bartlett,

78; Myers v. Moffett, 2 Bartlett, 564; Switzer ». Dyer, 2 Bartlett,

777. Sometimes the return of the election has been rejected, and

only those rotes counted which can be shown to have been legally

cast. Washburn v. Voorhies, 2 Bartlett, 54. Compare Chadwick

v. Melvin, Brightley's Election Cases, 251.

7 Renner v. Bennett, 21 Ohio, N. S. 431, 450.

holding the volls open but forty minutes when the law requires three hours, 1 and holding it at a different time or
different place from that fixed by law, 2 though even in
these cases an election may be supported if it is made to
appear that no one lost his vote as a consequence of the
law being disobeyed. 8 When an election is contested because of the reception of illegal votes, the effect which
shall be allowed to that circumstance must depend very
much upon other facts. If the judges have erroneously,
but in good faith, received incompetent votes, the election will not in general be defeated thereby ; ' but when
it can be shown for whom they were cast they will be deducted from the count, and the case determined without
them. 6 If, however, they have been received fraudulently,
and the whole number is so great that the entire poll is
tainted with the illegality, the election in that precinct may
be set aside altogether, as has frequently been done in
Congress. 6 If a legal vote is wrongfully rejected, it cannot
be counted on any showing of the intent to cast it for a
particular candidate ; 1 though if the number rejected is so
great that they might possibly have changed.the result, the
election may be declared void for that reason. 8

B Renner v. Bennett, 21 Ohio, N. S. 431. In Congress, votes wrong-

fully rejected have generally been counted on evidence being given

State v. Wollem, 37 Iowa, 131.
Dickey v. Hurlburt, 5 Cal. 343.
a Dale v. Irwin, 78 Ill. 170.
' Ex parte Murphy, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 153; Judkins v. Hill, 50 N. H.
140.
6 State v. Hilmantel, 21 Wis. 566; Harbaugh v. Cicotte, 33 Mich. 241.
6 Howard v. Cooper, 1 Bartlett, 275; Dodge v. Brooks, 2 Bartlett,
78; Myers v. Moffett, 2 Bartlett, 564; Switzer 11. Dyer, 2 Bartlett,
777. Sometimes the return of the election has been rejected, and
only those votes counted which can be shown to have been legally
cast. Washburn v. Voorhies, 2 Bartlett, 54. Compare Chadwick
v. Melvin, Brightley's Election Cases, 251.
7 Renner v. Bennett, 21 Ohio, N. S. 431, 450.
8 Renner v. Bennett, 21 Ohio, N. S. 431. In Congress, votes wrongfully rejected have generally been counted on evidence being given
1
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Eligibility to Office. — The Constitution and laws of the

United States determine what shall be the qualifications

for federal offices, and state constitutions and laws can

neither add to nor take away from them. This has been

repeatedly decided in Congress, in the case of persons

elected to seats therein when provisions in the state con-

stitution, if valid, would render them ineligible.1 When

the law is silent respecting qualifications to office, it must

be understood that electors are eligible, but no others."

The question has often been made, what shall be the rule

when an ineligible person receives a sufficient number of

votes to elect him if he were qualified; and the authorities

are greatly divided on the subject. In England under

such circumstances the person receiving the next highest

number of votes will be declared elected, especially if the

ineligibility of the leading candidate was notorious ;8 and

some of the American States follow this course.4 The de-

cided weight of authority in this country, however, is that

in such case the election has failed; the votes cast for the

disqualified person, though not electing him, being enough

to show that the people have not intended to choose any
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other person.6 Such has been the conclusion of both

to show how the electors intended to cast them. See Delano v. Mor-

gan, 2 Bartlett, 168. It would certainly be very proper to provide by

statute that votes offered and rejected should be marked and pre-

served, in order that they might be counted in case it should after-

wards appear that there was error in rejecting them.

1 Taney v. Marshall, 1 Bartlett, 167; Trumbull's Case, Ibid. 619.

2 State v. Smith, 14 Wis. 497.

8 French v. Nolan, 2 Moak, 711; McCrary, Am. Law of Elections,

§ 231; Cooley, Const. Lim , 4th ed., 781, 782.

« Gulick v. New, 14 Ind. 93; Price v. Baker, 41 Ind. 570; Hatch-

eson v. Tilder, 4 H. & McH. (Md.) 279.

6 Decisions to that effect in Wisconsin, Rhode Island, Pennsylva-

nia, Missouri, Michigan, Maine, Louisiana, California, Mississippi,

Eligibility to O.ifice• ..._The Constitution and laws of the
United States determine what shall be the qualifications
for federal offices, and state constitutions and laws can
neither add to nor take away from them. Tais has been
repeatedly decided in Congress, in the case of persons
elected to seats therein when provisions in the state constitution, if valid, would render them ineligible. 1 When
the law is silent respecting qualifications to office, it must
be understood that electors are eligible, but no others.~
The question has often been made, what shall be the rule
when an ineligible person receives a sufficient number of
votes to elect him if he were qualified; and the authorities
are greatly divided on the subject. In England under
such circumstances the person receiving the next highest
num her of votes will be declared elected, especially if the
ineligibility of the leading candidate was notorious ; 8 and
some of the American States follow this course} The decided weight of authority in this country, however, is that
in such case the election has failed ; the votes cast for the
disqualified person, though not electing him, being enough
to show that the people have not intended to choose any
other person. 5 Such has been the conclusion of both

and Georgia are given in Cooley's Const. Lim., 4th ed., 781. And see

Stephens v. Wyatt, 17 B. Monr. (Ky.) 547.
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to show how the electors intended to cast them. See Delano v. Morg1m, 2 Bartlett, 168. It would certainly be very proper to provide by
statute that votes offered and rejected should be marked and preserved, in order that they might be counted in case it should afterwards appear that there was error in rejecting them.
1 Taney v. Marshall, 1 Bartlett, 167; Trumbull's Case, Ibid. 619.
~ State v. Smith, 14 Wis. 497.
8 French v. Nolan, 2 Moak, 711; McCrary, Am. Law of Elections,
§ 231 ; Cooley, Const. Lim , 4th ed., 781, 782.
4 Gulick v. New, 14 Ind. 93; Price v. Baker, 41 Ind. 670; Hatcheson v. Tilder, 4 H. & McH. (Md.) 279.
6 Decisions to that effect in Wisconsin, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Michigan, Maine, Louisiana, California, Mississippi,
and Georgia a.re given in Cooley's Const. Lim., 4th ed., 781. And see
Stephens v. Wyatt, 17 B. Monr. (Ky.) 647.
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houses of Congress.1 The forfeiture of eligibility to office,

it is sometimes declared, shall follow some specified breach

of the law; such, for example, as the giving or receiving a

bribe, the sending or accepting a challenge to light a duel,

&c. This renders the act which is thus condemned a public

offence, and the disqualification becomes a punishment.

The determination whether the offence has been committed

involves an inquiry into the law and the facts, and this, be-

ing in its essence a judicial inquiry, must be had before a

judicial tribunal, and the disqualification regularly adjudged

before the punishment can be inflicted. The determination

cannot be left to a canvassing board, or to mere minis-

terial officer's.2

Freedom of Elections. — An election fails in its legitimate

purpose when the electors are subjected to such influences

that they abstain from depositing their ballots at all, or

give them unintelligently, or from improper and corrupt

motives, or under the influence of fear or compulsion.

When any considerable number of voters are kept from the

polls through reasonable fear of personal injury from riot-

ous mobs, or from abuse of legal authority, the election
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should be deemed altogether void. Congressional elec-

tions have often been declared void because of intimi-

dation, when there was reason to believe that electors

sufficient in number to have changed the result were

deterred from depositing their ballots through fear or

actual violence. A careful writer of much experience

gives the following rules as deductions from the de-

cisions in Congress: —

1 Cushing, Leg. Assem., 66. The subject was fully and carefully

considered in the contested election case of Smith v. Brown, in the

House of Representatives (1868), and the doctrine of the text has

been acted upon repeatedly since.

2 Commonwealth v. Jones, 10 Bush, (Ky.) 725, approving In re

Dorsey, 7 Port. (Ala.) 293, and Huber v. Reily, 53 Penn. St. 112. See

Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333.

houses of Congress. 1 The forfeiture of eligibility to office,
it is sometimes declared, shall follow some specified breach
of the law; such, for example, as the giving or receiving a
bribe, the sending or accepting a challeng·e to fight a duel,
&c. This renders the act which is thus condemned a public
offence, and the disqualification becomes a punishment.
The determination whether the offence has been committed
involves an inquiry into the law and the facts, and this, being in its essence a judicial inquiry, must be had before a
judicial tribunal, and the disqualification regularly adjudged
before the punishment can be inflicted. The determination
cannot be left to a canvassing board, or to mere ministerial officers. 2
Freedom of Elections. -An election fails in its legitimate
purpose when the electors are subjected to such influences
that they abstain from depositing their ballots at all, or
give them unintelligently, or from improper and corrupt
motives, or under the influence of fear or compulsion.
When any considerable number of voters are kept from the
polls through reasonable fear of personal injury from riotous mobs, or from abuse of legal authority, the election
should be deemed altogether void. Congressional elec.tions have often been declared void because of intimidation, when there was reason to believe that electors
sufficient in number to have changed the result were
deterred from depositing their ballots through fear or
actual violence. A careful wmter of much experience
gives the following rules as deductions from the decisions in Congress : Cashing, Leg. Assem., 66. The subject was fully and carefully
considered in the contested election case of Smith v. Brown, in the
House of Heprt~sentatives (1868), and the doctrine of the text has
been acted upon repeatedly since.
~ Commonwealth v. Jones, 10 Bush, (Ky.) 725, Approving In re
Dorsey, 7 Port. (Ala.) 293, and Huber v. Reily, 53 I>enn. St. 112. See
Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333.
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"1. If the violence and intimidation have been so ex-

tensive and general as to render it certain that there has

been no fair and free expression by the great body of elec-

tors, then the election must be set aside, notwithstanding

the fact that in some of the precincts or counties there

was a peaceable and fair election.

"2. When there has been an election embracing a num-

ber of counties or precincts in which there have been vio-

lence and intimidation, enough to exclude from the count

one or more precincts or voting places, but not enough to

destroy the freedom and fairness of the election as a whole,

such violence will not invalidate the election, nor affect the

results of it," unless it be shown affirmatively that but for

it the results would have been different.

"3. The question must be, has the great body of the

electors had an opportunity to express their choice through

the medium of the ballot and according to law; and this

fact must be decided in the light of all the facts and cir-

cumstances shown in the evidence." 1

The presence of a military force at or near the polls of

an election, commanded by those who favor a particular
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candidate or party, is almost of necessity a menace to the

electors, and an interference with them in giving their suf-

frages freely ;a and in England and some of the States of

the Union, even the training of the militia on election day

is forbidden by law. It is usual, also, to forbid the service

of legal process on election day, lest it be employed as a

measure of intimidation to voters who are in debt. Betting

upon the results of elections is illegal at common law be-

cause it tends to bring improper influences to bear upon the

results. So are all contracts which have the same tendency.*

1 McCrary, Am. Law of Elections, § 429. See Hunt r. Sheldon,

House of Rep. (1869).

a McCrary, Am. Law of Elections, §§ 418, 421.

» Nichols v. Mudgett, 82 Vt. 546; Meacham v. Dow, 82 Vt. 721;

Piatt v. People, 29 111. 54; Duke v. Asbee, 11 Ired. (N. C.) 112.

'' 1. If the violence and intimidation have been so ex~
tensive and general as to render it certain that there has
been no fair and free expression by the great body of electors, then the election must be set aside, notwithstanding
the fact that in some of the precincts or counties there
was a peaceable and fair election.
'' 2. When there has been an election embracing a number of counties or precincts in which there have been violence and intimidation, enough to exclude from the count
one or more precincts or voting places, but not enough to
destroy the freedom and fairness of the election as a whole,
such violence will not invalidate the election, nor affect the
results of it," unless it be shown affirmatively that but for
it the results would have been different.
'' 3. The question must be, has the great body of the
elect.ors had an opportunity t.o express their choice through
the medium of the ballot and according to law ; and this
fact must be decided in the light of all the facts and circumstances shown in the evidence .." 1
The presence of a military force. at or near the polls of
an election, commanded by those who favor a particular
candidate or party, is almost of necessity a menace to the
electors, and an interference with them in giving their suffrages freely ; ~ and in England and some of the States of
the Union, even the training of the militia on election day
is forbidden by law. It is usual, also, to forbid the service
of legal process on election day, lest it be employed as a
measure of intimidation t.o voters who are in debt. Betting
upon the results of elections is illegal at common law because it tends to bring improper influences to bear upon the
results. So are all contracts which have the same tendency.•
t McCrary, Am. Law of Elections, § 429. See Hunt o. Sheldon,
House of Rep. (1869).
t McCrary, Am. Law of Elections, §§ 418, 421.
I Nichols v. Mudgett, 82 Vt. 646; Meacham v. Dow, 32 Vt. 721 ;
Piatt"· People, 29 Ill. M; Duke 11. Asbee, 11 Ired. (N. C.) 112.
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A vote may properly be rejected in a contest over an elec-

tion when it appears that it was obtained for a valuable

consideration.1 Treating electors to intoxicating drinks

on the day of election is very commonly prohibited, not

only because it is a species of bribery, but also because

it tends to unfit the voters for the intelligent discharge

of their duties.

Canvass and Return of Votes. — Ballots cast are to be

canvassed in the various electoral districts or precincts,

and a report made of the results. If the officers to be

chosen are for that district only, the judges of the election

are usually empowered to decide who is elected; but if

they are for a division of the State embracing several elec-

tion districts, the local judges will be required to make

returns to a canvassing board, authorized to canvass the

returns for the whole division, and to declare the election

as it appears upon such returns. The general rule in the

several States is that these division or district canvassers

act in the performance of their duties in a ministerial way

only; that is, that they are to receive the returns that are

transmitted to them in apparent conformity to the law as
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correct, and they are not to assume the judicial function of

going behind them to inquire into facts, but must leave any

allegation of error, mistake, or fraud to be inquired into in

some regular judicial contest, if the parties concerned shall

afterwards see fit to institute it.2 If a return is void on its

face, it must of course be rejected;8 but it would be almost

a matter of course to permit errors of form to be corrected

1 State v. Olin, 23 Wis. 309, 327; State v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213.

a Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, (N. Y.) 42; Opinions of Justices, 64 Me.

688; Phelps v. Schroder, 26 Ohio, N. S. 549; People v. Hilliard,

29 111. 413; State v. Governor, 25 N. J. 344; State v. Harrison, 38

Mo. 540; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107; Switzer v. Dyer, House

of Eep. (1870).

8 State v. State Canvassers, 36 Wis. 498; Perry v. Whittaker,

71 N. C. 475.

A vote may properly be rejected in a contest over an election when it appears that it was obtained for a valuable
consideration. 1 Treating electors to intoxicating drinks
on the day of election is very commonly prohibited, not
only because it is a species of bribery, but also because
it tends to unfit the voters for the intelligent discharge
nf their duties.
Canvass and Return of Votea. -Ballots cast are to be
canvassed in the various electoral districts or precincts,
and a report made of the results. If the officers to be
chosen are for that district only, the judges of the election
are usually empowered to decide who is elected ; but if
they are for a division of the State embracing several election districts, the local judges will be required to make
returns to a canvassing board, authorized to canvass the
returns for the whole di vision, and to declare the election
as it appears upon such returns. The general rule in the
several States is that these division or district canvassers
act in the performance of their duties in a ministerial way
only ; that is, that they are to receive the returns that are
transmitted to them in apparent conformity to the law as
correct, and they are not to assume the judicial function of
·going behind them to inquire into facts, but must leave any
allegation of error, mistake, or fraud to be inquired into in
some regular judicial contest, if the parties concerned shall
afterwards see fit to institute it. t If a return is void on its
face, it must of course be rejected ; 8 but it would be almost
a matter of course to permit errors of form to be corrected
State v. Olin, 23 Wis. 309, 327 ; State v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213.
Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, (N. Y.) 42; Opinions of Justices, 64 Me.
688; Phelps v. Schroder, 26 Ohio, N. S. 649; People v. Hilliard,
29 111. 413; State v. Governor, 25 N. J. 344; State v. Harrison, 38
Mo. 640; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107; Switzer v. Dyer, House
of Rep. (1870).
8 State v. State Canvassers, 36 Wis. 498; Perry v. Whittaker,
71 N. C. 476.
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by the local board when the case admitted of it. Forgery in

the returns the canvassing board must necessarily inquire

into, since a forged return is in law no return at all.1

In a few of the States during the unsettled times follow-

ing the civil war, returning boards were provided for by

law, with powers far surpassing those which any judicial

body can exercise; for they were empowered to revise

and reject returns on ex parte showing, and thus to proceed

without trial and condemn parties not heard. It may no

doubt be safely assumed that the time when such excessive

powers could be created or tolerated has passed away.

Canvassing boards in the performance of their duties

are, like other ministerial or administrative bodies, under

the control of judicial authority, and when they neglect or

refuse to obey the law may be coerced by means of the

writ of mandamus.2

Contesting Elections. — It is no doubt competent to pro-

vide by the state constitution that the decisions of the

canvassing board upon the election of any officers under

the State shall be conclusive.8 This, however, is unusual;

and in general the party who claims to have been deprived
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of an office unjustly by the results of the canvass may

have his claim tried in the courts. In some cases it has

been held that jury trial upon such a claim is matter of

right,4 but this is denied in others;6 and there is much

1 Attorney-General v. Barstow, 4 "Wis. 567.

2 Commonwealth v. Emminger, 74 Penn. St. 479; Clark v. McKen-

rie, 7 Bush, (Ky.) 523; State v. Gibbs, 13 Fla. 55; Bank v. Super-

visors, 4 W. Va. 371; Kisler v. Cameron, 39 Ind. 488.

8 Grier v. Shackleford, Const. Rep. (S. C.) 642; Batman v. Mego-

wan, 1 Met. (Ky.) 533; State r. Marlow, 15 Ohio, N. S. 114; People

v. Goodwin, 22 Mich. 496; Baxter v. Brooks, 29 Ark. 173.

* State v. Bennett, 2 Ala. 140; People v. Railroad Co., 57 N. Y.

160.

6 Ewing v. Fuller, 43 Penn. St. 384; Commonwealth v. Leech, 44

Penn. St. 332; State v. Johnson, 26 Ark. 281.

by the local board when the case admitted of it. Forgery in
the returns the canvassing board must necessarily inquire
into, since a forged return is in law no return at all. 1
In a few of the States during the unsettled times following the civil war, returning boards were provided for by
law, with powers far surpassing those which any judicial
body can exercise ; for they were empowered to revise
and reject returns on ex parte showing, and thus to proceed
without trial and condemn parties not heard. It may no
doubt be safely assumed that the time when such excessive
powers could be created or tolerated has passed away.
Canvassing boards in the performance of their duties
are, like other ministerial or administrative bodies, under
the control of judicial authority, and when they neglect or
refuse to obey the law may be coerced by means of the
writ of mandamus. 1
Contesting Elections. - It is no doubt competent to provide by the state constitution that the decisions of the
canvassing board upon the election of any officers under
the State shall be conclusive. 8 This, however, is unusual ;
and in general the party who claims to have been deprived
of an office unjustly by the results of the canvass may
have his claim tried in the courts. In some cases it has
been held that jury trial upon such a claim is matter of
right,• but this is denied in others ; 6 and there is much
Attorney-General v. Barstow, 4: Wis. 567.
Commonwealth v. Emminger, 74 Penn. St. 479; Clark v. McKenzie, 7 Bush, (Ky.) 523; State v. Gibbs, 13 Fla. 55; Bank v. Supervisors, 4 W. Va. 371; Kisler''· Cameron, 39 Ind. 488.
a Grier v. Shackleford, Const. Rep. (S. C.) 642; Batman t•. Megowan, 1 Met. (Ky.) 533; State i·. Marlow, 15 Ohio, N. S. 114; People
v. Good win, 22 Mich. 496 ; Baxter v. Brooks, 29 Ark. 173.
4 State v. Bennett, 2 Ala. 140; People v. Railroad Co., 57 N. Y.
160.
6 Ewing v. Fuller, 43 Penn. St. 384; Commonwealth v. Leech, 44
Penn. St. 332; State v. Johnson, 26 Ark. 281.
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reason for saj-ing that the State may provide any method

that seems most consistent with public policy for deter-

mining •who, by the result of an election, is entitled to be

recognized as the official administrator of its laws.1 It is

different when the question is one of the forfeiture of an

office; for when once acquired, the incumbent has property

rights in it.

Legislative elections are determined by the body for a

seat in which the election is had. This is expressly pro-

vided by the Constitution in the case of the two houses of

Congress,2 and the judiciary can in no manner interfere

with their conclusions. The evidence in a legislative con-

test is usually taken by committees, and the case decided

on the committee's report. On general principles a case

once decided should be considered closed forever.8

Fifteenth Amendment. — By the fifteenth article of the

amendments it is provided that " the right of citizens of

the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged

by the United States, or by any State, on account of race,

color, or previous condition of servitude." This provision

gives to the freedmen and other colored persons the right
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to impartial consideration in the law of suffrage in the sev-

eral States.

The second clause of the fourteenth article was intended

to influence the States to bring about by their voluntary

action the same result that is now accomplished by this

amendment. It provided that when the right to vote was

denied to any of the male inhabitants of a State, being

twenty-one years of age and citizens of the United States,

1 Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 IT. S. Rep. 480.

! Const., Art. I. § 5. Provisions for contested elections to Con-

gress are made by Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), ch. 8.

8 Mr. McCrary, in the sixth chapter of his treatise on the Law of

Elections, has gone at some length into the evidence receivable by

legislative committees.

reason for saying that the State may provide any method
that seems most- consistent with public policy for -determining who, by the result of an election, is entitled to be
recognized as the official administrator of its laws. 1 It is
different when the question is one of the forfeiture of an
office ; for when once acquired, the incumbent has property
rights in it.
Legislative eleetions are determined by the body for a
seat in which the election is had. This is expressly provided by the Constitution in the case of the two houses of
Congress, 2 and the judiciary can in no manner interfere
with their conclusions. The evidence in a legislative contest is usually taken by committees, and the case decided
on the committee's report. On general principles a case
once decided should be considered closed forever. 8
Fifteenth .Amendment. - By the fifteenth article of the
amendments it is provided that '' the right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States, or by any State, on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude." This provision
gives to the freedmen and other colored persons the right
to impartial consideration in the.law of suffrage in the several States.
The second clause of the fourteenth article was intended
to influence the States to bring about by their voluntary
action the same result that is now accomplished by this
amendment. It provided that when the right to vote was
denied to any of the male inhabitants of a State, being
twenty-one years of age and citizens of the United States,
Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U.S. Rep. 480.
Const., Art. I. § 6. Provisions for contested elections to Congress are made by Rev. Stat. U. S. (1878), ch. 8.
8 Mr. McCrary, in the sixth chapter of his treatise on the Law of
Elections, has gone at some length into the evidence receivable by
legislative committees.
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or any way abridged except for participation in crime,

the basis of representation in Congress should be reduced

in the proportion which the number of such male citi-

zens should bear to the whole number of male citizens

twenty-one years of age in such State. By this, the pur-

pose was to induce the States to admit colored freemen to

the privilege of suffrage by reducing the representation

and influence of the States in the federal government, in

case they refused. No opportunity occurred for testing

the efficacy of this plan previous to the adoption of

the fifteenth article, and it cannot therefore be affirmed

whether it would or would not have been successful. Im-

portant questions, however, may still arise under it. The

provision is general; it is not limited to freedmen, but it

applies wherever the right to vote is denied to male citi-

zens of the proper age, or is abridged for other cause than

for participation in crime. The State of Connecticut de-

nies the right of suffrage to all who cannot read, and

Massachusetts and Missouri to all who cannot both read

and write; and many of the States admit no one to the

privilege of suffrage unless he is a tax-payer. So in the
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majority of the States a citizen absent therefrom, though

in the public service, cannot vote, because the State re-

quires as a condition the personal presence of the voter at

the polls of his municipality. Possibly it may be said, in

respect to such cases, that the representation of the State

should be reduced in proportion to the number of those

who are excluded because they cannot read and write, or

do not pay taxes, or are absent. It is not likely, however,

that any such position would be sustained. To require

the payment of a capitation tax is no denial of suffrage;

it is demanding only the preliminary performance of pub-

lic duty, and may be classed, as may also presence at the

polls, with registration, or the observance of any other

preliminary to insure fairness and protect against fraud.

or any way abridged except for participation in crime,
the basis of representation in Congress should be reduced
in the proportion which the number of such male citizens should bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State. By this, the purpose was to induce the States to admit colored freemen to
the piivilege of suffrage by reducing the representation
and influence of the States in the federal government, in
case they refused. No opportunity occurred for testing
the efficacy of this plan previous to the adoption of
the fifteenth article, and it cannot therefo_re be affirmed
whether it would or would not have been successful. Important questions, however, may still arise under it. The
provision is general ; it is not limited to freedmen, but it
applies wherever the right to vote is denied to male citizens of the proper age, or is abridged for other cause than
for participation in crime. The State of Connecticut denies the right of suffrage to all who cannot read, apd
Massachusetts and 1\lissouri to all who cannot both read
and write ; and many of the States admit no one to the
privilege of suffrage unless he is a tax-payer. So in the
majority of the States a citizen absent therefrom, though
in the public service, cannot vote, because the State requires as a condition the personal presence of the voter at
the polls of his municipality. Possibly it may be said, in
respect to such cases, that the representation of the State
should be reduced in proportion to the number of those
who are excluded because they cannot read and write, or
do not pay taxes, or are absent. It is not likely, however,
that any such position would be sustained. To require
the payment of a capitation tax is no denial of suffrage ;
it is demanding only the preliminary performance of public duty, and may be classed, as may also presence at the
polls, with registration, or the observance of any other
preliminary to insure fairness and protect against fraud.
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Nor can it be said that to require ability to read is any

denial of suffrage. To refuse to receive one's vote be-

cause he was born in some particular country rather than

elsewhere, or because of his color, or because of any natu-

ral quality or peculiar^ which it would be impossible for

him to overcome, is plainly a denial of suffrage. But abil-

ity to read is something within the power of any man; it

is not difficult to attain it, and it is no hardship to require

it. On the contrary, the requirement only by indirection

compels one to appropriate a personal benefit he might

otherwise neglect. It denies to no man the suffrage, but

the privilege is freely tendered to all, subject only to a

condition that is beneficial in its performance, and light in

its burden. If a property qualification, or the payment

of taxes upon property when one has none to be taxed, is

made a condition to suffrage, there may be room for more

question.

Discriminations in Naturalization. — Although the fif-

teenth amendment forbids discriminations founded on

race, color, &c. as between citizens, it does not forbid

discriminations in the naturalization laws. Indeed, at the
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time when this amendment was adopted only white persons

were permitted to become citizens by naturalization, and

the amendment to the laws since made only extends the

privilege to persons of African descent.1

Reasons for the Amendment. —The experiment of impar-

tial suffrage, though confessedly under the circumstances

one of much danger, was entered upon under the influence

of two sets of reasons; the first of which had in view the

interest of the colored people, and the second contemplated

the general interest of the country. The experiment, it

was believed, would benefit the colored race, first, because

it would give to them importance, secure to them respect,

and protect them against unfriendly action or legislation;

1 Eev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 2169; Act of July 14, 1870.

Nor can it be said that to require ability to read is any
denial of suffrage. To refuse to receive one's vote because be was born in some particular country rather than
elsewhere, or because of his color, or because of any natural quality or peculiarity which it would be impossible for
him to overcome, is plainly a denial of suffrage. But ability to read is something within the power of any man ; it
is not difficult to attain it, and it is no hardship to require
it. On the contrary, the requirement only by indirection
compels one to appropriate a personal benefit he might
otherwise neglect. It denies to no man the suffrage, but
the privilege is freely tendered to all, subject only to a
condition that is beneficial in its performance, and light in
its burden. If a property qualification, or the payment
of taxes upon property when one has none to be taxed, is
made a condition to suffrage, there may be room for more
question.
Discn"minations in Naturali~ation. -Although the fifteenth amendment forbids discriminations founded on
race, color, &c. as between citizens, it does not forbid
discriminations in the naturalization laws. Indeed, at the
time when this amendment was adopted only white persons
were permitted to become citizens by naturalization, and
the amendment to the laws since made only extends the
privilege to persons of African descent. 1
Reasons for the .Amendment. -The experiment of impartial suffrage, though confessedly under the circumstances
one of much danger, was entered upon under the influence
of two sets of reasons ; the first of which had in view the
interest of the colored people, and the second contemplated
the general interest of the country. The experiment, it
was believed, would benefit the colored race, first, because
it would give to them importance, secure to them respect,
and protect them against unfriendly action or legislation ;

,

1

Itev. Stat. U. S. (1878), § 2169; Act of July 14, 1870.
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and, second, because it would be to them an educational

and, second, because it would be to them an educational
process of the highest importance, not only as it would in~ite them to prepare themselves for the duties of citizenship, but as it would accustom them to the practical performance of such duties.
An opinion has been expressed that these were the real
purposes of the amendment. 1 But as all rules of suffrage
contemplate the benefit of the state rather than that of individuals, we may assume that the advantage to individuals was only a secondary purpose. The reasons why the
change was thought to be important on public grounds
were, first, that unless the ballot was given to the freedmen
the government of the Southern States must for a considerable time be in the hands of those lately in re hellion, and
who might be expected not to co-operate in government
heartily and cordially with those from whose political association they had so strenuously endeavored to break
away ; and, second, that the existence in the political community of a great body of citizens, against whom the laws
discriminate in a particular which makes the discrimination
a stigma and a disgrace, must always be an occasion of
discontent, disorder, and danger.
The expeiiment, however fraught with danger, was directly in the line of others which began with the organization of the government. All chan~es had been in the
direction of enlarging the basis of suffrage, and this
amendment did n~t originate the embarrassments and
dangers attending unintelligent participation in elections,
but only added to them.
Legislation. - The fifteenth amendment empowers Congress to enforce it by appropriate legislation. It is unquestionable that the amendment is self-executing to this
extent, that all laws and all provisions of state constitutions which contlict with it were at once annulled. Con-

process of the highest importance, not only as it would in-

cite them to prepare themselves for the duties of citizen-

ship, but as it would accustom them to the practical per-

formance of such duties.

An opinion has been expressed that these were the real

purposes of the amendment.1 But as all rules of suffrage

contemplate the benefit of the state rather than that of in-

dividuals, we may assume that the advantage to individ-

uals was only a secondary purpose. The reasons why the

change was thought to be important on public grounds

were, first, that unless the ballot was given to the freedmen

the government of the Southern States must for a consid-

erable time be in the hands of those lately in rebellion, and

who might be expected not to co-operate in government

heartily and cordially with those from whose political as-

sociation they had so strenuously endeavored to break

away; and, second, that the existence in the political com-

munity of a great body of citizens, against whom the laws

discriminate in a particular which makes the discrimination

a stigma and a disgrace, must always be an occasion of
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discontent, disorder, and danger.

The experiment, however fraught with danger, was di-

rectly in the line of others which began with the organ-

ization of the government. All changes had been in the

direction of enlarging the basis of suffrage, and this

amendment did not originate the embarrassments and

dangers attending unintelligent participation in elections,

but only added to them.

Legislation. — The fifteenth amendment empowers Con-

gress to enforce it by appropriate legislation. It is un-

questionable that the amendment is self-executing to this

extent, that all laws and all provisions of state constitu-

tions which conflict with it were at once annulled. Con-

1 Hunt, J., in United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. Rep. 214, 217.

l

•

HuntJ J., in United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. Rep. 214, 217 •
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gressional legislation could only be needed to prevent the

impartial rule of the Constitution being nullified by failure

of officers to give effect to it.

Congress has made elaborate provisions for protecting

the political rights which are given by the fifteenth amend-

ment, and also the right to the equal protection of the laws,

secured by the fourteenth amendment. The most impor-

tant of these are the provisions for the appointment by the

United States Circuit Courts of supervisors to watch and

oversee the registration of voters and the elections for rep-

resentatives in Congress; for the appointment of deputy

United States marshals to assist in the preservation of

order at the elections, and to aid the supervisors in the

performance of their duties; for the punishment as crimes

of such acts as tend to invade, hinder, or obstruct the en-

joyment of the political rights which the amendments were

intended to confer and secure; and for the conferring upon

the federal courts of jurisdiction in election cases where a

federal right, privilege, or immunity is in question.1 The

legislation thus adopted has received the attention of the

Supreme Court, and the following general principles have
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been laid down: —

1. The Constitution of the United States confers the

right to vote upon no one. That right comes to the citi-

zens of the United States, when they possess it at all,

under state laws, and as a grant of state sovereignty.

But the fifteenth amendment confers upon citizens of the

United States a new exemption; namely, an exemption

from discrimination in elections on account of race, color,

or previous condition of servitude. This exemption the

United States may protect by appropriate legislation.

2. The power in Congress to legislate at all on the sub-

ject of voting at state elections rests upon the fifteenth

amendment. The whole subject was in the hands of the

i Eer. Stat. U. S. (1878), ch. 24 and 20.

gressional legislation could only be needed to prevent the
impartial rule of the Constitution being nullified by failure
of officers to give effect to it.
Congress has made elaborate provisions for protecting
the political rights which are given by the fifteenth amendment, and also the right to the equal protection of the laws,
secured by the fourteenth amendment. The most important of these are the provisions for the appointment by the
United States Circuit Courts of supervisors to watch and
oversee the registration of voters and the elections for representatives in Congress; for the appointment of deputy
United States marshals to assist in the preservation of
order at the elections, and to aid the supervisors in the
performance of their duties ; for the punishment as crimes
of such acts as tend to invade, hinder, or obstruct the enjoyment of the political rights which the amendments. were
intended to confer and secure ; and for the conferring upon
the federal courts of jurisdiction in election cases where a
federal right, privilege, or immunity is in question. 1 The
legislation thus adopted has received the attention of the
Supreme Court, and the following general principles have
been laid down : 1. The Constitution of the United States confers the
right to vote upon no one. That right comes to the citizens of the United States, when they possess it at all,
under state laws, and as a grant of state sovereignty.
But the fifteenth amendment confers upon citizens of the
United States a new exemption; namely, an exemption
from discrimination in elections on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude. This exemption the
United States may protect by appropriate legislation.
2. The power in Congress to legislate at all on the subject of voting at state elections rests upon the fifteenth
amendment. The whole subject was in the hands of the
I

1

Rev. Stat. U.S. (1878), ch. 24 and 26.
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States before, and Congress obtained a right to intervene

only by the amendment, and to the extent that should be

needful to protect the exemption to which citizens of the

United States thereby became entitled.

3. The third and fourth sections of the act of May 31,

1870, which undertook to punish election officers and

others for denying or abridging the right of citizens to

vote, not being limited in their operation to unlawful dis-

criminations on account of race, color, or previous condi-

tion of servitude, were beyond the limit of the fifteenth

amendment, and therefore beyond the power of Congress.

Parties cannot be punished under them, even though their

acts may have contemplated or accomplished the uncon-

stitutional discrimination.1

Section III. —The Right of Assembly and Petition.

The Constitution. — The first amendment to the Consti-

tution further declares that Congress shall make no law

abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble

and to petition the government for a redress of griev-

ances. Two rights are protected by this provision: the

right of the people to assemble themselves together, and
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the right of petition; but they are protected as against

States before, and Congress obtained a right to intervene
only by the amendment, and to the extent that should be
needful to protect the exemption to which citizens of the
United States thereby became entitled.
3. The third and fourth sections of the act of May 31,
1870, which undertook to punish election officers and
others for denying or abridging the right of citizens to
vote, not being limited in their operation to unlawful discriminations on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, were beyond the limit of the fifteenth
amendment, and theref(;)re beyond the power of Congress.
Parties cannot be punished under them, even though their
acts may have contemplated or accomplished the unconstitutional discrimination. 1

federal action only.a

The People. '— When the term the people is made use

of in constitutional law or discussions, it is often the case

SECTION

III. -THE

RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND PETITION.

that those only are intended who have a share in the gov-

ernment through being clothed with the elective franchise.

Thus, the people elect delegates to a constitutional con-

vention, and determine by their votes whether the com-

pleted work of the convention shall or shall not be

adopted; the people choose the officers under the consti-

i United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. Rep. 214; United States v.

Cruikshanks, 92 U. S. Rep. 542.

* United States v. Cruikshanks, 92 U. S. Rep. 542.

The Constitution. - The first amendment to the Constitution further declares that Congress shall make no law
abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Two rights are protected by this provision: the
right o'r the people to assemble themselves together, and
the right of petition ; but they are protected as against
federal action only.~
The People.-· When the term the people is made use
of in constitutional law or discussions, it is often the case
that those only are intended who have a share in the gov. ernment through being clothed with the elective franchise.
Thus, the people elect delegates to a constitutional convention, ~nd determine by their votes whether the completed work of the convention shall or shall not be
adopted ; the people choose the officers under the constiUnited States v. Reese, 92 U. S. Rep. 214; United States v.
Cruikshanks, 92 U. S. Rep. 542.
2 United States v. Cruikshanks, 9'J U. S. Rep. 542.
1
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tution, and so on. For these and similar purposes the

electors, though constituting hut a small minority of the

whole body of the community, nevertheless act for all,

and, as being for the time the representatives of sover-

eignty, they are considered and spoken of as the sovereign

people. But in all the enumerations and guaranties of

rights the whole people are intended, because the rights

of all are equal, and are meant to be equally protected.

In this case, therefore, the right to assemble is preserved

to all the people, and not merely to the electors, or to any

other class or classes of the people.

Right to Assemble. — The right to assemble may be im-

portant for religious, social, industrial, or political pur-

poses; but it was no doubt its political value that was in

view in adopting the amendment. To assemble for re-

ligious purposes is a part of the religious liberty of the peo-

ple, and required no additional protection. Social meetings

and industrial meetings are seldom likely to be disturbed

by the authorities, except when they are believed to con-

template public disorder, and are in open defiance of the

law; but there must be an actual breach of the law before
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they can be intermeddled with. Individuals may perhaps

render themselves liable to arrest by threats, but these

only constitute individual misconduct.

A political meeting by electors may have one purpose,

and that by non-electors another. The former will usually

meet for some purpose preparatory to the exercise of the

political franchise, such as to hear addresses, select candi-

dates for their suffrages, and the like, or perhaps to petition

those for the time in authority in respect to something in

which they may take special interest. The non-electors

may also meet for petition or remonstrance, or, on the

other hand, they may meet to express their sense of wrong

at being excluded from political privileges, and to demand

a right to participate with others. A demand for equality

tution, and so on. For these and similar purposeg the
electors, though constituting but a small minority of the
whole body of the community, nevertheless act for all,
and, as being for the time the representatives of sovereignty, they are considered and spoken of as the sovereign
people. But in all the enumerations and guaranties of
rights the whole people are intended, because the rights
of all are equal, and are meant to be equally protected.
In this case, therefore, the right to assemble is preserved
to all the people, and not merely to the electors, or to any
other class or classes of the people.
Right to Assemble. -The right to assemble may be important for religious, social, industrial, or political purposes ; but it was no doubt its political value that was in
view in adopting the amendment. To assemble for religious purposes is a part of the religious liberty of the people, and required no additional protection. Social meetings
and industrial meetings are seldom likely to be disturbed
by the authorities, except when they are believed to contemplate public disorder, and are in open defiance of the
law ; but there must be an actual breach of the law before
they can be intermeddled with. Individuals may perhaps
render themselves liable .to arrest bv threats, but these
only constitute individual misconduct.
A political meeting by electors may have one purpose,
and that by non-electors another. The former will usually
meet for some purpose preparatory to the exercise of the
political franchise, such as to hear addresses, s~lect candidates for their suffrages, and the like, or perhaps to petition
those for the time in authority in respect to something in
which they may take special interest. The non-electors
may also meet for petition or remonstrance, or, on the
other hand, they may meet to express their sense of wrong
at being excluded from political privileges, and to demand
a right to participate with others. A demand for equality
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of political privilege by a disfranchised class, persistently

made and pressed, has often made itself heard, and the

Constitution of the land has been altered in response to it.

Still more often statutes have been enacted, modified, or

repealed, in deference to the appeals of those who were

not allowed the right to vote ; and perhaps the right of as-

sembly on their part is more important to the state than

the same right on the part of those who may make them-

selves heard through their direct participation in the

government.

The right of assembly always was, and still is, subject

to reasonable regulations by law. Parliament has some-

times been compelled to interpose strict regulations, when

a great and tumultuous body of people threatened to

appear at its doors to present a demand for a change in

the law. i

Right to Petition. — The right to petition is not co-

extensive with the right to assemble; for in its nature it

can have no place in merely social affairs, though it has

a limited range in religious and industrial organizations.

Petition is for the redress or prevention of grievances, and
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is addressed to some person or body having, in respect to

the matter in hand, superior authority. It is a generic

term, however, and applies to all recommendations to

office or public position or privilege, as well as to remon-

strances against them, and to appeals of every sort, and

for every purpose, made to the judgment, discretion, or

favor of the person or body having authority in the

premises.1

A petition is, nevertheless, merely a privileged publica-

tion, and the right to be heard by means of it may be so

abused as to take away the privilege. One must not re-

sort to it for the purpose of visiting his malice upon others,

» Kershaw v. Bailey, 1 Exch. 743; Bradley v. Heath, 12 Pick

(Mass.) 163.

of political privilege by a disfranchised class, persistently
made and pressed, has often made itself heard, and the
Constitution of the land has been altered in response to it.
Still more often statutes have been enacted, modified, or
repealed, in deference to the appeals of those who were
not allowed the right to vote ; and perhaps the right of assembly on their part is more important to the state than
the same right on the part of those who may make themselves heard through their direct participation in the
government.
The right of assembly always was, and still is, subject
to reasonable regulations by law. Parliament has sometimes been compelled to interpose strict regulations, when
a great and tumultuous body of people threatened to
appear at its doors to present a demand for a change in
the law.
Right to Petition. -The right to petition is not coextensive with the right to assemble ; for in its nature it
can have no place in merely social affairs, though it has
a limited range in religious and industrial organizations.
Petition is for the redress or prevention of grievances, and
is addressed to some person or body having, in respect to
the matter in hand, superior authority. It is a ~eneric
term, however, and applies to all recommendations to
office or public position or privilege, as well as to remonstrances against them, and to appeals of every sort, and
for every purpose, made to the judgment, discretion, or
favor of the person or body having authority in the
premises. 1
A petition is, nevertheless, merely a privileged publication, and the right to be heard by menns of it may be so
abused as to take away the privilege. One must not resort to it for the purpose of visiting his malice upon others,
1 Kershaw v. Bailey, 1 Exch. 743; Bradley v. Heath, 12 Pick
(Maaf.) 163.
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through the publication of false charges; but when the

occasion is proper for petition, good motives in presenting

it will be presumed, and the fact that it contains false and

injurious aspersions of character will not. make out a right

of action, but malice in the petitioner must be established

also.1 The petition must be for something within the au-

thority of the person or body addressed to grant, or must

in good faith be supposed to-be;2 and when it is, it will

be protected while circulating for signatures, as well as

after it has been presented.8 But if a false charge is

merely put in the form of a petition, without the intent to

present it, it is not within the privilege.4

Section IV. — The Right to Keep and Bear Abms.

The Constitution. — By the second amendment to the

Constitution it is declared that, "a well-regulated mili-

tia being necessary to the security of a free state, the

right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be

infringed."

The amendment, like most other provisions in the Con-

through the publication of false charges ; but when the
occasion is proper for petition, good motives in presenting
it will be presumed, and the fact that it contains false and
injurious aspersions of character will not.make out a right
of action, but malice in the petitioner most be established
also. 1 The petition must be for something within the authority of the person or body addressed to grant, or must
in good faith be supposed to-- be ; ~ and when it is, it will
be protected while circulating for signatures, as well as
after it has been presented. 8 But if a false charge is
merely put in the form of a petition, without the intent to
present it, it is not within the privilege.•

stitution, has a history. It was adopted with some modi-

fication and enlargement from the English Bill of Rights of

SECTION

IV. -THE RIGHT

TO KEEP AND BEAR

.Amis.
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1688, where it stood as a protest against arbitrary action

of the overturned dynasty in disarming the people, and as

a pledge of the new rulers that this tyrannical action should

cease. The right declared was meant to be a strong moral

check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers,

and as a necessary and efficient means of regaining rights

when temporarily overturned by usurpation.6

1 Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R. (Penn.) 23; Howard v. Thompson,

21 "Wend. (N. Y.) 319.

8 See Fairman v. Ives, 5 B. & Aid. 642.

» Vanderzee v. McGregor, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 545.

* State v. Burnham, 9 N. H. 34.

6 1 Tuck. Bl. Com., App. 300.

The Constitution. - By the second amendment to the
Constitution it is declared that, '' a well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed."
The amendment, like most other provisions in the Constitution, has a history. It was adopted with some modification and enlargement from the English Bill of Rights of
1688, where it stood as a protest against arbitrary action
of the overturned dynasty in disarming the people, and as
a pledge of the new rulers that this tyrannical action should
cense. The right declared was meant to be a strong moral
check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers,
- and as n necessary and efficient means of regaining rights
when temporarily overturned by usurpation. 6
Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R. (Penn.) 23 ; Howard o. Thompson,
Wend. (N. Y.) 319.
2 See Fairman v. Ives, 5 B. & Aid. 642.
8 Vanderzee v. McGregor, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 545.
4 State v. Burnham, 9 N. H. 34.
6 1 Tuck. Bl. Com., App. 300.
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The Right is General. — It might be supposed from the

phraseology of this provision that the right to keep and

bear arms was only guaranteed to the militia; but this

would be an interpretation not warranted by the intent.

The militia, as has been elsewhere explained, consists of

those persons who, under the law, are liable to the per-

formance of military duty, and are officered and enrolled

for service when called upon. But the law may make pro-

vision for the enrolment of all who are fit to perform mili-

tary duty, or of a small number only, or it may wholly

omit to make any provision at all; and if the right were

limited to those enrolled, the purpose of this guaranty

might be defeated altogether by the action or neglect to

act of the government it was meant to hold in check.

The meaning of the provision undoubtedly is, that the peo

pie, from whom the militia must be taken, shall have the

right to keep and bear arms; and they need no permission

or regulation of law for the purpose. But this enables the

government to have a well-regulated militia; for to bear

arms implies something more than the mere keeping;' it

implies the learning to handle and use them in a way that
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makes those who keep them ready for their efficient use;

in other words, it implies the right to meet for voluntary

discipline in arms, observing in doing so the laws of public

order.

Standing Army. — A further purpose of this amendment

is, to preclude any necessity or reasonable excuse for

keeping up a standing army. A standing army is con-

demned by the traditions and sentiments of the people, as

being as dangerous to the liberties of the people as the

general preparation of the people for the defence of their

institutions with arms is preservative of them.

What Arms may be kept. — The arms intended by the

Constitution are such as are suitable for the general de-

fence of the community against invasion or oppression,

The Right is General. - It might be supposed from the
phraseology of this provision that the right to keep and
bear arms was only guaranteed to the militia ; but this
would be an interpretation not warranted by the intent.
The militia, as has been elsewhere explained, consists of
those persons who, under the law, are liable to the performance of military duty, and are officered and enrolled
for service when called upon. But the law may make provision for the enrolment of all who are fit to perform military duty, or of a small number only, or it may wholly
omit to make any provision at all ; and if the right were
limited to those enrolled, the purpose of this guaranty
might be defeated altogether by the action or neglect to
act of the government it was meant to hold in check.
The meaning of· the provision undoubtedly is, that the peo
ple, from who~ the militia must be taken, shall have the
right to keep and bear arms ; and they need no permission
or regulation of law for the purpose. But this enables the
government to have a well-regulated militia; for to bear
arms implies something more than the mere keeping ; · it
implies the learning to handle and use them in a way that
makes those who keep them ready for their efficient use ;
in other words, it implies the right to meet for voluntary
discipline in arms, observing in doing so the laws of public
order.
Standing Army. -A further purpose of this amendment
is, to preclude any necessity or reasonable excuse for
keeping up a- standing army. A standing army is condemned by the traditions and sentiments of the people, as
being as dangerous to the liberties of the people as the
general preparation of the people for the defcnce of their
institutions with arms is preservative of them.
What Arms may be kept. -The arms intended by the
Constitution are such as are suitable for the general defence of the community against invasion or oppression,

272

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

272

CONSTITUTIONAL LA"W.

and the secret carrying of those suited merely to deadly

individual encounters may be prohibited.1

Section V.—Freedom op Speech and op the Press.

and the secret carrying of those suited merely to deadly
individual encounters may be prohibited. 1

The Constitution. — The first amendment to the Consti-

tution further provides that Congress shall make no law

abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. What is

first noticeable in this provision is that it undertakes to

give no rights, but it recognizes the rights mentioned as

something known, understood, and existing, and it forbids

any law of Congress that shall abridge them. We are

thus referred for an understanding of the protection to the

pre-existing law; and this must either have been the com-

mon law, or the existing statutes of the States. The

statutes, however, will be found to be nearly silent on this

important subject, and the common law must be our guide.

Freedom of the Press. — De Lolme, who wrote upon the

Constitution of England just before the meeting of the

Constitutional Convention, and who undertook to gather

from the common law the meaning of this among other

principles of liberty, has expressed his conclusion thus:

"The liberty of the press as established in England con-
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sists in this, that neither the courts of justice, nor any

other judges whatever, are authorized to take notice of

writings intended for the press, but are confined to those

which are actually printed, and must in these cases pro-

ceed by the trial by jury."2 Mr. Justice Blackstone

adopted this view as undoubtedly correct,8 and in this

country it has been accepted as expressing the views of

those who framed and adopted this amendment.4 If it

1 Andrews v. State, 3 Heisk. 165, found also with notes in 1 Green's

Cr. Rep. 466, and 8 Am. Rep. 8.

a De Lolme, Const, of Eng., ch. 10. 8 4 Bl. Com. 151.

* Rawle on Const., ch. 10; 2 Kent, 17; Story on Const., § 1889;

Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 304, 313.

SECTION

V. -

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.

T/1e Constitution. - The first amendment to the Constitution further pro,ides that Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. What is
first noticeable in this provision is that it undertakes to
give no rights, but it recognizes the rights mentioned as
something known, understiood, and existing, and it forbids
any law of Congress that shall abridge them. We are
thus referred for an understanding of the protection to the
pre-existing law; and this must either have been the common law, or the existing statutes of the States. The
statutes, however, will be found to be nearly silent on this
important subject, and the common law must be our guide.
Freedom of the Press. - De Lolme, who wrote upon the
Constitution of England just before the meeting of the
Constitutional Convention, and who undertook to gather
from the common law the meaning of this among other
plinciples of liberty, has expressed his conclusion thus :
'"The liberty of the press as established in England consists in this, that neither the courts of justice, nor any
other judges whatever, are authorized to take notice or
writings intended for the press, but are confined to those
which are actually printed, and must in these cases proceed by the trial by jury." ~ Mr. Justice Blackstone
adopted this view as undoubtedly correct, 8 and in this
country it has been accepted as expressing the views of
those who framed and adopted this amendment.• If it
1 Andrews v. State, 3 Heisk. 165, found also with notes in 1 Green's
Cr. Rep. 466, and 8 Am. Rep. 8.
~ De Lolme, Const. of Eng., ch. 10.
a 4 Bl. Com. 151.
4 Rawle on Const., ch. 10; 2 Kent, 17; Story on Const.,§ 1889;
Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 304, 313.
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expresses their views fully, we must conclude that the

amendment is aimed only at such censorship of the press

as had sometimes been exercised in England, and to some

extent in the Colonies also, and that, while forbidding this,

and leaving every one to publish what he might please, it

left him, at the same time, to such responsibility for his

publications as the law might provide.

It seems more than probable, however, that the con-

stitutional freedom of the press was intended to mean

something more than mere exemption from censorship in

advance of publication. Such censorship had never been

general in the Colonies: it did not exist at all at the time

of the Revolution, and there was no apparent danger of its

ever being restored. To forbid it, therefore, and especially

just at a time when the people had been taking a larger

share in the government into their own hands, and when

the command would be laid on their own representatives,

would appear to savor somewhat of idle ceremonj\ But

the history of the times shows that the people believed a

right of publication existed which might be invaded and

abridged by oppressive prosecutions, and by laws which
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admitted the liberty to publish, but enlarged beyond reason

the sphere of responsibility; and the evils they feared had

no necessary connection with any established or threat-

ened censorship. Nor could any valuable purpose be ac-

complished by introducing in the Constitution a provision

which should forbid merely a previous supervision of in-

tended publications, if the law might be so made, or so ad-

ministered, as to inflict punishment for publications which

might be not only innocent, but commendable. The citi-

zen might better have the arm of the government inter-

posed for prevention, than reached out afterwards to inflict

penalties; his just freedom would be restrained in the one

case as well as in the other.

Light may be thrown upon the intent by a consideration

18

expresses their views fully, we must con~lude that the
amendment is aimed only at such censorship of the press
as had sometimes been exercised in England, and to some
extent in the Colonies also, and that, while forbidding this,
and leaving every one to publish what he might please, it
left him, at the same time, to such responsibility for his
publications as the law m~ght provide.
It seems more than probable, however, that the constitutional freedom of the press was intended to mean
something more than mere exemption from censorship in
advance of publication. Such censorship had never been
general in the Colonies : it did not exist at all at the time
of the Revolution, and there was no apparent danger of its_
ever being restored. To forbid it, therefore, and especially
just at a time when the people had been taking a larger
share in the government into their own hands, ancl when
the command would be laid on their own representatives,
would appear to savor somewhat of idle ceremony. But
the history of the times shows that the people believed a
right of publication existed which might be invaded and
abridged by oppressive prosecutions, and by laws which
admitted the liberty to publish, but enlarged beyond reason
the sphere of responsibility ; and the evils they feared had
no necessary connection with any established or threa~
ened censorship. Nor could any valuable purpose be accomplished by introducing in the Constitution a provision
which should forbid merely a previous supervision of intended publications, if the law might be so made, or so administered, as to inflict punishment for publications which
might be not only innocent, but commendable. The citizen might better have the arm of the government interposed for prevention, than reached out afterwards to inflict
penalties ; his just freedom would be restrained in the one
case as well as in the other.
Light .may be thrown upon the intent by a consideration
18

274

274

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

of the purposes which the enjoyment of the right sub-

serves. The press is a public convenience, which gathers

up the intelligence of the day to lay before its readers,

notifies coming events, gives warning against disasters,

and in various ways contributes to the happiness, comfort,

safety, and protection of the people. But in a constitu-

tional point of view its chief importance is, that it enables

the citizen to bring any person in authority, any public

corporation or agency, or even the government in all its

departments, to the bar of public opinion, and to compel

him or them to submit to an examination and criticism of

conduct, measures, and purposes in the face of the world,

with a view to the correction or prevention of evils; and

also to subject those who seek public positions to a like

scrutiny for a like purpose. These advantages had been

fully realized and enjoyed by the people during the revo-

lutionary epoch: the press had been the chief means of

disseminating free principles among the people, and in

preparing the country to resist oppression; and its powers

for good in this direction had appeared so great as to cast

its other benefits into the shade. It is a just conclusion,
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therefore, that this freedom of public discussion was meant

to be fully preserved; and that the prohibition of laws im-

pairing it was aimed, not merely at a censorship of the

press, but more particularly at any restrictive laws or ad-

ministration of law, whereby such free and general dis-

cussion of public interests and affairs as had become

customary in America should be so abridged as to deprive

it of its advantages as an aid to the people in exercising

intelligently their privileges as citizens, and in protecting

their liberties.

The freedom of the press may therefore be defined to be

the liberty to utter and publish whatever the citizen may

choose, and to be protected against legal censure and pun-

ishment in so doing, provided the publication is not so far

of the purposes which the enjoyment of the right subserves. The press is a public convenience, which gathers
up the intelligence of the day to lay before its readers,
notifies coming events, gives warning against disasters,
and in various ways contributes to the happiness, comfort,
safety, and protection of the people. But in a constitutional point of dew its chief importance is, that it enables
the citizen to bring any person in authority, any public
corporation or agency, or even the government in all its
departments, to the bar of public opinion, and to compel
him or them to submit to an examination and criticism of
conduct, measures, and purposes in the face of the world,
with a view to the correction or prevention of evils ; and
also to subject those who seek public positions to a like
scrutiny for a like purpose. These advantages had been
fully realized and enjoyed by the people during the revolutionary epoch ; the press had been the chief means of
disseminating free principles among the _people, and in
preparing the country to resist oppression ; and its powers
for good_ in this direction had appeared so great as to cast
its other benefits into the shade. It is a just conclusion,
the refore, that this freedom of public discussion was meant
to be fully preserved ; and that the prohibition of laws impairing it was aimed, not merely at a censorship of the
press, but more particularly at any restrictive laws or administration of law, whereby such free and general discussion of public interests and affairs as had become
customary in America should be so abridged as to deprive
it of its advantages as an aid to the people in exercising
intelligently their privileges as citizens, and in protecting
their liberties.
· The freedom of the press may therefore be defined to be
the liberty to utter and publish whatever the citizen may
choose, and to be protected against legal censure and punishment in so doing, provided the publication is not so far
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injurious to public morals or to private reputation as to be

condemned by the common-law standards, by which de-

famatory publications were judged when this freedom was

thus made a constitutional right. And freedom of speech

corresponds to this in the protection it gives to oral

publications.1

Blasphemous and indecent publications, and the exhibi-

tion of indecent pictures and images, were always punish-

able at the common law, and their punishment may be pro-

vided for by Congress in any territory under its exclusive

control. Libellous written, printed, or pictorial attacks

upon individuals, maliciously made, were also criminal;

and if, in respect to these offences, the common law should

be found defective, statutory law may supply the defects,

— not, however, enlarging the general scope of liability.

Besides the criminal, there was always a civil responsibility,

in the case of any false and malicious publication calculated

to disgrace or injure an individual, and damages might be

recovered by the party wronged, whether the publication

was made by writing or print, or was merely oral. These

rules are consistent with a just freedom, and they remain
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undisturbed.

The cases which are important in a constitutional point

of view are those which are said to be privileged; by

which is meant, that the party is protected against respon-

sibility, either civil or criminal, notwithstanding his publi-

cation may prove both unfounded and injurious. There

are two classes of privilege; the one absolute, or where

the protection is complete and perfect, and the other con-

ditional and dependent on motive. Some of these cases

rest on grounds of private confidence merely, and are not

important here; but others rest on public and general

reasons.

Cases of Absolute Privilege. — One of these is provided

1 Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 527.

injurious to public morals or to private reputation as to be
condemned by the common-law standards, by which defamatory publications were judged when this freedom was
thus made a constitutional right. And freedom of speech
corresponds to this in the protection it gives to oral
publications. 1
Blasphemous and indecent publications, and the exhibition of indecent. pictures and images, were always punishable at the common law, and their punishment may be provided for by Congress in any territory under its exclusive
control. Libellous written, printed, or pictorial attacks
upon individuals, maliciously made, were also criminal ;
and if, in respect to these offences, the common law should
be found defective, statutory law may supply the defects,
- not, however, enlarging the general scope of liability.
Besides the criminal, there was always a civil responsibility,
in the case of any false and malicious publication calculated
to disgrace or injure an individual, and damages might be
recovered by the party wronged, whether the publication
was made by writing or print, or was merely oral. These
rules are consistent with a just freedom, and they remain
undisturbed.
The cases which are important in a constitutional point
of view are those ' which are said to be privileged ; by
which is meant, that the party is protected against responsibility, either civil or criminal, notwithstanding his publication may prove both unfounded and injurious. There
are two classes of privilege ; the one absolute, or where
the protection is complete and perfect, and the other condition~! and dependent on motive. Some of these cases
rest on grounds of private confidence merely, and are not
important here ; but others rest on public and general
reasons.
Oase1 of .AlJaolute Privilege. - One of these is provided
1

Cooley, Const. Lim.,. 4th ed., 627.
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for specially in the clause of the Constitution which de-

clares that members of Congress, for any speech or debate

in either house, shall not be questioned in any other place.1

Another relates to what is said by a witness in the course

of judicial proceedings, and which is not allowed to be

made the ground of a civil action, however false and ma-

licious it may be, though the State may punish the per-

jury.2 A like protection is thrown around what a juror

may say to his fellows in the jury-room, concerning the

parties to the case submitted to them, or concerning those

who may have given evidence therein.8 Complaints for

the purpose of bringing a supposed offender to trial, and

the preliminary information on which the officers may act

in originating proceedings have a similar privilege,4 and

so do pleadings and other papers in the progress of liti-

gation, where in their statements they do not depart from

the matter in controversy.6 The Executive of the United

States and the governors of the several States are exempt

from responsibility for their official utterances, and so are

all judges of courts, and all officers performing functions

in their nature judicial, while acting within the limits of
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their jurisdiction.6 The party to a cause, summing it up

to jury or court, must have the utmost liberty of dealing

with the actions, conduct, and motives of the opposing

party and the witnesses, and the law protects this liberty

and extends it to his counsel also; and the latter, so long

as he keeps to the case in hand and does not wander from

it for the purpose of detraction and abuse, may freely

1 Const., Art. I. § 6.

2 Marsh v. Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309; Terry v. Fellows, 21 La. An.

875.

* Dunham t Powers, 42 Vt. 1.

* Dawkins v. Lord Pawlet, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94.

5 Garr v. Selden, 4 N. Y. 91; Strauss v. Meyer, 48 111. 385.

» Townshend, Slander and Libel, § 227; Cooley on Torts, 214.

for specially in the clause of the Constitution which declares that members of Congress, for any speech or debate
in either house, shall not be questioned in any other place. 1
Another relates to what is said by a witness in the course
of judicial proceedings, and which is not allowed to be
made the ground of a civil action, however false and malicious it may be, though the State may punish the perjury. 2 A like protection is thrown around what a juror
may say to his fellows in the jury-room, concerning the
parties to the case submitted to them, or concerning those
who may have given evidence therein. 1 Complaints for
the purpose of bringing a supposed offender to trial, and
the preliminary information on which the officers may act
in originating proceedings have a similar privilege, 4 and
so do pleadings and other papers in the progress of litigation, where in their statements they do not depart from
the matter in controversy. 6 The Executive of the United
States and the governors of the several States are exempt
from responsibility for their official utterances, and so are
all judges of courts, and all officers performing functions
in their nature judicial, while acting within the limits of
their jurisdiction. 8 The party to a cause, summing it up
to jury or court, must have the utmost liberty of dealing
with the actions, conduct, and motives of the opposing
party and the witnesses, and the law protects this liberty
and extends it to his counsel also ; and the latter, so long
as he keeps to the case in hand and does not wander frqm
it for the purpose of detraction and abuse, may freely
1

1

Const., Art. I. § 6.
Marsh v. Ellsworth, 60 N. Y. 809 ; Terry "· Fellows, 21 La. A1h

875.
Dunham i Powers, 42 Vt. 1.
' Dawkins v. Lord Pawlet, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94.
1 Garr v. Selden, 4 N. Y. 91 ; Strauss "· Meyer, 48 Ill. 885.
• Townshend, Slander and Libel,§ 227; Cooley on Torts, 214.
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urge in the interest of his client what he believes the case

demands.1

Libels on Government. — At the common law it was a

criminal offence to publish anything against the constitu-

tion of the country or the established order of govern-

ment. This was upon the ground that the tendency of

uch publications was to excite disaffection with the gov-

. rnment, and thus to induce a revolutionary spirit. But

a calm and temperate discussion of public events and

measures was always in theory allowed, and every man

had a right to give to every matter of public importance

a candid, full, and free discussion. It was therefore only

when a publication went beyond this, and tended to excite

tumult, that it became criminal. But as the government

itself will institute and conduct the prosecutions, and

as the offence will consist in a criticism of the constitu-

tion and system of government as the authorities admin-

ister them, it is never likely that anything very effectual

in criticism will be found by the prosecution to be either

calm or temperate. The government prosecutions for

libel in England, have been so manifestly and notoriously
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unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive, that one advocate

won a great name and a great place in the regard of the

people in resisting them; and at length public sentiment

compelled their abandonment. A publication in criticism

or condemnation of the government or Constitution of

'the United States is not punishable at the common law,

for the reason that the United States as such has no com-

mon law, and can therefore punish as crimes only those

acts which are made punishable by express statute.2 Nor

is it by any means clear that such publications could be

made crimes by legislation. The right of the people to

change their institutions at will is expressly recognized by

1 Hoar v. Wood, 3 Met. (Mass.) 193.

2 United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32.

urge in the interest of his client what he believes the case
demands. 1
Libels on Government. - At the common law it was a
criminal offence to publish anything against the constitution of the country or the established order of government. This was upon the ground that the tendency ~f
'.uch publications was to excite disaffection with the gov~ rnment, and thus to induce a revolutionary spirit.
But
a calm and temperate discussion of public events and
·measures was always in theory allowed, and every man
had a right to give to every matter of public importance
a candid, full, and free discussion. It was therefore only
when a publication went beyond this, and tended to excite
tumult, that it became criminal. But as the government
itself will institute and conduct the prosecutions, and
as the offence will consist in a criticism of the constitu.;.
tion and system of government as the authorities admin~
ister them, it is never likely that anything very effectual
in criticism will be found by th~ prosecution to be either
calm or temperate. The government prosecutions for
libel in England, have been so manifestly and notoriously
unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive, that one advocate
won a great name and a great place in the regard of the
people in resisting them; and at length public sentiment
compelled their abandonment. A publication in criticism
or condemnation of the government or Constitution of
/ the United States is not punishable at the common law~
for the reason that the United States as such has no common law, and can therefore punish as crimes only those
ads which are made punishable by express statute. 2 Nor
is it by any means clear that such publications could be
made crimes by legislation. The right of the people to
change their institutions at will is expressly recognized by
1
2

Hoar v. Wood, 3 Met. (Mass.) 193.
United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32.
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federal and state constitutions, and this implies a right to

criticise, discuss, and condemn, and a right if possible to

bring the people to the point of consenting to any change

short of the abolition of republican institutions. It is

believed that the sedition law of 1798 went to the very-

verge of constitutional authority, if not beyond it;1 and

the entire failure to re-enact any similar legislation since

is satisfactory evidence that it is regarded as unnecessary,

if not unsound in principle. But conspiracies to over-

turn the government by force are alwaj-s punishable, and

seditious publications are usually a part of the res gestce

of such offences.

Reports of Trials, S?c. — Full and fair reports of what

takes place publicly in legislative bodies and their com-

mittees, and in the courts high and low, are also absolutely

privileged. The citizen has a right to be present at such

proceedings, but the reasons which throw them open to

spectators justify publication for the benefit of those who

cannot or do not attend. It is only by publicity of pro-

ceedings that those to whom the liberty and civil and

political rights of their fellows are submitted, can be kept
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under a due sense of responsibility, and within the limits

of the rules that should govern their conduct.2 But the

report must be confined to the proceedings themselves,

and must not indulge in defamatory observations, head-

ings, or comments.8 The privilege, however, has never

been extended to ex parte proceedings or examinations,

the reason being that they tend to mislead the public

1 The prosecutions under this law, reported in Wharton's State

Trials, pp. 333, 659, 684, and 688, are very instructive. They did

more to excite disaffection to the government than all the miscon-

duct complained of. ,

2 Hoare v. Silverlock, 9 C. B. 20; Gazette Co. v. Timberlake, 10

Ohio, N. S. 548.

» Pittock v. O'Niel, 63 Penn. St. 253; Storey v. Wallace, 60 111. 51.

federal and state constitutions, and this implies a right to
criticise, discuss, and condemn, and a right if possible to
bring the people to the point of consenting to any change
short of the abolition of republican institutions. It is
believed that the sedition law of 1798 went to the very
verge of constitutional authority, if not beyond it ; 1 and
the entire failure to re-enact any similar legislation since
is satisfactory evidence that it is regarded as unnecessary,
if not unsound in principle. But conspiracies to overturn the government by force are always punishable, and
seditious publications are usually a part of the res gestm
of such offences.
Reports of Trials, ~c. - Full and fair reports of what
takes place publicly in legislative bodies and their committees, and in the courts high and low, are also absolutely
privileged. The citizen has a right to be present at such
proceedings, but the reasons which throw them open to
spectators justify publication for the benefit of those who
cannot or do not attend. It is only by publicity of proceedings that those to whom the liberty and civil and
political rights of their fellows are submitted, can be kept
under a due sense of responsibility, and within the limits
of the rules that should govern their conduct.~ But the
report must be confined to the proceedings themselves,
and must not indulge in defamatory observations, headings, or comments. 8 The privilege, however, has never
been extended to ex p•rte proceedings or examinations,
the reason being that they tend to mislead the public
1 The prosecutions under this law, reported in Wharton's State
Trials, pp. 333, 659, 684, and 688, are very instructive. They did
more to excite disaffection to the government than all the misconduct complained of.
2 Hoare v. Sil verlock, 9 C. B. 20 ; Gazette Co. v. Timberlake, 10
Ohio, N. S. 548.
a Pittock v. O'Niel, 63 Penn. St. 263; Storey v. Wallace, 60 ID. 51.
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rather than to enlighten it.1 One may publish these, but

at the peril of being held responsible if any untrue state-

ment made in the publication proves injurious to the

standing, reputation, or business of individuals.

Cases conditionally Privileged. — In eases of absolute

privilege the motive of the party making the publication is

not suffered to be gone into, because the public benefit to

be accomplished in the exercise of the privilege cannot be

fully had without the most full and absolute exemption

from civil responsibility. But there are some cases which

are privileged in which it is perfectly reasonable to require

that the privileged party shall publish only what he believes,

and that the occasion of the publication shall be such as to

justify it if true. The following are such cases.

Criticism of Officers and Candidates. — When one offers

himself as a candidate for a public position, he voluntarily

puts in issue his fitness for the place, and those who ques-

tion it have a right to be heard before the people, and to

give their reasons freely. When one holds a public office

the issue offered is still broader, for the manner in which

official duties have been performed comes in with his per-
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sonal qualities, character, and habits, and maybe discussed

as something in which the public are concerned. Any citi-

zen may speak freely, not only what he knows, which bears

upon the subject, but also what he believes and what he

suspects, provided he has only the public interest in view

and does not act maliciously. It must be said, however,

that, while the authorities have conceded this rule, they

have in some cases applied it with so little liberality as

nearly to destroy its value.2

Discussion of Public Affairs. — A like liberty of comment

and discussion is allowed upon subjects in which the gen-

1 Usher v. Severance, 20 Me. 9.

a King v. Eoot, 4 Wend. (N. T.) 113; Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns.

(N. Y.) 1 ; Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 539-561.

rather than to enlighten it. 1 One may publish these, but
at the peril of being held responsible if any untrue statement made in the publication proves injurious to the
standing, reputation, or business of individuals.
Cases conditionally Priv{leged. - In cases of absolute
privilege the motive of the party making the puhlication is
not suffered to be gone into, because the public benefit to
be accomplished in the exercise of the privilege cannot be
fully had without the most full and absolute exemption
from civil responsibility. But there are some cases which
are privileged in which it is perfectly reasonable to require
that the privileged party shall publish only what he believes,
and that the occasion of the publication shall be such as to
justify it if true. The following are such cases.
Criticism of Officers and Candidates. - When one offers
himself as a candidate for a public position, he voluntarily
puts in issue his fitness for the place, and those who question it have a right to be heard before the people, and to
give their reasons freely. When one holds a public office
the issue offered is still broader, for the manner in which
official duties have been performed comes in with his personal qualities, character, and habits, and may be discussed
as something in which the public are concerned. Any citizen may speak freely, not only what he knows, which bears
upon the subject, but also what he believes and what he
suspects, provided he has only the public interest in view
and does not act maliciously. It must be said, however,
that, while the authorities have conceded this rule, they
have in some cases applied it with so little liberality as
nearly to destroy its value. 2
Discussion of Public Affairs. -A like liberty of comment
and discussion is allowed upon subjects in which the genUsher v. Severance, 20 Me. 9.
King v. Root, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 113; Lewis v. Few, 6 Johna.
(N. Y.) 1; Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 639-661.
1
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eral public may reasonably be supposed to have an interest,

and the discussion will be privileged if conducted within

the bounds of moderation and reason, though individuals

may incidentally suffer therefrom.1 The English authori-

ties limit this privilege to cases of general, and not merely

local interest,2 though the reason for any distinction be-

tween them is not very apparent. But in matters of pri-

vate interest, such as the affairs of a private corporation,

there is no such liberty of comment, except by and among

the parties concerned.8

Criticisms of Booh, fyc. —The publication of books, mag-

azines, pamphlets, &c. is an assumption that they are fit

to be read by the public, useful, and therefore proper for

publication; and whoever disputes this may freely publish

his reasons, doing so in good faith, and taking care not to

make his criticisms of the publication an excuse for assail-

ing the author.4

The Truth as a Protection. —When the party complain-

ing of an injurious publication brings suit for the recovery

of damages, the truth of the publication is a complete de-

fence, whether the case was or was not one of privilege.
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If. nothing but the truth is published of an individual it is

no ground for the recovery of damages by him that the

truth is so derogatory to his reputation that it injures him.

But written or printed slander may be the ground for a

criminal prosecution also, and in criminal prosecutions a

different principle applies. The injury then complained of

is an injury to the public; and when private reputation

and conduct are needlessly dragged before the public to the

1 Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73; Kinyon v. Palmer, 18 Iowa,

377.

2 Powell v. Lawler, L. R. 1 C. P. Div. 481; Gassett v. Gilbert,

6 Gray, (Mass.) 94.

3 Wilson v. Fitch, 41 Cal. 363.

4 Reade v. Sweetzer, 6 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 9, note.

eral public may reasonably be supposed to have an interest,
and the discussion will be privileged if conducted within
the bounds of moderation and reason, though individuals
may incidentally suffer therefrom. 1 The English authorities limit this privilege to cases of general, and not merely
local interest, 2 though the reason for any distinction between them is not very apparent. But in matters of private interest, such as the affairs of a private corporation,
there is no such liberty of comment, except by and among
the p&.rties concerned. 8
Criticisms of Books, ~c. -The publication of books, magazines, pamphlets, &c. is an assumption that they are fit
to be read by the public, useful, and therefore proper for
publication ; and whoever disputes this may freely publish
his reasons, doing so in good faith, and taking care not to
make his criticisms of the publication an excuse for assailing the author.•
11he Truth as a Protection. -When the party complaining of an injurious publication brings suit for the recovery
of damages, the truth of the publication is a complete defence, whether the case was or was not one of ptivilege.
If. nothing but the truth is p~blished of an individual it is
no ground for the recovery of damages by him that the
truth is so derogatory to his reputation that it injures him.
But written or printed slander may be the ground for a
criminal prosecution also, and in criminal prosecutions a
different principle applies. The injury then complained of
is an injury to the public ; and when private reputation
and conduct are needlessly dragged before the public to the
l

Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 78 ; Kinyon v. Palmer, 18 Iowa,

377.
2 Powell v. Lawler, L. R. 1 C. P. Div. 481; Gassett v. Gilbert,
6 Gray, (Mass.) 94.
3 Wilson v. Fitch, 41 Cal. 863.
' Reade v. Sweetzer, 6 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 9, note .
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disturbance of the peace of society, the public injury may

be as great when only the truth is spoken, as when the pub-

lication is wholty untrue. The truth, therefore, is not in

all cases a defence to a prosecution for criminal libel, but

the publisher, in addition to the truth, must show that he

made the publication with good motives and for justifiable

ends. This is recognized in the constitutional provisions

of the several States, which declare in substance that the

truth shall be a complete defence in all prosecutions for

libel, provided it was published with good motives and on

justifiable occasion. If the publication was one proper to

be placed before the public, either for the accomplishment

of some commendable public purpose, or for warning and

protection to the public or to individuals, or even for the

amendment of the person arraigned, the proper motives

maj- be inferred;1 but where none of these things is ap-

parent the burden of proof is on the publisher to establish

good motives and show a just occasion. But blasphemous

and indecent publications could not be justified at all,

since the necessary tendency must be evil. And the fact

that the publication was merely the repetition of a charge
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made by another is by itself no defence whatever.2

The Jury Judges of the Law. —A provision in state con-

stitutions that the jury shall be judges of the law in crimi-

nal prosecutions for libel is common, and sometimes the

provision is broader, and embraces all suits for libel and

slander. These provisions had their occasion in early rul-

ings of the courts, that the jury in suits for defamation of

character must confine their attention to the fact of publi-

cation, and must receive the opinion of the court on the

libellous or innocent character of the publication as conclu-

sive. This doctrine was overruled by statute in England,

and the jury are now permitted to judge of the whole case,

1 State v. Burnham, 9 N. H. 34.

2 Regina v. Newman, 1 El. & Bl. 268.

disturbance of the peace of society, the public injury may
be as great when only the truth is spoken,- as when the publication is wholly untrue. The truth, therefore, is not in
all cases a defence to a prosecution for criminal libel, but
the publisher, in addition to the truth, must show that· he
made the puhlication with good motives and for justifiable
ends. Tliis is recognized in the constitutional provisions
of the several States, which declare in substance that the
truth shall be a complete defence in all prosecutions for
Jibel, provided it was published with good motives and on
justifiable occasion. If the publication was one proper to
be placed before the public, either for the accomplishment
of some commendable public purpose, or for warning and
protection to the public or to individuals, or even for the
amendment of the person arraigned, the proper motives
may be inferred ; 1 but where none of these things is apparent the burden of proof is on the publisher to establish
good motives and show a just occasion. But blasphemous
and indecent publications could not be justified at all,
since the necessary tendency must be evil. And the fact
that the publication was merely the repetition of a charge
made by another is by itself no defence whatever.~
·
The Jury Judges of the Law. - A provision in state constitutions that the jury shall be judges of the law in criminal prosecutions for libel is common, and sometimes the
provision is broader, and embraces all suits for libel and
slander. These provisions had their occasion in early rulings of the courts, that the jury in suits for defamation of
character must confine their attention to the fact of publication, and must receive the opinion of the court on the
libellous or innocent character of the publication as conclusive. This doctrine was overruled by statute in England,
and the jury are now permitted to judge of the whole case,
1
2

State v. Burnham, 9 N. H. 34.
Regina v. Newman, 1 El. & Bl. 268.
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and to decide, not merely upon the responsibility of the

publication, but upon the animus with which it was made,

and whether within the rules of law the publication is

libellous. The instructions of the judge upon the law be-

come under this rule advisory merely, and the jury may

disregard them if their judgment is not convinced.

Publication of News. — No privilege has ever been ac-

corded to the publishers of mere items of news except to

this extent: that when the publication is made in good faith,

in the ordinary course of business, and without intent to

defame, the party injured will be restricted in his recovery

to the actual damages.1 Generally in suits for defamation

of character the jury have a large discretion in awarding

what are called exemplary damages.

Meaning of "the Press." — The freedom of the press is

not limited to any particular form or method of publica-

tion, but it extends to all modes of putting Ihcts, views,

and opinions before the public. Books, pamphlets, cir-

culars, &c. are therefore as much within it as the peri-

odical issues.

1 Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447; Perrett v. N. 0.
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Times, 25 La. An. 170.

and to decide, not merely upon the responsibility of thts
publication, but upon the animus with which it was made,
and whether within the rules of law the publication is
libellous. The instructions of the judge upon the law become under this rule advisory merely, and the jury may
disregard them if their judgment is not convinced.
Publication of News. -No privilege has ever been accorded to the publishers of mere items of news except to
this extent: that when the publication is made in good faith,
in the ordinary course of business, and without intent to
defame, the party injured will be restricted in his recovery
to the actual damages. 1 Generally in suits for defamation
of character the jury have a large discretion in awarding
what are called exemplary damages.
Meaning of "the Preas." -The freedom of the press is
not limited to any particular form or method of publication, but it extends to all modes of putting fucts, views,
and opinions before the public. Books, pamphlets, circulars, &c. a.re therefore as much within it as the periodical issues.
1 Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447; Perrett v. N. O.
Times, 25 La. An. 170.
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CHAPTER XV.

PROTECTIONS TO PERSONS ACCUSED OF CRIME.

Section I.—Legislative Adjudications.

General Considerations. — It is shown in a previous

chapter that the people, by creating separate legislative

and judicial departments of the government, by implica-

tion forbid the former from exercising any powers that

properly belong to the latter. Under this principle it

CHAPTER XV.

might well be held that the power in the legislature to deal

with crimes and their punishments, otherwise than by the

establishment of general laws by which conduct should be

judged in the future, was by implication forbidden. Even

PROTECTIONS TO PERSONS ACCUSED OF CRIME.

without the aid of that principle, it might well be said

that to judge the conduct of men otherwise than by estab-

lished laws existing when the acts complained of took

SECTION

I. -

LEGISLATIVE ADJUDICATIONS.

place, or otherwise than by a judicial tribunal, must be

understood as forbidden by necessary implication in the

very organization of a free state. By general consent a

legislative body, by its organization, its numbers, its

direct responsibility to the popular majority, and the fact

that it is chosen for other duties, is not a fit tribunal for

the trial of alleged offences, and the temptation to use the
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power of punishment as a political weapon is one to which

a wise people would never deliberately subject their legis-

lature. But in forming the Constitution it was judged

best to leave nothing of this sort to mere implication, and

accordingly we have the most positive prohibitions.

Bills of Attainder. — Both the United States 1 and the

1 Const., Art. L § 9, cL 3.

Genera/, Considerations. - It is shown in a previous
chapter that the people, by creating separate legislative
and judicial departments of the government, by implication forbid the former from exercising any powers that
properly belong to the latter. Under this principle it
might well be held that the power in the legislature to deal
with crimes and their punishments, otherwise than by the
establishment of general laws by which conduct should be
judged in the future, was by implication forbidden. Even
without the aid of that principle, it might well be said
that to judge the conduct of men otherwise than by established laws existing when the acts complained of took
place, or otherwise than by a judicial tribunal, must be
understood as forbidden by necessary implication in the
very organization of a free state. By general consent a
legislative body, by its organization, its numbers, its
direct responsibility to the popular majority, and the fact
that it is chosen for other duties, is not a fit tribunal for
the trial of. alleged offences, and the temptation to use the
power of punishment as a political weapon is one to which
a wise people would never deliberately subject their legislature. But in forming the Constitution it was judged
best to leave nothing of this sort to mere implication, and
accordingly we have the most positive prohibitions.
Bills of .Attainder. - Both the United States 1 and the
1

Const., Art. L § 9, cL 3.
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several States1 are forbidden to pass bills of attainder.

As known in English history, bills of attainder were en-

actments of Parliament, charging persons named with

criminal misconduct of some sort, convicting them thereof,

and adjudging the punishment of death, with forfeiture of

property. Sometimes the proceeding was resorted to be-

cause the obnoxious persons were out of the realm, and

therefore out of the reach of process, sometimes because

the evidences of guilt might not be sufficient for judicial

conviction, and sometimes because the obnoxious conduct

had never been made criminal by law, and consequently

the person whom the authorities desired to make way with

was not subject to punishment in any judicial proceeding.

It was quite possible in these cases for the bill to go

through all its stages without the accused party being al-

lowed any opportunity whatever for a hearing; and he

might be denied a hearing at the will of the legislature in

all cases. In the highest degree, therefore, such proceed-

ings were likely to be unjust and tyrannical; and if a pur-

pose existed to deal fairly in any particular case, the very

organization of the tribunal rendered it practically impos-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

sible. But in most cases there was no such purpose, and

the legislature, in passing a bill of attainder, was the tool

of a tyrant.2 And what might take place at the will of a

king, under a monarchy, might also happen, at the demand

of an excited and passionate majority, at some periods in

the history of a republic.

Besides bills of attainder there were also bills called

bills of pains and penalties, which differed from the former

only in this, that the punishments imposed were less than

death. Many instances of these had occurred in Ameri-

can history, particularly in the case of Americans who

had remained loyal to the British Crown after the revolt

1 Const., Art. I. § 10, el. 1.

2 This was particularly true of the reign of Henry VIIL

•

several States 1 are forbidden to pass bills of attainder.
As known in English history, bills of attainder were enactments of Parliament, charging persons named with
criminal misconduct of some sort, convicting them thereof,
and adjudging the punishment of death, with forfeiture of
property. Sometimes the proceeding was resorted to because the obnoxious persons were out of the realm, and
therefore out of the reach of process, sometimes because
the evidences of guilt might not be sufficient for judicial
conviction, and sometimes because the obnoxious conduct
had never been made criminal by law, and consequently
the person whom the authorities desired to make way with .
was not subject to punishment in any judicial proceeding.
It was quite possible in these cases for the bill to go
through all its stages without the ac~used party being allowed any opportunity whatever for a hearing ; and he
might be denied a hearing at the will of the legislature in
all cases. In the highest degree, therefore, such proceedings were likely to be unjust and tyrannical ; and if a purP.Ose existed to deal fairly in any particular case, the very
organization of the ttibunal rendered it practically impossible. But in most cases there was no such purpose, and
the legislature, in passing a bill of attainder, was the tool
of a tyrant.~ And what might take place at the will of a
king, under a monarchy, might also happen, at the demand
of an excited and passionate majority, at some periods in
the history of a republic.
Besides bills of attainder there were also bills called
bills/ of pains and penalties, which differed from the former
only in this, that the punishments imposed were iess than
death. Many instances of these had occurred in American history, particularly in the case of Americans who
had remained loyal to the British Crown after the revolt
1
2

Const., Art. I. § 10, cl. 1.
This was particularly true of the reign of Henry VIIL
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of the Colonies.1 It is conceded on all sides, that the

purpose of the constitutional inhibition is to take away

the power to pass either the one or the other; in short,

wholly to deprive the government of any power to inflict

legislative punishment for criminal, or supposed criminal

conduct.2 And a case in which the punishment is imposed

indirectly, as by depriving one of the right to follow his

occupation,8 or to institute suits,4 unless he will take an

oath that he has not been guilty of certain specified con-

duct, is as much a bill of attainder as is an act directly

imposing a punishment.

Ex Post Facto Laws. -—The United States 6 and the

States,6 alike, are also forbidden to pass ex post facto laws.

In its natural and ordinary sense this term embraces all re-

trospective laws ; but in the Constitution the sense is more

restricted, and is limited exclusively to laws of a criminal

nature. Of retrospective laws in general, therefore, there

is no occasion to speak in this connection; but they will

receive some attention when the constitutional rules for

the protection of property are given. One of the early

justices of the Supreme Court has classified ex post facto
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laws as follows : — " 1. Every law that makes an action

done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent

when done, criminal, and punishes such action. 2. Every

law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it

was when committed. 3. Every law that changes the pun-

ishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law

1 Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14. One of the New York bills of at-

tainder not only confiscated the property of the loyalists named, but

actually condemned them to death in their absence, and without trial.

a Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333. Excepting, of course, such con-

duct as may be punished under parliamentary law as contempt.

8 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277.

♦ Pierce ». Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234.

5 Const., Art. I. § 9, el. 3.

• Const, Art. I. § 10, el. 1.

of the Colonies. 1 It is conceded on all sides, that the
purpose of the constitutional inhibition is to take away
the power to pass either the one or the other ; in short,
wholly to deprive the government of any power to inflict
legislative punishment for criminal, or supposed criminal
conduct. 2 And a case in which the punishment is imposed
indirectly, as by depriving one of the right to follow his
occupation, 8 or to institute suits,• unless he will take an
oath that he has not been guilty of certain specified conduct, is as much a bi!l of attainder as is an act directly
imposing a punishment.
Ex Post Facto Laws.-· The United States 6 and the
States, 8 alike, are also forbidden to pass ex post facto laws.
In its natural and ordinary sense this term embraces all retrospective laws ; but in the Constitution the sense is more
restricted, and is limited exclusively to laws of a criminal
nature. or retrospective laws in general, therefore, there
is no occasion to speak in this connection ; but they will
receive some attention when the constitutional rules for
the protection of property are given. One of the early
justices of the Supreme Court has classified ex post facto
laws as follows: - '' 1. Every law that makes an action
done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent
when done, criminal, and punishes such action. 2. Every
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was when committed. 3. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14. One of the New York bills of attainder not only confiscated the property of the loyalists named, but
actually condemned them to death in their absence, and without trial.
2 Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333. Excepting, of course, such conduct as may be punished under parliamentary law as contempt.
8 Cummings l'· Missouri, 4 Wall. 277.
' Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234.
I Const., Art. I. § 9, cl. 3.
e Const., Art. I. § 10, cl. 1.
1
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annexed to the crime when committed. 4. Every law

that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or

different testimony than the law required at the time of

the commission of the offence, in order to convict the 'of-

fender." 1 And to these classes may be added, — 5. Every

law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies

only, in effoct imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a

right for something which when done was lawful. And

6. Every law which deprives persons accused of crime of

some lawful protection to which they have become entitled;

such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal,

or of a proclamation of amnesty.2

But a law is not obnoxious to this provision which

changes the punishment by mitigating it;8 or which chan-

ges the practice in criminal cases, still preserving to the

defendant his substantial rights; * or which takes from him

the privilege of mere technical objections ; * or which limits

the number of peremptory challenges to jurors,6 or modi-

fies not unreasonably the grounds of challenge for cause;'

or permits a change of venue for the purposes of a fair

trial.8 Nor is it incompetent, in providing for the trial of
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such offences as may be committed in the future, to permit

the punishment to be increased on proof of a previous con-

viction; though the previous conviction took place before

the law; for it is the subsequent offence only that is

punished in such a case, and it was committed with con-

structive, if not actual, notice of what the punishment might

» Calder v. Bull, 2 Dall. 386,390.

2 State v. Keith, 63 N. C. 140.

» Clarke v. State, '23 Miss. 261; Ratzky v. People, 29 N. Y. 124.

4 State v. Manning, 14 Texas, 402; State v. Corson, 59 Me. 137.

5 Commonwealth v. Hall, 97 Mass. 570.

6 Dowling v. State, 13 Miss. 664.

7 Stokes ». People, 53 N. Y. 164.

8 Gut v. State, 9 Wall. 85.

annexed to the crime when committed. 4. Every law
that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives les.3 or
different testimony than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offence, in order to convict the ·offender." 1 And to these classes may be added,'- 5. Every
law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
only, in em,ct imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a
right for something which when done was lawful. And
6. Every law which deprives persons accused of crime of
some lawful protection to which they have become entitled ;
such as the protection or a former conviction or acquittal,
or of a proclamation of amnesty.i
But a law is not obnoxious to this proyision which
changes the punishment by mitigating it; 8 or which changes the practice in ciiminal cases, still preserving to the
defendant his substantial rights ; 4 or which takes from him
the privilege of mere technical objections; 6 or which limits
the number of peremptory challenges to jurors, 6 or modifies not unreasonably the grounds of challenge for cause ; 7
or permits a change of venue for the purposes of a fair
trial. 8 Nor is it incompetent, in providing for the trial of
such offences as may be committed in the future, to permit
the punishment to be increased on proof of a previous conviction ; though the previous conviction took place before
the law ; for it is the subsequent offence only that is
punished in such a case, and it was committed with constructive, if not actual, notice of what the punishment might
I
i
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Calder v. Bull, 2 Dall. 386, 390.
State v. Keith, 63 N. C. 140.
Clarke v. State, 23 Miss. 261 ; Ratzky v. People, 29 N. Y. 124.
State v. Manning, 14 Texas, 402; State v. Corson, 69 Me. 137.
Commonwealth v. Hall, 97 Mass. 570.
Dowling v. State, 13 Miss. 664.
Stokes "· People, 53 N. Y. 164.
Gut v. State, 9 Wall. 85.
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be.1 And a person may be extradited under a treaty,

though he had obtained asylum in the country before the

treaty was made.2

Section II. — Treason: its Definition and Pun-

ishment.

7 he Coiistitution.—It is declared in the Constitution,

be. 1 And a person may be extradited under a treaty,
though he had obtained asylum in the country before the
treaty w~ made. t

that " treason against the United States shall consist only

in levying war aga;nst them, or in adhering to their ene-

mies, giving them aid and comfort." 8 The provision is

SECTION

II. -

TREASON :

ITS DEFINITION AND

PuN-

ISHMENT.

taken from the Statute of Treasons, 25 Edw. III., before

the passage of which, as the ancient common law was ad-

ministered, it was in the breast of the judges to determine

what conduct was treason and what not, whereby the

creatures of tyrannical princes had opportunity to create

abundance of constructive treasons; that is, by forced and

arbitrary constructions to raise offences into the crime and

punishment of treason, which never had been suspected to

be such.4 The statute did not fully accomplish its purpose

in England, as was proved by the conviction and execution

of Algernon Sidney, whose real offence was the combating

in argument the arbitrary doctrines which were then pop-

ular at the court;6 but the wrongs of that arbitrary period

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

had been avenged upon the perpetrators, and similar per-

versions of law and justice were not again to be looked for

either in England or in America. If the attempt to revive

constructive treasons should be made, the Constitution by

this clause provided against it as far as was possible.

What is Treason ? — A mere conspiracy by force to sub-

vert the established government is not treason; but there

1 Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Grat. (Va.) 738.

2 In re De Giacomo, 12 Blatch. 391.

• Const., Art. III. § 3.

1 Instances are given by Blaekgtone, 4 Com. 75.

5 Trial of Sidney, 9 State Trials, 817.

'1. he Constitution. - It is declared in the Constitution,
that '' treason against the United States shall consist only
in levying war aga ~ nst them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort." 8 The provision is
taken from the Statute of Treasons, 25 Edw. III., before
the passage of which, as the ancient common law was administered, it was in the breast of the judges to determine·
what conduct was treason and what not, whereby the
creatures of tyrannical princes had opportunity to create
abundance of constructive treasons ; that is, by forced and
arbitrary constructions to raise offences into the crime and
punishment of treason, which never had been suspected to
be such.• The statute did not fully accomplish its purpose
in England, as was proved by the conviction and execution
of Algernon Sidney, whose real offence was the combating
in argument the arbitrary doctrines which were then popular at the court ; 6 but the wrongs of that arbitrary period
had been avenged upon the perpetrators, and similar perversions of law and justice were not again to be looked for
either in England or in America. If the attempt to revive
constructive treasons should be made, the Constitution by
this clause provided against it as far as was possible.
What is Treason ? - A mere conspiracy by force to subvert the established government is not treason; but there
Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Grat. (Va.) 738.
t In re De Giacomo, 12 Blatch. 391.
a Const., Art. III. § 8.
t Instances are given by Blackstone, 4 Com. 75.
I Trial of Sidney, 9 State Trials, 817.
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must be an actual levying of war.1 War, however, is

levied when men are assembled with the intent of effecting

by force a treasonable purpose; and all persons who then

perform any act, however minute, or however remote from

the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the

general conspiracy, are to be considered traitors.2 And

one is adherent to the enemies of the country, and giving

them aid and comfort, when he supplies them with intelli-

gence, furnishes them with provisions or arms, treacher-

ously surrenders to them a fortress, and the like.8 But

coming from an enemy's ship to the shore peaceably to

procure provisions for him is said not to be treason.4

Evidence. — A conviction of treason must be on the

testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act,

or on confession in open court.6 This, like the first, was

a provision of the Statute 25 Edw. III., and had been

equally perverted to the destruction of innocence.

Section III. — The Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The Constitution. — The right to the important writ by

means of which the liberty of the citizen is protected

against arbitrary arrests is not expressly declared in the
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Constitution, but it is recognized in the provision that

"The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be

suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion

the public safety may require it." 8 This writ was the off-

spring of the common law, but its benefits and securities

were enlarged and guarded by the Habeas Corpus Act of

must be an actual levying of war. 1 War, however, is
levied when men are assembled ~th the intent of effecting
by force a treasonable purpose ; and all persons who then
perform any act, however minute, or however remote from
the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the
general conspiracy, are to be considered traitors. 2 And
one is adherent to the enemies of the country, and giving
them aid and comfort, when he supplies them with intelligence, furnishes them with provisions or arms, treacherously surrenders to them a fortress, and the ~e. 8 But
coming from an enemy's ship to the shore peaceably to
procure provisions for him is said not to be treason.'
Evidence. - A conviction of treason must be on the
testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act,
or on confession in open court. 6 This, like the first, was
a provision of the Statute 25 Edw. III., and had been
equally perverted to the destruction of innocence.

Charles II., the general provisions of which are either

1 Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75.

SECTION

III.

-THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

2 Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75, 126. See Fries's Case, Whart.

State Trials, 634, and the voluminous report of Burr's Trial.

8 4 Bl. Com. 76.

* United States v. Pryor, 3 Wash. C. C. 234.

6 Const., Art. III. § 3. • Const., Art. I. § 9, cl. 2.

The Constitution. -The right to the important writ by
means of which the liberty of the citizen is protected
against arbitrary arrests is not expressly declared in the
Constitution, but it is recognized in the provision that
"The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion
the public safety may require it." 6, This writ was the offspring of the common law, but its benefits and securities
were enlarged and guarded by the Habeas Corpus Act of
Charles II., the general provisions of which are either
Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75.
Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75, 126. See Fries's Case, Whart.
State Trials, 634, and the voluminous report of Burr's Trial.
a 4 Bl. Com. 76.
' United States v. Pryor, S Wash. C. C. 284.
I Const., Art. m. § 8.
I Const., Art. L § 9, cl. 2.
1
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adopted by recognition, or by express legislation, in the

several States.

Suspension of the Writ. — The privilege of the writ con-

sists in this: that, when one complains that he is unlaw-

fully imprisoned or deprived of his liberty, he shall be

brought without delay before the proper court or magis-

trate for an examination into the cause of his detention,

and shall be discharged if the detention is found to be un-

warranted. The suspension of the privilege consists in

taking away this right to an immediate hearing and dis-

charge, and in authorizing arrests and detentions without

regular process of law. Such suspension has been many

times declared in Great Britain, or in some section of the

British empire, within the present century; sometimes jn

view of threatened invasion, and sometimes when risings

among the people had taken place or were feared, and

when persons whose fidelity to the government was sus-

pected, and whose influence for evil might be powerful,

had as yet committed no overt act of which the law could

take cognizance. It has been well said that the suspension

of the habeas corpus is a suspension of Magna Charta,1

and nothing but a great national emergency could jus-
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tify or excuse it. The Constitution limits it within nar-

rower bounds than do the legislative precedents in Great

Britain.

The power to suspend this privilege is a legislative

power, and the President cannot exercise it except as au-

thorized by law.2 The suspension does not legalize what is

done while it continues; it merely suspends for the time

this particular remedy. All other remedies for illegal ar-

rests remain, and may be pursued against the parties mak-

'May, Const. Hist., ch. 11.

8 Ex parte Merryman, 9 Am. Law Reg. 524; S. C, 14 Law Rep.

N. S. 78; Taney, 246; McCall v. McDowell, 1 Abb. U. S. 212; Ex

parte Field, 5 Blatch. 63.

19

adopted by recognition, or by expre·ss legislation, in the
several States.
Suspension of the Writ. -The privilege of the writ consists in this: that, when one complains that he is unlawfully imprisoned or deprived of his liberty, he shall be
brought without delay before the proper court or magistrate for an examination into the cause of his detention,
and shall be discharged if the detention is found to be unwarranted. The suspension of the privilege consists in
taking away this right to an immediate hearing and discharge, and in authorizing arrests and detentions without
regular process of law. Such· suspension has been many
times declared in Great Britain, or in some section of the
British empire, within the present century ; sometimes jn
view of threatened invasion, and sometimes when risings
among the people had taken place or were feared, and
when persons whose fidelity to the government was suspected, and whose influence for evil might be powerful,
had as yet committed no overt act of which the law could
take cognizance. It has been well said that the suspension
of the habeas corpus is a suspension of Magna Charta, 1
and nothing but a great national emergency could justify or excuse it. The Constitution limits it within narrower bounds than do the legislative precedents in Great
Britain.
The power to suspend this privilege is a legislative
power, and the President cannot exercise it except as authorized by law. 2 The suspension does not legalize what is
done while it continues ; it merely suspends for the time
this particular remedy. All other remedies for illegal arrests remain, and may be pursued against the parties makMay, Const. Hist., ch. 11.
I Ex parte Merryman, 9 Am. Law Reg. 624; S. C., 14 Law Rep.
N. S. 78; Taney, 246; McCall v. McDowell, 1 Abb. U. S. 212; Ex
parte Field, 6 Blatch. 63.
1
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ing or continuing them. It is customary, after the writ has

been suspended in Great Britain, to pass acts of indem-

nity for the protection of those in authority, who, in the

performance of their duties to the State, felt themselves

warranted in arresting suspected persons while the sus-

pension continued. Something similar has been done in

this country by provisions in state constitutions ;1 but a?

a right of action arising under the principles of the common

law is property as much as are tangible things, it is not

believed the right could be destroyed by statute.2

State Suspensions. — Nothing in this provision hinders

the States from suspending the privilege of this writ issu-

ing from their own courts, and the declaration of martial

law in the State has the effect of suspending it.8

Si ttion IV. — Accusations op Crime.

Grand Jury. — Among the other provisions which by

the fifth amendment are made for the protection of per-

sons accused of crimes is this, —that " No person shall be

held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime

unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, ex-

cept in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
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militia when in actual service in time of war or public

ing or continuing them. It is customary, after the writ has
been suspended in Great Britain, to pass acts of indemnity for the protection of those in authority, who, in the
performance of their duties to the State, felt themselves
warranted in arresting suspected persons while the suspension continued. Something similar has been done in
th_is country by provisions in state constitutions ; 1 but ara right of action arising under the principles of the common
law is property as much as are tangible things, it is not
believed the right could be destroyed by statute.~
State Suspensi~ons. - Nothing in this provision hinders
the States from suspending the privilege of this writ issuing from their own courts, and the declaration of martial
law in the State has the effect of suspending it. 1

danger." A grand jury is a tribunal consisting of not

Sl: 1TION IV. -ACCUSATIONS

less than twelve nor more than twenty-three men, taken

from the bodj- of the community, and sworn to inquire

into and make presentment of offences committed within

their jurisdiction, and twelve of whom at least must unite

in any presentment. The security to accused persons con-

sists in the popular character of the tribunal, in the fact

1 See Drehman v. Stifel, 8 Wall. 595; Hess v. Johnson, 3 W. Va.

645.

2 Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; Johnson v. Jones, 44 111. 142. See

Milligan v. Hovey, 8 Biss. 1.

8 Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.

OF CRIME.

Grand Jurg. -Among the other provisions which by
the fifth amendment are made for the protection of persons accused of crimes is this, -that'' No person shall be
held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
militia when in actual service in time of war or public
danger." A grand jury is a tribunal consisting of not
less than twelve nor more than twenty-three men, taken
from the body of the community, and sworn to inquire
into and- make presentment of offences committed within
their jurisdiction, and twelve of whom at least must unite
in any presentment. The security to accused persons consists in the popular character of the tribunal, in the fact
\

1

See Drehman v. Stifel, 8 Wall. 595; Hess v. Johnson, 3 W. Va.

645.
~ Griffin v. Wilcox, 21Ind370; Johnson"· Jones, 44 Ill. 142.
Milligan v. Hovey, 3 Biss. 1.
a Luther "· Borden, 7 How. 1.

See
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that they meet, receive, and sift the evidence indepen-

dently of the prosecuting authorities, and in their own

way, and are therefore not likely to be swayed or influ-

enced by the passions, desires, or interests of those in au-

thority, or of malignant prosecutors.

An infamous offence is one involving moral turpitude in

the offender, or infamy in the punishment, or both. It is

probable that in this amendment the punishment was in

view as the badge of infamy rather than any element in the

offence itself, and that provision for the punishment of

minor offences otherwise than on indictment, even though

they be degrading in their nature, would not be held un-

constitutional, provided the punishment imposed was not

greater than that usually permitted to be inflicted by magis-

trates proceeding in a summary way. But the punish-

ment of the penitentiary must always be deemed infamous,

and so must any punishment that involves the loss of civil

or political privileges.

The exceptional cases mentioned in the amendment are

such as come under the cognizance of military or martial

law, and are punished by military tribunals.

Section V.—Bail.
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The Constitution. — The eighth amendment forbids re-

quiring excessive bail. The bail here intended is that

which is given by persons who are accused of crime, and

awaiting trial or final judgment, or who are held for se-

curity to keep the peace.

Bail is usually allowed in all cases except those in

which the offence charged is punished capitally or by life

imprisonment, and even then it may be taken in the dis-

cretion of the court.1 That reasonable bail shall be ac-

cepted is an admonition addressed to the judgment and

1 United States v. Hamilton, 3 Dall. 17; United States v. Jones,

3 Wash. C. C. 224.

that they meet, receive, and sift the evidence independently of the prosecuting authorities, and in their own
way, and are therefore not likely to be swayed or influenced by the passions, desires, or interests of those in authority, or of malignant prosecutors.
An infamous offence is one involving moral turpitude in
the offender, or infamy in the punishment, or both. It is
probable that in this amendment the punishment was in
view as the badge of infamy rather than any element in the
offence itself, and that provision for the punishment of
minor offences otherwise than on indictment, even though
they be degrading in their nature, would not be held unconstitutional, provided the punishment imposed was not
greater than that usually permitted to be inflicted by magistrates proceeding in a summary way. But the punishment of the penitentiary must always be deemed infamous,
and so must any punishment that involves the loss of civil
or political privileges.
The exceptional cases mentioned in the amendment are
such as come under the cognizance of military or martial
law, and are punished by milltary tribunals.
SECTION

v. -BAIL.

'/'he Constitution. -The eighth amendment forbids requiring excessive bail. The bail here intended is that
which is given by persons who are accused of crime, and
awaiting trial or final judgment, or who are held for security to keep the peace.
Bail is usually allowed in all cases except those in·
which the offence charged is punished capitally or by life
imprisonment, and even then it may be taken in the discretion of the court. 1 That reasonable bail shall be accepted is an admonition addressed to the judgment and
1 United States v. Hamilton, 3 Dall. 17; United States v. Jones,
3 Wash. C. C. 224.
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conscience of the court or magistrate empowered to fix

the amount: it is impossible that a definite rule shall be

established by law for particular cases. The principle,

however, is this: thai any bail is excessive which is

greater than is needful to secure satisfactorily the attend-

ance of the accused for trial or sentence, or the perform-

ance of such other obligation as may have been required

of him.

Section VI. — Incidents of the Trial and Pun-

ishment.

Venue. — One of the most valuable protections which

the common law gave to accused persons was found in the

principle that the trial should take place within the county

conscience of the court or magistrate .empowered to fix
the amount : .it is impossible that a definite rule shall be
, established by law for particular cases .. The principle,
however, is this: that any bail is excessive which is
greater than is needful to secure satisfactorily. the attendance -of the accused for trial or sentence, or the performance of such. other. obligation as may have been required
of him.

where the alleged offence was committed. This protected

the accused against being dragged away from his home

and his friends for trial in such distant and perhaps hostile

SECTION·

VI. -

INCIDENTS OF THE TRIAL AND

PUN-

ISHHENT.

locality as his prosecutors might select, and it gave him

the benefit on his trial of a good reputation if he had

maintained one among his neighbors, and also rendered

more probable the attendance of his witnesses, who would

usually be found in his vicinity. A further principle, to

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

which the people were even more greatly attached, was

that the trial should be by jury. Both these were provided

for by the original Constitution, which declared that " the

trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall

be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where

the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not

committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place

or places as the Congress may by law have directed." 1

The sixth amendment made the right more specific, and

corrected a defect as regards the venue: "In all crimi-

nal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a

speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State

» Const, Art. III. § 2, cL 3.

Venue. -- One of the most valuable protections which
the common law gave-to accused persons was found in the
principle that the trial should take place within the county
where the alleged offence was committed. This protected
the accused against being dragged· away from his home
and his friends for trial· in such distant and ·perhaps hostile
locality as his prosecutors might select, and it gave him
the benefit on his trial of a good reputation if he had
maintained one among· his neighbors, and also rendered
more probable the attendance. of his witnesses, who would
usually be found in his vicinity. A further principle, to
which the people were even more -greatly attached, was
that the trial should be by jury. Both these were provided
tor by the original Constitution, which declared that '' the
trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall
be by.jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where
the said crimes ·shall have been committed ; but when not
committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place
or· places as the Congress may by law have directed/' 1
The sixth: .amendme~t made the right more specific, and
corrected a defect as regards -the venue: '' In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy· the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
1

Const., Art. ill. § 2, cl. 3.
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and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,

which district shall have been previously ascertained by

law." The important differences in these provisions are,

that the earlier did not require the trial to take place in the

district of the crime, when the State was divided into two

districts, nor did it in terms make it necessary that the

jury should be summoned from the vicinage, though doubt-

less that was to be understood. The amendment says

nothing about crimes committed out of the limits of States,

and has no application to them.1

Speedy Trial. — A speedy trial cannot be defined more

accurately than this, that it is a trial brought on as speed-

ily as the prosecution can reasonably be expected or re-

quired to be ready for it.2 A public trial is not of necessity

one to which the whole publje is admitted, but it is one so

far open to all as that the prisoner's friends, and others

who may be inclined to watch the proceedings, in order to

see if justice is intelligently and impartially administered,

may have opportunity to do so. There maj- be and often

is justifiable occasion to exclude from a trial those who

are inclined to attend from idle or morbid curiosity only,

and especially in cases involving loathsome or disgusting
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details.

The Jury. — By jury in the Constitution is meant a com-

mon-law jury. This is a tribunal of twelve persons, im-

partially selected for the purposes of the trial in accordance

with rules of law previously established, and who are to

sit together, hear and consider the evidence in the case,

and render their verdict upon the facts as they find them.

The jury cannot consist of less than twelve, and a trial

by less than that number, even by consent, is a mis-trial.8

1 United States v. Dawson, 15 How. 467. i.

2 See Ex parte Stanley, 4 Nev. 113.

» Work u. State, 2 Ohio, N. S. 296; Cancemi o. People, 18 N. Y.

128; Brown v. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 561. i

and district wherein. the crime shall have been committed,
which district. shall have been prcnously ascertained by
law." The important dUferences in these provisions are,
that the earlier did not require· the trial to. take place in the
district of the crime, when the State was divided into two
districts, nor did it in terms make- it. necessary that the
jury should be summoned from the vicinage, though doubtless that was to ·be understood. The amendment says
nothing about crimes committed out of the limits of States,
and has no application to them. 1
Speedy Trial. - A speedy. trial cannot be defined =more
accurately than this, that it is a trial brought on as speedily as the. prosecution can reasonably be expected or required to be ready for it. 1 A public trial is not of necessity
one to which the whole publjc is admitted, but it is one so
far open to all as that the prisoner's friends, and others
who may be inclined to watch the proceedings, in· order to
see if justice is intelligently and impar~ially administered,
may have opportunity to do so. There may be .and often
is justifiable occasion to exclude from a trial those who
are inclined to attend from idle or morbid .curiosity only,
and especially in cases involving loathsome or disgusting
details.
The Jury. -By jury in the Constitution is meant a common-law jury. This is a tribunal of twelve persons, im..
partially selected for the purposes of the trial in accordance
with rules of law previously established, and who are to
sit together, hear and consider the evidence in the case,
and render their verdict upon the facts as they find them.
The jury cannot consist of less than twelve, and a trial
by less than that number, even by consent, is a mis-trial. 8
United States v. Dawson, 15.How. 467. .
See Ex parte Stanley, 4 Nev. 113.
a Work v. State, 2 Ohio, N. S. 296; Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y.
128; Brown ~. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 561.
1
2

1
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To secure impartiality «each party is allowed a certain

number of peremptory challenges, and as many others as

he can show cause for. The jury listen to the evidence in

the presence and under the direction of the court, and

they are advised by the court what the law is that should

govern the case. Formerly it was supposed that the jury

might be punished if they failed to follow in their verdict

the instructions of the court upon the law; but it has long

been settled that the jury may render their verdict freely,

and without assigning reasons.1 If the accused is con-

victed against the law, or against the evidence, the judge

may correct the error by granting a new trial. The ver-

dict of the jury must be unanimous; and therefore, if

agreement becomes impossible, they must be discharged,

and a new jury summoned.

The Indictment. — The sixth amendment entitles the ac-

cused " to be informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation." This information is to be conveyed by the

indictment, and the accused must have a copy in ample

time to enable him to be prepared for trial. To make the

indictment sufficient for the purpose, it must contain such
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a recital of facts as will reasonably apprise the defendant

what the case is which he must meet; and this cannot be

dispensed with even by statute.2 But the unnecessary

formalities and technicalities of the old forms may be

abolished, and no cause for complaint be given thereby.'

The Evidence. — The fifth amendment also declares that

no person '' shall be compelled in any criminal case to be

a witness against himself." This was a common-law prin-

ciple, and it has been incorporated in the Constitution to

prevent the possibility of a recurrence to the inquisitorial

1 Penn's Case, 6 State Trials, 951; Bushel's Case, Vaughan's Eep.

136

2 State ». O'Flaherty, 7 Nev. 153; State v. Corson, 59 Me. 137.

s State V. Learned, 47 Me. 426; People v. Mortimer, 46 Cal. 114.

To secure impartiality .each party is allowed a certain
number of peremptory challenges, and as many others as
he can show cause for. The jury liiten to the evidence in
the presence and under the direction of the court, and
they are advised by the court what the law is that should
govern the case. Formerly it was supposed that the jury
might be punished if they failed to follow in their verdict
the instructions of the court upon the law ; but it has long
been settled that the jury may render their verdict freely,
and without assigning reasons. 1 If the accused is conYicted against the law, or against the evidence, the judge
m~y correct the error by granting a new trial.
The verdict of the jury must be unanimous ; and therefore, if
agreement becomes impossible, they must be discharged,
and a new jury summoned.
The Indictment. -The sixth amendment entitles the accused ''to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation." Thi~ information is to be conveyed by the
indictment, and the accused must have a copy in ample
time to enable him to be prepared for trial. To make the
indictment sufficient for the purpose, it must contain such
a recital of facts as will reasonably apprise the defendant
what the case is which he must meet ; and this cannot be
dispensed with even by statute.~ But the unnecessary
formalities and technicalities of the old forms may be
abolished, and no cause for complaint be given thereby.1
The Evidence. -The fifth amendment also declares that
no person '' shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself.'' This was a common-law principle, and it has been incorporated in the Constitution to
prevent the possibility of a recurrence to the inquisitorial
1

Penn's Case, 6 State Trials, 951; Bushel's Case, Vaughan's Rep.

136.
~

State v. O'Flaherty, 7 Nev. 163; State v. Corson, 69 Me. 137.
a State v. Learned, 47 Me. 426; People v. Mortimer, 46 Cal. 114.
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proceedings which in arbitrary periods were sometimes

had, and which are now admitted in some countries under

systems of jurisprudence differing from our own. Under

the laws of some States accused persons are permitted to

give evidence on their own behalf; but if one elects not to

do so, the fact is not allowed to be made use of to his

prejudice, since, if it were, this would indirectly force him

to be sworn.1 By the sixth amendment the accused has

the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him,

and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in

his favor. No comment need be made on this last privi-

lege: the other renders it necessary that the prosecution

procure the presence of their witnesses in open court,

where the jury may have opportunity to observe them, and

where full liberty of cross-examination may be had.2

Counsel. — By the sixth amendment the accused has the

privilege " to have the assistance of counsel for his de-

fence." This is a common-law privilege, much improved

and extended in late years, and it is secured with all its

accustomed incidents. The counsel must be at liberty to

deal with the case freely, and to comment fearlessly upon

the facts, and upon the conduct, purposes, and motives of
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prosecutors and witnesses, only keeping within the bounds

of decorum. The law protects implicitly the confidence

which the relation of counsel and client requires, and will

not suffer the counsel, even in the courts of justice, to dis-

close the confidential communications that may have been

made to him with a view to pending or anticipated litiga-

1 People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522; State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555; Bird

v. State, 50 Geo. 585.

2 Jackson v. Commonwealth, 19 Grat. (Va.) 656; State v. Thomas,

64 N. C. 74. If, on the second trial of a cause, it is found that the

accused has kept away a witness, his evidence given on the first trial

may be proved by the prosecution. Reynolds v. United States, 98

U. S. Rep. 145.

proceedings which in arbitrary periods were sometimes
had, and which are now admitted in some countries under
systems of jurisprudence differing from our own. Under
the laws of some States accused persons are permitted to
give evidence on their own behalf; but if one elects not to
do so, the fact is not allowed to be made use of to his
prejudice, since, if it were, this would indirectly force him
to be sworn. 1 By the sixth amendment the accused has
the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him,
and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor. No comment need be made on this last privilege : the other renders it necessary that the prosecution
procure the presence of their witnesses in open court,
where the jury may have opportunity to observe them, and
where full liberty of cross-examination may be had.~
Counsel. - By the sixth amendment the accused has the
privilege ''to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." This is a common-law privilege, much improved
and extended in late years, and it is secured with all its
accustomed incidents. The counsel must be at liberty to
deal with the case freely, and to comment fearlessly upon
the facts, and upon the conduct, purposes, and motives of
prosecutors and witnesses, only keeping within the bounds
of decorum. The law protects implicitly the confidence
which the relation of counsel and client requires, and will
not suffer the counsel, even in the courts of justice, to disclose the confidential communications that may have been
made to him with a view to pending or anticipated litiga1

People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522; State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555; Bird
v. State, 50 Geo. 585.
2 Jackson v. Commonwealth, 19 Grat. (Va.) 656; State v. Thomas,
64 N. C. 74. If, on the second trial of a cause, it is found that the
accused has kept a way a witness, his evidence given on the first trial
may be proved by the prosecution. Reynolds v. United States, 98
Rep. 145.
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tion.1 As the jury in general are judges of the facts only,

the argument of counsel upon the law should be addressed

to the court;a but the jury may be addressed directly,

upon both law and fact, in those cases where by statute or

constitution they are made judges of both.8

Punishments. — By the eighth amendment excessive fines

and cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden. What

punishment is suited to a specified offence must in general

be determined by the legislature, and the case must be

very extraordinary in which its judgment could be brought

in question. A punishment maybe unlawful either, 1. be-

cause it is in excess of, or different from, that prescribed by

law ;4 or, 2. because it is not warranted by the judgment

of any competent court; and, possibly, 3. because, though

apparently warranted by law, it is so manifestly out of all

proportion to the offence as to shock the moral sense with

its barbarity, or because it is a punishment long disused

for its cruelty until it has become "unusual." Nothing

more definite can on this point be affirmed.6

Twice in Jeopardy. — The fifth amendment forbids that

any person shall be subject, for the same offence, to be
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twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. This is an old phrase,

which has come from times when sanguinary punishments

1 Whiting v. Barney, 30 N. Y. 330. Compare Dixon v. Parmelee,

2 Vt. 185.

2 United States v. Morris, 1 Curt. C. C. 23; United States v. Riley,

5 Blatch. 204.

8 Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 541. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 10

Met. (Mass.) 263.

* Bourne v. The King, 7 Ad. & El. 58; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall.

163.

6 A punishment may perhaps be deemed cruel and unusual if

from its nature it would be intolerable to one class of people, but

comparatively indifferent to others; as, for example, the punishment

of depriving a native of China of his hair.\ Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan,

18 Am. Law Reg. 676.

tion. 1 As the jury in general are judges of the facts only,
the argument of counsel upon the law should be addressed
to the court ; i but the jury may be addressed directly,
upun both law and fact, in those cases where by statute or
constitution they are made judges of both. 8
P.unisl1ments. - By the eighth amendment excessive fines
and cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden. What
punishment is suited to a specified offence must in general
be determined by the legislature, and the case must be
very extraordinary in which its judgment could be brought
in question. A punishment may be unlawful either, 1. because it is in excess of, or different from, that prescribed by
law;' or, 2. because it is not warranted by the judgment
of any competent court; and, possibly, 3. because, though
apparently warranted by law, it is so manifestly out of all
proportion to the offence as to shock the moral sense with
its barbarity, or because it is a punishment long disused
for its cruelty until it has become "unusual." Nothing
more definite can on this point- be affirmed. 6
Twice in Jeopardy. -The fifth amendment forbids that
any person shall be subject, for the same offence, to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. This is an old phrase,
which has come from times when sanguinary punishments
1 Whiting v. Barney, 30 N. Y. 330. Compare Dixon v. Parmelee,
2 Vt. 185.
2 United States v. Morris, 1 Curt. C. C. 23; United States v. Riley,
6 Blatch. 204.
s Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 641. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 10
Met. (Mass.) 263.
~ Bourne v. The King, 7 Ad. & El. 68 ; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall.
163.
6 A punishment may perhaps be deemed cruel and unusual if
from its nature it would be intolerable to one class of people, but
comparatively indifferent to others; as, for example, the punishment
of depriving a native of China of his hair.\ Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan,
18 Am. Law Reg. 676.
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were common; but the meaning is-, that no person shall be

put on trial a second time for the same offence, after he

has been tried and convicted, or acquitted. But some

explanation is necessary, since in some cases one may be

entitled to the benefits of an acquittal, though a verdict

has never been returned.

A person is in jeopardy when he is put upon trial, be-

fore a court of competent jurisdiction, upon an indictment

or information which is sufficient in form and substance to

sustain a conviction, and a juiy has been impanelled and

sworn to try him.1 The accused then becomes entitled to

a verdict that shall forever protect him against any future

prosecution,2 and a discharge of the jury without his con-

sent is equivalent to an acquittal, except in the few cases

in which a discharge without a verdict becomes a necessity.8

But one is not put in jeopardy by a prosecution in a court

which has no jurisdiction of the case ;4 or upon an indict-

ment which is so defective that no judgment can be given

upon it;6 and the jeopardy once attached is removed, if the

jury are discharged by reason of the impossibility of agree-

ment, or by consent, or if the case is stopped by the sick-
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ness or death of the judge, or a juror,6 or if, after verdict

of conviction, it is set aside on motion of the accused, or

judgment upon it is reversed in an appellate court, or is

arrested for fatal defects in the indictment;7 and in any of

these and similar cases, the accused may be tried a second

1 McFadden v. Commonwealth, 23 Perm. St. 12; O'Brian v. Com-

monwealth, 9 Bush, (Ky.) 333.

2 Barker v. People, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 686.

8 People v. Barrett, 2 Caines, (N. Y.J 304; Nolan e. State, 55 Geo.

521.

4 People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161.

5 Gerard v. People, 4 111. 363; Kohlheimer v. State, 39 Miss. 548.

8 Nugent v. State, 4 Stew. & Port. (Ala.) 72; Hector v. State,

2 Mo. 166.

7 Casborus v. People, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 351.

were common ; but the meaning is·, that no person shall be
put on trial a second time for the same offence; after he
has been .tried and convicted, or acquitted. But some
explanation is necessary, since in some cases one may be
entitled to the benefits of an acquittal, though a verdict
has never been returned.
A person is in jeopardy when he is put upon trial, .before a court of competent jurisdiction, upon an indictment
or information which is sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction, and a jury has been impanelled and
sworn to try him. 1 The accused then becomes entitled to
a verdict that shall forever protect him against any future
prosecution, 2 and a discharge of the jury without his con·
sent is equivalent to an acquittal, except in the few case~
in which a discharge without a verdict becomes a necessity. 8
But one is not put in jeoparcjy by a prosecution in a court
which has no jurisdiction of the case ; 4 or upon an indictment which is so defective that no judgment can be given
upon it ; 6 and the jeopardy once attached is removed, if the
jury are discharged by reason of the impossibility of agree..
ment, or by consent, or if the case is stopped by the sick..
ness or death of the judge, or a juror, 6 or if, afte~ verdict
of conviction, it is set aside on motion of the accused, or
judgment upon it is reversed in ·an appellate court, or is
arrested for fatal defects in the indictment; 1 and in any of
these and similar cases, the accused may be tried a second
1 McFadden v. Commonwealth, 23 Penn. St. 12; O'Brian v. Commonwealth, 9 Bush, (Ky.) 333.
2 Barker v. People, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 686.
8 People v. Barrett, 2 Caines, (N. Y.) 304; Nolan t•. State, 65 Geo.
521.
' People t•. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161.
5 Gerard v. People, 4 Ill. 363; Kohlheimer v. State, 39 Miss. 548.
6 Nugent v. State, 4 Stew. & Port. (Ala.) 72; Hector v. State,
2 Mo. 166.
1 Casborus v. People, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 351.
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time. But an acquittal, however erroneous, must be a bai,

unless a remedy by writ of error is given to the State by

statute, as has been done in some States.1 If the accused

is acquitted on some counts in an indictment and convicted

on others, and the conviction is set aside, he can be put

upon trial the second time on those counts only on which

he was before convicted, and is forever discharged from

the others.a

Due Process of Law. — The fifth amendment also pro-

vides, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law. The meaning of

this protection has been more fully considered in another

place; at present, it is sufficient to say that, as a protec-

tion to life and liberty, it requires, before either can be

taken away Under legal proceedings, that there shall be a

prosecution according to the forms of law, resulting in

conviction after public trial, and opportunity to be heard,

and followed by judgment applying the law which the con-

victed party violated.

Contempts of Authority. — It sometimes becomes essen-

tial, in the course of their discharge of public duties, that
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legislative bodies and courts should punish summarily

those who disturb their proceedings, or who refuse or neg-

lect to perform any duty required of them in respect there-

to. Such conduct is called a contempt of authority, and the

power to punish it is inherent in such bodies.8 But as the

tribunal that punishes will also be the tribunal whose just

authority has been contemned, the power is one to be ex-

ercised very sparingly, and only when the necessity plainly

appears. When inferior courts punish for contempts, their

records must show that the party is convicted of conduct

i State ». Tait, 22 Iowa, 140.

2 Campbell v. State, 9 Yerg. 333; Barnett v. People, 54 H1. 325.

8 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; Eobinson ex parte, 19 Wall.
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time. But an acquittal, however erroneous, must be a ba1 .
unless a remedy by writ of error is given to the State bJ
statute, as has been done in some States. 1 If the accused
is acquitted on some counts in an indictment and convicted
on others, and the conviction is set aside, he can be put
upon trial the second time on those counts only on which
he was before convicted, and is forever discharged from
the others. 2
Due Proces1 of Law. -The fifth amendment also provides, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. The meaning of
this protection has been more fully considered in another
place ; at present, it is sufficient to say that, as a protection to life and liberty, it requires, before either can be
taken away under legal proceedings, that there shall be a
prosecution according to the forms of law, resulting in
conviction after public trial, and opportunity to be heard,
and followed by judgment applying the law which the convicted party Yiolated.
Oontempts of Authority. - It sometimes becomes essential, in the course of their discharge of public duties, that
legislative bodies and courts should punish summarily
those who disturb their proceedings, or who refuse or neglect to perform any duty required of them in respect thereto. Such conduct is called a contempt of authority, and the
power to punish it is inherent in such bodies. 8 But as the
tribunal that punishes will also be the tribunal whose just
authority has been contemned, the power is one to be exercised very spa1ingly' and only when the necessity plainly
appears. When inferior courts punish for contempts, their
records must show that the party is convicted of conduct
State "· Tait, 22 Iowa, 140.
t Campbell v. State, 9 Yerg. 333 ; Barnett v. People, 64 Ill. 325.
a Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; Robinson ex parte, 19 Wall.

1
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which is in fact a contempt;1 and the conviction will be

void if the finding is wanting. A different rule applies

in the courts of general jurisdiction.2 In tribunals of all

sorts and grades the party accused of contempt is entitled

to a hearing.8 Bodies having quasi judicial and legislative

powers, like boards of supervisors and city councils, can-

not punish for contempts.4

1 Bachelder v. Moore, 42 Cal. 412; Turner v. Commonwealth

2 Met. (Ky.) 616.

a Bradley v. Eisner, 13 Wall. 335.

8 Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364.

* Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 118.

which is in fact a contempt ; 1· and the conviction will be
void if the finding is wanting. A different rule applies
in the courts of general jurisdiction.~ In tribunals of all
sorts and grades the party accused of contempt is ent.itled
to a hearing. 8 Bodies having quasi judicial and legislative
powers, like boards of supervisors and city councils, cannot punish for contempts. 4
_ . /
1
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Bachelder v. Moore, 42 Cal. 412; Turner v. Commonwealtl1
2 Met. (1\:y.) 616.
~ Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335.
a Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364.
' Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 118.
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CHAPTER XVI.

PROTECTION TO CONTRACTS AND PROPERTY.

Section I.—Laws impairing the Obligation of Con-

tracts.

The Constitution. — Among the powers forbidden to the

States by the Constitution is the power to pass any law

CHAPTER XVI.

impairing the obligation of contracts.1 The prohibition

passed almost without comment at the time, and in the

careful and very full discussions of the Federalist it is

barely alluded to twice; first, as a provision to prevent

PROTECTION TO CONTRACTS AND PROPERTY.

aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens

would be injured by such laws ;2 and, second, as being a

"constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and

private rights" against laws which are "contrary to the

SECTION

I. -LA.ws

lllPA.IRING THE OB.LIGATION OF

Cox-

TRAcrs.

first principles of the social compact, and to every princi-

ple of sound legislation." 8 Apparently nothing was in

view at the time except to prevent the repudiation of

debts and private obligations, and the disgrace, disorders,

and calamities that might be expected to follow. In the

construction of this provision, however, it has become one

of the most important, as well as one of the most compre-
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hensive, in the Constitution; and it has been the subject

of more frequent and. more extended judicial discussion

than any other. Only brief reference can be made here

to the principles which the decisions have settled.

l Const, Art. I. § 10.

a Federalist, No. 7, instancing the then recent laws of Rhode

Island in their results on the neighboring States.

• Federalist, No. 44.

The Oonstitution. - Among the powers forl1idden to the
States by the Constitution is the power to pass any law
impairing the obligation of contracts. 1 The prohibition
passed almost without comment at the time, and in the
careful an~ very full discussions of the Federalist it is
barely alluded to twice ; first, as a provision to prevent
aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens
would be injured by such laws ; 2 and, second, as being a
''constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and
private rights" against laws which are " contrary to the
first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation." 8 Apparently nothing was in
view at the time except to prevent the repudiation of
debts and private obligations, and the disgrace, disorders,
and calamities that might be expected to follow. In the
construction of this provision, however, it has become one
of the most important, as well as one of the most comprehensive, in the Constitution ; and it has been the subject
of more frequent and, more extended judicial discussion
than any other. Only brief reference can be made here
to the principles which the decisions have settled.
Const., Art. I. § 10.
t Federalist, No. 7, instancing the then recent laws of Rhode
laland in their results on the neighboring States.
I Federalist, No. 44.
l
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What are Contracts ? — Contracts are either executory

or executed. An executory contract is one whereby a

party takes upon himself the obligation to do or abstain

from doing some particular thing. An executed contract

is one whereby an obligation assumed is performed, and

the transaction perfected; as a deed of conveyance per-

fects a sale of lands. The Constitution makes no distinc-

tion between these two classes of contracts, and the latter

as much as the former is within its protection. It is, there-

fore, not within the power of legislation, after a convey-

ance has been made, to annul it on any pretence; since

this would not merely impair the obligation of the con-

tract, but would destroy it entirely.1

Obligation of the Contract. — The obligation of a con-

tract consists in its binding force on the party making it,

which the law at the time recognizes, and for which it gives

a remedy. It involves, therefore, first, the promise or

assurance of the party, and, second, the sanction of the

law, whereby the promise or assurance becomes an effect-

ual contract.2 No promise or assurance can, therefore,

constitute a contract, unless the law lends its sanction;

and this in some cases it withholds. For example, if there
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is no consideration for an executory contract, this in law

is a mere nude pact, and invalid; and so is any promise

which is illegal, either in its consideration, or in the purpose

to be accomplished by it.8

What Contracts intended. — The contracts intended by

the Constitution are all those over which the State can

have authority, and which, but for this provision, might

be reached by state law. The contracts of the State itself

1 Fletcher ivPeck, 6 Cranch, 87, 133.

1 Branson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; MeCracken v. Hayward, 2 How.

608; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 259,302, 818.

» Meacham v. Dow, 32 Vt. 721; Piatt v. People, 29 111. 54; Mar-

shall v. Railroad Co., 16 How. 314.

What ·are Oontracta 1- Contracts are either executory·
or executed. An executory contract is one whereby a
party takes upon himself the obligation to do or abstain
from doing some partfoular thing. An executed contract
is one whereby an obligation assumed is performed, and
the transaction perfected ; as a deed of conveyance perfects a sale of lands. The Constitution makes no distinction between these two classes of contracts, and the latter
as much as the former is within its protection. It is, therefore, not within the power of legislation, after a conveyance has been made, to annul it on any pretence; since
this would not merely impair the obligation of the contract, but would destroy it entirely .1
-Obl,igation of tlie Ovntract. - The obligation of a contract consists in its binding force on the party making it,
which the law at the time·recognizes, and for which it gives
a remedy. It involves, therefore, first, the promise or
assnra·nce of the party, and, second, the sanction of the
1sw, whereby the promise or assurance becomes an effectual contract. 2 No ·promise or assurance can, therefore,
constitute a contract, unless the law lends its sanction ;
and this in some cases it withholds. For example, if there
is no consideration for an executory contract, this in law
is a mere nude pact, and invalid ; and so is any promise
which is illegal, either in its consideration, or in the purpose
to be accomplished by it. 8
What Oontracts intended. -The contracts intended by
the Constitution are all those over which the State can
have authority, and which, but for this provision, might
be reached by state law •. The contracts of the State itself
Fletcher v. ·Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 133.
Bronson 1;. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 ; McCracken t•. Hayward, 2 How.
608; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 269, 302, 818.
a Meacham v. Dow, 32 Vt. 721 ; Piatt v. People, 29 Ill. 64; Mar1ball v. Railroad Co., 16 How. 314.
1
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are therefore included, as much as those of individuals ; and a State is thus precluded from recalling its own
grants, as bad frequently been done on various pretexts in
England. 1 Neither can a State modify, except by mutual
consent, any provision of a pre-existing contract into
which it may ha ye entered. t For example, if· a State,
being the owner of the capital stock of a bank, provides
by law that its bills shall be received in payment for all
debts owing to the State, the provision is a promise to
those who shall receive the bills~ that they shall be thus
accepted for state dues ; and this promise the State cannot recall, to the prejudice of any who previously had become holders of the bills. 8 So if a State, or one of its
municipalities, contra:cts a debt and issues obligations
therefor, and these obligations come into the hands of
foreign holders who are not subject to state taxation, a
subsequent statute imposing a tax upon them, and directing that the amount thereof shall be deducted in making
payment, is void as to the foreign holders, because withholding something to which they are entitled, and to that
, extent impairing the obligation of the contracts. 4
/
Statutes. - A statute, public or private, is not a contract.
It is an expression· in due form of the will of the State, as
to what shall be the law on the subject covered by it; and
the State would be deprived of its sovereignty, and crippled in the exercise of its essential functions, if it were

are therefore included, as much as those of individu-

als; and a State is thus precluded from recalling its own

grants, as had frequently been done on various pretexts in

England.1 Neither can a State modify, except by mutual

consent, any provision of a pre-existing contract into

which it may have entered.2 For example, if a State,

being the owner of the capital stock of a bank, provides

by law that its bills shall be received in payment for all

debts owing to the State, the provision is a promise to

those who shall receive the bills j that they shall be thus

accepted for state dues; and this promise the State can-

not recall, to the prejudice of any who previously had be-

come holders of the bills.8 So if a State, or one of its

municipalities, contra'cts a debt and issues obligations

therefor, and these obligations come into the hands of

foreign holders who are not subject to state taxation, a

subsequent statute imposing a tax upon them, and direct-

ing that the amount thereof shall be deducted in making

payment, is void as to the foreign holders, because with-

holding something to which they are entitled, and to that

extent impairing the obligation of the contracts.4
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Statutes. — A statute, public or private, is not a contract.

It is an expression in due form of the will of the State, as

to what shall be the law on the subject covered by it; and

the State would be deprived of its sovereignty, and crip-

pled in the exercise of its essential functions, if it were

1 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Van Home v. Dorrance, 2 Dall.

304; Huidekoper v. Douglas, 3 Cranch, 1.' The principle stated

would of course not preclude a State from invoking judicial pro-

ceedings to set aside one of its grants on any grounds that would be

sufficient if it were a grant by an individual.

2 New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164.

• Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190; Furman v. Nichols, 8 Wall.

44; Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. Rep. 454.

« Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. Rep. 432. And see State Taz

on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300.

•

1 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87 ; Van Horne "· Dorrance, 2 Dall.
304 ; Huidekoper v. Douglas, 3 Cranch, 1. · The principle stated
would of course not preclude a State from invoking judicial proceedings to set aside one of its grants on any grounds that would be
sufllcient if it were a grant by an individual.
2 New Jersey "· Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164.
a Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190; Furman v. Nichols, 8 Wall.
44; Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. Rep. 454 .
' Murray v. Charleston, 00 U. S. Rep. 4S2. And see State Tax
on Foreign Held Bonds, H> Wall. 300.
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not at liberty to change its laws at discretion. But there

are exceptions to this general rule: for a State may give

to its contracts such form as it may choose to express its

assent in; and this is sometimes, the form of a statute.

The grants of land by a State are frequently made by

statute, and so are grants of special privileges. Bounties

are sometimes offered in this way; and when the terms of

the offer are accepted, a contract exists; but a bounty law

may be repealed at any time as to anything that may

accrue thereafter.1

Offices. — A public office is a public trust: the appoint-

ment or election to it is a delegation of the trust to the

person appointed or elected for the time being. But it is

not a contract, and neither the office nor its emoluments

can be claimed as matter of right, as against subsequent

legislation abolishing the one or reducing the other."i

Nevertheless, if in either of these particulars the state

constitution has made provisions, it is not competent by

law to change them, for the manifest reason that the con-

stitution in that case limits the legislative power in that

regard. For example, the President's term of office is

four years, and his compensation can neither be increased
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nor diminished during his term ;8 and in both these par-

ticulars the power of Congress over his office is excluded.

Statutory Privileges. — The grant of a statutory privi-

lege is not a contract, but it resembles a license, and is

always revocable, except that the party cannot be deprived

of benefits already enjoyed under it. Under this head

come exemptions from military and jury duty, exemptions

of property from taxation or from sale on execution,4 and

» Welch v. Cook, 97 TJ. S. Rep. 541.

2 Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; Head v. University, 19

Wall. 526.

• Const., Art. II.

* Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; East Saginaw

not at liberty to change its laws at discretion. But there
are exceptions to this general rule: for a State may give
to its contracts such form as it may choose to express its
assent in ; and this is sometimes. the form of a statute.
The grants of land by a State are frequently made by
statute, and so are grants of special privileges. Bounties
are sometimes offered in this way ; and when the terms of
the offer are accepted, a contract exists ; but a bounty law
may be repealed at any time as to anything that may
accrue thereafter. 1
Offices. - A public office is a public trust: the appointment or election to it is a delegation of the trust to the
person appointed or elected for the time being. But it is
not a contract, and neither the office nor its emoluments
can be claimed as matter of right, as against subsequent
legislation abolishing the one or reducing the other. ~1
Nevertheless, if in either of these particulars the state
constitution has made provisions, it is not competent by
law to change them, for the manifest reason that the constitution in that case limits the legislative power in that
regard. For example, the President's term of office is
four years, and his compensation can neither be increased
nor diminished during his term ; 8 and in both these particulars the power of Congress over his office is excluded.
Statutory Privileges. - The grant of a statutory privilege is not a contract, but it resembles a license, and is
always revocable, except that the party cannot be deprived
of benefits already enjoyed under it. Under this head
come exemptions from military and jury duty, exemptions
of property from taxation or from sale on execution,' and
Welch v. Cook, 97 U. S. Rep. 541.
2 Butler t'. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; Head v. University, 19
Wall. 626.
a Const., Art. II.
' Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; East Saginaw
I
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licenses to engage in any business the carrying on of

which is not open to the general public.1 And in general

it may be said that any privilege which is obtained under

the general law of the State may be taken away by a re-

peal or modification of the law.2

Municipal Corporations. — A grant of rights or privileges

to a municipal body or corporation for public purposes is

not a contract, but a law for the public good. Such bodies

and corporations are created as necessary conveniences in

government, and they must hold their powers and privileges

subject to legislative modification and recall at all times.

Therefore the grant to a town of the right to establish and

maintain a ferry across a public river may be revoked,8

the territorial limits of the town may be reduced, particular

powers taken away or changed at discretion, and so on.4

But a municipal corporation is entitled to protection in its

property as a natural person is, whether it comes from the

State or from any other source.6

Essential Powers of Government. — A State cannot by

contract bargain away any of the essential powers of sov-

ereignty, so as to deprive itself of the ability to employ
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them again and again, as the public exigencies shall seem

to require. For example, it cannot by granting land for

cemetery purposes preclude itself from forbidding the fur-

ther use of the land for those purposes when, by reason of

the increase of population in the vicinity, it has become, or

Salt, &c. Co. v. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373; Bull v. Conroe, 13 Wis.

233.

1 Calder v. Kirby, 5 Gray, (Mass.) 597; Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71.

a Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527.

8 East Hartford v. Bridge Co., 10 How. 511.

* Barnes ». District of Columbia, 91 U. S. Rep. 540; Laramie Co.

v. Albany Co., 92 U. S. Eep. 307.

* Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292; Terrett v. Taylor, 9

Cranch, 43; State v. Haben, 22 Wis. 660; Grogan v. San Francisco,

16 Cal. 590; Dillon, Mun. Corp., § 39 et seq.

licenses to engage in any business the carrying on of
which is not open to the general public. 1 And in general
it may be said that any privilege which is obtained under
the general law of the State may be taken away by a repeal or modification of the law. 2
Municipal Corporations. - A grant of rights or privileges
to a municipal body or corporation for public purposes is
not a contract, but a law for the public good. Such bodies
and corporations are created as necessary conveniences in
government, and they must hold their powers and privileges
subject to legislative modification and recall at all times.
Therefore the grant to a town of the right to establish and
maintain a ferry across a public river may be revoked, 8
the territorial limits of the town may be reduced, particular
powers taken away or changed at .discretion, and so on. 4
But a municipal corporation is entitled to protection in its
property as a natural person is, whether it comes from the
State or from any other source. 5
Essential Powers of Government. - A State cannot by
contra.ct bargain away any of the essential powers of sovereignty, so as to deprive itself of the ability to employ
them again and again, as the public exigencies shall seem
to require. For example, it cannot by granting land for
cemetery purposes preclude itself from for bidding the further use of the land for those purposes when, by reason of
the increase of population in the vicinity, it has become, or
Salt, &c. Co. v. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373; Bull v. Conroe, 13 Wis.
233.
1 Calder v. Kirby, 6 Gray, (Mase.) 697; Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71.
1 Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 627.
a East Hartford v. Bridge Co., 10 How. 611.
' Barnes"· District of Columbia, 91 U. S. Rep. 640; Laramie Co.
v. Albany Co., 92 U. S. Rep. 307.
' Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292; Terrett v. ·Taylor, g
Cranch, 43; State v. Haben, 22 Wis. 600; Grogan v. San Francisco,
16 Cal. 590 ·j Dillon, Mun. Corp., § 89 et seq.
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threatens to become, a nuisance ;1 and it cannot by a rail-

road charter deprive itself of the power to establish reason-

able regulations under which the railroad business shall be

carried on.2 So also the State cannot deprive itself of the

right to appropriate private property to public uses under

the eminent domain; this being a necessary power in gov-

ernment,8 or of the right to raise a revenue by an exercise

of the power to tax.

It is nevertheless held that the State may, for a consid-

eration, impose upon itself the obligation not to tax certain

subjects, otherwise taxable, for some definite period, or even

indefinitely; it being presumed in that case that the con-

sideration received by the State is equivalent to that which

might have been derived from the exercise of the custom-

ary power to tax.4 Nor is it essential that the considera-

tion shall be a direct pecuniary return, or one that can be

shown by evidence to be an equivalent; it is sufficient that

the State has apparently found it for its interest to as-

sume the obligation, and that some one else has acted in

reliance upon it. In the leading case the State made a

grant of lands, agreeing not to tax them in the hands of

the grantees; and this agreement was held to be an irrevo-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

cable exemption.6 In other cases the State, in granting

a charter of incorporation, has stipulated that the taxation

of the corporation shall only be at a certain rate, or on a

certain basis; and this also is irrevocable.6 But an ex-

1 Brick Presbyterian Church v. New York, 5 Cow. 538. See Fer-

tilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. Rep. 659.

2 Thorpe v. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 140; Railroad Co. v. Jacksonville,

67 111. 37.

* Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 343.

4 New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164; Pacific R. R. Co. v. Ma-

guire, 20 Wall. 36; University v. People, 99 U. S. Rep. 309.

s New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164.

* Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Railroad Co. v. Reid, 13

Wall. 264.

20

threatens to become, a nuisance ; 1 and it cannot by a railroad charter deprive itself of the power to establish reasonable regulations under which the railroad business shall be
carried on. 2 So also the State cannot deprive itself of the
right to appropriate private property to public uses under
the eminent domain; this being a necessary power in government, 8 or of the right to raise a revenue by an exercise
of the power to tax.
It is nevertheless held that the State may, for a consideration, impose upon itself the obligation not to tax certain
subjects, otherwise taxable, for some definite period, or even
indefinitely ; it being presumed in that case that the consideration reaeived by the State is equivalent to that which
might have been derived from the exercise of the customary power to tax. 4 Nor is it essential that the consideration shall be a direct pecuniary return, or one that can be
shown by evidence to be an equivalent; it is sufficient that
the State has apparently found it for its interest to assume the obligation, and that some one else 'has acted in
reliance upon it. In the leading case the State made a
grant of lands, agreeing not.. to tax them in the hands of
the grantees ; and this agreement was held to be an irrevocable exemption. 6 In other cases the State, in· granting
a charter of incorporation, has stipulated that the taxation
of the corporation shall only be at a certain· rate, or on a
certain basis ; and this also is irrevocable. 6 But an exBrick Presbyterian Church v. New York, 6 Cow. 638. See Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. Rep. 659.
t Tho-rpe v. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 140; Railroad Co. v. Jacksonville,
67 Ill. 37.
a Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 343.
' New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164; Pacific R. R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. 36; University v. People, 99 U. S. Rep. 309.
6 New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164.
& Piqua Bank 11. Knoop, 16 How. 869; Railroad Co. v. Reid, 13
Wall. 264.
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emption from taxation can never be granted as agtdnst a

provision in the state constitution which requires all prop-

erty to be uniformly taxed.1 And as the power to tax is

vital, and it is of the highest importance that it should

always remain unrestricted and in full force, the presnmp-

tion against any. intention to hamper or restrict it must

be strong in every case, and can only be overcome by the

employment of very clear terms to indicate that intent.a

And in any case an exemption from taxation, obviously

made as a mere favor, may be terminated at the will of

the State at any time.8

Exclusive Privileges. — It is settled by the authorities

that the State may grant exclusive privileges for many

purposes ; as, for example, to build a toll-bridge at a certain

point, to construct a toll-road between certain places, to

establish a certain ferry, and the like; and these grants,

when made to individuals or private corporations, are con-

tracts, and bind the State. But, as in the case of exemp-

tions from taxation, the intent of the State to restrict

or hamper its power for the future is not to be lightly

assumed, and it should appear with reasonable certainty in

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the legislation, and the grant will be strictly construed as

against the grantees. This is reasonable, not only when

the subject is regarded from the standpoint of state interest,

but also because exclusive privileges are to some extent in-

vidious and very justly obnoxious, and it is not reasonable

to suppose that the State would grant them, except when

some important public purpose or some necessary public

convenience cannot be accomplished or provided without

making the grant exclusive. Therefore, when the owners

1 Railroad Companies v. Gaines, 97 U. S. Rep. 697.

2 Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; Gilman v. Sheboy-

gan, 2 Black, 510.

• East Saginaw Salt, &c.Co. o.East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373; Home

Ins. Co. v. City Council, 93 U. S. Rep. 116; Welch v. Cook, 97 U. S.

Rep. 541.

emption· from taxation can never be granted as agninst a
provision in the state constitution which requires all property to be uniformly taxed. 1 And as the power to tax is
vital, and it is of the highest importance that it should
always remain unrestricted and in full force, the presumption against any, intention to hamper or restrict it must
be strong in every case, and can only be overcome by the
employment of very clear terms to indicate that intent. 9
And in any case an exemption from taxation, obviously
made as a mere favor, may be terminated at the will of
the State at any time. 8
Exclusive Privileges. -It is settled by the authorities
that the State may grant exclusive privileges for many
purposes ; as, for example, to build a toll-bridge at a certain
point, to construct a toll-road between certain places, to
establish a certain ferry, and the like ; and these grants,
when made to individuals or private corporations, are contracts, and bind the State. But, as in the case of exemptions from taxation, the intent of the State to restrict
or hamper its power for the future is not to be lightly
assumed, and it should appear with reasonable certainty in
the legislation, and the grant will be strictly construed as
against the grantees. This is reasonable, not only when
the subject is regarded from the standpoint of state interest,
but also because exclusive privileges are to some extent invidious and very justly obnoxious, and it is not reasonable
to suppose that the State would grant them, except when
some important public purpose or some necessary public
convenience cannot be accomplished or provided without
making the grunt exclusive. Therefore, when the owners
Railroad Companies v. Gaines, 97 U. S. Rep. 697.
Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, o10.
a East Saginaw Salt, &c. Co. v. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373; Home
Ins. Co. v. City Council, 93 U.S. Rep. 116; Welch v. Cook, 9i U. S.
Rep. 4)41.
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of a franchise under state grant contest the rights of the

State to make a second grant which would compete with

it, every doubt must be resolved in favor of their claim

before it can be sustained, and every resolution which

springs from doubt is against the claim.1 Moreover the

grant will never be extended by construction beyond the

plain terms in which it is made. A familiar instance is

where the owners of a ferry franchise, or of a franchise to

take toll for passing over a bridge, contest the right of the

State to grant a second franchise, the enjoyment of which

would diminish their own profits. As against them, the

presumption is that the State retained the right to license

as many crossings as should be found needful or desirable.9

But even the agreement of the State, that the grant

shall be exclusive, cannot prevent the making of another,

subject to the obligation to provide compensation, under

the principles governing the law of eminent domain. An

exclusive privilege only gives to the franchise additional

value as property; and all property is subject to be taken

and appropriated to public uses on making payment there-

for. Therefore, notwithstanding the existence of an ex-

clusive grant to construct a railroad between two named
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places, or a bridge over a river at a certain locality, the

State has, and must have, the power to make conflicting

grants when the public needs seem to require them; and

the progress of the State could or might be embarrassed or

stayed by improvident or dishonest state concessions if this

were otherwise.8 The new grant in such case does not

1 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Canal Commissioners, 21 Penn. St.

9, 22. See the discussions in Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S.

Rep. 659.

a Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420; Turnpike

Co. v. State, 3 Wall. 210.

8 West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507; Eastern R. R. Co. v.

Boston, &c. R. R. Co., Ill Mass. 125; Alabama, &c. R. R. Co. v.

Kenny, 39 Ala. 307.

of a franchise under state grant contest the rights of the
State to make a second grant which would compete with
it, every doubt must be resolved in favor of their claim
before it can be sustained, and every resolution which
springs from doubt is against the claim. 1 Moreover the
grant will never be extended by construction beyond the
plain terms in which it is made. A familiar instance is
where the owners of a ferry franchise, or of a franchise to
take toll for passing over a bridge, contest the right of the
State to grant a second franchise, the enjoyment of which
would diminish their own profits. As against them, the
presumption is that the State retained the right to license
as many crossings as should be found needful or desirable. 9
But even the agreement of the State, that the grant
shall be exclusive, cannot prevent the making of another,
subject to the obligation to provide compensation, under
the principles governing the law of eminent domain. An
exclusive privilege only gives to the franchise additional
value as property ; and all property is subject to be taken
and appropriated to public uses on making payment therefor. Therefore, notwithstanding the existence of an exclusive grant to construct a railroad between two named
places, or a bridge over a river at a certain locality, the
State has, and must have, the power to make conflicting
grants when the public needs seem to require them; and
the progress of the State could or might be embarrassed or
stayed by improvident or dishonest state concessions if this
were otherwise. 8 The new grant in such case does not
1 Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Canal Commissioners, 21 Penn. St.
9, 22. See the discussions in Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S.
Rep. 659.
t Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420; Turnpike
Co. v. State, 3 Wall. 210.
s West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507; Eastern R.R. Co."·
Boston, &c. R. R. Co., 111 Mass. 126; Alabama, &c. R. R. Co. "·
Kenny, 39 Ala. 307.
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impair the obligation of the other, but the obligation is

recognized in giving compensation for the exclusive privi-

lege.

Charter Contracts. — In the Dartmouth College Case, in

which the legislature undertook to remodel the charter of

an educational institution, in most important particulars,

without the consent of the corporators, it was decided that

the charter was a contract, which the State was supposed

to grant in consideration of expected benefits to accrue to

the general public, and whereby the State in legal contem-

plation promised that the corporators should enjoy the

privileges and franchises granted. The conclusion was

that the amendatory act was invalid, as impairing the obli-

gation of the contract.1 The same doctrine has been re-

asserted and reaffirmed in many cases since.2 Of course,

a total repeal of the charter would be a still plainer case.

Where, however, by the charter the legislature reserves

the right to alter, amend, or repeal it, it is plain that no

such consequence can follow, because then an alteration,

amendment, or repeal is in accordance with the contract,

and not hostile to it. So if by the constitution of the
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State, or by its general laws in force when the charter was

granted, it is provided that all charters shall be subject to

legislative control and alteration, this provision in legal

effect becomes a part of the charter, and therefore a part

of the contract.8

Police Regulations: General Principle. — All property

and all rights within the jurisdiction of a State are subject

to the regulations and restraints of its police power, ex-

1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518.

2 The Binghamton Bridge Case, 3 Wall. 51; Farrington v. Ten-

nessee, 95 U. S. Rep. 679.

» Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. Rep. 432, 448; Railroad Co. v.

Georgia, Q8 U. S. Rep. 359; Railroad Companies v. Gaines, 97 U. S.

Rep. 697

impair the obligation of the other, but the obligation is
recognized in giving compensation for the exclusive privilege.
Oharter Oontracts. - In the Dartmouth College Case, in
which the legislature undertook to remodel the charter of
an educational institution, in most important particulars,
without the consent of the corporators, it was decided that
the charter was a contract, which the State was supposed
to grant in consideration of expected benefits to accrue to
the general public, and whereby the State in legal contemplation promised that the corporators should enjoy the
privileges and franchises granted. The conclusion was
that the amendatory act was invalid, as impairing the obligation of the contract. 1 The same doctrine has· been reasserted and reaffirmed in many cases since. 2 Of course,
a total repeal of the charter would be a sti11 plainer case.
Where, however, by the charter the legislature reserves
the right to alter, amend, or repeal it, it is plain that no
such consequence can follow, because then an alteratibn,
amendment, or repeal is in accordance with the contract,
and not hostile to it. So if by the constitution ·of the
State, or by its general laws in force when the charter was
granted, it is provided that all charters shall be subject to
legislative control and alteration, this provision in legal
effect becomes a part of the .charter, and therefore a part
of the contract. 8
Police Regulations: General Prinmple. - All property
and all rights within the jurisdiction of a State are subject
to the regulations and restraints of its police power, exDartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 618.
The Binghamton· ~ridge, Case, 8 Wall. 61 ; Farrington t•. Tennessee, 95 U. S. Rep. 679.
I Murray v. Charleston,. 96 U. S. Rep. 432, 448 ; Railroad Co. v.
Georgia,. Qg. U.S. Rep. 359; Railroad Companies v. Gaines, 91 U.S.
Rep. 697
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cept so far as they are removed therefrom by the express

provisions or implications of the federal Constitution.1

The police power may be defined in general terms as that

power which inheres in the legislature to make, ordain, and

establish all manner of reasonable regulations and laws

whereby to preserve the peace and order of society and

the safety of its members, and to prescribe the mode and

manner in which every one may so use and enjoy that

which is his own as not to preclude a corresponding use

and enjoyment of their own by others.2

Interference with Federal Powers. —In a preceding chap-

ter cases have been mentioned in which attempts by the

States to exercise this power have been held invalid, be-

cause they interfered with the proper exercise by Congress

of its power in the regulation of commerce.8 More often

state regulations have been questioned on the ground that,

under the pretence of regulation, they took away rights

which were promised and assured by contract, and thereby

impaired the obligation of the contract.

Regulation of Charter Contracts. — It is not questioned

that all contract rights are subject to state regulation, as

all property is. Therefore, though a railroad company has
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a charter not subject to amendment or repeal by the legis-

lature, the company, nevertheless, in the conduct of busi-

ness under it, must conform to such rules and regulations

as the State may establish for the safety and protection

of those being carried by or having transactions with it.

Therefore the company may be required to fence its track

as a proper precaution, as well against the trains being

thrown from the track, as against the destruction or loss

1 United States ». De Witt, 9 Wall. 41; United States v. Reese,

92 U. S. Rep. 214.

2 License Cases, 5 How. 504; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462;

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. Rep. 113, 124.

» Ante, pp. 69-77.

cept so far as they are removed therefrom by the express
provisions or implications of the 'federal Constitution. 1
The police power may be defined in general terms as that
power which inheres in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of reasonable regulations and laws
whereby to preserve the peace and order of society and
the safety of its members, and to prescribe the mode !and
manner in which every one may so use and enjoy that
which is his own as not to preclude a corresponding use
and enjoyment of their own by others.i
Interference with Federal, Powers. - In a preceding chapter cases, have been mentioned in which attempts by the
States to exercise this power have been held invalid, because they interfered with the proper exercise by Congress
of its power in the regulation of commerce. 8 More often
state regulations have been questioned on the ground that,
under the pretence of regulation, they took away rights
which were promised and assured by contract, and thereby
impaired the obligation of the contract.
Regulation of Charter Contracts. - It is not questioned
that all contract, rights are subject to state regulation, as
all property is. Therefore, though a railroad company has
a charter not subject to amendment or repeal by the legislature, the company, nevertheless, in the conduct of business under it, must conform to such rules and regulations
as the State may establish for the safety and protection
of those being carried by or having transactions with it.
Therefore the company may be required to fence its track.
as a proper precaution, as well against the trains being
thrown from the track, as against the destruction or loss
1

United States v. De Witt, 9 Wall. 41; United States v. Reese,

9'J U. S. Rep. 214.

License Cases, 6 How. 604; License Tax Cases, 6 Wall. 462;
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. Rep. 113, 124.
a .Ante, pp. 69-77.
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of cattle,1 and to fix periodically its charges and keep them

posted for the information of the public.2 The follow-

ing are also reasonable regulations: requiring all trains

to check their speed at exposed places;8 to carry impar-

tially for all persons ;4 to permit other roads to cross the

railroad track, and to share with them the expense of the

crossing;6 to ring a bell or sound a whistle at crossings,

or to station a flagman at such, or any other dangerous

places ; * to respond in damages in case the death of any

person shall be caused by the company's wrongful act,

neglect, or default;7 and so on. On the other hand, if

the regulation assumes to take from the company some

substantial right which its charter confers, it will be void.

Instances are, the taking away a right to exact toll, which

had been clearly given;8 imposing upon the company new

liabilities for something it was expressly permitted to

do; * and so on.10 The limit to the exercise of the police

power over charter contracts is substantially this: the

regulations must have reference to the comfort, safety, or

welfare of society; they must not be in conflict with any

of the provisions of the charter, and they must not, under
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the pretence of regulation, take from the corporation any

i Thorpe v. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 140.

2 Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560.

8 Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Haggerty, 67 111. 113; Haas v. Railroad

Co., 41 Wis. 44; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. ». Lewis, 79 Penn. St. 33.

* Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. People, 67 111. 11.

6 Fitchburg, &c. R. R. Co. v. Grand Junction R. R. Co., 1 Allen,

(Mass.) 552.

6 Toledo, &c. R. R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 111. 37.

7 Steamboat Co. v. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120; Boston, &c. R. R. Co. v.

State, 32 N. H. 215.

» Pingrey ». Washburn, 1 Aik. (Vt.) 264.

• People v. Plank Road Co., 9 Mich. 285; Bailey v. Railroad Co.,

of cattle, 1 and to fix periodically its charges and keep them
posted for the information of the public.~ The following are also reasonable regulations: requiring all trains
to check their speed at exposed places; 8 to carry impartially for all persons ; 4 to permit other roads to cross the
railroad track, and to share with them the expense of the
crossing ; 6 to ring a beil or sound a whistle at crossings,
or to station a flagman at such, or any other dangerous
places ; 8 to respond in damages in case the death of any
person shall be caused by the company's wrongful act,
neglect, or default ; 7 and so on. On the other hand, if
the regulation assumes to take from the company some
substantial right which its charter confers, it will be void.
Instances are, the taking away a right to exact toll, which
had been clearly given ; 8 imposing upon the company new
liabilities for something it was expressly permitted to
do ; 9 and so on. 10 The limit to the exercise of the police
power over charter contracts is substantially this : the
regulations must have referencc to the comfort, safety, or
·welfare of society ; they must not be in conflict with any
of the provisions of the charter, and they must not, under
the pretence of regulation, take from the corporation any

4 Harr. (Del.) 389.

W p >e Washington Bridge Co. v. State, 18 Conn. 53; Philadelphia,

&c. R R. Co. v. Bowers, 4 Hous. (Del.) 506.

i

Thorpe v. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 140.
s Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 660.
a Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Haggerty, 67 Ill. 113; Haas v. Railroad
Co., 41 Wis. 44; Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Lewis, 79 Penn. St. 33.
' Chicago, &c. R.R. Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 11. .
6 Fitchburg, &c. R.R. Co. v. Grand Junction R.R. Co., 1 Allen,
.(Mass.) 652.
6 Toledo, &c. R.R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37.
7 Steamboat Co. v. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120; Boston, &c. R. R. Co. v.
State, 32 N. H. 215.
8 Pingrey v. Washburn, 1 Aik. (Vt.) 264.
t People v. Plank Road Co., 9 Mich. 285; Bailey v. Railroad Co.,
4 Harr. (Del.) 389.
10 S ~e Washington Bridge Co. v. State, 18 Conn. 63; Philadelphia,
&c. R R. Co. v. Bowers, 4 Hous. (Del.) 606.
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of the essential rights and privileges which the charter

confers. In short, they must be regulations in fact, and

not amendments of the charter in abridgment of the cor-

porate franchises.1 But where the charter reserves to the

legislature the power to alter, amend, or repeal it, or

where it is granted under a state constitution which ex-

pressly saves to the legislature that right, any change

whatever in the contract by legislative power is no impair-

ment of the contract.2 A legislature having such a power

may therefore fix the charges of railroad companies at

discretion.8

Implied Contracts.—Implied contracts, as well as those

made in express terms, are within the protection of the

Constitution. Under this head may be classed judgments

and decrees, and all statutory liens and rights of redemp-

tion when they spring from or originate in contracts, and

are in accordance with the law when the contract was

made.4

State Control of Remedies. — What is said further on re-

specting the control of remedies by the State is applicable

as well to contracts as to other rights. But the State must

always give some remedy, and it must be substantially the
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equivalent of that which was provided by law when the

contract was made. The withdrawal of the remedy for a

time by stay laws is an impairment of the obligation of

contracts.6 So is any law which, under the pretence of

changing the remedy, undertakes to compel the party to

accept something different in the place of that for which

1 Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 719, and cases cited. See Beer

Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. Rep. 25.

3 See the right of amendment with its limitations considered in

Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. Rep. 700.

• Chicago, &c. R. R. v. 1owa, 94 U. S. Rep. 155.

* Gunn b Barry, 15 Wall. 610.

6 Cooley, "onst. Lim., 4th ed., 457, and cases cited.

of the essential rights and privileges which the charter
confers. In short, they must be regulations in fact, and
not amendments of the charter in abridgment of the corporate franchises. 1 But where the charter resen?es to the
legislature the power to alter, amend, or repeal it, or
where it is granted under a state constitution which expressly saves to the legislature that right, any change
whatever in the contract by legislative power is no impairment of the contract. 2 A legislature having such a power
may therefore fix the charges of railroad companies at
discretion. 8
Implied Contracts. - Implied contracts, as well as those
made in express terins, are within the protection of the
Constitution. Under this head may be classed judgments
and decrees, and all statutory liens and rights of redemption when they spring from or originate in contracts, and
are in accordance with the law when the contract was
made.•
State Control of Remedies. -What is said further on respecting the control of remedies by the State is applicable
as well to contracts as to other rights. But the State must·
always give some remedy, and it must be substantially the
equivalent of that which was provided by law when the
contract was made. The withdrawal of the remedy for a
time by stay laws is an impairment of the obligation of
contracts. 6 So is any law which, under the pretence of
changing the remedy, u~dertakes to compel the party to
accept something different in the place of that for which
1 Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 719, and cases cited.
See Beer
Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. Rep. 25.
2 See the right of amendment with ·its limitations considered in
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. Rep. 700.
a Chicag'l, &c. R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. Rep. 165.
' Gunn" Barry, 15 Wall. 610.
I Cooley, "onst. Lim., 4th ed., 457, and cases cited
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he contracted; as, for example, land at an appraisal in the

place of money.1 So is anj- law which gives a preference

in payment of one creditor over another, which the law

when their contracts were made did not give, even though

the preferred creditor is tne State itself.2 So is any law

which takes away from the creditor any substantial right

which the contract assured to him; for example, the right

to the possession of mortgaged lands until the mortgage

debt is paid.8 So is any law which so far increases the

exemptions from executions issued on judgments as se-

riously to impair the value of the remedy, and reduce the

probabilities of collection.4 Even the power to tax may

sometimes become an important element in the obligation

of a contract. Thus, if a city contracts debts at a time

when it has by law ample power to levy taxes for their

payment, the creditor has a right to rely upon this power

as the means by the employment of which his debt shall be

satisfied, and the State cannot afterwards withdraw the

power, or so restrict it as to render payment by means

thereof impossible, and an act for that purpose would be

inoperative as to existing debts.6

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Reasonable limitation laws a State may alwaj-s pass,

and make them applicable to existing contracts.6 So the

State may make and enforce insolvent laws when there is

no national bankrupt law in existence, and under these

may discharge debtors from further liability on their con-

1 McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608.

2 Barings v. Dabney, 19 Wall. 1.

3 Mundy v. Monroe, 1 Mich. 68.

* Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. Rep. 595.

6 Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Galena ». Amy, 5 Wall.

705. This principle will apply when the corporate charter which

existed when the debt was created has been taken away, and a new

one substituted. Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. Rep. 266.

6 Bell v. Morrison, 1 ~° ?t. 351; Terry v. Anderson, 95 TJ. S. Rep.

628.

he contracted; as, for example, land at an appraisal in the
place of money. 1 So is any law which gives a preference
in paym~nt of one creditor over another, which the law
when their contracts were made did not give, even though
the preferred creditor ~s tue State itself. 2 So is any law
which takes away from the creditor any substantial right
which the contract assured to him ; for example, the right
to the possession of mortgaged lands until the mortgage
debt is paid. 1 So is any law which so far increases the
exemptions from executions issued on judgments as seriously to impair the value of the remedy' and reduce the
probabilities of collection. 4 Even the power to tax may
sometimes become an important element in the obligation
of a contract. Thus, if a city contracts debts at a time
when it has by law ample power to levy taxes for their
payment, the creditor has a right to rely upon this power
as the means by the employment of which his debt shall be
satisfied, and the State cannot afterwards withdraw the
power, or so restrict it as to render payment by means
thereof impossible, and an act for that purpose would be
inoperative as to existing debts. 6
Reasonable limitation laws a State may always pass,
and make them applicable to existing contracts. 6 So the
State may make and enforce insolvent laws when there is
no national bankrupt law in existence, and under these
may discharge debtors from further liability on their conMcCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608.
Barings v. Dabney, 19 Wall. 1.
3 Mundy v. Monroe, 1 Mich. 68.
'Edwards v. Kearzey, 00 U.S. Rep .. 695.
6 Von Hoffman t'. Quincy, 4 Wall. 635 ; Galena v. Amy, 6 Wall.
705. This principle will apply when the corporate charter which
existed when the debt was created has been taken away, and a new.
one substituted. Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. Rep. 266.
6 Bell v. Morrison, 1 "l>:it. 351; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. Rep.
628.
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tracts on such terms and conditions as shall be reasonable.

But such laws can only be applied to contracts subse-

quently made within the State, and between residents

thereof.1

Contracts of Guaranty. — Contracts of suretyship or of

secondary liability are as much within the protection of

the Constitution as are the principal contracts which they

secure, or on which they depend. Therefore, where the

law makes stockholders in a corporation liable for the cor-

porate debts, the liability, so far as existing debts are

concerned, is one which cannot be taken away or reduced

by a change in the law.2 But penalties imposed by stat-

ute may be released by statute at any time before they are

actually recovered.8

Objectionable Considerations. — The fact that a contract

had its origin in a consideration now recognized as im-

moral and insufficient is immaterial, provided it was suffi-

cient under the law at the time. Therefore, contracts for

the purchase price of slaves were enforced after emanci

pation, notwithstanding the State by its constitution had

provided that they should not be; the States having no

more power to impair the obligation of a contract by con-
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stitutional provision than by any other law.4

Adding to Contracts. — It is as incompetent to import

new terms into a contract as it is to take away or detract

from the force of those already there. But this point will

receive some attention hereafter.

Is Congress restrained ? — That Congress should not have

1 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 273; Baldwins. Hale, 1 Wall. 223.

* Ochiltree v. Railroad Co., 21 Wall. 249.

8 Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454; United States v. Tynen, 11

Wall. 8&

* White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646. See Delmar v. Insurance Co., 14

Wall. 661; Marsh v. Burroughs, 1 Woods, 463; Swain v. Seamans,

9 Wall. 254.

tracts on such terms and conditions as shall be reasonable.
But such laws can only be applied to contracts subsequently made within the State, and between residents
thereof. 1
Contracts of Guaranty. - Contracts of suretyship. or of
secondary liability are as much within the protection of
the Constitution as are the principal contracts which they
secure, or on which they depend. Therefore, where the
law makes stockholders in a corporation liable for the corporate debts, the liability, so far as existing debts are
concerned, is one which cannot be taken away or reduced
by a change in the law. 2 But penalties imposed by statute may be released by statute at any time before they are
actually recovered. 8
Objectionable Considerations. - The fact that a contract
had its origin in a consideration now recognized as immoral and insufficient is immaterial, provided it was sufficient under the law at the time. Therefore, contracts for
the purchase price of slaves were enforced after emanci
pation, notwithstanding the State by its constitution had
provided that they should not be ; the States having no
more power to impair the obligation of a contract by constitutional provision than by any other law.•
Adding to Contracts. - It is as incompetent to import
new terms into a contract as it is to take away or detract
from the force of those already there. But this point will
receive some attention hereafter.
Is Congress restrained~ -That Congress should not have
Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 273; Baldwin v. Hale, 1Wall.223.
t Ochiltree v. Railroad Co., 21 Wall. 249.
8 Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454; United States v. Tynen, 11
Wall. 88.
' White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646. See Delmar v. Insurance Co., 14
Wall. 661; Marsh v. Burroughs, 1 Woods, 403; Swain v. Seamans,
9 Wall. 254.
1
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been prohibited from impairing the obligation of contracts,

as the States were, may well excite some surprise. It was

certainly never intended that Congress under any circum-

stances should exercise that tyrannical power, and it prob-

ably never occurred to any one as possible that it would

ever attempt to do so. Should it, however, attempt it, in

the case of private contracts, the act may well be held not

to be legitimate legislation, and therefore incompetent and

void.1 But in respect to contracts by the government it-

self, so long as they remain executory, if it shall choose

not to perform them, there can be no redress. A govern-

ment cannot be compelled to pay its debts against its will

by any process short of war or of forcible reprisal. And

Congress may indirectly impair the obligation of private

contracts, through its power to debase the currency and

to establish and change the law of tender, as it did to

some extent in the act making treasury-notes a lawful ten-

der in payment of pre-existing debts. For such wrongs

only the political remedies can be available.

Miscellaneous Cases. — Some police regulations have

been contested, as amounting to a virtual destruction of
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property; for example, those prohibiting the sale of spirit-

uous or malt liquors as a beverage, and those establish-

ing limits in cities within which buildings of wood shall

not be constructed or repaired. But there is no doubt

that the legislature in its discretion may establish such

regulations.2

Section II.—Protection to Property.

The Constitution. — The fifth amendment to the Constitu-

tion provides that no person shall be deprived of property

1 See opinion in Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610.

2 License Cases, 5 How. 504; Commonwealth v. Intoxicating

Liquors, 115 Mass. 153; Insurance Co.-v. Brown, 11 Mich. 265. See

Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. Eep. 635.

been prohibited from impairing the obligation of contracts,
as the States were, may well excite some surprise. It was
certainly never intended that Congress under any circumstances should exercise that tyrannical power, and it probably never occurred to any one as possible that it would
ever attempt to do so. Should it, however, attempt it, in
the case of private contracts, the act may well be held not
to be legitimate legislation, and therefore incompetent and
void. 1 But in respect to contracts by the government itself, so long as they remain executory, if it shall choose
not to perform them, there can be no redress. A government cannot be compelled to pay its debts against its will
by any process short of war or of forcible reprisal. And
Congress may indirectly impair the obligation of private
contracts, through its power to debase the currency and
, to establish and change the law of tender, as it did to
some extent in the act making treasury-notes a lawful tender in payment of pre-existing debts. For such wrongs
only the political remedies can be available.
Miscellaneous Oases. - Some police regulations ·have
been contested, as amounting to a virtual destruction ot
property ; for example, those prohibiting the sale of spirituous or malt liquors as a beverage, and those establishing limits in cities within which buildings of wood shall
not be constructed or repaired. But there is no doubt
that the legislature in its discretion may establish such
regulations. 2
SECTION

II. -

PROTECTION TO PROPERTY.

The Constitution. -The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of property
See opinion in Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610.
License Cases, 5 How. 504:; Commonwealth ''· Intoxicating
Liquors, 115 Mass. 153; Insurance Co. -v. Brown, 11 Mich. 265. See
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. Rep. 635.
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without due process of law. This provision is a restraint

upon the federal powers only. The fourteenth amendment

supplements this by providing that no State shall deprive

any person of property without due process of law.

What is Property ? — That is property which is recog-

nized as such by the law, and nothing else is or can be.

"Property and law are born and must die together.

Before the laws, there was no property; take away the

laws, all property ceases."1 In America the law which

determines what is property is for the most part the com-

mon or customary law, though to this some additions are

made by statute. Whatever a man produces by the labor

of his hand or his brain, whatever he obtains in exchange

for something of his own, and whatever is given to him,

the law will protect him in the use, enjoj-ment, and dis-

position of. The wild beast is the property of him who

captures and subdues it, provided he keeps it subjected to

his dominion; game belongs to him who slays it; and so

on. The natural increase of domestic animals is the

property of the owner of the mother, and the natural pro-

ductions of the soil, as well as the crops produced by the

labor of man, belong to him who owns the soil.
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When an article either intrinsically or by the use to

which it is put becomes prejudicial, the law may withdraw

from it the attribute of property, and then any one may

be at liberty to destroy it. When anything becomes a

nuisance, the party incommoded may destroy it if the

nuisance cannot otherwise be abated; and if the public are

incommoded, the right to abate is general. Sometimes

things are declared nuisances by law because of their in-

jurious influence upon the morals of the community; as

for example, lottery tickets when kept for sale, the imple-

ments by means of which games of chance are played,

when kept for gambling, and intoxicating liquors when

1 Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, ch. 8.

without due process of law. This provision is a restraint
upon the federal powers only. The fourteenth amendment
supplements this by providing that no State shall deprive
any person of property without due process of law.
·What is Property 1- That is property which is recognized as such by the law, and nothing else is or can be.
''Property and law are born and must die together.
Before the laws, there was no property; take away the
laws, all property ceases." 1 In America the law which
determines what is property is for the most part the com·
mon or customary law, though to this some additions are
made by statute. Whatever a man produces by the labor
of his hand or his brain, whatever he obtains in exchange
for something of his own, and whatever is given to him,
the law will protect him in the use, enjoyment, and disposition of. The wild beast is the property of him who
captures and subdues it, provided he keeps it subjected to
his dominion ; game belongs to him who slays it ; and so
on. The natural increase of domestic animals is the
property of the owner of the mother, and the natural productions of the soil, as well as the crops produced by the
labor of man, belong to him who owns the soil.
·
When an article either intrinsically or by the use to
which it is put becomes prejudicial, the law may withdraw
from it the attribute of property, and then any one may
be at liberty to destroy it. When anything becomes a
nuisance, the party incommoded may destroy it if tho
nuisance cannot otherwise be abated ; and if the public are
incommoded, the right to abate is general. Sometimes
things are declared nuisances by law because of their injurious influence upon the morals of the community ; as
for example, lottery tickets when kept for sale, the implements by means of which games of chance are played, ,
when kept for gambling, and intoxicating liquors when
1

Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, ch. 8.
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offered for sale in violation of law. But when the wrong

consists solely in the use to which an article, not a nui-

sance in itself, is put, the owner's property in it cannot be

taken away until it has been judicially determined that a

breach of the law has been committed. A private citizen

cannot determine for himself that a property right in nome

other pel son has been forfeited by disobedience of law.1

Who restrained.—The prohibitions of the Constitution

apply to all departments of government, and to all private

citizens. The executive must of course always show au-

thority of law for his action: and when this is out of his

power, what he does cannot be by due process of law.

All ministerial officers must show warrant for everything

they assume to do in apparent disturbance of the rights of

others. The judiciary, from the highest courts to the low-

est, must exercise its authority within the limits permitted

by law, or it will act without jurisdiction, and therefore

without due process.

The validity of judicial action is tested by the one ques-

tion, Was it done with jurisdiction? Jurisdiction is com-

monly said to be, first, of the subject-matter, and, second,
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of the persons concerned. The former divides itself into

territorial and subjective. Every court has its territorial

jurisdiction assigned to it by law, and its process is in-

operative outside the prescribed limits. And within those

limits the court may take cognizance of such causes of

action as may be committed to it by law, and by the acts

of parties having a right to bring suit. For example, the

Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Del-

aware has a territorial jurisdiction within that State only;

but to ascertain what may be the subject-matter of a suit

in that court, it is necessary to consult the Constitution

aud the laws of the United States, and sometimes also the

common law. The Constitution prescribes to what cases the

1 Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, (Mass.) 1.

offE.'red for sale in violation of law. But when the wrong
consists solely in the use to which an article, not a nuisance in itself, is put, the owner's property in it cannot be
taken away until it has been judicially determined that a
breach of the law has been committed. A private citizen
cannot determine for himself that a property right in nome
other pe1 .son has been forfeited by disobedience of law . 1
Who restrained. -The prohibitions of the Constitution
apply to all departments of government, and to all private
citizens. The executive must of course always show authority of law for his action : and when this is out of his
power, what he does cannot be by due process oC law.
All ministerial officers must show warrant for everything
they assume to do in apparent disturbance of the rights of
others. The judiciary, from the highest courts to the lowest, must exercise its authority within the limits permitted
by law, or it will act without jurisdiction, and therefore
without due process.
The validity of judicial action is tested by the one question, Was it done. with jurisdiction? Jurisdiction is commonly said to be, first, of the subject-matter, and, second,
of the persons concerned. The former divides itself into
territorial and subjective. Every court has its territorial
jurisdicti<?n assigned to it by law, and its process is inoperative outside the prescribed limits. And within those
limits the court may take cognizance of such causes ot
action as may be committed to it by law, and by the acts
of parties having a right to bring suit. For example, the
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Delaware has a tenitorial jurisdiction within that State only ;
but to ascertain what may be the subject.matter of a suit
in that court, it is necessary to consult the Constitution
a.ud the laws of the United States, and sometimes also the
common law. The Constitution prescribes to what cases the
1

Fisher o. McGirr, 1 Gray, (Mass.) 1.
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jurisdiction may be extended; the laws of Congress extend

it to all these cases, or to less than all, as shall be deemed

wise; but these laws are made with those common-law

principles in view which determine what causes of action

are local, and what are transitory. Thus, the Constitution

permits a citizen of another State to sue a citizen of Dela-

ware in the United States courts; the law of Congress au-

thorizes the suit to be brought in the United States Circuit

Court only when the amount or value in controversy ex-

ceeds five hundred dollars. But if the matter in dispute

was the recovery of possession of land in another State,

it could not be brought in Delaware, because such an

action is local, and must be brought where the land is;

while if it was the recovery of the amount of a promissory

note, it would be immaterial where the right of action

arose, as such an action is always transitory; by which

is meant, that it may be brought wherever service can be

obtained, if the local law permits.

Consent can never confer jurisdiction of the subject-

matter of suits.1 Courts are created, and their jurisdiction

limited and defined, on considerations of general public

policy, and parties cannot be suffered of their own dis-
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cretion to modify and enlarge these limits. Therefore,

where a court by law has no authority to take cognizance

of a particular subject-matter in controversy, if it shall

proceed to do so either party to the controversy may

repudiate its action at any stage of the proceedings, and

refuse to be bound by them; and his previous consent to

them, however formal, can never be an impediment to his

rejecting them.2 This is the conclusive reason why di-

1 Mordecai t>. Lindsay, 19 How. 199; Montgomery v. Anderson,

21 How. 386; Coffin v. Tracy, 3 Caines, (N. Y.) 128; Preston v. Bos-

ton, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 7; Green v. Collins, 6 Ired. (N. C.) 139.

2 Bostwick v. Perkins, 4 Geo. 47 ; Ginn v. Rogers, 9 111. 131; White

v. Buchanan, 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 32.

jurisdiction may he extended; the laws of Congress extend
it to all these cases, or to less than all, as shall be deemed
wise ; but these laws are made with those common-law
principles in view which determine what causes of action
are local, and what are transitory. Thus, the Constitution
permits a citizen of another State to sue a citizen of Delaware in the United States courts; the law of Congress authorizes the suit to be brought in the United States Circuit
Court only when the amount or value in controversy exceeds five hundred dollars. But if the matter in dispute
was the recovery of possession of land in another State,
it could not be brought in Delaware, because such ari
action is local, and must be brought where the land is ;
while if it was the recovery of the amount of a promissory
note, it would ·be immaterial where the right of action
arose, as such an action is always transitory ; by which
is meant, that it may be brought wherever service can be
obtained, if the local law permits.
Consent can never confer jurisdiction of the subjectmatter of suits. 1 Cow1is are created, and their jurisdiction
limited and defined, on considerations of general public
policy, and parties cannot be suffered of their own discretion to modify and enlarge these limits. The1·efore,
where a court by law has no authority to take cognizance
of a particular subject-matter in controversy, if it shall
proceed to do so either party to the controversy may
·repudiate its action at any stage of the proceedings, and
refuse to be bound by them ; and his previous consent to
them, however formal, can never be an impediment to his
rejecting -them.t, This is the conclusive reason why diMordecai v. Lindsay, 19 How. 199; Montgomery v. Anderson,
21 How. 386; Coffin v. Tracy, 3 Caines, (N. Y.) 128; Presion v. Boaton, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 7; Green v. Collins, 6 Ired. (N. C.) ioo.
2 Bostwick t'. Perkins, 4 Geo. 47; Ginn v. Rogers, 9 Ill. 181; White
o. Buchanan, 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 32.
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vorces obtained collusively by citizens of one State in the

tribunals of another, are wholly inoperative and null; for

no court of one State can take cognizance of the domestic

relations of another with a view to their dissolution.1

Jurisdiction of the persons of litigants is acquired by

courts in the following ways : — 1. Of the plaintiff, by his

voluntary institution of suit; and, 2. Of the defendant, by

his being served with legal process at the commencement

of suit, or by his voluntary appearance in suit without pro-

cess, or after irregular service of process. This jurisdic-

tion may always be given to courts by consent of the party,

provided the subject-matter of the controversy is within

their jurisdiction.

Some cases are said to proceed in rem, because the pro-

cess which begins them is served upon the thing which is

the subject of controversy, instead of upon parties, and

the pleadings and other proceedings take notice of the

thing in litigation, and not of those interested in it. The

law or the practice of the court may require notice to be

given in some form to the parties concerned before final

judgment, but the jurisdiction is obtained by the original
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seizure or service.

Irregularities in Judicial Action. — When a court has

acquired jurisdiction, it may nevertheless exercise it irreg-

ularly. An irregularity consists in the failure to observe

that particular course of proceeding which, conformably to

the practice of the court, ought to have been observed in

the case. It is a general rule, that, while a want of juris-

diction renders the proceedings of a court void, an ir-

regularity only subjects them to be avoided on a direct

proceeding instituted for the purpose. The proper pro-

ceeding is either, — 1. An application to the court in which

the irregularity occurred, to set aside all action based upon

1 Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y.

80; People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247; Leith v. Leith, 39 N. H. 20.

vorces obtained collusively by citizens or one State in the
tribunals of another, are wholly inoperative and null ; for
no court of one State can take cognizance of the domestic
relations of another with a view to their dissolution. 1
Jurisdiction of the persons or litigants is acquired by
courts in the following ways : - 1. Of the plaintiff, by his
voluntary institution of suit; and, 2. Of the defendant, by
his being served with legal process at the commencement
of suit, or by his voluntary appearance in suit without process, or after irregular service of process. This jurisdiction may always be given to courts by consent of the party,
provided the subject-matter of the controversy is within
their jurisdiction.
Some cases are said to proceed iH rem, because the process which begins them is served upon the thing which is
the subject of controversy, instead of upon parties, and
the pleadings and other proceedings take notice of the
thing in litigation, and not of those interested in it. The
law or the practice of the court may require notice to be
given in some form to the parties concerned before final
judgment, but the jurisdiction is obtained by the original
seizure or service.
Irregularities in Judicial .Action. - When a court has
acquired jurisdiction, it may nevertheless exercise it irregularly. An irregularity consists in the failure to observe
that particular course of proceeding which, conformably to
the practice of the court, ought to have been observed in
the case. It is a general rule, that, while a want of jurisdiction renders the proceedings of a court void, an irregularity only subjects them to be avoided on a direct
-- proceeding instituted for the purpose. The proper proceeding is either, - 1. An application to the court in which
the irregularity occurred, to set aside all action based upon
Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y.
80; People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247; Leith v. Leith, 39 N. H. 20.
1

PROTECTION TO CONTRACTS AND PROPERTY. 319

PROTECTION TO CONTRACTS AND PROPERTY. 319

or affected by it; or, 2. The removal of the case to some

appellate court or jurisdiction for the correction of the

error as right and justice may require. But an irregular

step cannot he taken advantage of in a collateral proceed-

ing, but must be taken to be valid, while a want of juris-

diction may always be inquired into, and the enforcement

of a judgment obtnined without jurisdiction can never be

due process of law.

Divesting Rights by Legislation. —The legislature makes

the laws, but cannot pass judgments or decrees, or make

a law that is such in substance.1 It must "govern by

promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in partic-

ular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the

favorite at court and the countryman at plough."5 Never-

theless the general laws of the State may make different

regulations for different kinds of business, and prescribe

different rules for the different classes of people who com-

pose the State. The rules of civil capacity and criminal

responsibility are justly and properly made for different

classes of people; for minors and adults, for males and

females, for the sound in mind and the insane, for those

engaged in hazardous employments and those who are not,
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and so on. If an employment is one which concerns the

general public, and requires for its proper usefulness that

it should have the unhesitating confidence of the public, —

as in the cases of bankers and carriers of passengers, —

it may be proper that special and even severe regulations

be established to prevent the confidence being abused, and

to insure that the public reliance shall be justified. To

compel the observance of these under penalties is neither

unjust nor unconstitutional.

1 Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Penn. St. 9; Gaines v. Buford,

1 Dana, (Ky.) 481.

2 Locke on Civil Government, § 142; Griffin v. Cunningham, 20

Grat. (Va.) 31.

or affected by it ; or, 2. The removal of the case to some
appellate court or jurisdiction for the correction of the
error as right and justice may require. But an irregular
step cannot be taken advantage of in a collateral proceeding, but must be taken to be valid, while a want of jurisdiction may always be inquired into, and the enforcement
of a judgment obtftined without jurisdiction can never be
due process of law.
Divest1~ng Rights by Leg1,9slation. -The legislature makes
the laws, but cannot pass judgments or decrees, or make
a law that is such in substance. 1 It must '' govern by
promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the
favorite at court and the countryman at plough."~ Nevertheless the general laws of the State may make different
regulations for different kinds of business, an.d prescribe
different rules for the different classes of people who compose the State. The rules of civil capacity and criminal
responsibility are justly and properly made for different
classes of people ; for minors and adults, for males and
females, for the sound in mind and the insane, for those
engaged in hazardous employments and those who are not,
and so on. If an employment is one which concerns the
general public, and requires for its proper usefulness that
it should have the unhesitating confidence of the public, as in the cases of bankers and carriers of passengers, it may be proper that special and even severe regulations
be established to prevent the confidence being abused, and
to insure that the public reliance shall be justified. To
compel the observance of these under penalties is neither
unjust nor unconstitutional.
1

Tyson v. School Directors, 61 Penn. St. 9; Gaines v. Buford,
1 Dana, (Ky.) 481.
2 Locke on Civil Government, § 142; Griffin v. Cunningham, 20
Grat. (Va.) 31.
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Vested Rights. — The test of unlawful interference with

property is that vested rights are abridged or taken away.

Eights are vested, in contradistinction to being expectant

or contingent. They are vested when the right to enjoy-

ment, present or prospective, has become the property of

some particular person or persons as a present interest.

They are expectant, when they depend upon the continued

existence of a present condition of things until the happen-

ing of some future event. They are contingent, when they

are only to come into existence on an event or condition

which may not happen or be performed until some other

event may prevent their vesting.

Rights in Expectancy. — The man who to-day erects

buildings and puts in them machinery for the manufacture

of some important article of common consumption, on the

importation of which the law imposes a tariff duty which

is practically prohibitory, may expect that this will con-

tinue in force, and that he will in consequence reap large

profits from his manufactory. But he has no vested right

in the general laws of his country which entitles him to in-

sist that any one of them shall remain unchanged for his

benefit;1 and if the duty shall be removed, and his prop-
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erty rendered worthless in consequence, he is nevertheless

deprived of no right. All statutory privileges depend upon

this principle, and they may be taken away by changes in

the general laws at any time. The privilege of exemption

from arrest, exemption from taxation, exemption of prop-

erty from forced sale on execution, and exemption from

jury duty, are all within the principle. Even an exemp-

1 "A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of

the common law. . . . Rights of property, which have been created

by the common law, cannot be taken away without due process; but

the law itself as a rule of conduct may be changed at the wil). or

even at the whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by constitu-

tional limitations." — Munn v. Illinois, 94 IT. S. Rep. 113,134.

Vested Rights. -The test of unlawful interference with
property is that vested rights are abridged or taken away.
Rights are vestied, in contradistinction to being expectant
or contingent. They are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of
some particular person or persons as a present interest.
They are expectant, when they depend upon the continued
existence of a present condition of things until the happening of some future event. They are contingent, when they
are only to come into existence· on an event or condition
which may not happen or be performed until- some other
event may prevent their vesting.
Rights in Expectancy. -The man who to-day erects
buildings and puts in them machinery for the manufacture
,)f some important article of common consumption, on the
importation of which the law imposes a tariff duty which
is practically prohibitory, may expect that this . will continue in force,. and that he will in c0nsequence reap large
profits from his manufactory .. But he has no vested right
in the general laws of his country which entitles· him to in·
sist that any one of them shall remain unchanged fur his
benefit ; 1 and if the duty shall be removed, and his property rendered worthless in con~equence, . he is nevertheless
deprived of no right. All statutory privileges depend.upon
this principle, and they may be taken away by changes in
the general laws at any time. The privilege of exemption
from arrest, exemption from taxation, exemption of property from forced · sale on execution, and exemption from
jury duty, are all within the principle. Even an exemp"A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of
the common law . . . . Rights of property, which have been created
by the common law, cannot be taken away without due process; but
the law itself as a rule of conduct may be changed at the wiU. or
even at the whim, of the legislatu110, unlesa prevented by const1tu·
tional limitations.'' - Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. Rep. 113, 134.
1
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tion from military duty, granted by the law after full per-

formance of duty for some previously fixed period, may be

w:lhdrawn when the exigencies of the State appear to re-

quire it.1

So the rules of descent may be changed in the legislative

discretion, though thereby the expectations of living per-

sons under the previous laws are disappointed. The living

have no heirs, and the laws which provide who shall be

their heirs in the event of their death are only expressive

of present views of what is best, and may be changed as

these views change; and no vested rights can be impaired,

since no rights under these laws can vest while the owner

of the estate is living. The expectation is not property;

it cannot be sold or mortgaged; it is not subject to debts;

and it is not in any manner taken notice of by the law

until the moment of the owner's death, when the statute

of descents as it then exists comes in, and for reasons of

general public policy passes the estate to persons standing

in certain degrees of relationship to the deceased, in pref-

erence to all others. It is not until that moment that there

is any vested right in the person who becomes heir.2

So qualities annexed to estates, and to affect their enjoy-
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ment in the future, may be changed when the interests of

the owners are not rendered less beneficial, Estates tail

may be changed into estates in fee simple, estates in joint

tenancy into estates in common.8 So the expectant right

of the husband to an estate bj- the courtesy in his wife's

lands may be taken away by general legislation at any time

before it has become initiate by the birth of living issue of

the marriage, and the expectant right of the wife to dower

1 Conlmonwealth o. Bird, 12 Mass. 443; Swindle ». Brooks, 34

Geo. 67; Murphy v. People, 37 111. 447; State v. Wright, 53 Me. 328.

8 Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 446.

• Holbrook v. Finney, 4 Mass. 465; Burghardt v. Turner, 12 Pick.

(Mass.) 534.
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tion from military duty, granted by the law after full p~r
formance of duty for some previously fixed period, may be
w:thdrawn when the exigencies of the State appear to reqmre it. 1
So the rules of descent may be changed in the legislative
discretion, though thereby the expectations of living persons tinder the previous laws are disappointed. The living
have no heirs, and the laws which provide who shall be
their heirs in the event of their death are only expressive
of present views of what is best, and _may be changed as
these views change; and no vested rights can be impaired,
since no rights under these laws can vest wbile the owner
of the estate is living. The expectation is not property ;
it cannot be sold or mortgaged ; it is not subject to debts ;
and it is not in any manner taken notice of by the law
until the moment of the owner's death, when the statute
of descents as it then exists comes in, and for reasons of
general public policy passes the estate to persons standing
in certain degrees of relationship to the deceased, in preference to all others. It is not until that moment that there
is any vested right in the person who becomes heir.~
So qualities annexed to estates, and to affect their enjoyment in the future, may be changed when the interests of
the owners are not rendered less beneficial, Estates tail
may be changed into estates in fee simple, estates in joint
tenancy into estates in common. 8 So the expectant right
of the husband to an estate by the courtesy in his wife's
lands may be taken away by general legislation at any time
before it has become initiate by the birth of living issue of
the marriage, and the expectant right of the wife to dower
1

Commonwealth v. Bird, 12 Mass. 443; Swindle v. Brooks, 34

Geo. 67 ; Murphy v. People, 37 Ill. 44 7 ; State v. Wright, 53 Me. 328.
~

Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 446.

a Holbrook v. Finney, 4 Mass. 465; Burghardt v. Turner, 12 Pick.

(Mus.) 634.

21
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in her husband's lands at any time before it has passed

from the condition of expectancy and become perfected by

the husband's death.1 The marriage gives no vested right

in either of these cases.

Trust Interests. — Where one holds property for another,

the vested right which the law regards is not that of the

trustee, but of the beneficiary. It is a perfectly legitimate

exercise of legislative power to convert equitable estates

into legal, thereby wholly divesting the trustee of his legal

ownership. The Statute of Uses 2 had this for its main

purpose, and its general features have been re-enacted in

many States of the Union, and recognized by judicial de-

cision in others. Trusts arising by construction of law to

prevent frauds are subject to a like legislative control, but

with this limitation: that, as the legislature cannot adjudge

that a fraud has been committed, the supposed trustee, if

he claims the property, must have a right to a judicial hear-

ing upon his claim before he can be dispossessed. And as

between those who claim adversely as beneficiaries the

legislature can never decide, but they must be left to liti-

gate their conflicting claims in the courts.8
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Curative Laws. — One method in which beneficial in-

terests are protected by legislation is by a retrospective

correction of .errors and defects in conveyances. A lead-

ing case on the subject was one in which a statute was

passed to validate certain leases of land which under pre-

vious judicial decisions had been declared inoperative.

By the express terms of the statute it was made applica-

ble to pending suits in which contracts of leasing might

come in question. It was sustained as undoubtedly valid,

though it was contested as a law impairing the obligation

1 Lucas v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa, 517; Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37; Pratt

r. Tefft, 14 Mich. 191; Westervelt ». Gregg, 12 N. Y. 202.

* Stat. 27 Hen. VIII. c. 10.

• Cash, Appellan* » Mich. 193; Lane v. Dorman, 4 111. 238.

in her husband's lands at any time before it has passed
from the condition of expectancy and become perfected by
the husband's death. 1 The marriage gives no vested right
in either of these cases.
Trust Interests. -Where one holds property for another,
the vested right which the law regards is not that of the
trustee, but of the beneficiary. It is a perfectly legitimate
exercise of legislative power to convert equitable estates
into legal, thereby wholly divesting the trustee of his legal
ownership. The Statute of Uses ~ had this for its main
purpose, and its general features have been re-enacted in
many States of the Union, and recognized by judicial decision in others. Trusts arising by construction of law to
prevent frauds are subject to a like legislative control, but
with this limitation : that, as the legislature cannot adjudge
that a fraud bas been committed, the supposed trustee, if
he claims the property, must have a right to a judicial hearing upon his claim before he can be dispossessed. And as
between those who claim adversely as beneficiaries the
legislature can never decide, but they must be left to litigate their conflicting claims in the courts. 8
Curative Laws. - One method in which beneficial interests are protected by legislation is by a retrospective
correction of .errors and defects i~ conveyances. A leading case on the subject was one in which a st..'\tute was
passed to validate certain leases of land which under previous judicial decisions had been declared inoperative.
By the expres~ terms of the statute it was made applicable to pending suits in which contracts of leasing might
come in question. It was sustained as undoubtedly valid,
though it was contested as a law impairing the obligation
t•.

1 Lucas v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa, 617; Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37; Pratt
Tefft, 14 Mich. HH; 'Vestervelt "· Gregg, 12 N. Y. 202.
i Stat. 27 H_en. VIII. c. 10.
' Cash, A ppellan., 1 Mich. 193 ; Lane v. Dorman, 4 Ill. 238.
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of contracts.1 Manifestly, it had no such effect as was

pretended; it rather imported into the contract an obliga-

of contracts. 1 Manifestly, it had no such effect as was
pretended; it rather imported into the contract an obligation which the parties had attempted, but failed, to incorporate in it. And this is the principle on which all
such laws may be sustained ; they merely give legal validity to what the parties have attempted to accomplish ;
converting their invalid agreements into the valid conveyances which they undertook to make. PresumptiYely,
therefore, these laws further the intent the parties had
in view.
It may happen that the grantor in the invalid conveyance,
when he finds the title has not been transferred, may desire
to take advantage of the invalidity, and may insist that he
has a vested right wh~ch the legislature cannot take away.
But obviously he has in such a oose no equitable right.
In equity he is considered as holding for the benefit
the
party to whom he undertook to convey ; and, as has been
well said, '' Courts do not regard rights as vested contrary
to the justice and equity of the case." 2
This principle has been applied to the conveyances of
married women, and they have been validated retrospectively, though they were so entirely void in their origin
that they did not constitute even a contract, or raise an
equity which could be taken notice of judicially. 8 The
woman has no right to complain if the law which prescribed forms for her protection shall interfere when justice
demands it, to preclude her taking advantage of an imperfection in her own act.'

tion which the parties had attempted, but failed, to in-

corporate in it. And tin's is the principle on which all

such laws may be sustained; they merely give legal va-

lidity to what the parties have attempted to accomplish;

converting their invalid agreements into the valid convey-

ances which they undertook to make. Presumptively,

therefore, these laws further the intent the parties had

in view.

It may happen that the grantor in the invalid conveyance,

when he finds the title has not been transferred, may desire

to take advantage of the invalidity, and may insist that he

has a vested right whjeh the legislature cannot take away.

But obviously he has in such a ease no equitable right.

In equity he is considered as holding for the benefit of the

party to whom he undertook to convey; and, as has been

well said, "Courts do not regard rights as vested contrary

to the justice and equity of the case."2

This principle has been applied to the conveyances of

married women, and they have been validated retrospect-

ively, though they were so entirely void in their origin
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that they did not constitute even a contract, or raise an

equity which could be taken notice of judicially.8 The

woman has no right to complain if the law which pre-

of

scribed forms for her protection shall interfere when justice

demands it, to preclude her taking advantage of an imper-

fection in her own act.4

1 Satterlee v. Mathewson, 16 S. & R. (Perm.) 169; S. C. in error,

2 Pet. 380.

a State v. Newark, 27 N. J. 185,197; Foster v. Essex Bank, 16

Mass. 245; Brown v. New York, 63 N. Y. 239; Chestnut v. Shane's

Lessee, 16 Ohio, 599.

» Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Underwood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R.

(Penn.) 97; Deutzel ». Waldie, 30 Cal. 138.

* Goshorn v. Puroell, 11 Ohio, N. S. 641.

•

Satterlee v. Mathewson, 16 S. & R. (Penn.) 169; S. C. in error,
2 Pet. 380.
~ State v. Newark, 27 N. J. 185, 197; Foster v. Essex Bank, 16
Mass. 245; Brown v. New York, 63 N. Y. 239; Chestnut v. Shane's
Lessee, 16 Ohio, 699.
a Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Underwood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R.
(Penn.) 97 ; Deutzel v. Waldie, 80 Cal. 188.
' Goshorn v. Pureell, 11 Ohio, N. S. 641.
1
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If, however, the grantor in the invalid conveyance shall

subsequently convey in due form of law to a bona fide pur-

chaser, the previous deed cannot afterwards be corrected

to his prejudice. The reason is, that he has equities equal

to those of the first purchaser, and, having connected the

legal title with these, his right, according to well-settled

rules of the courts of equity, has become unassailable.1

And if the defective conveyance was one which for any

other reason was inoperative; as where the grantor as-

sumed to convey by it contrary to conditions or qualifica-

tions which, for the benefit of others, were imposed upon

his title, or in fraud of the rights of others whose rep-

resentative or agent he was, it is not in the power of the

legislature to validate it retrospectively, since validating it

would divest equities instead of perfecting them.2 An in-

valid will, or trust in a will, can never be helped after the

testator's death, for the obvious reason that titles vest

under it immediately.8

The defects in conveyances and contracts which render

them inoperative arise from two causes : — 1. Defect in legal

capacity in the party making them; 2. Failure to observe
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some legal formality in their execution. The former may

arise from nonage, coverture, or guardianship, or it may

be a defect of intelligent will. The disabilities which are

imposed by the law itself may be removed or modified by

a change in the law. The same is true of legal formalities:

the statute establishes what are deemed important, and the

statute may dispense with them. And the general rule is

this: it is competent for the legislature to give retrospect-

1 Brinton v. See vers, 12 Iowa, 389; Le Bois v. Bramel, 4 How.

449; Sherwood v. Fleming, 25 Texas, 408 (Supplement).

2 Shonk v. Brown, 61 Penn. St. 320.

• Hilliard v. Miller, 10 Penn. St. 326; Greenough v. Greenough,

11 Penn. St. 489; Alter's Appeal, 67 Penn. St. 341; State v. Warren,

28 Md. 338.

If, however, the grantor in the invalid conveyance shall
subsequently convey in due form of law to a bona fide purchaser, the previous deed cannot afterwards be corrected
to his prejudice. The reason is, that he has equities equal
to those of the first purchaser, and, having connected the
legal title with these, his right, according to well-settled
rules of the courts of equity, has become unassailable. 1
And if the defective conveyance was one which for any
other reason was inoperative; as where the grantor ·assumed to convey by it contrary to conditions or qualifications which, for the benefit of others, were imposed upon
his title, or in fraud of the rights of others whose representative or agent he was, it is not in the power of the
legislature to valida~ it retrospectively, since validating it
would divest equities instead of perfecting them.~ An invalid ·will, or trust in a will, can never be helped after the
testator's death, for the obvious reason that titles vest
under it immediately. 8
The defects in conveyances and contracts which render
·them inoperative arise from two causes : -1. Defect in legal
capacity in the party making them ; 2. Failure to observe
some legal formality in their execution. The former may
arise from nonage, coverture, or guardianship, or it may
be a defect of intelligent will. The disabilities which are
imposed by the law itself may be removed or modified by
a change in the law. The same is true of legal formalities:
the statute establishes what are deemed important, and the
statute may dispense with them. And the general rule is
this: it is competent for the legislature to give retrospect1 Brinton o. Seevers, 12 Iowa, 389; Le Bois v. Bramel, 4 How.
"9; Sherwood v. Fleming, 25 Texas, 408 (Supplement).
1 Shonk v. Brown, 61 Penn. St. 320.
• Hilliard v. Miller, 10 Penn. St. 826; Greenough v. Greenough,
11 Penn. St. 489; Alter's Appeal, 67 Penn. St. 341 ; State v. Warren,

28 Md. 338.
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ively the capacity it might have given in advance, and to

dispense retrospectively with any formality it might have

dispensed with in advance.1 But it can never,, either pro-

spectively or retrospectively, dispense with the act of

assent, and therefore cannot validate the deed of an in-

sane person.2 , .

The power to correct applies to all classes of contracts.

A marriage defective in formalities of execution may be

validated retrospectively; 3 so may notes and bills issued

by a corporation on which the power has not been con-

ferred by its charter; * so may negotiable paper which is

wholly or in part void for usury.6 It is not an uncommon

exercise of legislative power to validate the imperfect con-

tracts of municipal corporations, whether the defect con-

sists in a want of original power in the corporation to do

what was attempted, or in neglect of proper formalities in

entering into them.6

Caring Defects in Judicial Proceedings. — It is a well-

settled principle that the legislature can never, by retro-

spective .proceedings, cure a defect of jurisdiction in the

proceedings of courts. The reason is manifest. Such

proceedings being utterly void, they would acquire vitality
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as judicial acts, if at all, by the legislative act exclusively,

and the curative act must therefore be in its nature a

1 Single v. Supervisors of Marathon, 38 Wis. 363.

2 Routsong v. Wolf, 35 Mo. 174.

8 Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209.

* Lewis v. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 347; Trustees ». McGaughy, 2 Ohio,

N. S. 152.

5 Savings Bank v. Allen, 28 Conn. 97; Thompson v. Morgan,

6 Minn. 292; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 48 111. 331; Woodruff v. Seruggs,

27 Ark. 26.

6 Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45

N. H. 9; Ahl ». Gleim, 52 Penn. St. 432; State v. Demorest, 82 N. J.

528; Coffman v. Keightley, 24 Ind. 509; Mills v. Charlton, 29 Wig.

400. See Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. Rep. 687.

ively the capacity it might have given in advance, and to
dispense retrospectively with any formality it might have
dispensed with in advance. 1 Bu.t it can never,, either prospectively or retrospectively, dispense with the act ot
· assent, and therefore cannot validate the deed of an insane person. 2
The power to correct applies to all classes of contracts.
A marriage defective in formalities of execution may be
validated retrospectively ; 3 so may notes and bills issued
by a corporation on which the power has not been conferred by its charter ; ' so may negotiable paper which is
wholly or in part void for usury.' It is not an uncommon
exercise of legislative power to validate the imperfect contracts of municipal corporations, whether the defec• consists in a want of. original power in the corporation to do
what was attempted, or in neglect of proper formalities in
entering into them. 6
Curing Defects in Jltdiclal Proceedings. - It is a wellsettled principle that the legislature can never, by retrospective ,proceedings, cure a defect of jurisdiction in the
proceedings of courts. The reason is manifest. Such
proceedings being utterly void, they would acquire vitality
as judicial acts, if at all, by the legislative act exclusively,
and the curative act must therefore be in its nature a
Single v. Supervisors of Marathon, 38 Wis. 363.
Routsong v. Wolf, 35 Mo. 174.
a Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209.
' Lewis v. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 347; Trustees v. McGaughy, 2 Ohio,
N. S.152.
6 Savings Bank v. Allen, 28 Conn. 97; Thompson v. Morg~n,
6 Minn. 292; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 48 Ill. 331; Woodruff 'D. Seruggs,
27 Ark. 26.
6 Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45
N. II. 0; Ahl v. Gleim, 52 Penn. St. 4:32 ; State v. Demorest, 32 N. J.
528; Coffman v. Keightley, 24 Ind. 509; Mills v. Charlton, 29 Wia.
,00. See Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. Rep. 687.
l

2

826

326

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

judgment.1 But mere irregularities in judicial proceedings

may always be cured retrospectively. A leading case

was where a sale in a partition case was ineffectual, be-

cause the purchase was made by several, and the deed was

made to one only. But it appeared that the deed was so

made by mutual agreement of all, for convenience in mak-

ing subsequent sales and conveyances, and a healing

statute was consequently in furtherance of justice, and un-

objectionable.2 So execution sales have been validated

where the defect consisted in an over-charge of officer's

fees on the execution,8 and sales by executors and guard-

ians where various irregularities existed not affecting the

substantial interests of the parties concerned.4 Indeed, it

is not uncommon to provide by general law that certain

specified defects and irregularities occurring in such sales

shall not affect them; and the right to enact such a law is

undoubted.6

Administrative Proceedings.—The same principle applies

in all administrative proceedings. For example, irregular

proceedings in taxation may be made good retrospect-

ively,6 but subject to this limitation, that there must origi-
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nally have been in the officers jurisdiction to impose the

levy; and they must have made it in accordance with the

general principles which underlie the power to tax.7 An

1 McDaniel u. Correll, 19 111. 226; Denny v. Mattoon, 2 Allen,

361; State v. Doherty, 60 Maine, 504.

2 Kearney v. Taylor, 15 How. 494. See Boyee v. Sinclair, 3 Bush

(Ky.) 261.

8 Beach v. Walker, 6 Conn. 190.

4 Davis v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316; Lucas v. Tucker, 17 Ind. 41.

'6 Toll v. Wright, 37 Mich. 93. This whole matter of Retro-

active Laws is fully and carefully examined in Mr. Wade's treatise

on that subject, which was received too late to be made use of in

this work.

6 Butler v. Toledo, 5 Ohio, N. S. 225; Iowa, &a. Co. v. Soper, 39

Iowa, 112; Astor v. New York, 62 N. Y. 580.

7 People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15.

judgment. 1 But mere irregularities in judicial proceedings
may always be cured retrospectively. A leading case
was where a sale in a partition case was ineffectual,, because the purchase was made by several, and the deed was
made to one only. But it appeared that the deed was so
made by mutual agreement of all, for convenience in making subsequent sales and conveyances, and a healing
statute was consequently in furtherance of justice, and unobjectionable. 2 So execution sales have been validated
where the defect consisted in an over-charge of officer's
fees on the execution, 8 and sales by executors and guardians where various irregularities existed not affecting the
substantial interests of the parties concerned. 4 Indeed, it
is not uncommon to provide by general law that certain
specified defects and irregularities occurring in such sales
shall not affect them ; and the right to enact such a law is
undoubted. 5
.Administrative Proceedings. -The same principle applies
in all administrative proceedings. For example, irregular
proceedings in taxation may be made good retrospectively, 6 but subject to this limitation, that there must originally have been in the officers jurisdiction to impose the
levy ; and they must have made it in accordance with the
general principles which underlie the power to tax. 1 An
1 McDaniel v. Correll, 19 Ill. 226; Denny v. Mattoon, 2 Allen,
861; State ~- Doherty, 60 Maine, 504.
2 Kearney t'. Taylor, 15 How. 494:.
See Boyce v. Sinclair, 8 Bush
(Ky.) 261.
a Beach v. Walker, 6 Conn. 190.
• Dav"is v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316; Lucas v. Tucker, 17 Ind. 41.
6 Toll v. Wright, 37 Mich. 93.
This whole matter of Retroactive Laws is fully and carefully examined in Mr. Wade's treatise
on that subject, which was received too late to be made use of in
this work.
6 Butler v. Toledo, 5 Ohio, N. S. 225; Iowa, &(}. Co. v. Soper, 39
Iowa, 112 ; Astor r1. New York, 62 N. Y. 580.
1 People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15.
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instance of the failure to observe these principles would be

a leyy without an apportionment among the subjects taxed;

an arbitrary levy being no tax1 at all. And a tax sale

effected by fraud is incapable of confirmation.1 Defects in

execution or mortgage sales, or in the execution of any

statutory power, may be cured under the same rules.2

And so may irregularities in the proceedings of public and

private corporations.8

Rights of Action. —It is not competent by legislation to

bring into existence and establish against a party a de-

mand which previously he was neither legally nor equita-

bly bound to recognize and satisfy.4 On the other hand,

it is not competent for the legislature to deprive a party of

a right of action accruing to him under the rules of the

common law, or in accordance with its principles. There-

fore the right to redress for illegal arrests cannot be taken

away;6 neither can the right to recover back taxes ille-

gally exacted,6 nor the right to have a void tax sale set

aside.7 Nor can conditions to the exercise of the right be

imposed, which are of a nature to render it practically of no

value.8 But an action for a forfeiture, given by and de-

pending on statute, will be gone if, before recovery, the
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statute is repealed without expressly saving it.9

1 Conway v. Cable, 37 111. 82.

2 Allen o. Archer, 49 Me. 346; Commonwealth v. Marshall, 69

Penn. St. 328.

8 Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327; Mitchell v. Deeds, 49 111.

416; State ». Guttenburg, 38 N.J. 419.

* Medford v. Learned, 16 Mass. 215; Albertson v. Landon, 42

Conn. 209; People v. Supervisors, 43 N. Y. 130; Ohio, &c. R. R. Co.

v. Lackey, 78 111. 55.

* Johnson v. Jones, 44 111. 142; Griffin u. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370.

6 Hubbard v. Brainerd, 35 Conn. 563.

1 Wilson v. McKenna, 52 111. 43.

8 McFarland v. Butler, 8 Minn. 116; Wilson v. McKenna, 52 111. 43.

» Ante, p. 313; Miller v. White, 50 N. Y. 139; Breitung v. Lindauer,

37 Mich. 217.

instance of the failure to observe these principles would be
a levy without an apportionment among the subjects taxed ;
an arbitrary levy being no tax• at all. And a tax sale
effected by fraud is incapable of confirmation. 1 Defects in
execution or mortgage sales, or in the execution of any
statutory power, may be cured under the same rules.~
And so may irregularities in the proceedings of public and
piivate corporations. 8
Rights of Action. - It is not competent by legislation to
bring into existence and establish against a party a demand which previously he was neither legally nor equitably bound to recognize and satisfy. 4 On the other hand,
it is not competent for the legislature to deprive a party of
a right of action accruing to him under the rules of the
common law, or in accordance with its principles. Therefore the right to redress for illegal arrests cannot be taken
away; 5 neither can the right to recover hack taxes illegally exacted, 6 nor the right to have a void tax sale set
aside. 7 Nor can conditions to the exercise of the right be
imposed, which are of a nature to render it practically of no
value. 8 But an action for a forfeiture, given by and depending on statute, will be gone if, before recovery, the
statute is repealed without expressly saving it. 9
Conway v. Cable, 37 Ill. 82.
2 Allen v. Archer, 49 Me. 34:6; Commonwealth v. Marshall, 69
Penn. St. 328.
a Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327; Mitchell v. Deeds, 49 Ill.
416; State t'. Guttenburg, 38 N. J. 419.
4 Medford v. Learned, 16 Mass. 215; Albertson v. Landon, 42
Conn. 209; People v. Supervisors, 43 N. Y. 130; Ohio, &c. R. R. Co.
v. Lackey, 78 Ill. 55.
· 6 Johnson v. Jones, 44: Ill. 142; Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370.
6 Hubbard v. Brainerd, 35 Conn. 563.
7 Wilson v. McKenna, 52 Ill. 43.
s McFarland v. Butler, 8 Minn. 116; Wilson v. McKenna, 52 Ill. 43.
9 Ante, p. 313; Miller v. White, 50 N. Y. 139; Breitung v. LindauerJ
37 Mich. 217.
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A statute of limitation takes away no right of property.

Such a statute prescribes a reasonable time within which a

party claiming legal rights which another withholds shall

commence legal proceedings for their enforcement, and it

withdraws the privilege of suing if the time is suffered to

elapse without action.1 This is a proper and reasonable

regulation of a right; not a denial of it.a And when the

time limited by the statute has been suffered to elapse

without suit, so that the right of action is gone, it is not

competent to revive it by retrospective legislation, since

this would be equivalent to creating a new demand.8 But

all limitation acts must allow to claimants a reasonable

opportunity to assert their rights in court, and one entirely

and manifestly unreasonable in the time it gives is void.4

It is a rule of construction, that a statute of limitation

does not apply to suits instituted by the State itself, unless

it is so provided in express terms.6 And state statutes

cannot limit suits by the United States.8

Remedies. — The power to provide remedies for all civil

wrongs, and to change them when found ineffectual, or when

others shall promise to be more effectual, is and must be
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continuous. The citizen has no vested right to any partic-

ular remedy, and the State may therefore take away at

i Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351.

a Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351; State v. Jones, 21 Md. 432; Pit-

man i!. Bump, 5 Oreg. 17.

8 Brent v. Chapman, 5 Cranch, 358; Lockhart v. Horn, 1 Woods,

628; Reformed Church v. Schoolcraft, 65 N. Y. 134; Atkinson t>.

Dunlap, 50 Me. 1ll; Yancy v. Yancy, 5 Heisk. 353; Thompson t>.

Reid, 41 Iowa, 48; Rockport v. Walden, 54 N. H. 167; Hicks v. Stei-

gleman, 49 Miss. 377; Horbach v. Miller, 4 Neb. 31; Bradford v.

Shine, 13 Fla. 393.

4 Pereles v. Watertown, 6 Biss. 79; Hart v Bostwick, 14 Fla. 162;

Berry ». Ramsdell,4 Met. (Ky.) 292 ; Ludwig v. Steward, 32 Mich. 27.

6 Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92.

6 United States v. Hoar, 2 Mason, 311.

A statute of limitation takes away no right of property.
Such a statute prescribes a reasonable time within which a
party claiming legal rights which another withholds shall
commence legal proceedings for their enforcement, and it
withdraws, the privilege of suing if the time is suffered to
elapse without action. 1 This is a proper and reasonable
regulation of a right ; not a denial of it.~ And when the
time limited by the statute has been suffered to elapse
without suit, so that the right of action is gone, it is not
competent to revive it by retrospective legislation, since
this would be equivalent to creating a new demand. 1 But
all limitation acts must allow to claimants a reasonable
opportunity to assert their rights in court, and one entirely
ancl manifestly unreasonable in the time it gives is void.'
It is a rule of construction, that a statute of limitation
does not apply to suits instituted by the State itself, unless
it is so provided in express terms. 6 And state statutes
cannot limit suits by the United States. 8
Remedies. -The power to provide remedies for all civil
wrongs, and to change them when found ineffectual, or when
others shall promise to be more effectual, is and must be
continuous. The citizen has no vested right to any particular remedy, and the State may therefore take away at
Bell "· Morrison, 1 Pet. 851.
Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351; State "· Jones, 21 Md. 432; Pitman v. Bump, 6 Oreg. 17.
8 Brent v. Chapman, 6 Cranch, 368; Lockhart v. Hom, 1 Woods,
628; Reformed Church v. Schoolcraft, 65 N. Y. 134; Atkinson "·
Dunlap, 50 Me. 111; Yancy "· Yancy, 6 Heisk. 353; Thompson "·
Reid, 41 Iowa, 48; Rockport"· Walden, Di N. H. 167; Hicks v. Steigleman, 49 Miss. 377; Horbach "· Miller, 4 Neb. 31; Bradford "·
Shine, 13 Fla. ~93.
' Pereles o. Watertown, 6 Biss. 79; Hart v. Bostwick, 14 Fla. 162;
Berry z,. Ramsdell,4 Met. (Ky.) 292; Ludwig t'. Steward, 32 Mich. 27.
6 Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92.
6 United States v. Hoar, 2 Mason, 311.
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discretion those it provides, and substitute others which

shall apply to wrongs already committed as well as to those

which may be committed thereafter.1 The exceptions to

this general statement are, that the remedy given must

be one which recognizes and gives effect to the obligation

of the contract when the wrong grows out of non-perform-

ance of contract,2 and it must in any case be a remedy

calculated to give redress, and not merely colorable.8 But

no right in property is violated, and no wrong done, when

a new or additional remedy is given for a right or equity

previously in existence, and not sufficiently provided for

before. This often becomes important to the accomplish-

ment of effectual justice.4

An alteration in the rules of evidence is often one of the

most serious modifications of remedies; but the power in

the legislature to make it is undoubted, and the changes

maj- be made to apply in the investigation of causes of ac-

tion previously accruing.6 So the burden of proof maj- be

changed from one party to the other by legislation; as has

often been done by statutes which make a deed given on

the sale of lands for taxes prima facie evidence of a com-

plete title in the grantee, whereas before such statutes the
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grantee would be compelled to make out his prima facie

ease by showing that the proceedings anterior to and upon

the sale were regular.6 The statutes making defective rec-

1 Railroad Co. v. Hecht, 95 Tf. S. Rep. 168; Tennessee v. Sneed,

96 U. S. Rep. 69.

2 MeCracken v. Hay ward, 2 How. 608 ; Gantley's Lessee v. Ewing,

t How. 707; Bronson v. Kenzie, 1 How. 311.

8 Oatnian v. Bond, 15 Wis. 20; Walker r. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314.

4 Hope v. Johnson, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 123; Danville v. Pace, 25 Grat

(Va.) 1; Bartlett v. Lang, 2 Ala. (N. S.) 401.

6 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 249; Webb v. Den, 17 How.

577; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304; Gibbs v. Gale, 7 Md. 76.

6 Sprague v. Pitt, McCahon, (Kan.) 212; Callanan v. Hurley, 93

U. S. Rep. 387; Hand v. Ballou, 12 N. Y. 541.

discretion ·those it provides, and substitute others which
shall apply to wrongs already committed as well as to those
which may be committed thereafter. 1 The exceptions to
this general statement are, that the remedy given must
be one which recognizes and gives effect to the obligation
of the contract when the wrong grows out of non-performance of contract, 2 and it must in any case be a remedy
calculated to give redress, and not merely colorable. 8 But
no right ill' property is violated, and no wrong done, when
a new or additional remedy is given for a right or equity
previously in existence, and not sufficiently provided for
before. This often becomes important to the accomplishment of effectual justice.~
An alteration in the rules of evidence is often one of the
most serious modifications of remedies ; but the power in
the legislature to make it is undoubted, and the changes
may be made to apply in the investigation of causes of action previously accruing. 6 So the burden of proof may be
changed from one party to the other by legislation ; as has
often been done by statutes which make a deed given on
the sale of lands for taxes prima f acie evidence of a complete title in the grantee, whereas before such statutes the
grantee would be compelled to make out his prima facie
case by showing that the proceedings anterior to and upon
the sale were regular. 6 The statutes making defective rec1 Railroad Co. v. Hecht, 96 U'. S. Rep. 168; Tennessee v. Sneed,
96 U. S. Rep. 69.
2 McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Gantley's Lessee v. Ewing,
I How. 707; Bronson v. Kenzie, 1 How. 311.
8 Oatman v. Bond, 16 Wis. 20; Walker t•. 'Vhitehead, 16 Wall. 314:.
' Hope v. Johnson, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 123; Danville v. Pace, 26 Grat.
(Va.) 1; Bartlett v. Lang, 2 Ala. (N. S.) 401.
6 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 249; Webb v. Den, 17 How.
677; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304; Gibbs v. Gale, 7 Md. 76.
6 Sprague t'. Pitt, McCahon, (Kan.) 212; Callanan v. Hurley, 93
U. S. Rep. 387; Hand v. Ballou, 12 N. Y. 641.
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ords of conveyances evidence, notwithstanding the defects,

is a further illustration of legislative power in this regard.1

Such laws presumptively wrong no one. They provide

such method of investigating the truth as seems likely to

be most effectual and just for the particular cases men-

tioned, and they preclude no one from establishing his

rights. A statute which should undertake to establish

conclusive rules of evidence, whereby a party might be

excluded from any opportunity to show the facts, on the

affirmative presentation of his adversary's case, would be

nothing short of a statute of confiscation, and manifestly

in violation of constitutional right.2 In saying this we ex-

cept all those cases to which the principle of estoppel may

be justly applied; that principle being that a party shall be

precluded from showing a state of facts differing from that

which by his own conduct or assurances he has induced

another to believe in and act upon, when the effect would

be to deceive and defraud the party so acting. This is a

valuable and just principle recognized by the common law

and in equity.

Betterment Laws. — Those laws which charge a man's
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land with a hen in favor of one who, while holding it ad-

versely in good faith, has expended his money in improve-

ments upon it, seem at first view to be laws creating de-

mands for the improvement of one's lands against his will;

but as they only recognize an equity to the payment for

benefits which he must appropriate when he recovers his

land, they are not unjust and not unconstitutional.8 All

such laws give the owner the option to pay for the im-

provements and take the land, or to abandon the land to

the occupant, and recover its value without the improve-

1 Webb r. Den, 17 How. 577.

2 Wright v. Cradlebaugh, 3 Nev. 341; Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13

Mich. 329; East Kingston v. Towle, 48 N. H. 57.

8 Whitney v. Richardson, 31 Vt. 300; Eoss v. Irving, 14 111. 171.

ords of conveyances evidence, notwithstanding the defects,
is a further illustration of legislative power in this regard. 1
Such laws presumptively wrong no one. They provide
such method of investigating the truth as seems likely to
be most effectual and just for the particular cases mentioned, and they preclude no one from establishing his
rights. A statute which should undertake to establish
conclusive rules of evidence, whereby a party might be
excluded from any opportunity to show the facts, on the
affirmative presentation of his adversary's case, would be
nothing short of a statute of confiscation, and manifestly
in violation of constitutional right. 2 In saying this we except all those cases to which the principle of estoppel may
be justly applied ; that principle being that a party shall be
precluded from showing a state of facts differing from that
which by his own conduct or assurances he has induced
another to believe in and act upon, when the effect would
be to deceive and defraud the party so acting. This is a
valuable and just principle recognized by the common law
and in equity.
Betterment Laws. -Those laws which charge a man's
land with a lien in favor of one who, while holding it adversely in good faith, has expended his money in improvements upon it, seem at first view to be laws creating demands for the improvement of one's lands against his will ;
but as they only recognize an equity to the payment for
benefits which he must appr6pria.te when he recovers his
land, they are not unjust and not unconstitutional. 8 All
such laws give the owner the option to pay for the improvements and take the land, or to abandon the land to
the occupant, and recover its value without the improveWebb t•. Den, 17 How. 677.
Wright v. Cradlebaugh, 3 Nev. 341; Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13
Mic. ~1. 329; East Kingston v. Towle, 48 N. H. 67.
8 Whitney v. Richardson,, 31 Vt. 300; Ross v. Irving, 14 Ill. 171.
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ments; which is as much as in justice he can claim. It

would not be competent to make him personally liable for

the improvements.1

Sales for Taxes. — Taxes may always be levied through

administrative proceedings, the assessors exercising quasi

judicial authority in so doing. This is due process of law

for such cases.2 The collection of taxes may be enforced

by suits, by sale of property, or by forfeiture for non-pay-

ment or for attempts to evade the law. Where the tax is

a personal or property tax, it is most commonly collected

by means of a seizure and sale of property. The general

rule is, that in proceedings for this purpose the officers

must follow the law with some strictness, and comply with

all those provisions which are enacted for the protection of

the person taxed.8 For the collection of imposts and excise

taxes the United States has always made provision under

which forfeitures may be imposed for evasions of the law.

The forfeitures sometimes extend, not merely to the prop-

erty or thing in respect to which the tax is imposed, but

to the building or ship which has been made the instrument

of accomplishing the fraud upon the revenue. Forfeitures

are judicially declared, and, as they accrue at the time when
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the illegal act was committed, it is held that the judgment

relates back to that time, and will cut off the right of a

subsequent bona fide purchaser.4

Section III. — The Eminent Domain.

The Constitution. —In the fifth amendment to the Con-

stitution the fact is recognized that in some cases the ne-

i Childs i). Shower, 18 Iowa, 261; McCoy v. Grandy, 3 Ohio, N. S

463.

a Cruikshanks v. Charleston, 1 McCord, (N. C.) 360; Weimer v.

Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201, 212.

8 Stead v. Course, 4 Cranch, 403; Williams v. Peyton, 4 Wheat. 77.

4 Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 14 Wall. 44. See United States

v. The Reindeer, 2 Cliff. 57.

ments ; which is as much as in justice he can claim. It
would not be competent to make him personally liable for
the improvements. 1
Sales for Taxes. -Taxes may always be levied through
administrative proceedings, the assessors exercising quasi
judicial authority in so doing. This is due pr0cess of law
for such cases. 2 The collection of taxes ·may be enforced
by suits, by sale of property, or by forfeiture for non-payment or for attempts to evade the law. Where the tax is
a personal or property tax, it is most commonly collected
by means of a seizure and sale of property. The general
rule is, that in proceedings for this purpo~e the officers
must follow the law with some strictness, and comply with
all those provisions which are enacted for the protection of
the person taxed. 8 For the collection of imposts and excise
taxes the United States has always made provision under
which forfeitures may be imposed for evasions of the law.
The forfeitures sometimes extend, not merely to the property or thing in respect to which the tax is imposed, but
to the building or ship which has been made the instrument
of accomplishing the fraud upon the revenue. Forfeitures
·are judicially declared, and, as they accrue at the time when
the illegal act was committed, it is held that the judgment
relates back to that time, and will cut off the right of a
subsequent bona fide purchaser. 4
SECTION

III. -THE

EMINENT DOMAIN.

The Constitution. - In the fifth amendment to the Constitution the fact is recognized that in some cases the ne1

Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261 ; McCoy v. Grandy, 3 Ohio, N. S.

463.
i Cruikshanks v. Charleston, 1 McCord, (N. C.) 360; Weimer v.
Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201, 212.
a Stearl v. Course, 4 Cranch, 403; Williams v. Peyton, 4 Wheat. 77.
' Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 14 Wall. 44. See United States
v. The Reindeer, 2 Cliff. 57.
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cessities of the government must override the rights of

private ownership, and compel the surrender of specific

private property to the public use. To prevent oppression

in such cases, it is provided that private property shall not

be taken for public use without just compensation. This

is a declaration of the underlying principle of the law of

eminent domain.

Definition. —The eminent domain may be defined as the

lawful authority which exists in every sovereignty to con-

trol and regulate those rights of a public nature which

pertain to its citizens in common, and to appropriate and

control individual property for the public benefit, as the

public safety, necessity, convenience, or welfare may de-

mand. The most important of these public rights consist

in the use of the public highways, by land or by water,

and to participate in the public fisheries. Highways and

other public conveniences, however, must be provided by

the State in the exercise of the eminent domain; and as

the legal controversies respecting its principles usually

arise in connection with appropriations for these purposes,

the right itself is often spoken of and treated as if it were
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restricted to such cases.

State and Nation. — As between the United States and

the several States, the regulation and protection of private

rights, privileges, and immunities belongs primarily to the

States, and the States are expected to make provision for

the conveniences and necessities of public travel, and for

the other wants of the general public, or of the State itself,

which are commonly supplied under this right. The emi-

nent domain, therefore, pertains in general to the States,

not to the United States. Nevertheless, for all national

purpose^ it is in the United States, and the government

may exercise the power of appropriation as an attribute of

the national sovereignty.1 In the Territories the general

1 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. Rep. 387.

cessities or the government must override the rights ot
private ownership, and compel the surrender of speciflo
private property to the public use. To prevent oppression
in such cases, it is provided that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation. This
is a declaration of the underlying principle of the law ot
eminent domain.
Definition. -The eminent domain may be defined as the
lawful authority which exists in every soverejgnty to control and regulate those rights of a public nature which
pertain to its citizens in common, and to appropriate and
control individual property for the public benefit, as the
public safety, necessity, convenience, or welfare may demand. The most important of these public rights consist
in the use of the public highways, by land or by water,
and to participate in the public fisheries. Highways and
other public conveniences, however, must be provided by
the State in the exercise of the eminent domain; and as
the legal controversies respecting its principles usually
arise in connection with appropriations for these purposes,
the right itself is often spoken of and treated as if it were
restticted to such cases.
State and Nation. -As between the United Ststes and
the several States, the regulation and protection of private
rights, privileges, and immunities belongs primarily to the
States, and the States are expected to make provision for
the conveniences and necessities of public travel, and for
the other wants of the general public, or of the State itself,
which are commonly supplied under this right. The eminent domain, therefore, pertains in general to the States,
not to the United States. Nevertheless, for all national
purpose~ it is in the United States, and the government
may exercise the power of appropriation as an attribute ot
the national sovereignty .1 In the Territories the general
1

Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. Rep. 367.
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right belongs to the United States, but it is within the

ordinary compass of territorial legislative power to exer-

cise it for local purposes. When the Territory is admitted

into the Union as a State, the right passes with all its in-

cidents to the new sovereignty.1 Among these incidents

is the right to the sea-shore below the line of private

ownership.2

Legislation essential. — But although the right is inhe-

rent in sovereignty, it lies dormant until legislation is had,

defining the occasions, methods, conditions, and agencies

under and by means of which it may be exercised. And

as an exercise of the right in the appropriation of private

estates against the will of the owners is a severe instance

of governmental convenience displacing private ownership,

the rule is general that the legislation which permits it

must be strictly construed and strictly followed, and that

every precedent form or ceremony which hy law is made

a condition to a completed appropriation, must be had or

observed before the right of the government will be per-

fected, and the right of the citizen appropriated.8

Distinguished from Taxation. — Taxation takes property

from the citizen for the public use, but it does so under
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general rules of apportionment and uniformity, so that

each citizen is supposed to contribute only his fair share

to the expenses of government, and to be compensated for

doing so in the benefits which the government brings him.

What is taken under the right of eminent domain, on the

other hand, is something exceptional, — some particular

parcel or item of property of which the government has

special need. The case, therefore, is not one in which

there nan be any apportionment of the burden as between

1 Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57.

2 Pollard's Lessee t>. Hagan, 3 How. 212.

» Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; Burt v. Brigham, 117 Mass.

307.

right belongs to the United States, but it is within the
ordinary compass of territorial legislative power to exercise it for local purposes. 'Vhen the Territory is admitted
into the Union as a State, the right passes with all its incidents to the new sovereignty . 1 Among these incidents
is the right to the sea-shore below the line of private
ownership. 2
Legislation essenti"al. - But although the right is inherent in sovereignty, it lies dormant until legislai!.on is had,
defining the occasions, methods, conditions, and agencies
under and by means of which it may be exercised. And
as an exercise of the right in the appropriation of private
estates against the will of the owners is a severe instance
of governmental convenience displacing private ownership,
the rule is general that the legislation which permits it
must be strictly construed and strictly followed, and that
every precedent form or ceremony which by law is made
a condition to a completed appropriation, must be had or
observed before the right of the government will be perfected, and the right of the citizen appropriRted. 8
Distinguished from Taxation. - Taxation takes property
from the citizen for the public use, but it does so under
general rules of apportionment and uniformity, so that
each citizen is supposed to contribute only his fair share
to the expenses of government, and to be compensated for
doing so in the benefits which the government brings him.
What is taken under the right of eminent domain, on the
other hand, is something exceptional, - some particular
parcel or item of property of which the government has
special need. The case, therefore, is not one in which
there r.,an be any apportionment of the burden as between
Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 67.
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212.
• Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; Burt v. Brigham, 117 Maas.
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the citizen whose property is taken, and the body of the

community, and compensation to him of a pecuniary na-

ture must therefore be made. Equalization in any other

mode is not possible.

The Purposes. — The purposes for which the right of ap-

propriation may be exercised must be determined by the

needs of the government, and be declared by law. The

United States, in the exercise of the powers conferred upon

it'by the Constitution, may construct fortresses, light-

houses, piers, docks, military roads, public buildings, &c.,

and for these or any other constitutional purpose may have

need of land or material which the owner refuses to sell,

or for which he demands an extortionate compensation.

Any such purpose is within the reason of the right, and

may be supplied by means of its exercise. The State pro-

vides for the ordinary highways, and for other state and

municipal purposes, under a similar necessity, and under

the same right. The limitation in either case must be

this: that the purpose must be public, and must be one

which falls within the proper sphere of the government

undertaking to make provision for it. The United States
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must judge of its own needs, and make provision for them,

and the State must in like manner judge of and provide

for its own: neither can exercise this right for the benefit

of the other.1

But though the appropriation must be made for some

public use, it is not indispensably necessary that it be

made to the State or the nation itself. When the need

provided for is municipal, as where it is for a city street

or park or public building, the land will be taken to the

corporate body having need of it, not to the State, and

the corporate bodj- may be permitted to be the actor in

making the appropriation, and be clothed with the power

of the State for the purpose. In some cases even a private

1 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. Eep. 367.

the citizen whose property is taken, and the body of the
community, and compensation to him of a pecuninry nature must therefore be made. Equalization in any other
mode is not possible.
The Purposes. -The purposes for which the right of appropriation may be exercised must be determined by the
needs of the government, and be declared by law. The
United States, in the exercise of the powers conferred upon
it• by the Constitution, may construct fortresses, lighthouses, piers, <locks, military roads, public buildings, &c.,
and for these or any other constitutional purpose may have
need of land or material which the owner refuses to sell,
or for which he demands an extortionate compensation.
Any such purpose is within the reason of the right, and
may be supplied by means of its exercise. The State provides for the ordinary highways, and for other state and
municipal purposes, under a similar necessity, and under
the same right. The limitation in either case must be
this : that the purpose must be public, and must be one
which falls within the proper sphere of the government
undertaking to make provision for it. The United States
must judge of its own needs, and make provision for thell),
and the State must in like manner judge of and provide
for its own : neither can exercise this right for the benefit
of the other. 1
But though the appropriation must he made for some
public use, it is not indispensably necessary that it be
made to the State or the nation itself. When the need
provided for is municipal, as where it is for a city street
or park or public building, the land will be taken to the
corporate body having need of it, not to the State, and
the corporate body may be permitted to be the actor in
making the appropriation, and be clothed with the power
of the State for the purpose. In some cases even a private
I

Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. Rep. 367.
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corporation, when it has been created by law to supply

some public convenience, may be endowed with the power

of appropriation for the purpose, and is regarded as a

public agent in exercising it. A familiar instance is that

of a railroad company empowered by legislation to appro-

priate a right of way to its own use.1

The line of distinction between the purposes that are to

be deemed public and those which cannot be, is not very

accurately drawn by the authorities. It is certain that no

government can under any circumstances divest one citizen

of his estate for the benefit of another, — the public in-

terest being in no way involved, — and this whether com-

pensation is made or not.2 The case of a private road is

one of this sort, and it can only be allowed where the

people by their constitution have assented to it.8 Nor in

any case is the fact that the public will be incidentally

benefited by the appropriation sufficient to supply the

power, when the taking is purely for a private purpose.

There are some cases, however, in which the improve-

ment of private estates, where it cannot be accomplished

without the appropriation of an easement for the purpose
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over the lands of others, has been deemed so far a matter

of public interest as to bring the case within the principle

of the law of eminent domain. Thus, it is held in some

States that lands may be appropriated by flooding, to en-

able the owners of mill sites to improve them for manu-

facturing purposes,4 and in Pennsylvania it seems that a

private road may be laid out over the lands of an unwilling

» Beekman v. Saratoga, &c. R. R. Co., 3 Paige, (N. Y.) 45, 73;

Secomb v. Railroad Co., 23 Wall. 108.

2 Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648; Bloodgood v. Mohawk, &c. R. R.

Co., 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 9.

* Taylor t>. Porter, 4 Hill, (N. Y.) 140; Clark ». White, 2 Swan,

(Tenn.) 540; Consolidated Cannel Co. v. Cent. Pac. R. R. Co., 51 Cal.

269.

* Mills, Em. Dom., §§ 287, 288; Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 666-
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corporation, when it has been created by law to supply
some public_ convenience, may be endowed with the power
of appropriation for the purpose, and is regarded as a
public agent in exercising it. A familiar instance is that
of a railroad ~ompany empowered by legislation to appropriate a right of way to its own use. 1
The line of distinction between the purposes that are to
be deemed public and those which cannot be, is not very
accurately drawn by the authorities. It is certain that no
government can under any circumstances divest one citizen
of his estate for the benefit of another, - the public interest being in no way involved, - and this whether compensation is made or not.i The case of a private road is
one of this sort, and it can only be allowed where the
people by their constitution have assented to it. 8 Nor in
•
any case is the fact that the public will be incidentally
benefited by the appropriation sufficient to supply the
power, when the taking is purely for a private purpose.
There are some cases, however, in which the improvement of private estates, where it cannot be accomplished
without the appropriation of an easement for the purpose
over the lands of others, has been deemed so far a matter
of public interest as to bring the case within the principle
of the law of eminent <Jomain. Thus, it is held in some
States that lands may be appropriated by flooding, to enable the owners of mill sites to improve them for manufacturing purposes,• and in Pennsylvania it seems that a
private road may be laid out over the lands of an unwilling
Beckman v. Saratoga, &c. R. R. Co., 3 Paige, (N. Y.) 45, 73;
Secomb t:. Railroad Co., 23 Wall. 108.
2 Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648; Bloodgood v. Mohawk, &c. R. R.
Co., 18 'Vend. (N. Y.) 9.
a Taylor "· Porter, 4 Hill, (N. Y.) 140; Clark "· White, 2 Swan,
(Tenn.) 540; Consolidated Cannel Co. v. Cent. Pac. R. R. Co., 61 Cal.
269.
'
' Mills, Em. Dom.,§§ 287, 288; Cooley, Const. Lim., 4th ed., 6661

669.
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owner, to enable one who has a coal mine to obtain access

to and develop it.1 It may be said of these cases, that the

easement taken enables dormant wealth, in the develop-

ment of which the whole public is concerned, to be brought

into use and added to the general wealth of the State; and

the same may be said where large swamps or other low

lands owned by individuals are drained and made available

by means of ditches cut across the lands of others, under

the right of eminent domain.2 But these are extreme

cases, and stand upon disputed ground. Lands may always

be appropriated, however, for the drainage of others with

a view to the benefit of the public health.8

Adjudging the Necessity. — The State may not only de-

termine upon the necessity of some appropriation for its

needs, but it may also decide for itself whether it is need-

ful to take any particular estate or parcel of property for

the purpose. It is not of right that the property owner

shall be heard upon this question, since, if it were, the pub-

lic purpose might be defeated by an adjudication against

the necessity. This is so improbable, however, that it is

not uncommon to provide by law that the necessity shall
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be passed upon by a jury or by commissioners. When a

corporation is permitted to make an appropriation, it may

also be empowered to judge of tb,e necessity, where other

provision is not made by the constitution.

What may be taken. — The property which the Constitu-

tion protects is anything of value which the law recognizes

as such, and in respect to which the owner is entitled to a

remedy against any one who may disturb him in its enjoy-

ment. It is immaterial whether the property be tangible

or intangible, — whether the interest in it be permanent or

1 Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, (Penn.) 63.

2 Matter of Drainage of Lands, 35 N. J. 497; Talbot v. Hudson,

16 Gray, (Mass.) 417.

8 Reeves v. Treasurer, &c., 8 Ohio, N. S. 333.

owner, to enable one who has a coal mine to obtain access
to and develop it. 1 It may be said of these cases, that the
easement taken enables dormant wealth, in the development of which the whole public is concerned, to be brought
into use and added to the general wealth of the State ; and
the same may be said whe~ large swamps or other low
lands owned by individuals are drained and made available
by means of ditches cut across the lands of others, under
the right of eminent domain. 2 But these are extreme
cases, and stand upon disputed ground. Lands may always
be appropriated, however, for the drainage of others with
a view to the benefit of the public health. 1
.Adjudging the Necessity. -The State may not only determine upon the necessity of some appropriation for its
needs, but it m!'y .also decide for itself whether it is needful to take any particular estate or parcel of property for
the purpose. It is not of right that the property owner
shall be heard upon this question, since, if it were, the public purpose might be defeated by an adjudication against
the necessity. This is so improbable, however, that it is '
not uncommon to provide by law that the necessity shall
be passed upon by a jury or by commissioners. 'Vhen a
corporation is permitted to make an appropriation, it may
also be empowered to judge of tQe necessity, where other
provision is not made by the constitution.
What rnay be taken. -The property which the Constitution protects is anything of value which the law recognizes
as such, and in respect to which the owner is entitled to a
remedy against any one who may disturb him in its enjoyment. It is immaterial whether the property be tangible
or intangible, - whether the interest in it be permanent or
Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, (Penn.) 63.
Matter of Drainage of Lands, 36 N. J. 4:97; Talbot o. Hudaon,
16 Gray, (Mass.) 417.
a Reeves "· Treasurer, &c., 8 Ohio, N. S. 833.
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merely temporary. A franchise is the subject of appro-

priation equally with land, and the interest of the Qwners in

it is also equally protected.1 So the complete and exclu-

sive possession of his estate is assured to every owner as

much as is the fee itself, and he may defend himself against

any trespass upon it, or any encroachment not made under

the constitutional conditions. Therefore a telegraph com-

pany cannot set its poles along the line and upon the right

of way of a railroad, until it shall first have obtained per-

mission, or made lawful appropriation of the land for the

purpose.2 So there is an appropriation of property where

its value is taken, either wholly or in part, by something

done or set on foot at a distance; as where, by means of a

dam across a water-course, one's land is flooded with drift-

wood, or sediment,8 or where, by the occupation of the

street in front of his lot, he is cut off from his means of

access to it;4 or where, after the State has granted an ex-

clusive privilege, it grants another which competes with

it,6 and the like. • >

Incidental Injuries. — It is a general rule, however, that

the mere fact that one suffers incidental loss in conse-

quence of the undertaking and construction of a public

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

work, where nothing to which he has a legal right is actually

appropriated, can never give him a claim to compensation.

The following are illustrations. A second toll-bridge

constructed unde» legislative authority near the first may

destroy its value; but unless the owner of the first had

an exclusive franchise, he has no legal ground of com-

plaint. So a railroad may render a turnpike valueless, but

» Richmond, &o. R. R. Co. v. Louisa, &c. R. R. Co., 13 How. 71.

2 Atlantic, &c. Tel. Co. v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 6 Biss. 158.

• Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166.

* Lackland v. Railroad Co., 31 Mo. 180.

5 Central Bridge Corp. v. Lowell, 4 Gray, (Mass.) 474; Common-

wealth v. Penn. Canal Co., 66 Penn. St. 41.

merely temporary. A franchise is tb"e subject of appropriation equally with land, and the interest of the Qwners in
it is also equally protected. 1 So the complete and exclusive possession of his estate is assured to every owner as
much as is the fee itself, and he may defend himself against
any trespass upon it, or any encroachment not made under
the constitutional conditions. Therefore a telegraph com~
pany cannot set·its poles along the line and upon the right
of way of a railroad, until it shall first have obtained permission, or made lawful appropriation of the land for the
purpose. 2 So there is ·an appropriation of property where
its value is taken, either wholly or in part, by something
done or set on foot at a distance ; as where, by means of a
dam across a water-course, one's land is flooded with driftwood, or sediment, 8 or where, by the occupation of the
street in front of his lot, he is cut off from his means of
access to it; ' or where, after the State has granted an exclusive privilege, it grants another which competes with
it, 6 and the like.
•
Incidental Injuries. - I t is a general rule, however, that
the mere fact that one suffers incidental loss in consequence of the undertaking and construction of a public
work, where nothing to which he has a legal right is actually
appropriated, can never give him a claim to compensation.
The following are illustrations. A second toll-bridge
constructed unde1 legislative authority near the first may
destroy its value; but unless the owner of the first had
an exclusive franchise, he has no legal ground of complaint. So a railroad may render a turnpike valueless, but
Richmond, &c. R.R. Co. v. Louisa, &c. R.R. Co., 13 How. 71.
Atlantic, &c. Tel. Co. v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 6 Biss. 158.
• Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166.
4 Lackland v. Railroad Co., 31 Mo. 180.
1 Central Bridge Corp. v. Lowell, 4 Gray, (Mass.) 474; Common.
wealth v. Penn. Canal Co., 66 Penn. St. 41.
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when the turnpike itself is not taken, no property is taken;

there is merely a new competition in business to the injury

of the party least competent to transact it profitably.1 So

a dam constructed under legislative authority may have

its value destroyed by the subsequent construction of a

canal under like authority; but where the last grant is not

inconsistent with the first, so that no contract is violated,

it is equally true that no property is appropriated.2 Loss

to some one is almost a necessary incident of any exercise

of governmental authority: a tax law cannot be changed,

a street opened or graded, a county-seat changed, a new

town set off from an old, or anything else of public im-

portance done, without injurious consequences falling upon

some one. But the loss is damnum absque injuria, as it is

also in the instances above recited.8

The Interest appropriated. — When land is taken for a

public use the fee is not in general appropriated, but an

easement only is taken, and the easement consists in the

righlf to make use of the land for the particular pfurpose,

and for no other. When under such circumstances the

use ceases, the owner is restored to his former estate. If
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in the mean time it becomes important to make use of the

land for any other public use than that to which it was

devoted by the first appropriation, and this is done, the

original owner becomes entitled to a new assessment of

compensation. The reasons for this aiie, first, that the

new use may alfect the right of reverter; but, second and

principally, it introduces new elements, which might have

affected in an important manner the compensation origi-

nally awarded had they then been present. It will be

seen as we proceed that every inquisition of damages is

1 Kenneth's Petition, 24 N. H. 139; Lafayette P. It. Co. ». New

Albany, &o K. It. Co., 13 Ind. 90.

2 Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Wright, 9 W. & S. (Penn.) 9.

8 See Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. Hep. 635.

when the turnpike itself is not taken, no property is taken ;
there is rperely a new competition in business to the injury
of the party least competent to transact it profitably . 1 So
a dam constructed under legislative authority may have
its value destroyed by the subsequent construction of a
canal under like authority ; but where the last grant is not
inconsistent with the first, so that no contract is violated,
it is equally true that no property is appropriated. 2 Loss
to some one is almost a necessary incident of any exercise
of governmental authority: a tax law cannot be changed,
a street opened or graded, a county-ses.t changed, a new
town set off from an old, or anything else of public importance done, without injurious consequences falling upon
some one. But the loss is damnum absque injuria, as it is
also in the instances above recited. 8
Tl1e Interest appropriated. - When land is taken for a
public use the fee is not in general appropriated, but an
easement only is taken; and the easement consists in the
righf to make use ·of the land for the particular },1urpose,
and for no other. When under such circumstances the
use ceases, the owner is restored to his former estate. If
in the mean time it becomes important to make use of the
land for any other public use than that to which it was
devoted by the first appropriation, and this is done, the
original owner becomes entitled to a new assessment of
compensation. The reasons for this a~e, first, that the
new use may affect the right of reverter; but, second and
principally, it introduces new elements, which might have
affected in an important manner the compensation originally awarded had they then been present. It will be
seen as we proceed that every inquisition of damages is
1 Kenneth's Petition, 24 N. H. 139; Lafayette P. R. Co. v. New
Albany, &\!. R. R. Co., 13 Ind. 00.
s Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Wright, 9 W. & S. (Penn.) 9.
a See Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. Rep. 635.
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made with the use in view to which the land is to be de-

voted : one use may bring with it important compensations

in benefits, while another may be specially injurious far

beyond the value of the land taken, and a new use maj-

entirety reverse these conditions. For example, if a com-

mon highway is opened through agricultural lands, it will

more often be beneficial to the premises than hurtful, and

the award of damages to the owner will often be merely

nominal. But if the highway is then converted into a

canal, the injury is likely to be of a character to render

the former assessment wholly inadequate. The general

rule therefore is, that, when an appropriation of land is

made for one purpose, the owner retains such an interest

therein as entitles him, when the same land is taken for a

new use, to a new estimate of his injury in view of the

new conditions which the new use introduces, and of their

effect upon his estate generally. And this right does not

depend upon the question whether the fee was at first

taken, or only an easement. The rule, however, can only

apply where the first appropriation was of a part only of

the parcel of land; for if all was taken, the change in the

use cannot concern the former owner.
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Neio Uses. — It is not a new use if a common highway

is taken for a plank road or a turnpike; the public being

at liberty to avail themselves of its advantages in the

same waj- as before, and the tolls exacted being only a

substitute for the tax which must before have been levied

for repairs.1 But when a highway or toll-road is taken

for the purposes of a railway, the use is so different,

and the probable influence upon the value of adjoining

estates so different also, that it is justly held that a fur-

ther property of the owner is appropriated when the

change is made.2 At least, he has a right to an inquisi-

1 Murray v. County Commissioners, 12 Met. (Mass.) 455.

a Imlay v. Union Branch R. R. Co., 26 Conn. 249; Wager v. Troy

Union R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 526.

made with the use in view to which the land is to be de·
voted : one use may bring with it important compensations
in benefits, while another may be specially injurious far
beyond the value of the land taken, and a new use .may
entirely reverse these conditions. For example, if a com·
mon highway is opened through agiicultural lands, it will
more often be beneficial to the premises than hurtful, and
the award of damages to the owner will often be merely
nominal. But if the highway is then converted into a
canal, the injury is likely to be of a character to render
the former assessment wholly inadequate. The general
rule therefore is, that, when an appropriation of land is
made for one purpose, the owner retains ·such an interest
therein as entitles him, when the same land is taken for a
new use, to a new estimate of his injury in view of the
~ew conditions which the new use introduces, and of their
effect upon his estate generally. And this right does not
depend upon the question whether the fee was at first
taken, or only an easement. The rule, however, can only
apply where the first appropriation was of a part only of
the parcel of land; for if all was taken, the change in the
use cannot concern the former owner.
Neto Uses. - It is not a new use if a common highway
is taken for a plank road or a turnpike ; the public being
at liberty to avail themselves of its advantages in the
same way as before, and the tolls exacted being only a
substitute for the tax which must before have been levied
for repairs. 1 But when a highway or toll-road is taken
for the purposes of a railway, the use is so different,
and the probable influence upon the value of adjoining
estates so different also, that it is justly held that a further property of the owner is appropriated when . the
change is made. 2 At least, he has a right to an inquisi1 Murray v. County Commissioners, 12 Met. (Mass.) 455.
s Imlay v. Union Branch R.R. Co.,,26 Conn. 249; Wager v. Tro7
Union R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 626.
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tion, to determine whether or not he suffers further in-

jury. The case would be still plainer, if possible, were

the highway taken for a canal. But the case of a city

street afterwards appropriated to the purposes of a horse

railway is different. When land is taken for a city street,

it is taken for all the purposes to which city streets are

usually devoted: for sewers, and the laying of water, gas,

and steam pipes, as well as for passage of men and team3,

and for all such improved methods of passage and car-

riage as may come into use, and as may not be inconsistent

with the enjoyment of the way for other customary uses.

A horse railway is such an improved method, and it is

permitted for the reason that it tends to relieve the street,

instead of further burdening it.1 Similar to this, in some

respects, is the case of a rafting and booming company

on a natural water-course in the lumbering regions, whose

operations under authority of law may constitute a virtual

monopoly of the stream; but they are allowed, because

they facilitate this peculiar navigation instead of hinder-

ing it, subject, nevertheless, to responsibility to the owners
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of the banks, should they cause them to be flooded or

otherwise injured,2 and to any persons lawfully using the

stream whom they might needlessly or unreasonably ob-

struct or inconvenience.

The rules respecting a second assessment are appli-

cable to cases where the land was originally dedicated

to a public purpose, as well as to those of a compulsory

taking.

Assessment of Compensation. — It is not an uncommon

provision of law, that, when land is to be taken for the

public use, an attempt shall first be made to agree with the

owner upon compensation, and when this fails the com-

pensation may be assessed by some statutory tribunal. It

'Elliott v. Fair Haven, &c. R. E. Co., 32 Conn. 579; People ».

Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188.

2 Grand Rapids Booming Co. v. Jarvis, 30 Mich. 308.

tion, to determine whether or not he suffers further injury. The case would be still plainer, if possible, were
the highway taken for a canal. But the case of a city
street afterwards appropriated to the purposes of a horse
railway is different. When land is taken for a city street,
it is taken for all the purposes to which city streets are
usually devoted : for sewers, and the laying of water, gas,
and steam pipes, as well as for passage of men and teams,
and for all such improved methods of passage and carriage as may come into use, and as may not be inconsistent
with the enjoyment of the way for other customary uses.
A horse railway is such an improved method, and it is
permitted for the reason that it tends to relieve the street,
instead of further burdening it. 1 Similar to· this, in some
respects, is the case or a rafting and booming company
on a natural water-course in the lumbering regions, whose
operations under authority or law may constitute a virtual
monopoly of the stream ; but they are allowed, because
they facilitate this peculiar navigation instead of hindering it, subject, nevertheless, to responsibility to the owners
or the banks, should they cause them to ·be flooded or
otherwise injured, 1 and to any persons lawfully using the
stream whom they might needlessly or unreasonably obstruct or inconvenience.
, The rules respecting a second assessment are applicable to cases where the land was originally dedicated
to a public purpose, as well. as to those of a compulsory
taking .
.A.11e1Bment of Oompen1ation. - It is not an uncommon
provision of law, that, ·when land is to be taken for the
public use, an attempt shall first be made to agree with the
owner upon compensation, and when this fails the compensation-may be assessed by some statutory tribunal. It
1 Elliott v. Fair Haven, &c. R. R. Co., 32 Conn. 579 ; People •·
Kerr, ~7 N. Y. 188.
1 Grand Rapids Booming Co. v. Jarvis, SO Mich. 308.
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is not competent for the State to decide for itself what

compensation shall be made, for the manifest reason that

the question is one in respect to which the State and the

property owner occupy antagonistic positions; and for the

State to decide it would be to make itself judge in its own

cause, in violation of an inflexible principle of constitu-

tional right.1 The duty of the State is to provide an

impartial tribunal, which can judge of the injury that will

be sustained, and before which the land-owner shall be at

liberty to appear and present his proofs in the customary

modes.2

The rule by which compensation shall be measured is

not the same in all cases, but is largely affected by the

circumstances. If what is taken is the whole of what the

owner may have lying together, it is clear that he is en-

titled to its value, judged by such standards as the markets

and the opinions of witnesses can afford, and that this,

except in extraordinary cases, must be the full measure of

his injurj'. This rule will apply in all cases where the whole

of any article or thing of value is taken, and not a part

only, to the injury of what remains. But when less than

the whole is taken, the question of just compensation be-
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comes a question of damages merely; and in determining

these the benefit to what is left may be offset against the

damages, and the question to be determined will be to

what extent the owner's interest in that a part of which is

to be taken will be diminished thereby. If the taking is

of some right in an easement, or exclusive franchise, or

other intangible right, the question will also be one of

damages merely. But in any case mere incidental injuries

or benefits, like those suffered and received by the com-

1 Co. Lit., § 212; Dimes v. Proprietors, &c., 3 House L. Cas. 759;

Rich v. Chicago, 59 I11. 286.

2 Charles River Bridge «. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420,571; Powers's

Appeal, 29 Mich. 504.

is not competent for the State to decide for itself what
compensation shall be made, for the manifest reason that
• the
the question is one in respect to which the State and
property owner occupy antagonistic positions ; and for the
State to decide it would be to make itself judge in its own
cause, in violation of an inflexible principle of constitutional right. 1 The duty ·of the State is to prov·ide an
impartial tribunal, which can judge of the injury that will
be sustained, and before which the land-owner shall be at
liberty to appear and present his proofs in the customary
modes. 2
The rule by which compensation shall be measured is
not the same in all cases, but is largely affected by the
circumstances. If what is taken is the whole of what the
owner may have lJing together, it is clear that he is entitled to its value, judged by such standards as the markets
and the opinions of witnesses can afford, and that this,
except in· extraordinary cases, must be the full measure of
his injury. This rule will apply in all cases where the whole
of any article or thing of value is taken, and not a part
only, to the injury of what remains. But when less than
the whole is taken, the question of just compensation bec.omes a qnestion of damages merely ; and in determining
these the benefit to what is left may be offset against the
damages, and the question to be determined· will be to
what extent the owner's interes~ in that a part of which is
to be taken will be diminished thereby. If the taking is
of some right in an easement, or exclusive franchise, or
other intangible right, the question will also be one of
damages merely. But in any case mere incidental injuries
or benefits, like those suffered and received by the comCo. Lit.,§ 212; Dimes v. Proprietors, &c., 3 House L. Cas. 759;
Rich v. Chicago, 59 Ill. 286.
2 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11Pet.420, 571; Powers'&
Appeal, 29 Mich. 504.
l
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munity at large, — such as the greater facility in travel

when the taking is for a railway, or the greater danger of

fright 'to teams when making use of the highway, — are

to be excluded altogether from the computation.1 It may

possibly happen that an assessment on these principles

will award to the owner nothing, but he nevertheless in

contemplation of law receives it in the benefits which over-

balance his losses.2

Payment. — It is sometimes expressly provided by law,

that payment shall precede appropriation. But where that

is not the ease, it is still believed to be essential in all

cases where the appropriation is made for, and payment to

be made by, a private corporation, such as a railroad or

toll-road company.8 But where the State takes the prop-

erty for its own use,4 or for the use of one of its own mu-

nicipalities,6 this is not essential. The reason is, that the

property owner is supposed to be fully protected, in the

faith and the means of the State or municipality, so that

eventual payment is certain.

The party may waive his right to payment in any case,

either expressly or by failing to claim it within such period
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of limitation as may be established by law.6

1 Somerville, &c. R. R. Co. ads. Doughty, 22 N.J. 495; Greenville,

&c. R. R. Co..p. Partlow, 5 Rich. (S. C.) 428.

2 White v. County Commissioners, 2 Cush. 361.

» Powers v. Bears, 12 Wis. 220.

* Orr v. Quimby, 54 N. H. 590; White v. Nashville, &c. R. R. Co.,

7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 518.

6 Commissioners v. Bowie, 34 Ala. 461; Talbot v. Hudson, 16

Gray, (Mass.) 417.

6 Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 140; Callison v. Hedrick,

15Grat. (Va.) 244.

munity at large, - such as the greater facility in travel
when the taking is for a railway, or the greater danger of
fright •to teams when making use of the highway, -are
to he excluded altogether from the computation. 1 It may
possibly happen that an assessment on these principles
will award to the owner nothing, but he nevertheless in
contemplation of law receives it in the benefits which overbalance his losses.~
Payment. - It is sometimes expressly provided by law,
that payment shall precede appropriation. But where that
is not the case, it is still believed to be essential in all
cases where the appropriation is made for, and payment to
be made by, a private corporation, such as a railroad or
toll-road company. 8 But where the State takes the property for its own use,' or for the use of one of its own municipalities, 6 this is not essential. The reason is, that the
property owner is supposed to ·be fully protected, in the
faith and the means of the State or municipality, so that
eventual payment is certain.
The party may waive his right to payment in any case,
either expressly or by failing to claim it within such period
of limitation as may be established by law. 8
1 Somerville, &c. R.R. Co. ads. Doughty,22 N.J. 496; Greenville,
&c. R.R. Co.p. Partlow, 5 Rich. (S. C.) 428.
2 White v. County Commissioners, 2 Cush~ 361.
I Powers t•. Bears, 12 Wis. 220.
' Orr v. Quimby, 64 N. H. 690; White v. Nash,·ille1 &c. R.R. Co.,
7 He~k. (Tenn.) 618.
' Commissioners v. Bowie, 34 Ala. 461 ; Talbot v. Hudson, 16
Gray, (Mass.) 417.
e Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 140; Callison v. Hedrick,
15 Grat. (Va.) 244.
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CHAPTER XVII.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

Their Functions. — The place of municipal corporations

in the structure of American governments has been inci-

dentally referred to in the preceding pages, and little fur-

ther mention is important here. It is axiomatic that the

management of purely local affairs belongs to the people

CHAPTER XVII.

concerned, not only because of being their own affairs, but

because they will best understand, and be most competent

to manage them. The continued and permanent existence

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

of local government is, therefore, assumed in all the state

constitutions, and is matter of constitutional right, even

when not in terms expressly provided for. It would not

be competent to dispense with it by statute.1

Their Creation. — Nevertheless there is no constitutional

form or model of local government, or standard or measure

of local powers; and these need to be different according

to the circumstances. A city of a million of inhabitants,

with boulevards, parks, water-works, docks, and other

public property, may need an elaborate structure of gov-

ernment with extensive powers, while a very simple form

and few powers may answer the purposes of a country
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hamlet. To determine the local needs in this regard, legis-

lation is requisite; and the State, therefore, will create

local governments, confer upon them such powers as in its

wisdom may seem expedient, and prescribe such safeguards

and limitations to their exercise as shall be deemed needful

or prudent. The powers thus conferred the State may in-

crease at discretion, so long as they are limited to govern-

1 People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44; People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15.

Their Functions. -The place of municipal corporations
in the structure of .American governments has been inci·
dentally referred to in the preceding pages, and little further mention is irpportant here. It is axiomatic that the
management of purely local affairs belongs to the people
concerned, not only because of being their own affairs, but
because they will best understand, and be most competent
to manage them. The continued and permanent existence
of local government is, therefore, assumed in all the state
constitutions, and is matter of constitutional right, even
when not in terms expressly provided for. It would not
be competent to dispense with it by statute.1
Their Creation. - Nevertheless there is no constitutional
form or model of local government, or standard or measure
of local powers ; and these need to be different according
to the circumstances. A city of a million of inhabitants,
with boulevards, parks, water-works, docks, and other
public property, may need an elabornte structure of government with extensive powers, while a very simple form
and few powers may answer the purposes of a country
hamlet. To determine the local needs in this regard, legislation is requisite ; and the State, therefore, will create
local governments, confer upon them such powers as in its
wisdom may seem expedient, and prescribe such safeguards
and limitations to their exercise as shall be deemed needful
or prudent. The powers thus conferred the State may increase at discretion, so long as they are limited to govern·
1

People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44; People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15.
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mental matters of purely local concern, but the State may

also diminisL them at discretion, and may at any time

abolish any particular local government and substitute

another in its place. In other words, while the local com-

munity is entitled to local government, it cannot claim, as

against the State, any particular charter or form of local

government.1

The creation of municipal governments within the States

belongs exclusively to the States. Congress may create

them in the District of Columbia and the Territories.

Within the Territories, however, it is customary to leave

the authority with the territorial legislature.

Duplicate Nature of Municipalities. — Municipal corpo-

rations are sometimes spoken of as having a duplicate

nature, and they certainly possess and exercise two classes

of powers; the one of which pertains to them in what may

be called their private capacity, and does not differ in na-

ture from the powers exercised by other corporations,

while the other pertains to their public capacity, and is

purely governmental. In the one capacity the municipal

corporation may acquire property for its own purposes and
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the benefit of its people; and it has a constitutional right

to be protected in this, as any individual or private corpo-

ration has.2 It may also make contracts within the limits

of the powers the State has conferred, and it is entitled to

exercise its own proper judgment and discretion in making

such contracts, and cannot be forced by the State to con-

tract debts against its will.8 But* in its public capacity

1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Barnes r.

District of Columbia, 91 U. S. Rep. 540; Laramie Co. v. Albany

Co., 02 U. S. Rep. 307.

* Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; Pawlett). Clark, 9 Cranch, 292;

State v. Haben, 22 Wis. 660.

8 Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37; Pope v. Phifer, 3 Heisk.

(Tenn.) 683; Howell v. Bristol, 8 Bush, (Ky.) 493; Washington

Avonue, 69 Penn. St. 352.

mental matters of purely local concern, but the State may
also diminisl them at discretion, and may at any time
abolish any particular local government and substitute
another in its place. In other words, while the local community is entitled to local government, it cannot claim, as
against the State, any particular charter or form of local
government. 1
The creation of municipal governments within the States.
belongs exclusively to the States. Congress may create
them in the District of Columbia and the Territories.
Within the Ten-itories, however, it is customary to leaYe
the authority with the territorial legislature.
Duplicate Nature of Municipalities. - Municipal corporations are sometimes spoken of as having a duplicate
nature, and they certainly possess and exercise two classes
of powers ; the one of which pertains to them in what may
be called their private capacity, and does not differ in nature from the powers exercised by other corporations,
while the other pertains to their public capacity, and is
purely governmental. In the one capacity the municipal
corporation may acquire property for its own purposes and
the benefit of its people; and it has a constitutional right
to be protected in this, as any individual or private corporation has. 2 It may also make contracts within the limits
of the powers the State has conferred, and it is entitled to
exercise its own proper judgment and discretion in making
such contracts, and cannot be forced by the State to contract debts against its will. 8 But· in its public capacity
1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Barnes 1'.
District of Columbia, 91 U. S. Rep. MO; Laramie Co. v. Albany
Co., 9'J U. S. Rep. 807.
i Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 29'J;
State v. Haben, 22 Wis. 660.
a Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37; Pope v. Phifer, 3 ,Heisk.
(Tenn.) 68J; Howell v. Bristol, 8 Bush, (Ky.) 493; Washington
A venue, 69 Penn. St. 352.
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the municipal corporation is merely an agent in govern-

ment, and the State will employ it as seems best, and

mould and control its powers with a view to the utmost

usefulness. To a large extent state duties are apportioned

for performance between the local governments, and they

are required to perform them within their limits, and to

levy taxes for the purpose if necessarj-. Illustrations of

state duties thus apportioned are those of maintaining

local courts, and the local police force, and of making

and keeping in repair the highways.1 If the localities fail

in these particulars, the State may coerce them; but it is

inconsistent with local institutions, as they have always

existed in this county-, that the local community should

be coerced by the State in matters of purely local con-

venience, or that the State should appoint officers to take

charge of local affairs.

Legislative Powers. — Within their proper sphere the

municipalities have legislative powers, and may make by-

laws and ordinances which have the force of local law.

These powers they exercise under the same rules which

govern state legislative authority. They cannot delegate

them to individuals for exercise; they must employ them
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in conformity to the charter of local government; they are

subject to all the restrictions which the federal Constitution

imposes on the States, — such as that ex post facto laws

and laws impairing the obligation of contracts shall not

be passed; and they must restrain their action within the

municipal limits. The State itself cannot so far enlarge

municipal powers as to enable the local officers to burden

their people with taxes for objects not of local interest.2

1 See People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md.

476; In re Pennsylvania Hall, 5 Penn. St. 204; People v. Detroit,

28 Mich. 228.

2 Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo. 385; Livingston County v. Weider,

64 111. 427; Mills v. Charlton, 29 Wis. 413.

the municipal corporation is merely an agent in government, and the State will employ it as seems best, and
mould and control its powers with a view to the utmost ,
usefulness. To a large extent state duties are apportioned
for performance between the local governments, and they
are required to perform them within their limits, and to
levy taxes for the purpose if necessary. Illustrations of
state duties thus apportioned are those of maintaining
local courts, and the local police force, and of making
and keeping in ~epair the highways. 1 If the localities fail
in these particulars, the State may coerce them ; but it is
inconsistent with local institutions, as they have always
existed in this country, that the local community should
be coerced by the State in matters of purely local convenience, or that the State should appoint officers to take
charge of local affairs.
Legislatil'e Powers. - Within their proper sphere the
municipalities have legislative powers, and may make bylaws and ordinances which have the force of local law.
These powers they exercise under the same rules which
govern st.ate legislative· authority. They cannot delegate
them to individuals for exercise ; they must employ them
in conformity to the charter of local government ; they are
subject to all the restrictions which the federal Constitution
imposes on the States, - such as that ex post facto laws
and laws impairing the obligation of contracts shall not
be passed ; and they· must restrain their action within the
municipal limits. The State itself cannot so far enlarge
municipal powers as to enable the local officers to burden
their people with taxes for objects not of local interest. 2
1 See People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md.
476; In re Pennsylvania Hall, 6 Penn. St. 204; People t•. Detroit,
~8 Mich. 228.
s Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo. 385 ; Livingston County v. Weider,
64 Ill. 427 ; Mills v. Charlton, 29 Wis. 413.
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A.

ACCUSED PARTIES.

(See Bail; Crimes; Habeas Corpus.)

ACTIONS,

for divorce, 180.

penal, 181.

local and transitory, 182.

rights in, are property, 327.

INDEX.

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION,

of federal courts, 113-115, 120.

ADMISSION OF STATES,

how brought about, 169-177.

ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS,

provisions of, 94.

A.

ALIENS,

how made citizens, 77, 242-244.

may be given special privileges, 77, 78.

ACCUSED PARTIES.
(See BAIL; CRDIEs;

AMBASSADORS,

jurisdiction of cases affecting, 112, 113.

AMENDMENTS,

to federal Constitution, 37, 199-204.

to State constitutions, 195-197.
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APPELLATE JURISDICTION,

of federal courts, 111, 130.

APPOINTMENT,

to fill senatorial vacancy, 46.

to offices by the President, 104.

APPORTIONMENT,

of representatives, 46.

HABEAS

CORPUS.)

ACTIONS,
for divorce, 180.
penal, 181.
local and transitory, 182.
rights in, are property, 327.

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION,
of federal courts, 113-115, 120.

ADMISSION OF STATES,

of taxes, 333.

how brought about, 169-177.

ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS,
provisions of, 94.
ALIENS,
how made citizens, 77, 242-244.
may be given special privileges, 77, 78.
AMBASSADORS,
jurisdiction of cases affecting, 112, 113.
AMENDMENTS,
to federal Constitution, 37, 199-204.
to State constitutions, 195-197.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION,
of federal courts, 111, 130.
APPOINTMENT,
to fill senatorial vacancy, 46.
to office8 by the President, 104. ,
APPORTIONMENT,
of representatives, 46.
of taxes, 333.

348

MS

INDEX.

INDEX.

APPROPRIATIONS,

no money to be drawn but in pursuance of, lOfi

APPROVAL OF LAWS,

by the President, 50, 105, 159-163.

ARBITRARY ARRESTS,

forbidden, 209-213.

relief from, 128-130, 288-290.

ARBITRARY EXACTIONS,

on pretence of taxation, 327.

ARMS,

right to keep and bear, 270-272.

ARMY,

Congress may raise and support, 87.

commander-in-chief, 100.

standing, 271.

ARREST,

privilege of Congressmen from, 49.

without warrant, 213.

unlawful, 209-212.

relief from, 128-130, 288-290.

ART, WORKS OF,
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copyright of, 84.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION.

(See Confederation, Articles of )

ASSEMBLY,

right of, 267-270.

ATTAINDER,

bills of, forbidden, 283-285.

in cases of treason, 91.

AUTHOR,

exclusive rights of, 84.

B.

BAIL,

right of accused parties to give, 291.

BALLOT,

voting by, 47, 252-254.

APPROPRIATIONS,
no money to be drawn but in pursuance of, lOR
APPROVAL OF LAWS,
by the President, 50, 105, 159-163.
ARBITRARY ARRESTS,
forbidden, 209-213.
relief from, 128-130, 288-290.
ARBITRARY EXACTIONS,
on pretence of taxation, 327.
ARMS,
right to keep and bear, 270-272.
ARMY,
Congress may raise and support, 87.
commander-in-chief, 100.
standing, 271.
ARREST,
privilege of CongreMmen from, 49.
without warrant, 213.
unlawful, 209-212.
relief from, 128-130, 288-290.
ART, WORKS OF,
copyright of, 84.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION.
(See

CONFEDERATION, ARTICLES OF)

ASSEMBLY,
right of, 267-270.
ATTAINDER,
bills of, forbidden, 283-285.
in cases of treason, 91.
AUTHOR,
exclusive rights of, 84.

B.
BAIL,
right of accused parties to give, 291.
BALLOT,
voting by, 47, 252-254.
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INDEX.

BANKRUPTCY,

power over, 78, 312, 313.

exemptions in cases of, 78, 79.

BEARING ARMS,

right of, 270-272.

BETTERMENT LAWS,

right to pass, 330.

BILL OF RIGHTS,

of 1 William and Mary, 7.

none in the Constitution, 17.

supplied by amendments, 18.

BILLS, LEGISLATIVE,

introduction of, 50.

BILLS OF ATTAINDER,

prohibition of, 280-283.

BILLS OF CREDIT,

States not to emit, 81.

what are, 82.

BLASPHEMY,

may be punished, 207.

in publications, 275.

BOOKS,
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copyright of, 84.

criticism sf, 280.

BORROWING MONEY,

power of, in Congress, 63.

BOUNTIES,

offer of, may be recalled, 303.

BRIDGES,

State power to authorize, 74.

C.

CHARTERS,

when contracts, 308.

regulation of rights under, 309-311.

CHECKS AND BALANCES,

in government, what are, 141-163.

BANKRUPTCY,
power over, 78, 312, 313.
exemptions in cases of, 78, 79.
BEARING ARMS,
right of, 270-272.
BETTERMENT LA \VS,
right to pass, 330.
BILL OF RIGHTS,
of 1 'Vi~liam and l\Iary, 7.
none in the Constitution, 17.
~upplied by amendments, 18.
BILLS, LEGISLATIVE,
introduction of, 50.
BILLS OF ATTAINDER,
prohibition of, 280-283.
BILLS OF CREDIT,
States not to emit, 81.
what are, 82.
BLASPHEMY,
may be punished, 207.
in publications, 275.
BOOKS,
copyright of, 84.
criticism )f, 280.
BORROWING l\IONEY,
power of, in Congress, 63.
BOUNTIES,
offer of, may be recalled, 303.
BRIDGES,
State power to authorize, 74.

c.
CHARTERS,
when contracts, 308.
regulation of rights under, 309-311.
CHECKS AND BALANCES,
in government, what are, 141-163.
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CHRISTIANITY,

recognition of, in the law, 205-208.

CHURCH AND STATE,

union of, forbidden, 205.

CITIZENS,

who are, 77, 119, 120, 188.

aliens, how made, 77, 242, 244.

of different States, may sue in federal courts, 108, 119.

of States, privileges and immunities of, 187-1S9.

of the United States, privileges and immunities of, 245-247.

CITIZENSHIP,

of colored persons, 242.

how acquired, 242-244.

how lost, 242.

in State and nation, 242.

CIVIL LIBERTY,

meaning of, 226.

CIVIL RIGHTS,

religious liberty, 205-208.

security of dwelling, person, and papers, 208-213.

freedom guaranteed, 213-221.
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guaranties of life, liberty, and equality, 221-237.

right to jury trial in civil cases, 237-240.

CLASS LEGISLATION,

not admissible, 226, 227.

COINING MONEYS,

power over, 79. „

what it consists in, 79, 80

COLONIES, AMERICAN,

legislation for, 4-6.

imperial taxation of, 5, 6, 8.

right to common law in, 6.

violations of constitutional right in, 8.

COLOR,

not to affect suffrage, 267.

COLORED PERSONS,

citizenship of, 241-244.

rights of, in schools, 230, 231.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,

President to be, 100.

CHRISTIANITY,
· recognition of, in the law, 205-208.
CHURCH AND STATE,
union of, forbidden, 205.
CITIZENS,
. who are, 77, 119, 120, 188.
aliens, how made, 77, 242, 244.
of different States, may sue in federal courts, 108, 119.
of States, privileges and immunities of, 187-189.
of the United States, privileges and immunities of, 245-247.
CITIZENSHIP,
of colored persons, 242.
how acquired, 242-244.
how lost, 242.
in State and nation, 242.
CIVIL LIBERTY,
meaning of, 226.
CIVIL RIGHTS,
religious liberty, 205-208.
security of dwelling, person, and papers, 208-213.
freedom guaranteed, 213-221.
guaranties of life, liberty, and equality, 221-237.
right to jury trial in civil cases, 237-240.
CLASS LEGISLATION,
not admissible, 226, 227.
COINIXG MONEYS,
power over, 79.
what it consists in, 79, 80
COLONIES, AMERICAN,
legislation for, 4-6.
imperial taxation of, 5, 6, 8.
right to common law in, 6.
violations of constitutional right in, 8.
COLOR,
not to affect suffrage, 267.
COLORED PERSONS,
citizenship of, 241-244. ,
rights of, in schools, 230, 231.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
President hl be, 100.
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INDEX.

INDEX.

COMITY,

inter-state, 178-198.

COMMERCE,

Congress may regulate, 64.

meaning of, 65.

includes telegraphic communication, 65.

between the States, what is, 66, 67.

with Indian tribes, 68.

embargo as a regulation of, 68.

power to regulate, is exclusive, 69-73.

apparent exceptions, 74.

cases of bridges, dams, and ferries, 74, 75.

must not be hampered by State taxes, 69, 70, 75, 76.

preferences in regulation of, forbidden, 76.

(See Common Carriers; Police Power.)

COMMON CARRIERS,

regulation of business of, 70-73, 233, 234.

(See Railroad Companies.)

COMMON LAW",

what it is, 7, 8.

colonists entitled to, 8.

in the States, 131.
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United States has none, 131.

COMPACT,,

the Constitution not a, 27.

COMPACTS BETWEEN STATES,

what may be entered into, 89.

COMPENSATION,

of members of Congress, 49.

of the President, 106.

for property taken for public uses, 340-342.

CONCURRENT POWERS,

of State and nation, 35, 74.

CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION,

how dealt with, 133-136.

CONFLICT OF LAWS,

under the federal Constitution, 31-33.

how may arise, 178.

in cases of contracts and transfers of property, 178-180.

in questions of marriage and divorce, 180.

COMITY,
inter-state, 178-198.
COMMERCE,
Congress may regulate, 64.
meaning of, 65.
includes telegraphic communication, 65.
between the States, what is, 66, 67.
with Indian tribes, 68.
embargo as a regulation of, 68.
power to regulate, is exclusive, 69-73.
apparent exceptions, 74.
cases of bridges, dams, and ferries, 74, 75.
must not be hampered by State taxes, 69, 70, 75, 76.
preferences in regulation of, forbidden, 76.
(See COMMON CARR!Ens; POLICE POWER.)
COMMON CARRIERS,
regulation of business of, 70-73, 233, 234.
(See RAILROAD COMPANIES.)
COMMON LAW,
what it is, 7, 8.
colonists entitled to, 8.
in the States, 131.
Gnited States has none, 131.
COMPACT,.
the Constitution not a, 27.
CO~fPACTS BETWEEN STATES,
what may be entered into, 89.
COMPENSATION,·
of members of Congress, 49.
of the President, 106.
for property taken for public uses, 340-342.
CONCURRENT POWERS,
of State and nation, 35, 74.
CO:NFLICTS OF JURISDICTION,
how dealt with, 133-136.
CON'FLICT OF LA \VS,
·under the federal Constitution, 31-33.
how may arise, 178.
in cases of contracts and transfers of property, 178-180.
in que8tions of marriage and divorce, 180.

351

352

352

INDEX.

INDEX.

CONFLICT OF LAWS, — continued.

in cases of penal prosecutions, 182.

in local and transitory actions, 182.

as to corporations, 182, 183.

CONFRONTED WITH WITNESSES,

right of accused party to be, 295.

CONGRESS,

powers of, in general, 54.

to lay and collect taxes, 54-63.

to contract debts, 63.

to regulate commerce, 64-77.

over naturalization, 77, 243.

over bankruptcy, 78.

to coin money, 79.

to issue paper money, 80.

to regulate weights and measures, 82.

to punish counterfeiting, 82.

in respect to post-offices and post-roads, 83.

in respect to copyrights and patents, 84.

to punish piracies, &c, 85.

to declare and conduct war, 86-90.
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to govern ceded districts, 90.

to punish treason, 91, 287.

non-enumerated and implied, 91-97.

restrictions on, 97-99, 205, 208, 210, 237, 272, 283-

287.

to suspend the habeas corpus, 288-290.

to create and regulate courts, 108.

to determine finally political questions, 138.

to hold other departments in check, 141-163.

to govern the Territories, 164-168.

to admit new States, 169-177.

to protect republican government in the States, 191-

198.

to propose amendments to the Constitution, 199.

to create municipal corporations, 344.

CONSCIENCE,

freedom of, 205-208.

CONSEQUENTIAL INJURIES,

in exercise of eminent domain, 337, 341, 342.

CONFLICT OF I"A WS, - continued.
in cases of penal prosecutions, 182.
in local and transitory actions, 182.
as to corporations, 182, 183.
CONFRONTED WITH WITNESSES,
right of accused party to be, 295.
CONGRESS,
powers of, in general, 54.
to lay and collect taxes, 54-63.
to contract debts, 63.
to regulate commerce, 64-77.
over naturalization, 77, 248.
over bankruptcy, 78.
to coin money, 79.
to issue paper money, 80.
to regulate·weights and measures, 82.
to punish counterfeiting, 82.
in respect to post-offices and post-roads, 83.
in respect to copyrights and patents, 84.
to punish piracies, &c., 85.
to declare and conduct war, 86-90.
to govern ceded districts, 90.
to punish treason, 91, 287.
non-enumerated and implied, 91-97.
restrictions on, 97-99, 205, 208, 210, 237, 272, 283287.
to suspend the habeas corpus, 288-290.
to create and regulate courts, 108.
to determine finally political questions, 138.
to hold other departments in check, 141-163.
to govern the Territories, 164-168.
to admit new States, 169-177.
to protect republican government in the States, 194-198. .
to propose amendments to the Constitution, 199.
to create municipal corporations, 344.
CONSCIENCE,
freedom of, 205-208.
CONSEQUENTIAL INJURIES,
in exercise of eminent domain, 337, 841, 342.

INDEX.

INDEX.
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CONSTITUTION,

definition of, 22.

written and unwritten, 28.

of Great Britain, 6, 7, 24.

CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES,

formation of, 15, 16.

adoption of, 16, 26.

sovereign powers under, 22, 23.

not a mere compact, 27-29. •

is a grant of powers, 29-31.

is supreme, 31-33.

amendment of, 37, 199-204.

modification of powers under, 38, 39.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,

work of, 15, 16.

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS,

what are, 22.

CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES,

CONSTITUTION,
definition of, 22.
written and unwritten, 28.
of Great Britain, 6, 7, 24.
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
formation of, 15, 16.
adoption of, 16, 26.
sovereign powers under, 22, 23.
not a mere compact, 27-29.
is a grant of powers, 29-31.
is supreme, 31-33.
amendment of, 37, 199-204.
modification of powers under, 38, 89.

formation of the first, 10, 11.

powers under, 22, 23.

fundamental principles of, 23.
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must yield to federal Constitution, 32.

admission of States under, 169-177.

right to amend, 194-196.

CONSTRUCTION,

of the provisions for protection of individual rights, 18, 19

final authority in, 139.

CONTEMPTS,

of Congress, 48.

of authority in general, 298.

CONTESTING ELECTIONS,

methods of, 261, 262.

CONTESTED FACTS,

legislature not to decide, 45.

CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,

powers of, 9-11.'

CONTRACTS,

States may not impair obligation of, 300.

23

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
work of, 15, 16.
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS,
what are, 22.
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES,
formation of· the first, 10, 11.
powers under, 22, 23.
fundamental principles of, 23.
must yield to federal Constitution, 32.
admission of States under, 169-177.
right to amend, 194-196.
CONSTRUCTION,
of the provisions for protection of individual rights, 18, 19
final authority in, 139.
CONTEMPTS,
of Congress, 48.
of authority in general, 298.
CONTESTING ELECTIONS,
methods of, 261, 262.
CONTESTED FACTS,
legislature not to decide, 45.
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
powers of, 9-11. CONTRACTS,
States may not impair obligation of, 300.
23

354

354

INDEX.

INDEX

CONTRACTS, — continued.

what are, 301, 302, 308, 311.

obligation of, 301.

when statutes are, 302.

offices are not, 303, 308.

statutory privileges are not, 303.

essential powers of government not subjects of in general.

304-306.

of .the State not to tax, 305.

of the State to give exclusive privileges, 306, 307.

State regulation of, 308-311, 314.

control of remedies upon, 311-313.

illegal or immoral, 313.

States cannot add to, 313.

whether Congress may violate, 313, 314.

validating imperfect, 322-325.

COPYRIGHT,

power over, 84.

CORPORATE CHARTERS,

protection of, 306-308.

regulation of rights under, 309-311.
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CORPORATE PROPERTY,

of municipalities, protection in, 344, 345.

CORPORATIONS,

chartered by Congress, taxation of, 61, 62.

powers of, limited to jurisdiction where created, 182, 183

protection of charters of, 306-308.

municipal, 343-345.

COUNSEL,

right to, 295.

privilege of, 276.

COUNTERFEITING,

punishment of, 82, 83.

COURTS,

creation of, 52, 109.

essential powers of, 136.

martial, 137.

military, 52, 137.

territorial, 52, 53, 136.

CONTRACTS, - continued.
what are, 301, 302, 308, 811.
obligation of, 801.
when statutes are, 802.
offices are not, 803, 808.
statutory privileges are not, 303.
essential powers of government not subjects of in general.
304-306.
of .the State not to tax, 805.
of the State to give exclusive privileges, 306, 307.
State regulation of, 308-811, 314.
control of remedies upont 311-313.
illegal or immoral, 313.
States cannot add to, 313.
whether Congress may violate, 818, 314.
validating imperfect, 322-325.
COPYRIGHT,
power over, 84.
CORPORATE CHARTERS,
protection of, 306-308.
regulation of rights under, 809-811.
CORPORATE PROPERTY,
of municipalities, protection in, 844, 845.
CORPORATIONS, .
chartered by Congress, taxation of, 61, 62.
powers of, limited to jurisdiction where created, 182, 183
protection of charters of, 806-308.
municipal, 343-345.
COUNSEL,
right to, 295.
privilege of, 276.
COUNTERFEITING,
punishment of, 82, 88.
COURTS,
creation of, 52, 109.
essential powers of, 186.
martial, 137.
military, 52, 137.
territorial, 52, 53, 186.

INDEX.

INDEX.

COURTS, — continued.

political questions in, 138.

(See Judiciary.)

CRIMES,

against the United States, what are, 131.

COURTS, - continued.
political questions in, 138.
(See JUDICIARY.)

legislative punishments for, 283-287.

treason and its punishment, 287, 288.

accusations of, by indictment, 290, 291, 294.

infamous, what are, 291.

trials and punishments for, 292-296.

CRITICISM,

of persons, books, &c, by the press, 276-282.

CROWN OF GREAT BRITAIN,

control of colonies by, 4-6.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS,

forbidden, 296.

CURATIVE LAWS,

when may be passed, 322-326.

CUSTOMS DUES,

power to levy and collect, 54-63.

D.

DAMS,
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of navigable waters, 94.

DEBT, PUBLIC,

power to create, 62.

constitutional provisions respecting, 62-64.

DEEDS,

curing defective, by legislation, 322-325.

DEFINITION,

CRIMES,
against the United States, what are, 131.
legislative punishments for, 283-287.
treason and its punishment, 287, 288.
accusations of, by indictment, 290, 291, 294.
infamous, what are, 291.
trials and punishmentB for, 292-296.

CRITICISM,
of persons, books, &c., by the press, 276-282.

CROWN OF GREAT. BRITAIN,
control of colonies by, 4-6.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS,
forbidden, 296.
CURATIVE LAWS,
when may be passed, 322-326.
CUSTOMS DUES,
power to levy and collect, 54-63.

of bills of attainder, 284.

of citizens, 77.

of civil liberty, 226.

D.

of constitution, 22.

of due process of law, 221-224.

DAMS,

of eminent domain, 332.

of establishment of religion, 205.

of executive power, 43.

of navigable waters, 94.

DEBT, PUBLIC,

of ex post facto law, 285.

power to create, 62.
constitutional provisions respecting, 62-64.

DEEDS,
curing defective, by legislation, 822-325.

DEFINITION,
of bills of attainder, 284.
of citizens, 77.
of civil liberty, 226.
of constitution, 22.
of due process of law, 221-224 ..
of eminent domain, 332.
of establishment of religion, 205.
of executive power, 43.
of ex post facto law, 285.
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INDEX.

INDEX.

DEFINITION, — continued.

of infamous crime, 291.

of judicial power, 44.

of legislative power, 43.

of liberty, 225.

of liberty of the press, 272.

of nation, 20.

of people, 267.

of police power, 227.

of political liberty, 226.

of privileged communication, 275.

of property, 315.

of right of revolution, 25.

of sovereignty, 21.

of State, 20.

of treason, 287.

of unconstitutional law, 24.

of vested rights, 320.

DELEGATION OF POWERS,

by legislative bodies, 97, 98.

DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT,
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apportionment of powers to, 43-53.

each a check upon the others, 141-163.

DIRECT TAXES,

DEFINITION, - continued.
of infamous crime, 291.
of judicial power, 44.
of legislative power, 43.
of liberty, 225.
of liberty of the press, 272.
of nation, 20.
of people, 267.
of police power, 227.
of political liberty, 226.
of privileged communication, 275.
of property, 315.
of right of revolution, 25.
of sovereignty, 21.
of State, 20.
of treason, 287.
of unconstitutional law, 24.
of vested rights, 320.

what are, 62.

DISCUSSION, FREEDOM OF,

(See Press, Freedom of.)

DELEGATION OF POWERS,
by legislative bodies, 97, 98.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

government of, 90, 91, 344.

DIVORCE,

conflict of laws in respect to, 180, 229, 230.

DOMICILE,

protection of, 208-213.

DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT,
apportionment of powers t.o, 43-58.
each a check upon the others, 141-163.

DIRECT TAXES,

as determining rights, 178-183, 228, 229.

DOUBLE PUNISHMENT,

forbidden, 296-298.

what are, 62.

DISCUSSION, FREEDOM OF,

DUE PROCESS OF LAW,

(See

meaning of, 221-225.

in criminal cases, 298.

PRESS, FREEDOM OF.)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
government of, 90, 91, 344.

DIVORCE,
conflict of laws in respect to, 180, 229, 230.

DOMICILE,
protection of, 208-213.
as determining rights, 178-183, 228, 229.

DOUBLE PUNISHMENT,
forbidden, 296-298.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW,
meaning of, 221-225.
in criminal cases, 298.

INDEX.

INDEX.

DUTIES AND IMPOSTS,

may be laid, 54-63.

DWELLING-HOUSE,

protection of, 208-213.

E

EDUCATION,

right to, 230.

DUTIES AND IMPOSTS,
may be laid, 54-63.
DWELLlNG-HOUSE,
protection of, 208-213.

ELECTIONS,

of representatives in Congress, 47, 48, 49, 250.

of senators, 47-49.

basis of suffrage for, 249, 250.

qualifications of electors, 251, 262-266.

general rules governing, 252-261.

ELECTORS OF PRESIDENT,

choice by, 51, 142.

ELIGIBILITY,

of persons to office, 257.

EMANCIPATION,

history of, 213-221.

EMBARGO,

power to declare, 68.

EMINENT DOMAIN,
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law of the, 331-342.

EMPLOYMENT,

privilege to engage in, 231.

regulation of, 231.

prohibition of, injurious, 232.

ENABLING ACT,

for admission of State to Union, 171-173.

ENGLAND,

constitution of, 22.

separation from, 1-19.

EQUALITY,

religious, 206-208.

of civil rights, 226.

in elections, 262.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS,

right to, 221-227.

E.
·EDUCATION,
right to, 230.
ELECTIONS,
of representatives in Congress, 47, 48, 49, 250.
of senators, 47-49.
basis of suffrage for, 249, 250.
qualifications of electors, 251, 262-266.
general rules governing, 252-261.
ELECTORS OF PRESIDENT,
choice by, 51, 142.
ELIGIBILITY,
of persons to office, 257.
EMANCIPATION,
history of, 213-221.
EMBARGO,
power to declare, 68.
EMINENT DOMAIN,
law of the, 331-342.
EMPLOYMENT,
privilege to engage in, 231.
regulation of, 231.
prohibition of, injurious, 232.
ENABLING ACT,
for admission of State to Union, 171-173.
ENGLAND,
constitution of, 22.
separation from, 1-19.
EQUALITY,
religious, 206-208.
of civil rights, 226.
in elections, 262.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS,
right to, 221-227.
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INDEX.

INDEX.

ESTABLISHMENTS, RELIGIOUS,

meaning of, 205.

EVIDENCE,

change in rules of, 329.

EXCESSIVE BAIL,

not to be required, 291.

EXCISE TAXES,

levy of, 55, 56.

EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES,

grant of, in navigation, 67, 69.

ESTABLISHMENTS, RELIGIOUS,
meaning of, 205.

EVIDENCE,
change in rules of, 329.
EXCESSIVE BAIL,
not to be required·, 291.
EXCISE TAXES,

to authors and inventors, 84.

under State police regulations, 73, 235, 306, 337.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.

(See President.)

EXECUTIVE POWERS,

separated from others, 43.

EXEMPTIONS,

levy of, 55, 56.

EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES,
grant of, iu navigation, 67, 69.
to authors and inventors, 84.
under State police regulations, 73, 235, 306, 337.

of property from taxations, 208, 305.

under bankrupt laws, 78.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.
(See

EXPORTS,

PRESIDENT.)

State taxes on, 75.
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EX POST FACTO LAWS,

prohibition of, 285-287.

EXPULSION,

from Congress, 48.

EXTRADITION,

as between the States, 189-193.

F.

FEDERAL COURTS.

(See Judiciary, Federal.)

EXECUTIVE POWERS,
separated from others, 43.

EXEMPTIONS,
of property from taxations, 208, 305.
under bankrupt laws, 78.

EXPORTS,
State taxes on, 75.

FERRY FRANCHISES,

State power to create, 74.

FISHERIES,

State rights in, 189.

FORFEITURES,

of political rights, 244, 251.

in enforcing taxes, 331.

EX POST FACTO LAWS,
prohibition of, 285-287.

EXPULSION,
from Congress, 48.

EXTRADITION,
as between the States, 189-193.

F.
FEDERAL COURTS.
(See

JUDICIA8Y, FEDERAL.)

FERRY FRANCHISES,
State power to create, 74.

FISHERIES,
State rights in, 189.

FORFEITURES,
of political rights, 244, 251.
in enforcing taxes, 331.

INDEX.

INDEX.

FRANCHISES,

political, 248-253.

corporate, 74, 308.

municipal, 304, 342-344.

FREEDOM,

made universal, 213-221.

FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE,

return of, as between the States, 189-193.

FUGITIVES FROM SERVICE,

return of, 193.

G.

GENERAL LAWS,

incidental injuries from, 314, 320-322.

GENERAL WARRANTS,

illegality of, 212, 213.

GOVERNMENT,

FRANCHISES,
political, 248-253.
corporate, 74, 308.
municipal, 304, 342-344.
FREEDOM,
made universal, 213-221.
FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE,
return of, as between the States, 189-193.
FUGITIVES FROM SERVICE,
return of, 193.

departments of, 43-50.

agencies of, not to be taxed, 60.

checks and balances in, 141-163.

libels on, 277.

GOVERNOR,

not subject to judicial process, 191.
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GRAND JURY,'

when required, 290, 291.

GRANTS,

by States cannot be recalled, 301.

GREAT BRITAIN.

(See England.)

GUARANTY,

of republican government to the States, 194-198.

H.

HABEAS CORPUS,

Act of 31 Charles n., 7.

federal jurisdiction of writ of, 128-130, 288.

suspending privilege of, 289, 290.

HARBOR REGULATIONS,

States may make, 74.

G.

GENERAL LA 'vs,
incidental injuries from, 314, 320-322.
GENERAL WARRANTS,
illegality of, 212, 213.
GOVERNMENT,
departments of, 43-50.
agencies of, not to be taxed, 60.
checks and balances in, 141-163.
libels on, 277.
GOVERNOR,
not subject to judicial process, 191.
GRAND JURY,when required, 290, 291.
GRANTS,
by States cannot be recalled, 301.
GREAT BRITAIN.
(See ENGLAND.)
GUARANTY,
of republican government to the States, 194-198.

H.
HABEAS CORPUS,
Act of 31 Charles TI., 7.
federal jnrisdiction of writ of, 128-130, 288.
suspending privilege of, 289, 290.
HARBOR REGULATIONS,
States may make, 74.
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360

INDEX.

INDEX.

HEALTH LAWS,

States may pass, 74.'

HIGH SEAS,

crimes upon, 85.

HIGHWAYS,

, taking for railroads, &c., 339, 340.

providing for, is a State duty, 345.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

constitutional provisions respecting, 46-50.

impeachment by, 158.

HUSBAND AND WIFE,

laws changing prospective rights of, 321, 322.

(See Divorce; Marriage.)

L

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS,

have no obligation, 301.'

IMMUNITIES,

of citizens of States, what are, 187-189.

of citizens of United States, 245-247.

HEALTH LAWS,
States may pass, 74. ·
HIGH SEAS,
crimes upon, 85.
HIGHWAYS,
taking for railroads, &c., 339, 340.
providing for, is a Stat.e duty, 345.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
constitutional provisions respecting, 46-50.
impeachment by, 158.
HUSBAND AND 'VIFE,
laws changing prospective rights of, 321, 322.
(See DIVORCE; MARRIAGE.)

IMPAIRING CONTRACTS,

by State laws forbidden, 300-314.
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IMPARTIAL ACCOMMODATIONS,

by carriers and innkeepers, 71, 232, 233.

IMPARTIAL PROTECTION,

right to, 237.

IMPEACHMENT,

power in respect to, 158, 159.

IMPLIED POWERS,

of Congress, what are, 91-97.

IMPLIED PROHIBITIONS,

on taxation, 60-62, 69, 70.

on State action, 247.

IMPORTERS,

State taxes upon, 69, 75.

IMPOSTS,

levy of, 54-63.

L
ILLEGAL CONTRACTS,
have no obligation, 301. ·
Il\I:MUNITIES,
of citizens of States, what are, 187-189.
of citizens of United States, 245--247.
IMP AIRING CONTRACTS,
by State laws forbidden, 300-314.
IMPARTIAL ACCOMMODATIONS,
by carriers and innkeepers, 71, 232, 233.

IMPARTIAL PROTECTION,
right to, 237.
IMPEACHMENT,
power in respect to, 158, 159.
IMPLIED POWERS,
of Congress, what are, 91-97.
IMPLIED PROHIBITIONS,
on taxation, 60-62, 69, 70.
on State action, 247.
IMPORTERS,
State taxes upon, 69, 75.
IMPOSTS,
levy of, 54-63.

INDEX.

INDEX.

IMPRESSMENT,

of sailors, 88.

IMPRISONMENT,

relief from, on giving bail, 291.

habeas corpus in cases of, 128-130, 288-290.

IMPROVEMENTS,

when owner of lands may be compelled to pay for, 330.

INCHOATE RIGHTS,

may be taken away, 319-322.

INDEPENDENCE,

declaration of, 3, 9.

INDIAN TRIBES,

regulation of commerce with, 65, 68.

members of, are not citizens, 243.

INDICTMENT,

of accused parties, 293, 297.

INELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE,

effect of, 257.

INFAMOUS OFFENCE,

what is, 291.

INNKEEPERS,

regulation of business of, 232, 233.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

INQUISITORIAL TRIALS,

forbidden, 294, 295.

INSOLVENT LAWS,

States may pass, 312.

INSPECTION LAWS,

of the States, 75.

INSTRUCTION,

right of, 41, 42.

INSURRECTIONS,

protection of States against, 198.

INTEREST,

State control of rates of, 235.

INTERNATIONAL LAW,

what it is, 21.

certain principles of, 178-193.

IMPRESSMENT,
of sailors, 88.
IMPRISONMENT,
relief from, on giving bail, 291.
habeas corpus in cases of, 128-130, 288-290.
IMPROVEMENTS,
when owner of lands may be compelled to pay for, 330.
INCHOATE RIGHTS,
may be taken away, 319-322.
INDEPENDENCE,
declaration of, 3, 9.
INDIAN TRIBES,
regulation of commerce with, 65, 68.
members of, are not citizens, 243.
INDICTMENT,
of accused parties, 293, 297.
INELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE,
effect of, 257.
INF Al\:IOUS OFFENCE,
what is, 291.
INNKEEPERS,
regulation of business of, 232, 233.
INQUISITORIAL TRIALS,
forbidden, 294, 295.
INSOLVENT LAWS,
States may pass, 312.
INSPECTION LAWS,
of the States, 75.
INSTRUCTION,
right of, 41, 42.
INSURRECTIONS,
protection of States against, 198.
INTEREST,
State control of rates of, 235.
INTERNATIONAL LAW,
what it is, 21.
certain principles of, 178-193.
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862

362

INDEX.

INDEX.

INTER-STATE COMMERCE,

INTER-STATE COMMERCE,

regulation of, 65-71.

INTIMIDATION,

effect on elections, 258, 259.

regulation of, 65-71.

INTIMIDATION,

INTOXICATING DRINKS,

regulation of sale of, 73, 232.

INVASIONS,

protection of States from, 198.

INVENTIONS,

exclusive rights in, 84.

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE,

effect on elections, 258, 259.

INTOXICATING DRINKS,
regulation of sale of, 73, 232.

INVASIONS,
protection of States from, 198.

prohibited, 218, 221.

IRREGULARITIES,

in elections, effect of, 254-256.

INVENTIONS,
exclusive rights in, 84.

IRREPEALABLE LAWS,

not to be passed, 98.

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE,
prohibited, 218, 221.

J.

JEOPARDY,

meaning of, 296-298.

JOURNAL OF CONGRESS,

to be kept and published, 48, 49.
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JUDGES,

of civil courts, 52.

IRREGULARITIES,
in elections, effect of, 254-256.

IRREPEALABLE LAWS,
not to be passed, 98.

of territorial courts, 52, 53.

can be required to perform only judicial duty, 53.

impeachment of, 158.

J.

JUDGMENTS,

of one State to be respected in others, 183-187.

JUDICIARY,

may set aside unconstitutional law, 144-155.

power of, as respects the executive, 157, 158.

territorial, 168.

curing defects in proceedings of, 316-319.

JUDICIARY, FEDERAL,

grant of power to, 52, 108.

creation of courts, 52, 109.

jurisdiction of federal questions by, 109-112.

JEOPARDY,
meaning of, 296-298.

JOURNAL OF CONGRESS,
to be kept and published, 48, 49.
JUDGES,
of civil courts, 52.
of territorial courts, 52, 53.
can be required to perform only judicial duty, 53.
impeachment of, 158.

JUDGMENTS,
of one State to be respected in others, 183-187.

JUDICIARY,
may set aside unconstitutional law, 144-155.
power of, as respects the executive, 157, 158.
territorial, 168.
curing defects in. proceedings of, 316-319 •.

JUDICIARY, FEDERAL,
grant of power to, 52, 108.
creation of courts, 52, 109.
jurisdiction of federal questions by, 109-112.

~EX.

INDEX.

JUDICIARY, FEDERAL,— continued.

jurisdiction of cases affecting ambassadors, &c, 112.

of admiralty and maritime causes, 113-115.

of suits against the United States, 116.

of suits by and against States, 117, 118.

exclusive, 120.

original, 121, 122.

by transfer of causes to, 122-128.

of writ of habeas corpus, 128-130.

appellate, 111, 130.

what laws administered by, 130-133.

conflicts of jurisdiction, 133-136.

essential powers of, 136.

political questions in, 138.

final authority in construction, 139.

JUDICIARY, STATE,

may take cognizance of federal questions, 110.

appellate jurisdiction over, 111, 130.

transfer of causes from, 122-128.

jurisdiction of suits affecting personal liberty, 129, 130.

law administered by, 130-133.

judgments of, to be respected in other States, 183-187.
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JURY,

trial by, in the Colonies, 8.

in civil cases in federal courts, 237-240.

in cases of libel, 281.

in criminal cases, 293.

privileged discussions in the, 276.

JUSTIFICATION,

in libel cases, 280.

L.

LAW OF THE LAND,

right to, by Magna Charta, 6.

JUDICIARY, FEDERAL, - continued.
jurisdiction of cases affecting ambassadors, &c., 112.
of admiralty and maritime causes, 113-115.
of suits against the United States, 116.
of suits by and against States, 117, 118.
exclusive, 120.
original, 121, 122.
by transfer of causes to, 122-128.
of writ of habeas corpus, 128-130.
appellate, 111, 130.
what laws administered by, 130-133.
conflicts of jurisdiction, 133-136.
essential powers of, 136.
political questions in, 138.
:final authority in construction, 139.

JUDICIARY, STATE,
may take cognizance of federal questions, 110.
appellate jurisdiction over, 111, 130.
transfer of causes from, 122-128.
jurisdiction of suits affecting personal liberty, 129, 130.
law administered by, 130-133.
judgments of, to be respected in other States, 183-187.

JURY,

what is the, 221-225.

LAW OF NATIONS,

what is, 21.

certain principles of, 178-193.

trial by, in the Colonies, 8.
in civil cases in federal courts, 237-240.
· in cases of libel, 281.
in criminal cases, 293.
privileged discussions in the, 276.

JUSTIFICATION,
in libel cases, 280.

L.
LAW OF THE J.JAND,
right to, by Magna Charta, 6.
what is the, 221-225.

LAW OF NATIONS,
what is, 21.
certain principles of, 178-193.
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364

INDEX.

INDEX.

LEGAL TENDER,

power to make, 79-82.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT,

creation and organization of, 45-48.

proceedings and journals of, 48-50.

not to exercise judicial power, 283-287.

when enactments of, may be set aside, 144-155.

LEGISLATIVE POWERS,

assignment of, to one department, 43, 44.

not to be delegated, 97.

acts in excess of, are void, 144-155.

in the Territories, 166, 167.

of municipal bodies, 345.

LEGISLATORS,

privilege of, from arrest, 49.

from actions, 155, 276.

LEGISLATURES, TERRITORIAL,

what they are and the powers, 166-168.

LIBEL,

law of, 272-282.

LIBERTY,
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the birthright of, 4, 6, 9.

LEGAL TENDER,
power to make, 79-82.
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT,
creation and organization of, 45-48.
proceedings and journals of, 48-50.
not to exercise judicial power, 283-287.
when enactments of, may be set aside, 144-155.

LEGISLATIVE POWERS,
assignment of, to one department, 43, 44.
not to be delegated, 97.
ac~ in excess of, are void, 144-155.
in the Territories, 166, 167.
of municipal bodies, 345.

LEGISLATORS,
privilege of, from arrest, 49.
from actions, 155, 276.

guaranty of, 221-226.

religious, 206-208.

meaning of, 225, 226.

LEGISLATURES, TERRITORIAL,
what they are and the powers, 166-168.

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND PRESS,

law of, 272-282.

LIBERTY, RELIGIOUS,

LIBEL,
law of, 272-282.

protection of, 205-208.

LICENSE,

to follow certain employments, 232, 234.

LIMITATION LAWS,

cutting off contracts by, 328.

LITERARY PRODUCTIONS,

rights in, 84.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT,

the right to, 343-345.

LORD'S DAY,

legislation for observance of, 207.

LIBERTY,
the birthright of, 4, 6, 9.
guaranty of, 221-226.
religious, 208-208.
meaning of, 225, 226.

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND PRESS,
law of, 272-282.

LIBERTY, RELIGIOUS,
protection of, 205-208.

LICENSE,
to follow certain employments, 232, 234:.

LIMITATION LAWS,

.,

cutting off contracts by, 828.

LITERARY PRODUCTIONS,
rights in, 84.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT,
the right to, 343-345.
LORD'S DAY,
legislation for observance of, 207•.

INDEX.

INDEX.

M.

MAGNA CHARTA,

a charter of liberty, 6.

MAJORITY RULE,

restraints upon, 39-41.

M.

MALICE,

in official action, 155, 156.

in injurious publications, 279, 280.

MARITIME CASES,

jurisdiction of, 113-115, 120.

MARRIAGE,

conflict of laws in respect to, 180, 227-229.

MARTIAL LAW,

suspends habeas corpus, 290.

courts to administer, 52, 137.

MEASURES AND WEIGHTS,

Congress to fix standards of, 82.

MESSAGES,

of the President, 105.

MILITARY,

at the polls, 259.

quartering on the people, 208.
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MILITARY COURTS,

creation and powers of, 52, 137, 138.

MILITARY LAW,

to be prescribed by Congress, 88.

MILITIA,

enrollment and government of, 88, 89.

(See Soldiers.)

MILL-DAMS,

taking property for, 335, 336.

MISSOURI,

compromise on admission of, 174, 175, 215-217, 241.

MONEY,

power of Congress in respect to, 79-81.

counterfeiting, 82.

MAGNA CHARTA,
a charter of liberty, 6.
MAJORITY RULE,
restraints upon, 39-41.
MALICE,
in official action, 155, 156.
in injurious publications, 279, 280.
MARITIME CASES,
jurisdiction of, 113-115, 120.
MARRIAGE,
conflict of laws in respect to, 180, 227-229.
MARTIAL LAW,
suspends habeas corpus, 290.
courts to administer, 52, 137.
MEASURES AND WEIGHTS,
Congress to fix standards of, 82.
MESSAGES,
of the President, 105.
MILITARY,
at the polls, 259.
quartering on the people, 208.
MILITARY COURTS,
creation and powers of, 52, 137, 138.
MILITARY LAW,
to be prescribed by Congress, 88.
MILITIA,
enrollment and government of, 88, 89.
(See SOLDIERS.)
MILL-DAMS,
taking property for, 335, 336.
MISSOURI,
compromise on admission of, 174, 175, 215-217, 241.
MONEY,
power of Congress in respect to, 79-81.
counterfeiting, 82.

365

366

366

INDEX.

INDEX.

MONOPOLIES,

in the use of navigable waters, 67-69.

under State police regulations, 73, 235.

in general are illegal, 235.

combinations to effect, 236.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,

place of, in constitutional law, 343.

general rules respecting, 343-345.

N.

NATION,

definition of, 20.

MONOPOLIES,
in the use of navigable waters, 67-69.
under State police regulations, 73, 235.
in general are illegal, 235.
combinations to effect, 236.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
place of, in constitutional law, 343.
general rules respecting, 343-345.

balanced against States, 142-144.

NATIONAL BANKS,

power to create, 93.

taxation of, 61.

NATIONS, LAW OF,

what it is, 21.

rules of comity by, 178-193.

NATURAL LIBERTY,

meaning of, 226.

NATURALIZATION,
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power over, 77, 78.

citizenship by, 242-244.

discriminations in, 264.

NAVIGABLE WATERS,

bridges, dams, and ferries over, 74.

NAVIGATION,

regulated by Congress, 65, 67, 69.

NAVY,

Congress may provide and .maintain, 88.

NECESSITY,

underlies the law of eminent domain, 332, 336.

NEW STATES,

how admitted to the Union, 169-177.

NEWSPAPERS,

privileges of, 272-282.

NOBILITY,

titles of, not to be granted, 99, 198.

N.
NATION,
definition of, 20.
balanced against States, 142-144.
NATIONAL BANKS,
power to create, 93.
taxation of, 61.
NATIONS, LAW OF,
what it is, 21.
rules of comity by, 178-193.
NATURAL LIBERTY,
meaning of, 226.
NATURALIZATION,
power over, 77, 78.
citizenship by, 242-244.
discriminations in, 264.
NAVIGABLE WATERS,
bridges, dams, and ferries over, 74.
NAVIGATION,
regulated by Congress, 65, 67, 69.
NAVY,
Congress may provide and .maintain, 88.
NECESSITY,
underlies the law of eminent domain, 332, 336.
NEW STATES,
how admitted to the Union, 169-177.
NEWSPAPERS,
privileges of, 272-282.
NOBILITY,
titles of, not to be granted, 99, 198.

367

INDEX.

INDEX.

O.

OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS, .

o.

States not to impair, 300-314.

OFFICE,

appointment to, not a contract, 303.

OFFICERS,

OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,

•

appointment and removal of, 104.

liability of, to suits, 155, 156.

ORDINANCE OF 1787,

references to, 214, 218.

P.

PAPERS,

private, security of, 208.

PARDONS,

power to grant, 101, 102, 159.

PARLIAMENT,

control of Colonies by, 4-6.

sovereign powers of, 22, 23.

States not to impair, 300-314.

OFFICE,
appointment to, not a contract, 303.

OFFICERS,
appointment and removal of, 104.
liability of, to suits, 155, 156.
ORDINANCE OF 1787,
references to, 214, 218.

PASSENGERS.

(See Common Carriers.)

P.

PATENTS,

power to grant, 84.
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PEACE AND WAR.

(See Treaty, War.)

PENALTIES,

legislative release of, 327.

PEOPLE, THE,

sovereignty reposes in, 23.

meaning of, 267.

PERSONAL LIBERTY.

(See Habeas Corpus.)

PETITION, RIGHT OF,

PAPERS,
private, security of, 208.

PARDONS,
power to grant, 101, 102, 159.

PARLIAMENT,
control of Colonies by, 4-6.
sovereign powers of, 22, 23.

meaning and extent of, 267-270.

PETITION OF RIGHT,

PASSENGERS.
(See

provisions of, 7.

COMMON CARRIERS.)

PATENTS,
power to grant, 84.

PEACE AND WAR.
(See

TREATY, WAR.)

PENALTIES,
legislative release of, 327.

PEOPLE, THE,
sovereignty reposes in, 23.
meaning of, 267.

PERSON AL LIBERTY.
(See

HABEAS CORPUS.)

PETITION, RIGHT OF,
meaning and extent of, 267-270.

PETITION OF RIGHT,
provisions of, 7.

868

368

INDEX.

INDEX.

POLICE POWER,

belongs to the States, 67, 68, 73.

meaning of, 227.

monopolies under, 73, 235.

regulations of, affecting commerce, 70, 72.

general regulations under, 227-236, 308-311.

POLITICAL LIBERTY,

meaning of, 226.

POLICE POWER,
belongs to the States, 67, 68, 78.
meaning of, 227.
monopolies under, 78, 235.
regulations of, affecting commerce, 70, 72.
general regulations under, 227-236, 808-311.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS,

courts cannot determine, 138, 198.

POLITICAL RIGHTS,

POLITICAL LIBERTY,
meaning of, 226.

citizenship, 241-248, 264.

suffrage and elections, 248-267.

right of assembly and petition, 267-270.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS,
courts cannot determine, 138, 198.

right to keep and bear arms, 270-272.

freedom of speech and of the press, 272-282.

POST-OFFICES AND POST-ROADS,

power to establish, 83, 84.

POWERS OF GOVERNMENT,

distribution of, 43.

PRESENTS,
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what not to be accepted by officers, &c, 99.

PRESIDENT,

election of, 51.

general powers of,\100-106.

veto power of, 50, 105, 159-163.

compensation of, 106.

independence of, 107.

subject to impeachment, 159.

PRESS, LIBERTY OF,

meaning of the, 272-274, 282.

privileged cases, 276-280.

truth as a protection, 280, 281.

jury the judges of the law, 281.

PRICES,

regulation of, 334, 335.

PRIVATE PURPOSES,

taxes not to be laid for, 51-60.

property not to be taken for, 334-336.

POLITICAL RIGHTS,
citizenship, 241-248, 264.
suffrage and elections, 248-267.
right of assembly and petition, 267-270.
right to keep and bear arms, 270-272.
freed?m of speech and of the press, 272-282.

POST-OFFICES AND POST-ROADS,
power to establish, 83, 84.

POWERS OF GOVERNMENT,
distribution of, 43.

PRESENTS,
what not to be accepted by officers, &c., 99.

PRESIDENT,
election of, 51.
general powers of,,100-106.
veto power of, 50, 105, 159-163.
compensation of, 106.
independence of, 107.
subject to impeachment, 159.

PRESS, LIBERTY OF,
meaning of the, 272-274, 282.
privileged cases, 276-280.
truth as a protection, 280, 281.
jury the judges of the law, 281.

PRICES,
regulation of, 334, 835.

PRIVATE PURPOSES,
taxes not to be laid for, 51-60.
property not fu be taken for, 834-336.

INDEX.

PRIVILEGED PUBLICATIONS,

INDEX.

what are, 275-280.

PRIVILEGES,

of members of Congress, 49, 276.

of citizens of the States, 187-189.

of citizens of the United States, 245-248.

exclusive, 67, 69, 73, 84, 235, 306, 337.

PROCESS,

constructive service of, 186.

PROPERTY,

right to acquire, 187.

protection of, 314-342.

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS,

their place in the government, 343-345.

not subject to taxation, 61.

PUBLIC DEBT,

constitutional provisions respecting, 63, 64.

PUBLIC DOMAIN,

control of, 167.

PUBLIC GRANTS,

cannot be recalled or impaired, 301-314.

strict construction of, 306.
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PUBLIC PURPOSES,

what will support taxation, 57-60.

taking property for, 331-342.

PUBLIC SECURITIES,

counterfeiting, 83.

PUNISHMENTS,

legislative, forbidden, 283-287.

for crimes in general, 296-298.

for contempts of authority, 298.

Q-

QUALIFICATIONS,

of electors, 251, 262-264.

want of, in candidates, 257.

QUARANTINE,

right to establish regulations of, 74.

QUARTERING SOLDIERS. (See Soldiers.)

24

PRIVILEGED PUBLICATIONS,
what are, 27 5-280.
PRIVILEGES,
of members of Congre8s, 49, 276.
of citizens of the States, 187-189.
of citizens of the United States, 245-248.
exclusive, 67, 69, 73, 84, 235, 306, 337.
PROCESS,
constructive service of, 186.
PROPERTY,
right to acquire, 187.
protection of, 314-342.
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS,
their place in the government, 343-345.
not subject to taxation, 61.
PUBLIC DEBT,
constitutional provisions respecting, 63, 64.
PUBLIC DOMAIN,
control of, 167.
PUBLIC GRANTS,
cannot be recalled or impaired, 301-314.
strict construction of, 306.
PUBLIC PURPOSES,
what will support taxation, 57-60.
taking property for, 331-342.
PUBLIC SECURITIES,
counterfeiting, 83.
PUNISHMENTS,
legislative, forbidden, 283-287.
for crimes in general, 296-298.
for contempts of authority, 298.

Q.

QUALIFICATIONS,
of electors, 251, 262-264.
want of, in candidates, 257.
QUARANTINE,
right to establish regulations of, 74.
QUARTERING SOLDIERS. (See SOLDIERS.)
24

369

870

370

INDEX.

INDEX.

R.

RACE,

not to disqualify from voting, 267.

as affecting naturalization, 264.

RAILROADS,

regulation of communication by, 65, 73, 232-235.

taxes on freight carried by, 70.

bridges for, 70.

taking lands for, 334, 335.

protection of charters of, 308-311.

regulation of fares on, 234.

REBELLIONS,

protection against, 198.

RECONSTRUCTION,

of States, 172, 173, 197.

RECORDS,

of one State to be respected in the others, 183-187.

REGISTRATION,

of voters, 252.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,

protection of, 205-208.
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REMEDIES,

for wrongs, State control of, 327-330.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES,

to federal courts, 122-128.

REPEAL OF CHARTERS,

when lawful, 308, 343.

REPRESENTATIVES,

instruction of, 41, 42.

apportionment and election of, 46-48.

qualification of, 46, 50.

privileges of, 49, 276.

REPRIEVES,

power to grant, 101.

REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT,

guaranty of, to the States, 194-198.

R.
RACE,
not to disqualify from voting, 267.
as affecting naturalization, 264.
RAILROADS,
regulation of communication by, 65, 73, 232-235.
taxes on freight carried by, 70.
bridges for, 70.
taking lands for, 334, 335.
protection of charters of, 308-311.
regulation of fares on, 234.
REBELLIONS.
protection against, 198.
RECONSTRUCTION,
of States, 172, 173, 197.
RECORDS,
of one State to be respected fo the others, 183-187.
REGISTRATION,
of voters, 252.
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
protection of, 205-208.
REMEDIES,
for wrongs, State control of, 327-330.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES,
to federal courts, 122-128.
REPEAL OF CHARTERS,
when lawful, 308, 343.
REPRESENTATIVES,
instruction of, 41, 42.
apportionment and election of, 46-48.
qualification of, 46, 50.
privileges of, 49, 27 6.
REPRIEVES,
power to grant, 101.
REPUBLIC-AN GOVERNMENT,
guaranty of, to the States, 194-198.

INDEX

INDEX.

RESERVED RIGHTS,

what are, 35, 36.

RESOLUTIONS OF '98 AND '99.

what they were, 95, 96.

RETROACTIVE LAWS,

in criminal matters forbidden, 285-287.

in civil matters, 322-328.

REVENUE, FEDERAL,

provisions for raising, 50, 54-63.

REVOLUTION,

right of, 25, 26.

American, 3-11.

RIGHTS,

English bill of, 7, 17.

reserved by the Constitution, 35.

ROADS,

providing for, 339, 340, 345.

S.

SCHOOLS,

rights in, 230.

SEARCH-WARRANTS,

issue and execution of, 210-213.
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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,

unreasonable, forbidden, 208-213.

in the Colonies, 9.

SECEDED STATES,

not out of the Union, 27-29.

RESERVED RIGHTS,
what are, 35, 36.
RESOLUTIONS OF '98 AND '99.
what they were, 95, 96.
RETROACTIVE LAWS,
in criminal matters forbidden, 285-287.
in civil matters, 322-328.
REVENUE, FEDERAL,
provisions for raising, 50, 54-63.
REVOLUTION,
right of, 25, 26.
American, 3-11.
RIGHTS,
English bill of, 7, 17.
reserved by the Constitution, 35.
ROADS,
providing for, 339, 340, 345.

how restored to representation, 172, 173.

SECRECY, .

right to, in elections, 252.

SEDITION LAWS,

provisions of, 94.

SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS,

of constitutions, what are, 220, 221, 247.

SELF-GOVERNMENT, LOCAL,

rules respecting, 343-345.

s.

SCHOOLS,
rights in, 230.
SEARCH-,VARRANTS,
issue and execution of, 210-213.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,
unreasonable, forbidden, 208-213.
in the Colonies, 9.
SECEDED STATES,
not out of the Union, 27-29.
how restored to representation, 172, 173.
SECRECY, •
right to, in elections, 252.
SEDITION LAWS,
provisions of, 94.
SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS,
of constitutions, what are, 220, 221, 247.
SELF-GOVERNMENT, LOCAL,
rules respecting, 343-345.

371

372

372

INDEX.

INDEX.

SENATE, FEDERAL,

constitutional provisions respecting, 46-50.

SEPARATION,

of powers of government, 43.

SERVITUDE.

(See Slavery.)

SLANDER,

rules of liability for, 271-282.

SLAVE-TRADE,

prohibition of, 90.

SLAVERY,

abolished, 213-221.

SOLDIERS,

quartering of, on the people, 208, 209.

(See Army; Military, Militia.)

SOVEREIGN POWERS,

what are, 20, 21.

in the Colonies before the Revolution, 3.

in the States, 16, 17.

apportionment of, in the United States, 21, 22.

SOVEREIGN STATE,

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

what is, 20.

SPECIAL PRIVILEGES,

strict construction of, 306.

appropriation of, to public uses, 337.

SPEECH, FREEDOM OF,

meaning and extent of, 271-282.

SPEEDY TRIAL,

right to, 293.

STAMP ACT,

repeal of, 5.

STANDING ARMIES,

objectionable, 8, 271.

STATE,

meaning of, 20.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS,

how formed and accepted, 169-177.

must not conflict with federal powers, 32.

SEN ATE, FEDERAL,
constitutional provisions respecting, 46-50.
SEPARATION,
of powers of government, 43.
SERVITUDE.
(See SLAVERY.)
SLANDER,
rules of liability for, 271-282.
SLAVE-TRADE,
prohibition of, 00.
SLAVERY,
abolished, 213-221.
SOLDIERS,
quartering of, on the people, 208, 209.
(See ARMY; MILITARY, MILITIA.)
SOVEREIGN POWERS,
what are, 20, 21. .
in the Colonies before the Revolution, 3.
in the States, 16, 17.
apportionment of, in the United States, 21, 22.
SOVEREIGN STATE,
what is, 20.
SPECIAL PRIVILEGES,
strict construction of, 306.
appropriation of, to public uses, 337.
SPEECH, FREEDOM OF,
meaning and extent of, 27.1 -282.
SPEEDY TRIAL,
right to, 293.
STAMP ACT,
repeal of, 5.
STANDING ARMIES,
objectionable, 8, 271.
STATE,
meaning of, 20.
STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
how formed and accepted, 169-177.
must not conflict with federal powers, 32.

INDEX.

INDEX.

STATE LAW,

when federal courts administer, 130-133.

STATE EIGHTS,

what are, 33-35.

STATE LAW,
when federal courts administer, 130-133.

STATES OF THE UNION,

how formed and admitted, 169-177.

STATE RIGHTS,

may not withdraw, 27, 28.

are indestructible, 29.

what are, 33-35.

subordination of, as to federal powers, 32.

powers of, when concurrent with federal, 35, 69, 74.

are exempt from federal taxation, 60.

may not tax national agencies, 60-62.

power of, over legal tender, 79-82.

may not emit bills of credit, 81, 82.

suits by and against in federal courts, 117-119.

balanced against the Union, 142-144. /

division of, 173, 174.

guaranty of republican government to, 194-198.

protection of, against rebellion and invasion, 198.

conflicting claims to government of, 197.

citizenship in, 244,245.

privileges of citizens of, 187-189.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:45 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015003654012
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

not to pass bills of attainder, 283.

nor ex post facto laws, 285.

nor enter into treaty, &c., 89.

nor impair contracts, 303-313.

police powers of, 67, 73, 227-236, 308-311.

power of, in matters of war, 89.

may pass retroactive laws, 322-327.

may take property for public uses, 331-342.

rules of comity between, 178-198.

STATUTORY PRIVILEGES,

strict construction of, 306.

may be taken away, 303.

STAY LAWS,

when invalid, 311.

SUFFRAGE,

sometimes given to aliens, 77, 78.

general rules respecting, 237, 248-252.

STATES OF THE UNION,
how formed and admitted, 169-177.
may not withdraw, 27, 28.
are indestructible, 29.
subordination of, as to federal powers, 32.
powers of, when concurrent with federal, 35, 69, 74.
are exempt from federal taxation, 60.
may not tax national agencies, 60-62.
power of, over legal tender, 79-82.
may not emit bills of credit, 81, 82.
suits by and against in federal courts, 117-119.
balanced against the Union, 142-144.
division of, 173, 174.
guaranty of republican government to, 194-198.
protection of, against rebellion and invasion, 198.
conflicting claims to government of, 197.
citizenship in, 244, 245.
privileges of citizens of, 187-189.
not to pass bills of attainder, 283.
nor ex post facto laws, 285.
nor enter into treaty, &c., 89.
nor impair contracts, 303-313.
police powers of, 61, 73, 227-236, 308-311.
power of, in matters of war, 89.
may pass retroactive laws, 322-327.
may take property for public uses, 331-342.
rules of comity between, 178-198.

STATUTORY PRIVILEGES,
strict construction of, 306.
may be taken away, 303.

STAY LA'WS,
when invalid, 811.

SUFFRAGE,
sometimes given to aliens, 77, 78.
general rules respecting, 237, 248-252.
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INDEX.

INDEX

SUMPTUARY LAWS,

illegal, 236.

SUNDAY,

laws for observance of, 207.

SUPREME COURT, FEDERAL,

creation of, 52.

jurisdiction, 111, 112, 130.

SUPREME LAWS,

what are, 31-33.

SURRENDER OF OFFENDERS,

as between the States, 189-193.

T.

TAKING OF PROPERTY.

(See Eminent Domain.)

TAXATION,

in the Colonies, 5.

SUMPTUARY LAWS,
illegal, 236.
SUNDAY,
laws for observance of, 207.
SUPREME COURT, FEDERAL,
creation of, 52.
jurisdiction, 111, 112, 130.
SUPREME LAWS,
what are, 31-33.
SURRENDER OF OFFENDERS,
as between the States, 189-193.

by Congress, 54-56, 62.

of government agencies, 60-62.

discriminations in, 187-189.

of commerce by the States, 69-71, 246.

T.

in violation of contracts, 305.
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curing irregular, 326, 327.

TELEGRAPHIC CORRESPONDENCE,

regulation of, by Congress, 65.

TERRITORIES,

constitution not made for, 36.

dependence of, 36, 37.

courts of, 52, 53, 136,168.

government of, 164-168.

TITLES OF NOBILITY,

prohibited, 99, 198.

TONNAGE DUTIES,

States not to levy, 76.

TRADE-MARKS,

exclusive rights in, 84.

TREASON,

definition and punishment of, 91, 287, 288.

TAKING OF PROPERTY.
(See EMINENT DOMAIN.)
TAXATION,
in the Colonies, 5.
by Congress, 54-56, 62.
of government agencies, 60-62.
discriminations in, 187-189.
of commerce by the States, 69-71, 246.
in violation of contracts, 305.
curing irregular, 326, 327.
TELEGRAPHIC CORRESPONDENCE,
regulation of, by Congress, 65~
TERRITORIES,
constitution not made for, 36.
dependence of, 36, 37.
courts of, 52, 53, 136, 168.
government of, 164-168.
TITLES OF NOBILITY,
prohibited, 99, 198.
TONN AGE DUTIES,
States not to levy, 76.
TRADE-MARKS,
exclusive rights in, 84.
TREASON,
definition and punishment of, 91, 287, 288.

INDEX

375

INDEX.

TREATIES,

supreme authority of, 31-33, 103.

power to make, 103, 156.

TRIAL,

general right to, 223-225.

by jury in civil cases, 237-240.

in criminal cases, 8, 292-298.

TRUSTS,

governmental, 23, 303.

TWICE IN JEOPARDY,

accused parties not to be put in, 296-298.

U.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAWS,

what are, 24.

how and when set aside, 144-155.

UNITED STATES,

how formed, 10, 25, 27.

TREATIES,
supreme authority of, 31-33, 103.
power to make, 103, 156.
TRIAL,
general right to, 223-225.
by jury in civil cases, 237-240.
in criminal cases, 8, 292-298.
TRUSTS,
governmental, 23, 303.
TWICE IN JEOPARDY,
accused parties not to be put in, 296-298.

union of, indissoluble, 28.

suits by and against, 116.

(See Congress.)

UNREASONABLE,

u.

bail. (See Bail.)

V.
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searches, &c. (See Searches and Seizures.)

VACANCIES,

in Congress, how filled, 46, 47.

in the presidency, 51.

in federal offices, 104.

VALIDATING CONTRACTS.

(See Curative Laws.)

VESTED RIGHTS,

may not be taken away, 319-322.

VETO POWER,

exercise of, 50, 105, 159-163.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAWS,
what are, 24.
how and when set aside, 144-155.
UNITED STATES,
how formed, 10, 25, 27.
union of, indissoluble, 28.
suits by and against, 116.
(See CONGRESS.)
UNREASON ABLE,
bail. (See BAIL.)
\
searches, &c. (See SEARCHES AND

SEIZURES.)

v.
VACANCIES,
in Congress, how filled, 46, 47.
in the presidency, 51.
in federal offices, 104.
VALIDATING CONTRACTS.
(See CURATIVE LAws.)
VESTED RIGHTS,
may not be taken away, 319-322.
VETO PO\VER,
exercise of, 50, 105, 159-163.

376 INDEX.

376

INDEX.

VICE-PRESIDENT,

constitutional provisions respecting, 47, 51.

VOID STATUTES.

(See Unconstitutional Laws.)

VICE-PRESIDENT,
constitutional provisions respecting, 47, 51.

VOTERS.

(See Elections.)

VOID STATUTES.
(See

W.

WAR,

Congress may declare and conduct, 86-90.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAWS.)

VOTERS.
(See

WARRANTS,

ELECTIONS.)

for searches, 209-213.

arrests without, 213.

w.

WATER-COURSES,

general regulation of, 74.

exclusive privileges in, 67, 69.

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES,

Congress to fix standards of, 82.

WAR,
Congress may declare and conduct, 86-90.

WORKS OF ART,

exclusive rights in, 84.

WRITS OF ASSISTANCE,

illegality of, 213.
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University Press, Cambridge: John Wilson and Sort.

WARRANTS,
for searches, 209-213.
arrests without, 213.

WATER-COURSES,
general regulation of, 74.
exclusive privileges in, 67, 69. ·

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES,
Congress to fix standards of, 82.
WORKS OF ART,
exclqsive rights in, 84.

WRITS OF ASSISTANCE,
illegality of, 213.

University Press, Uambridge: John Wilson and Son.
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